ENGINEER'S OFFICE, DEPT. OF VA. AND N. CAROLINA, November 21, 1864.
Bvt. Major General J. G. BARNARD,
Chief Engineer, Armies in the Field, Va.:
GENERAL: I have the honor to report that your communication reached me late last night and beg leave to submit the following, viz:
In the event of the withdrawal of the Army of he James from its present position for operations elsewhere there will arise two cases. In both cases it will be necessary to hold the bridge-head at Deep Bottom, to insure us the navigation of the James River as far as Aiken's Landing, and the position at Cox's Hill (Fort Brady) for the advantages that will accrue to us from the probable success of Dutch Gap Canal. For these works it will require, I think, not less than 800 men for Deep Bottom and 300 men for Fort Brady in addition to their artillery, which garrisons might be reduced one-third in case they were garrisoned by excellent men with Spencer rifles.
1st. Complete evacuation. In this event it may safely be concluded that no future movement can again be made north of the James, allowing the enemy to possess the least common sense. For having shown them their mistakes previous to the present operations they will begin at once to shut up the avenues of approach on all their main roads. Occupying Camp Holly and Signal Hill with one or two strong redoubts, they will seal up the Darbytown, Long Bridge, and New Market roads, and their holding Fort Harrison will close the Varina road to us ever after. All other roads require such long flank marches to gain as to make the possibility of any future advance on this side entirely out of the question. Under these circumstances I do not think it advisable to waste labor on the destruction of any part of our present line.
2nd. Partial evacuation. This will require a force of not less than 2,500 men under excellent officers. This is a very small estimate indeed, and may be too small, but acting always on the defensive-300 men at Signal Hill, 500 at Camp Holly, 200 in the redoubt at Four-Mile Creek, 300 at Fort Brady, and the remainder distributed in the redoubts and batteries of the new line in front of Deep Bottom, could resist any determined attack, if not greater than the usual disproportionate force attacking earth-works. This arrangement it will be seen requires 1,400 men more than the first, and it is for higher authority to decide whether the advantages it gives are worth the men. The enemy may simply content themselves with occupying their old lines, throwing out a picket to watch or movements, or may select a new line below Four-Mile Church if unable to get us out of our redoubts. In regard to the present disposition of our present line in this case, I agree with you that that portion from Fort Brady to Fort Harrison need not be disturbed. The enemy will not occupy it, since their old line will be better suited for their purposes. The destruction of the gorge of the latter is advisable and could be imperfectly done at night by 500 men. You will have noticed that its command is very slight, not more than five feet above the crest of the hill, but the parapet makes up in thickness. The traverse that runs through it could be used by them as a front, however, and we could not destroy it without awakening their suspicions. From Fort Harrison to the left redoubt on the Tenth Corps front (5) no labor need be expended. There are three good strong redoubts (5, 4 and 3) on this front whose gorges should be destroyed quietly by the regiments nearest them the night before leaving, and completed the day following. If this is done effectually it will necessitate them either to advance a front and two faces to each work or throw up anew its old gorge for a front and retire the curtains to the rear (our present front). They will probably connect with Redoubt Numbers 3, where our line turns with their at present abandoned line, leaving that portion of ours running south standing, or will destroy it.
