THE MASOCHISM CAMPAIGN;
LETTER FROM LONDON |
DAVID
REMNICK. The
New Yorker. New York: May
2, 2005 |
Not long before making a series of visits to No. 10 Downing Street, I was
reading the novel that everyone in London seemed to be poring over in the cafes
and on the benches in St. James's Park--Ian McEwan's "Saturday,"
which is set on February 15, 2003, the day of the worldwide antiwar
demonstrations. The central character is a middle-aged neurosurgeon named Henry
Perowne. He is prosperous, fortunate in his wife and two children, happy, yet
haunted by the onset of middle age; and although he is not especially
political, he is pained and ambivalent about Tony Blair's support of the
American-led invasion of Iraq. At one point, Perowne recalls meeting Blair. As
a member of the Royal College of Surgeons, he'd been invited to the opening of
the Tate Modern, where he and his wife, Rosalind, were among four thousand
guests. Perowne wanders into a huge gallery and suddenly finds himself next to
Blair, who is, as ever, eager to shake hands, to forge a connection.
"I really admire the work you're doing," Blair says. "In
fact, we've got two of your paintings hanging in Downing Street. Cherie and I
adore them." Clearly, Blair has taken Perowne to be one of the Tate's
artists, and, after thinking it through, Perowne decides on honesty.
"You're making a mistake," he says.
"And, and on that word, there passed through the Prime Minister's
features for the briefest instant a look of sudden alarm, of fleeting
self-doubt," McEwan writes. "A hairline fracture had appeared in the
assurance of power."
To follow British politics these past weeks, to watch Blair campaign for a
third term--Election Day is May 5th--is to witness a politician putting himself
in the way of any audience, any camera, anyone who will have him. His aides
call it "the masochism campaign." The punishment is daily and takes
many forms. During a televised meet-the-voters session in Coventry, Blair's
declaration that he had improved the National Health Service was answered by
Mrs. Valerie Holsworth, who told him that she had so despaired of finding an
available N.H.S. dentist that she'd used her husband's pliers to yank her own
rotten teeth--four of them. As proof, she readily displayed her gums. Blair
winced in sympathy. At a Downing Street press conference, a tabloid reporter
reacted to the Government's proud announcement of a hike in the minimum wage by
asking Blair, "Would you be willing to wipe someone's bottom for this
'higher' minimum wage?" And, at a lunchtime session at No. 10 with British
journalists, I heard a reporter say that Blair had appeared on the cover of
Attitude, a magazine much like Out, which led him to ask the Prime Minister,
"Are you a gay icon?" In every case, one saw the "hairline
fracture in the assurance of power," the Halloween rictus, a practiced yet
futile attempt to mask embarrassment or anger with a smile that hopes to
project sincerity, patience, and (the essential category of pollsters)
likability.
The masochism campaign is a kind of political rope-a-dope, the idea being
that through constant exposure to Blair's kindly endurance, his lucid, if
canned, explanations, the electorate will eventually weary of its lingering
anger and distrust--primarily over Blair's unwavering support of George W.
Bush--and will come around to conceding that the Conservatives, under the forgettable
Michael Howard, have little to offer but fear-mongering on issues like
asylum-seeking immigrants from Asia and Eastern Europe, and that the
left-leaning Liberal Democrats are still a marginal party in the House of
Commons promoting, as one Blair aide airily put it, "the ideology of
bicyclists."
In a sense, after eight years of crisis and grating propinquity, Blair has
to revive the notion of his own charm. When he came to power, in 1997, as the
standard-bearer of New Labour, he ended eighteen years of Tory rule and the
distinct possibility that Labour would never head a government again. Blair did
not possess quite the glamour of a Kennedy, but, compared with his managerial
predecessor, John Major, he was positively vibrant, promising a progressive
revival as thorough as Margaret Thatcher's conservative revolution. He was just
forty-three, the youngest Prime Minister since the Napoleonic Wars. His
majority in the House of Commons was the biggest since 1935. He became the
first Labour Party premier ever to last two consecutive terms, winning votes
not just among the urban elites and the urban poor, the Labour base, but among
traditional Tory voters in the suburbs of Middle England. Now, despite a
rudderless opposition, Blair will be relieved if he wins a third term with a
less gaudy majority in the Commons than he has enjoyed. His campaign's only
anxiety is a sullen apathy among Labour voters. The Tories point to the 1970
campaign, when Harold Wilson's Labour Government held a decisive lead only to be
dumped from office by the Tory Edward Heath.
