MAJOR GENERAL OF THE WEST
by H. B. Disbrowe, 1971
Cromwell had discussed with Disbrowe and his other officers the poor performance of the cavalry at Edgehill. While he was fully conscious of the mistakes made by the Parliamentary side he was also aware of serious tactical errors made by the King's men. He was quick to see that the initial advantage of Rupert's furious charge, was lost through lack of discipline. They had dispersed their strength in pursuit and plundering and could not be regrouped for further action. He resolved that in his new regiment he would enlist only the best men, and would train them in tactics and obedience to command, whether by word of mouth or sound of trumpet. He described a conversation with his cousin John Hampden in which he expressed his ideas [1].
"At my first going out into this engagement [Edgehill], I saw our men were beaten at every hand. I did indeed and desired him [Hampden] that he would make some additions to my Lord Essex's army of some new regiments; and told him I would be serviceable to him in bringing in such men as I thought had a spirit that would do something in the work. Your troops, said I, are most of them old decayed serving men and tapsters, and such kind of fellows. Their troops are gentlemen's sons; younger fellows will ever be able to encounter gentlemen, they have honour and courage and resolution in them. You must get men of spirit, - that is likely to go as far as gentlemen will do, or else you will be beaten still. He was a wise and worthy person; and he did think I talked a good notion but an impracticable one. Truly I told him I could do something in it. I did so, - I raised such men as had the fear of God before them, as made some conscience of what they did, and from that day forward, - there were never beaten."
The men whom Cromwell enlisted in his regiment were selected with great care. He took only men who were known to him or his officers and they were superior both physically and in intelligence to the average cavalry trooper of the times. They were mainly young yoemen farmers, freeholders and the sons of freeholders. The officers were chosen for their ability without regard to their position in society. Several were closely related to him either by blood or marriage.
The enlistment and training of the men proceeded quickly. In March 1643 he used the regiment to supress a royalist revolt at Lowestoft. By September of the same year the regiment had grown to ten troops; eventually there were fourteen. Since a troop consisted of 60 - 100 men the full strength of the regiment varied between 840 - 1400. This was far in excess of the usual complement of a regiment of horse which ordinarily consisted of only six troops.
The regimental officers were as follows [2]:
Troop No. 1 - Colonel Oliver Cromwell, the regimental commander;
Troop No. 2 - Captain Edward Whalley, Cromwell's cousin;
Troop No. 3 - Captain John Disbrowe, Cromwell's brother-in-law, the husband of Jane Cromwell, his youngest sister;
Troop No. 4 - Captain Oliver Cromwell, the son of the regimental commander. He later died of smallpox on the eve of Marston Moor;
Troop No. 5 - Captain Valentine Walton, Cromwell's nephew, the son of his sister Margaret. He was later killed at Marston Moor;
Troop No. 6 - Captain Ayers;
Troop No. 7 - Captain Patterson;
Troop No. 8 - Captain John Grove;
Troop No. 9 - Captain Samuel Porter;
Troop No. 10 - Captain Adam Lawrence;
Troop No. 11 - Captain Swallow;
Troop No. 12 - Captain Christopher Bethell;
Troop No. 13 - Captain Ralph Margery;
Troop No. 14 - Major Ireton, second in command of the regiment. He later rose to high command and married Cromwell's daughter Bridget.
According to Sir Charles Firth, the celebrated authority on the Parliamentary army, the strength of Major John Disbrowe's troop on February 20, 1644, consisted, in addition to its commander, of one Lieutenant, one Cornet, one Quartermaster, three Corporals, one trumpeter and ninety-seven troopers.
Each trooper was equipped with body armour consisting of an iron headpiece or pot, and a back and breast which was a kind of chest armour. He was armed with a sword and a pair of pistols. In addition he was furnished with a horse. The total cost of mounting a trooper was about £10.
Paying the troops was a problem and possible only at irregular intervals, a fact which at times caused considerable discontent among the men. Money for the troops was furnished by Parliament, and to some extent, by the Eastern Association. The pay of the trooper was two shillings per day.
The regiment was put through a programme of training which raised it to a level of efficiency previously unknown in mounted troops. They learned to carry out intricate movements, to use their weapons to the best advantage, and to care for their horses and equipment. Most important of all, they were taught to charge and rally on command. The officers were made responsible for the welfare of their men. They were required to treat them fairly and to keep them well clothed and fed.
Discipline in the regiment was strictly maintained in infractions were punished with severity. Troopers guilty of swearing were fined twelvepence and for drunkenness they were confined to the stocks. More serious infractions were punished by flogging.
These methods produced a fighting force of unparalleled strength and discipline. It could mount a fierce charge and afterwards reassemble in good order; something quite new in cavalry tactics. The results were described by Clarendon [3]: "That difference was observed shortly from the beginning of the war: that though the King's troops prevailed in the charge and routed those they charged, they never rallied themselves again in order, nor could be brought to make a second charge the same day; whereas Cromwell's troops if they prevailed, or though they were beaten and routed, presently rallied again and stood in good order till they received new orders."
Notes for Chapter Three:
[1] - L. & S., speech II; also Abbott Vol. II
[2] - Firth (3), pp. 26-35
[3] - Buchan, p. 166 (quoting Clarendon)