Redoubts (1 and 2) on the New Market road should be destroyed and the woods slashed near the Kingsland road, as indicated in the tracing. I should like to be informed at least four days, if possible, before the contemplated movement. I would destroy the gorges the night before, finishing the following day with small detachments. I would call on the regiments that are close at hand to furnish the working parties, and I think I could manage so that no information could be gained as to the object of the work. With regard to bomb-proofs in the works, I think Fort Brady is the only one that needs them, and this work has one ninety feet long. All have capacious magazines and those on Camp Holly and Signal Hill contain wells sufficient to supply their garrisons. There is so much slashing necessary that I shall direct it to commence to-morrow in any case. With regard to your suggestions about the mines in the embankment of Dutch Gap Canal, I am sensible that your plan will be the most certain of success, and therefore I have this afternoon directed such changes to be made as circumstances will allow. I forward to your also a tracing of the Bermuda front. The weather has been so unfavorable since the receipt of your communication that nothing additional could be learned in regard to the enemy's line. I have myself been as near as one could go with safety some two months ago, and judge the following to be their general character: The accompanying tracing shows the line as it was hurriedly surveyed on the 16th of June during its temporary evacuation by the enemy. From the best information in our possession there are two lines of abatis, and in some places through the woods in front of our right another of fraise or wire, or both, in front of the line. The parapet is not formidable, but of the same character as that we now occupy. The ditch is not deep in front of infantry parapets. On the line in front of the open space eleven embrasures can be counted, and to the left (our right), just behind the woods, is a battery of six guns, formerly. The line is regarded as impregnable by them, but I think they may posses too great confidence, for it may be pierced by first rate troops, although with a heavy loss. The advantages, if successful, however, would more than repay whatever loss we might sustain. The attacking force should be well supported, as a heavy force of the enemy could soon be bright to the point of attack. A good line of defense could be made with its right resting at the Howlett house and crossing the railroad north of the Port Walthall Junction, so as to command both railroad and the turnpike; then refusing the left and resting on Bake-House Creek. This line could be made defensible in twelve hours after occupation, and would not be more than four miles long. The recent capture of a portion of our picket-line by the enemy in front of Redoubt McConihe may interfere with secrecy, as they now have a view of open ground behind the woods.
Very respectfully, & c.,
PETER S. MICHIE,
Lieutenant, U. S. Engineers, Brevet Major, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer.
FORT BRADY, VA., January 1, 1865.
Bvt. Brigadier General H. L. ABBOT,
Commanding Siege Artillery:
GENERAL: I have the honor to report no firing. The mine at Dutch Gap Canal was exploded at precisely 4 p. m. to-day. There was no perceptible shock and but little noise; should not have noticed it had I been looking in another direction. Not a ripple in the river was created at this distance. Am fearful that the experiment has proved a failure; have no positive information with regard to it, however. General Butler and staff, and Senator Clark, of New Hampshire, were here to witness the event.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. H. PIERCE,
Captain, First Connecticut Artillery.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE JAMES,
January 15, 1865. (Via Fort Monroe 16th.)
Major General B. F. BUTLER,
Fort Monroe, Va.:
GENERAL: I have the honor to forward you by telegraph the sounding at low tide on the centre line of the Dutch Gap Canal, taken at 1 p.m. this day. Commencing at 15 feet depth in the river at lower end of canal, and sounding at intervals of 18 feet to 15 feet depth of water in the river at upper end of canal, I find 15, 12, 11, 12, 10, 10 1/2, 9 1/2, 9, 10, 9 1/2, 9, 9, 9 1/4, 9, 7 1/2, 6, 6, 5, 5, 4, 3 1/2, 3 1/2, 3 1/2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2 1/2, 3, 3 1/2, 4, 4 1/2, 5, 7, 10, 15. Add 31/2 feet to all these sounding for depth at daily high tide, and 8 feet for depth at highest water during recent freshest in James River. One hundred and fifty feet of the shallowest part is, at low tide, 53 feet wide on surface of water in narrowest place.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
L. L. BUCKLAND,
First Lieutenant, First Engrs. New York State Vols., Actg. Asst. Engr.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE JAMES,
January 17, 1865.
Lieutenant-General GRANT:
Shall I discontinue work on Dutch Gap? The commodore of the river flotilla has stated to me that he would not attempt to go through the canal, if completed, until the battery now commanding it and the river above are captured. The freshest has washed in a quantity of earth from the banks, and the amount of labor to clear out the canal is reported by the engineer to be still very large and the labor very dangerous.
E. O. C. ORD,
Major-General.
CITY POINT, VA., January 17, 1865.
Major-General ORD:
You may stop work on the Dutch Gap Canal.
By command of Lieutenant-General Grant:
T. S. BOWERS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. DEPT. OF VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA,
CHIEF ENGINEER'S OFFICE,
January 18, 1865.
GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of engineering operations for the week ending January 14:
It having been observed that the enemy was engaged in throwing up small detached works in front of Fort Burnham, I examined the same from our picket-line and found them to be small splinter-proof huts, evidently designed for the twofold purpose of keeping their pickets warm and affording cover for sharpshooters. This idea was confirmed by the report of deserters, who stated that sharpshooting would be commenced by the enemy as soon as these works were completed. I therefore directed Captain Parsons, First New York Volunteer Engineers, chief engineer Twenty-fifth Army Corps, to strengthen our picket-line by connecting the detached rifle-pits and providing loop-holes for our own sharpshooters. The work has been completed, and Captain Parsons has also done considerable work in repairing and extending corduroy roads.