The masochism campaign is a daily operation. One morning, I stood in one of
the second-floor drawing rooms of No. 10 as a group of television technicians
set up their cameras, microphones, and lights for a taping with Little Ant and
Little Dec, two ten-year-old adorables who specialize in faux-naif celebrity
interviews for an ITV variety show called "Ant and Dec's Saturday Night
Takeaway." Little Ant and Little Dec sat jammed together into one of Downing
Street's better armchairs waiting for the Prime Minister. They wore little
black suits and their hair was pomaded. Their names are Dylan McKenna-Redshaw
and James Pallister, and they are the Mini-Mes of the show's oleaginous grownup
stars, Ant and Dec.
"Boys! Sit up straight!"
This was the voice of Georgie Herford-Jones, the show's producer.
Herford-Jones, who resembles the young Linda Evans, had complete command of her
puppies. When she barked, they straightened in the chair, and when she raised a
brow they commenced rehearsing the wiseacre questions that had been scripted
for them. The idea was to be both cute and rude, a
kids-say-the-darnedest-things routine. They'd interviewed the midfielder David
Beckham, Posh Spice's husband. "You and your wife just had your third
kid," one question went. "My dad says you must be at it like rabbits.
What does he mean?" They asked Angelina Jolie, "How big is your
mouth?" Bruce Willis was so offended by the prepubescent grilling that he
walked off the set, earning himself a couple of jabs in the tabloids.
Finally, Blair appeared, wearing no jacket but a genuine smile.
"How ya doin', boys?" he said, settling into a chair opposite
Little Ant and Little Dec.
Blair's press aides, David Hill and Hilary Coffman, stood out of camera
range and looked eager.
"Seven, eight million people watch this Saturday nights," Hill
whispered to me. "For this country, that's huge." Hill had said,
repeatedly, that Blair had to "reconnect" with the British public,
especially voters who rarely watched the news or read the papers. If some of
Blair's natural liberal constituents were staying home to protest his fealty to
Bush, he needed new, more forgiving voters. "Saturday Night Takeaway"
was the perfect forum in which to show Blair as "accessible, clear,
nice."
Little Ant and Little Dec were ready to begin.
The Prime Minister nodded distantly. Low clouds of preoccupation encased
him. Not only were the latest polls too tight for absolute comfort; the Pope
was on his deathbed and, in a few hours, Blair had a Cabinet meeting where he
would face his saturnine Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown. The closest
of comrades fifteen years ago, Blair and Brown have run the country in tandem
for eight years yet, at times, barely speak. Brown, who had hoped to lead the
Party himself, has always bridled at his sidecar position in the arrangement,
and his aides regularly leak word of his particular resentments to the
conflict-hungry press. For the duration of the campaign, and for the sake of
party comity, Blair and Brown would have to behave rather like an angrily
divorced couple who must come together on their daughter's wedding day; the
price of a spat now could be Blair's election and Brown's ambitions.
The tape rolled. The questions began:
"You run the whole country. Have you always been that bossy?"
"When your children are cheeky, do you ever say, 'How dare you speak to
the Prime Minister like that!'?"
"My dad says you've got to be mad to do your job. Are you mad?"
The biggest political story that week had been a campaign by the young
television cook Jamie Oliver, "The Naked Chef," to improve school
lunches, which are notoriously foul. Little Ant moved in.
"What were your school meals like?"
Before going up to St.