The work in the Twenty-fourth Corps consisted chiefly in repairing roads. The recent freshens and rainy weather have retarded considerably the work on the permanent bridge across the James River, but it is now progressing favorably. Lieutenant Trenor has been engaged in completing the new line on the Bermuda front. Profesor Maillefert has continued his blasting operations at Dutch Gap, and has succeeded in getting a channel two feet deep at low tide. This during the recent freshens was ten feet deep in the shoalest place.
I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. R. KING,
First Lieutenant of Engineers, Acting Chief Engineer
Department of Virginia and North Carolina.
Bvt. Major General J. G. BARNARD,
Chief Engineer Combined Armies of Virginia.
WASHINGTON, D. C., February 20, 1865.
Major P. S. MICHIE,
Chief Engineer, Headquarters Army of the James:
Telegraph me at once the exact condition of the Dutch Gap Canal, as to depth of water which can be carried through, and nature of impediments and amount of works, and of what kind, necessary to make it available; and also write giving all particulars of its width, depth, and condition; state also the number of guns, and what caliber, bearing on in and the river above.
J. G. BARNARD,
Brevet Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE JAMES,
February 20, 1865. (received 9.20 p. m.)
Major-General BARNARD:
The sounding at low tide on center line, beginning at lower mouth, are 12 feet, 8 1\2, 9, 9, 9, 6, 5, and 3, the distance between the sounding being 60 feet. This brings it up to within 50 feet of the upper mouth. In this latter space it average 3 feet, being filled with large lumps of hard blue clay. It deepens rapidly to 15 in 60 feet of distance from the upper month toward the river. The sounding of cross-section at every 70 feet, commencing at the lower mouth, are as follows: No 1.- 4, 9, 12, 12, 12, 10, 4; Numbers 2-4, 9, 12, 12, 11, 10, 4; No 3-4, 8, 9, 9 1\2, 9 1\2, 9 1\2, 8, 4; Numbers 4-4, 5, 6 1\2, 10, 7, 4; No 5-4, 5, 5, 6, 7 1\2, 7, 4; No 6-4, 4, 3, 7, 4, 3, 6, 4; Numbers 7-average of 3 feet; Numbers 8-average of 4 feet; the sounding at low-water mark, For high water add 3 feet to the above. The canal is from 55 to 60 feet wide at water-line, and about 500 feet long. There is from 5,000 to 7,000 cubic yards to be removed, to give 15 feet deep at high water. From 3,000 to 4,500 cubic yards is of hard blue clay, in lumps; it can only be removed by good dredges. The time of completing it depends on the capacity of the dredges. Those we had will not do good service; they are all old and worn out. Trowbridge might procure good ones in New York. They should be protected from direct firing, if possible, or run the risk of being destroyed and sunk. They might work at night, and remove a good portion of the stuff. Torpedoes will not, in my opinion, clear the channel. There is no rebel battery which enfilades the canal on that line of works that commands the upper mouth. Fourteen guns are mounted; distance, 2,800 yards from the mouth. I know of only the following armament of that line and the works above: Commencing at the right of Howlett's house is Battery Wood-one 8-inch rifle and two10-inch columbiads, with four light pieces of artillery; Battery Semmes, near Bishop's-one rifle, 8-inch, and two 10-inch columbiads, and another gun, reported to be mounted, caliber unknown; Battery Brooke, opposite grave-yard-one 7-inch rifle and two 10-inch columbiads, and two others reported going up between this point and Fort Darling. There are probably six more heavy guns from the appearance of the line, but they are not visible.
PETER S. MICHIE,
Major, Chief Engineer.
IN THE ARMY OF THE JAMES.