John's College, Oxford, Blair attended Fettes, a posh boarding school in
Scotland. In Britain, boarding-school food, with its rissoles fried in grease
and its wan Brussels sprouts, is no better than the rest, but, still, Blair is
rarely eager to remind anyone of Fettes and thus kept his answer vague.
"Have you actually tasted a Turkey Twizzler?" Ant persisted.
Turkey Twizzlers, a fatty processed food, had never been on Blair's menu.
Another dodge.
With each question, Blair parried in a pleasantly harrumph-ish sort of way,
but it became increasingly clear that he had been only casually briefed. In any
case, it was impossible to imagine an earlier Prime Minister--Gladstone,
Asquith, Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, Thatcher--coping with the inquisitions of
Little Ant and Little Dec. Informality was part of Blair's "American"
style--"Call me Tony," he told everyone, and everyone did--but now
the cost of informality was plain.
Then things got worse. After Blair mentioned that as a student he'd been in
a rock-and-roll band called the Ugly Rumors, Little Dec said, "When my
aunt makes a smell, she says, 'Oh, my, I think I started an ugly rumor.' Is
that where the name comes from?"
Well, no, Blair said, it comes from a Grateful Dead album that--
"If you make an ugly smell, do people pretend not to notice because you
is the Prime Minister?"
And then it came: the strained rictus, the hairline fracture . . .
Off-camera, Linda Evans beamed at her little darlings. She occasionally
asked them to repeat a flubbed question and kept gesturing for them to sit up
in their chair. Blair looked over at her, as if for a sign that this agony was
about to end.
"Why does the Labour Party have flowers as its logo? Isn't that a bit .
. . girlie?"
The grilling was over at last, but now there was an exchange of presents.
One of the boys picked up a shopping bag and handed over several gifts: a
bouquet of cheap flowers, some crummy memorabilia from the show, a pair of
panties and a pink boa for Blair's wife, Cherie.
"That's for Cherie? What can I say?"
"Say thank you," Little Dec said.
Blair looked over toward the cluster of aides. "I don't believe
this!" he said, mock indignant. "I'm not used to interviews like
this. I'll try to see who got me into this."
"Yesterday they did Ozzy Osbourne," the father of one of the boys
told me.
"How much of this will they use?" Blair asked as he wearily rose
from his chair.
"About half."
"I can think of some things to cut out," he said.
Linda Evans informed the Prime Minister that he had to film another scene.
Blair had already devoted forty-odd minutes to the Little Ones and he rolled
his eyes. And yet he obeyed. Linda Evans told him that the boys would sit on a
couch next to a telephone and that he, Blair, would suddenly enter. "You
come into the room and you say, 'Good morning, boys. Have you been looked
after?' "
Blair nodded moodily, as if he had just received a stern rebuke from the
Chancellor of the Exchequer.
We all moved to the next room for the shot. Suddenly, Cherie Blair arrived.
Someone had put Little Ant and Little Dec on her schedule, too.
"Hi, guys!" Cherie said brightly.
"This is Little Ant and Little Dec," the Prime Minister said, in
just about the same voice one might say, "These are the McCrary twins and
they have come to kidnap the children and shoot the dog."
"You're not really called Little Ant and Little Dec, are you?" she
said. "You're much cuter than the big ones."
"I was just asking them if they spent more time reading or playing on
the PlayStation," Blair said.
"I still read loads," Cherie said. "You must read. It's
really important. I love cuddling up in bed with a good book."
"Thank you, dear," the Prime Minister said. "That's what
twenty-five years of married life gets you, boys."
Cherie was told that the pink boa was for her. She fingered it and tried to
think of something clever to say. All she could manage was "Well! It's
been lovely! But I have to go do something about the Olympics!" London is
in the hunt to win the Summer Games in 2012. Then she beat it down a flight of
stairs.
"Are you jealous of the Queen?" Little Ant asked Blair.
"No. She's the Queen and I'm not."
"Really?"
This was beginning to sound like outtakes from "Krapp's Last
Tape."
"Well, she's Queen for a long time. Prime Ministers aren't," Blair
said, as he waited for a cue to leave the room and reenter. "What do you
want to do when you grow up?"
"Direct," Little Dec said.
At last, Linda Evans said, "Could I get you coming through the
door?"
"This one?" Blair asked, pointing. She nodded. He left. He came
back in, smiling. Beckett had now bowed to Feydeau.
"Hi, boys! Have you been looked after?"
Dec said, "A nice man called George Bush just called. He's bringing
pizzas . . ."
"Whoa!" Linda Evans said, waving her arms. She didn't like the
shot. "Um, could we do that once more?"
Blair squinted murderously.
"Right," he said, recovering. "So, I say . . ."
And then he went out the door once again.
A few seconds later, he came back in. The tape was rolling.
"Hi, boys. Have you been looked after?"
"A nice man called George Bush just called. He's bringing pizzas."
Then Tony Blair sighed and said, "Is he bringing one for me?"
After all that, the Prime Minister required what White House schedulers call
"a little bit of alone time." I was brought to a waiting room
downstairs. Blair lives and works in what must surely be the least commodious
headquarters of any leader of a major industrialized state. Downing Street is a
small cul-de-sac off Whitehall, and No. 10 is a large, somewhat worn,
seventeenth-century town house. (The Blairs and their four children, who range
in age from four to twenty-one, live in an apartment above No. 11. The Browns
are next door. There is a jungle gym in the back yard.) The Prime Minister does
not even have an officially designated office. Margaret Thatcher used a room on
the second floor. John Major read documents at the enormous table in the Cabinet
Room. Blair occupies a room just outside the Cabinet Room known as "the
den," which is just large enough for a couch, a desk, and two armchairs.
By the time Blair greeted me in the den, he seemed well over the
depredations of Little Ant and Little Dec.
"It was a piece of fun, that's all," he said gamely, and yet, he
went on, "it's always a battle, isn't it, between the modern world in
which we live, in which people expect their leaders to be a lot more accessible
. . . and the dignity of the office. And you've got to be careful that you
don't compromise the one in the attempt to enter into the other."
There is a tendency for political criticism to be sharper among the
chattering classes of London than in, say, the Midland suburbs and towns, where
concern for foreign policy is dwarfed by issues like binge drinking and
discipline in the schools. Nonetheless, it was remarkable how many people had
turned on Blair. Even early in his first term, there were those who considered
him unbearably pious, prone to empty idealism and windy intellectual
pronouncements--a spinner, a glad-hander. As far back as 1997, the joke was
that if you called the Downing Street switchboard after hours the answering
machine would say, "Please leave a message after the high moral tone."
He was Bambi, and Phony Tony. He wasn't especially smart, it was said, nothing
like the Labour giants of an earlier generation: Denis Healey, Harold Wilson,
Tony Crosland, Richard Crossman. At Oxford, he'd earned a second-class degree,
and, well, doesn't everyone at Oxford get a second-class degree just for
breathing? Blair's mentor, the late Roy Jenkins, a colossal figure in
Parliament and the biographer of Churchill and Gladstone, echoed an old remark
about F.D.R. when he told a writer for The Spectator that Blair had "a
second-class mind" and "a first-class temperament."
Unfortunately for Blair, most people seemed to remember only the former. He was
an actor in school--he'd played Mark Antony, and Captain Stanhope in
"Journey's End"--and now he was capable of changing his rhetoric,
even his accent, as the occasion warranted. Wasn't he just a British version of
Bill Clinton with a more settled domestic arrangement? "Blair's like a
very sweet pudding," one senior Tory M.P. told me. "The first
mouthful is nice, but then it becomes nauseating--the easy emoting, the
quivering chin . . ."
It was relentless. Perhaps only in England--the one country where, it is
said, the people feel Schadenfreude toward themselves--could a Prime Minister
with such promise, and, over time, real accomplishments, be whacked around so
mercilessly.