Station at Fort Pocahontas, communicating with one at Forth Powhatan, on James River, seven miles distant; stations at general headquarters, Cobb's Hill tower, Battery Anderson (or Numbers 3), General Carr's headquarters, Hatcher's house (headquarters Eighteenth Corps), Water Battery (or Spofford's), Dutch Gap, and flag-ship Onondaga, forming a line of signals around the front of the intrenchments between the general commanding, the officer commanding Eighteenth Corps, the commander of the James River flotilla, and Major Ludlow's working party at Dutch Gap; station of observation at Crow's Nest, James River, communicating with flag-ship Onondaga and Dutch Gap. Station at General Graham's headquarters, near pontoon bridge, communicating with general headquarters through the Cobb's Hill tower; station of observation at river-bank, Spring Hill, communicating with Cobb's Hill tower, and through the latter with general headquarters Tenth Corps, in front of Petersburg, communicating with station of observation (officers watching enemy's movements) at Avery's house and Friend's house.
A map is herewith inclosed showing by the signal flags placed upon it where the stations now in operation are located, and by deterred red lines those with which they communicated. In reviewing the operations of the signal detachment in this department for the four months and a half herein recorded, I find that seventy signal stations were established and operated, and of those twenty-seven were worked under the fire of the enemy, and twenty-four still remain in operation. Of the importance of the information of the enemy's movements given by the detachment, and of the information of the enemy's movements given by the detachment, and of its other labors, the commanding general, of course, is best able to judge. Although nearly all of our signal officers and flagmen have been freely exposed to the severest fire of the enemy in the performance of their various duties, I am happy to be able to state that the casualties have been small; we have lost but 1 officer and 2 men killed, and 2 men were slightly wounded.
All of the officers of the detachment have performed their duties to my entire satisfaction, but the following are especially mentioned as having made them conspicuous for gallantry, uncommon zeal, and close attention to duty, viz: First Lieutenant H. W. Benson, signal officer on the flag-ship of the James River flotilla, frequently under fire. First Lieutenant W. Bruyn, signal officer of the Water Battery, who remained at his post making observations of the rebel rams and directing the fire of our gun-boats upon them, himself under a severe cross-fire from the roams and the Howlett and Signal Hill batteries. First Lieutenant C. F. Cross, signal officer at Dutch Gap, who maintained constant communication with the gun boats and the Water Battery during the severe fire of the enemy upon Dutch Gap, August 13, 1864. His flagman was wounded by his side. Second Lieutenant O. B. Ireland, signal officer at Crow's Nest, who made the important discoveries of the enemy's movement across the James, and maintained his post under severe fire from the enemy. Second Lieutenant J. M. Swain, signal officer at Fort Pocahontas (Wilson's Wharf), who directed by signal the fire of our gun-boats upon the enemy during the attack upon Wild's colored brigade and whilst he himself was under the fire of the rebels. Second Lieutenant W. W. Clemens, signal officer on the iron-clad steamer Onondage, frequently under fire. Second Lieutenant D. L. Craft, signal officer at Cobb's Hill tower, who bravely maintained his position although the enemy for several days endeavored to knock down his tower with solid shot. Second Lieutenant A. G. Simons, acting signal officer at river-bank station, Spring Hill, through whose vigilance the commanding general was furnished with information of the enemy's movements upon the railroad and turnpike.
I have the honor to be, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
L. B. NORTON,
Captain and Chief Signal Officer, Dept. of Va. and N. C.
Major R. S. DAVIS,
Asst. Adjt. General, Dept. of Virginia and North Carolina.
UNION AUTHORITIES.
Narrative from the report of Lieutenant P. S. Michie, Corps of Engineers, brevet brigadier-general of volunteers, to General Delafield, Chief Engineer U. S. Army, dated October 10, 1865.
(See plans 11 and 12.*) The Army of the James, consisting of the Tenth and Eighteenth Army Corps (and subsequently of the Twenty- fourth and Twenty-fifth), commanded by Major General B. F. Butler, occupied a defensive position across the peninsula of Bermuda Hundred on a line 6,058 yards long, its right resting on the James River about one mile below the Howlett house, and its left on the Appomattox River, on the high ground across the creek, from and on the high ground overlooking Port Walthall.
This defensive line, from its position, was unusually strong. With its flanks resting on and protected by two rivers, and its front of attack being diminished to about one-fourth of its length, because of impassable ravines, it was capable of being held by a much inferior force than the enemy were required to keep in its front. But it had also its disadvantages; for the enemy intrenched on a line approaching not nearer than 800 yards, with flanks as secure as ours, and a front made unassailable my means of all the obstacles known to field defense, and thus effectually closed to our forces there every avenue to do damage to the railroad and turnpike, which were the lines of communication to the wings of the rebel army and the avenues to their capital. The position of the two lines is given below in the sketch.
In addition to the line above described there was a strong work thrown up on Spring Hill, on the south side of the Appomattox River, just opposite Point of Rocks, and also strong works at Wilson's Wharf and Fort Powhatan, on the James River, all of which were constructed and garrisoned by detachments from this army.
These latter commanded the channel of the river at very important points, and on their occupation depended the uninterrupted supply of the "Armies operating against Richmond."
Brigadier General Godfrey Weitzel, U. S. Volunteers, captain U. S. Engineers, was the senior engineer of this army until October, 1864, but in consequence of his illness, in August, the duties of his office devolved upon General Michie.
July.-No engineering operations of any importance were carried on during this month. Attention was principally directed to strengthening the lines already laid out, in building water batteries for 100-pounder guns for the defense of Trent's Reach, and in general repairs to the line. During this month there was constant picket firing all along the front, constant surprises on the part of both forces of the picket-lines, and attempts to gain ground toward each other.
A signal tower 120 feet high was built at Point of Rocks, from the top of which could be seen the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad and turnpike. This gave us the means of obtaining a great deal of information, and must have impressed the enemy with this idea, fore they established a casemated battery of three Whitworth rifled field guns for the special purpose of firing at this tower. But one shot of all fired at it struck it, and that only splintered one of the posts without damaging the tower itself.
August.-On the 3rd of August a pontoon bridge 560 feet long was built on the Appomattox River at Broadway Landing for the passage of the Second Army Corps.
A second signal tower 126 feet high, and capable of being made 40 feet higher, was built on the right flank of the line, on the high bluff known as "Crow's Nest," James River, opposite Aiken's. From the top of this could be seen the Richmond and Petersburg turnpike and the cross-roads connecting the main roads which ran to Richmond on the north side of the James River. A lookout constantly stationed here gave information of the enemy's movements.
Major-General Butler having conceived the idea of cutting a canal across the peninsula known as Dutch Gap, to pass iron-clads and other war vessels through to avoid Trent's Reach and the Howlett Battery, and the idea receiving the warm support of the then commander of the navy in the river, a survey of the locality was made by his direction.
From the sketch given below it will be seen that the river widens from 400 feet at the Howlett house to 2,700 at Trent's Reach. As a consequence, at the latter place the channel becomes narrower and shallower, and at ordinary high water vessels drawing twelve feet ten inches of water can pass under favorable circumstances, but the channel was effectually blocked by the powerful battery (Dantzler) at the Howlett house, which had a plunging fire upon the whole channel from Trent's Reach up to within a few hundred yards of the Howlett house. This battery had also embrasures cut to look up the river, to give a fire in rear in case any vessel was successful in passing the heavy fire of its front.
The survey of Dutch Gap showed a center section line 552 feet long, from a point in the channel on the south to a point in the channel on the north, 15 feet deep. The highest point on this center line was 38.5 feet above high-water mark, and the lowest 4 feet, which was at the south mouth. On a line 60 feet from this center line, on either side, the ground rose to 42,8 feet at the north mouth, and to 11.4 feet on the south. The difference of water level was 10.1 inches, taken at extreme low tide, thus showing the natural fall of the river between these points to be 2.13 inches to the mile. To all appearances the soil offered no insuperable difficulties for excavation, although it was rumored that the James River granite, which outcropped a mile above the lower mouth and a mile and a half below, would be met with beneath the upper strata and cause a complete failure.
The strata met with were as follows, viz: Yellow Virginia brick clay for twelve feet; layer of coarse sand and gravel, two to four feet; half an inch to two inches bog-iron ore; layer of pebbles and large gravel, two feet; then hard blue clay, or hardpan, containing a large quantity of sulphured of iron or iron pyrites. This latter stratum was never exhausted, and the bottom and sides of the canal were chiseled out of this, presenting as smooth and compact a surface as if built with masonry. In round numbers, there were about 48,000 cubic yards to be excavated-the canal to be sixty feet wide at high water, forty feet wide at bottom,and fifteen feet deep.