After the war in Iraq, it was something else, more serious. Blair and his
team were roundly blamed for "sexing up" an intelligence dossier that
had been compiled on Iraq and for presenting conjecture on weapons of mass
destruction as incontrovertible fact. Worse, Blair was seen as the
"poodle" of Bush and the Pentagon neoconservatives, ignoring domestic
opinion and the ambiguity of the intelligence estimates simply to rush into the
arms of the American President. So now he was Tony Bliar. And Tony Blur. And
the Right Honourable Member for Texas North. Last year, a small group of
members of the House of Commons undertook what was, in effect, an impeachment
initiative against Blair, with a motion called "Conduct of the Prime
Minister in relation to the war against Iraq." If successful, it would be
the first impeachment since the proceedings brought against Lord Melville, the
First Lord of the Admiralty, in 1806, for embezzlement. Some of Blair's own
diplomats thought that he had fudged the case on Iraq. One of his former First
Secretaries at the United Nations, Carne Ross, told the BBC,
"I personally don't trust him, no. . . . I'm afraid the government did not
tell the whole truth about the alleged threat that Iraq posed. That's why I
think it's a tawdry story." The rhetoric of his opponents could be
unhinged. In the Guardian, once the newspaper of Blair's electoral base, Harold
Pinter was quoted as saying, "Blair sees himself as a representative of
moral rectitude. He is a mass murderer."
One afternoon, I met with Peter Kilfoyle, a Labour traditionalist in the
Commons--"Not Old Labour," he insisted. "Vintage
Labour"--at the Pugin Room, one of the many tea rooms inside Westminster.
Kilfoyle represents a lower-income constituency in Liverpool. He had been such
an early enthusiast among the Party's Old Guard that he'd earned a spot as a
minister. He resigned in 2000.
Kilfoyle represents what one journalist called the "flat-cap and
pass-the-fish-and-chips" wing of the Party, and, in the end, sounding much
like some of Clinton's critics in the Democratic Party, he found Blair to be a
trimmer, insensitive to the poor, and inauthentic. "I once took him to a
football match," Kilfoyle said. "He showed up in a dark suit and a
polo sweater. I said, 'Tony, what the hell? You look like an Apache dancer!' He
called Peter Mandelson"--one of Blair's closest advisers at the
time--"to ask what he thought. He needed reassurance on how to play the
part.
"He's lost his way completely," Kilfoyle continued. "He's
trying to re-create the Labour Party, and he's trying to recast it in his own
image. The Labour Party was an ideological party and now it's a cult of
personality." The Pugin Room was crowded, loud, and smoky. Kilfoyle lit up
his fifth Silk Cut of the hour and said, "Look, we all mobilized behind
Tony Blair after eighteen years of opposition. Those around him treat him like
Chauncey Gardiner in 'Being There.'. . . The best government was postwar
Clement Attlee, who really changed this country: with welfare benefits, the
health service, massive renewal programs. This Government has just flitted
around the edges."
When I asked Kilfoyle if he would support Blair this time around, he smiled
and said only, "No comment."
"I'm a critical friend," he said. "If your friend is pissed
and says, 'Give me the keys, I'll drive,' you can't say O.K."
It really is remarkable how unwilling Blair's antagonists--whether Tory or
Labour--are to give him credit for what's gone right in the past eight years:
the lowest rate of inflation since the nineteen-fifties; a sharp decline in
unemployment; sustained economic growth for every year in office; a historic
breakthrough in the Northern Ireland dispute, leading to the 1998 Good Friday
agreement and a near-cessation of violence on all sides; the establishment of a
parliament in Scotland, an assembly in Wales, and a mayoralty in London; an
improvement in, or, at least, an end to the deterioration of, public services;
an increase in the number of doctors, nurses, and dentists (sorry, Mrs.
Holsworth!) and a reduction in the waiting period for surgery. Perhaps the most
significant of Blair's achievements was to lead the rescue of the Labour Party,
which, in the Thatcher-Major years, had seemed destined for marginality as the
English working class declined.