It is a question whether this project-one of the simplest in civil engineering-would have been of any advantage other than to bring our navy a few miles farther up the river; for after it was commenced it was well known that other and nearly as powerful batteries lined both bakes of the James River, commanding almost impassable obstacles, and ready to do their share in disputing the passage to the rebel capital. And besides, it was an ascertained fact that the river was filled with torpedoes of the most delicate construction of three of our vessels in reaching the position then occupied. If any advantage could have accrued to us from this canal in a military point of view, it would be a maximum only by keeping it a profound secret.
The excavation being ordered to proceed, ground was broken on the 9th of August, and immediately thereafter the enemy began the constant annoyance with their rifle and mortar batteries, which ended only with the suspension of labor on the canal, January 1, 1865. There were thrown in the vicinity of the working parties over 20,000 shells during the whole period of the work. The canal was excavated mainly by soldiers and partly by dredges. The latter were old and almost worn out, and were worked by civilians, who did not come up to their promises, being driven off and frightened by the enemy's shells. Not more than 6,000 to 7,000 cubic yards were removed by the dredges, which were promised to remove 400 cubic yards every ten hours. They worked from the south mouth 200 feet up into the canal, where an embankment separated the part on which the soldiers were working from the lower half.
The whole canal, except an embankment at the north mouth to protect against direct firing, was excavated to the required dimensions. The soil was very favorable below high-water mark. It was the "hardpan" of miners-a hard, stiff, blue clay, perfectly impervious to and insoluble in water. Whatever leakage took place through the strata of sand and gravel was removed by a steam pump.
About the middle of December the mines which had been made in the embankment were nearly completed. This embankment was much larger than was intended to be blown out with powder, for it had been General Michie's endeavor to reduce it far below what would have been almost certain to be removed, but during his absence the water had been let into the excavated part and up to the embankment without orders. It would have required a greater amount of labor and length of time to remove it than we were warranted to use at this period.
It remained then only to do the best to blow out the mass between the water in the river and that in the canal; and the problem became to use an amount of powder large enough to remove the embankment and disturb its foundation so that it would be easy to remove afterward and, at the same time, not so much as to disturb and cave down the walls of the canal in the vicinity. Twelve thousand pounds of powder were divided among five mines-one of 4,000 and four of 2,000 each-distributed as follows: Three mines were placed at a depth of fifteen feet below high water, one of 4,000 being on the center line of the canal and thirty-five feet from the face of the embankment, and two of 2,000 each were placed on the same level ten feet on each side of the center line and twenty-five feet from the face. Two remaining were at a depot of twenty-five feet below high-water mark, or ten feet lower than the three first, and twenty feet farther out than the central mine toward the channel on the north side.
Toward the time of charging and tamping the mines the water leaked in very rapidly and the pumps were kept going night and day. The powder in the four smaller mines was in tin cans holding 125 pounds each. In the larger mine the powder was in four large rubber bags holding 800 pounds, and in the center of which was the point of fusion of this mine.
The method of exploding the mines was by means of the Gomez fuse, a quick-burning composition said to be instantaneous for distances under 100 feet. This method proved defective, and the results showed conclusively that all of the powder did not burn, and will not when ignited in the center of large mines. The effect would, in General Michie's opinion, have been several times greater if centers of fusion could have been made for every hundred pounds of powder, which can be done now with an electric apparatus. In the method used, in the center of each charge was placed the end of a length of Gomez fuse, cut at different points to allow the flame to ignite the powder in several places. This fuse was then grafted to an equal length in the same level running to the other mine. The three mines in the upper level were joined in the same way and, finally, the two lines were grafted together and joined to the end of a piece of slow-match cut to burn twenty minutes. The grafts had been tried repeatedly before being finally determined on, and had always been successful.
On exploding the mine the embankment was thrown down and a current commenced running through the canal. Excavation by means of discharging cans of powder under water deepened and widened the channel, aided by strong freshest, so that at high water six and a half feet of water is on the embankment. General Butler having been relieved from the department about this time, work was discontinued by order.
The canal at present is used by the steamer O. S. Pierce and others of that class, which save by this way about five miles and a half of travel. A few days" work to clear up the disturbed mass and to widen and deepen the north mouth would make this the usual traveled route by all vessels navigating the river. The current and tide partly flow through this way, but their action is unimportant in clearing it out, because the debris consists of large lumps of cemented gravel and hard blue clay. The above embraces all the data of interest in this much-talked-of project, and is given complete to avoid referring to it in the account of each month's labor.