Blair risked everything in his decision to support Bush, and, when his case
for war turned out to be unfounded, he lost the confidence and trust of much of
the population. He will almost certainly win May 5th, but will he win
convincingly enough to rule? Or will he suddenly be afloat, a lame duck
paddling in the wake of Gordon Brown? Chris Patten, the last British governor
of Hong Kong and an avatar of the British political establishment, said,
"Never, after eight years, can it be glad, confident morning again. The
young leader would look shop-soiled even without Iraq. But Iraq showed the gap
between the image and the reality. . . . The real question to be asked about
Blair is whether he sacrificed the objective with which he entered office--of
making Britain comfortable in Europe--and sacrificed it to President
Bush."
The debate over Blair and Iraq centers on two vexed and related subjects:
the nature of the Prime Minister's core convictions and the efficacy of the
"special relationship" between the United States and Britain.
Two and a half years ago, as Blair made plain that he would be America's
strongest political and military ally, Roy Jenkins rose in the House of Lords,
and, like Mark Antony in his funeral oration, began with tribute:
I have a high regard for the Prime Minister. I have been repelled by
attempts to portray him as a vacuous man with an artificial smile and no
convictions. I am reminded of similar attempts by a frustrated Right to suggest
that Gladstone was mad, Asquith was corrupt, and Attlee was negligible. My view
is that the Prime Minister, far from lacking conviction, has almost too much,
particularly when dealing with the world beyond Britain. He is a little
Manichean for my perhaps now jaded taste, seeing matters in stark terms of good
and evil, black and white, contending with each other, and with a consequent
belief that if evil is cast down good will inevitably follow. I am more
inclined to see the world and the regimes in it in varying shades of gray.
Although it was left unsaid in which particular shades of gray Roy Jenkins
saw the Iraqi Baathists, he was undoubtedly right to see a moralist in his
protege. When Blair was at Oxford, in the early seventies, he impressed no one
as a budding politico; he was not an activist, nor did he join the Oxford Union
or any political groups--not even the student Labour Party. (In fact, his
father was a Tory who revered Margaret Thatcher.) He read law, but he also had
time for history and political theory, particularly the works of Christian
socialists like R. H. Tawney, and, through an older friend at Oxford, an
Australian-born vicar named Peter Thomson, he came to read the work of John
Macmurray, a Scottish philosopher whose left-of-center Christian thought--a
disdain for raw individualism, a yearning for solidarity without
collectivization--anticipates the work of some of the American communitarians,
as John Rentoul, one of Blair's biographers, writes. Like Blair himself a
quarter century later, Macmurray was a philosophical triangulator, rejecting
the prescriptive designs of socialism yet accepting its softer Sermon on the
Mount generalities. "If you really want to understand what I'm all
about," Blair once said, "you have to take a look at a guy called
John Macmurray. It's all there."
When Blair was at Oxford, religious observance in England was already in
decline, and yet he became observant and was eventually confirmed in the
Anglican Church. As a young barrister, he married a colleague, Cherie Booth,
who had been reared in the Labour Party and the Catholic Church. Blair often
took Communion at Cherie's church, in Islington, in North London, until, in
1996, Cardinal Basil Hume wrote to him and asked that he, as an Anglican with
sufficient access to Anglican churches, desist. Blair wrote back obliging the
Cardinal, but, with a drop of acid in his pen, added, "I wonder what Jesus
would have made of it."
As a Labour Party activist and then as an M.P. from the constituency of
Sedgefield, Blair continued speaking about politics in moralistic terms. He was
not at all rooted in the socialist, Labour vocabulary of Michael Foot and Tony
Benn, following instead the Victorian path of such Liberal Party lights as
Gladstone, Asquith, and Lloyd George. He did not, like Gladstone, wander the
night streets of London looking to redeem the souls of prostitutes, but he did
write with the starch of a parson invoking the awfulness of moral relativism.
"Christianity is a very tough religion," he wrote. "It is
judgmental. There is right and wrong. There is good and bad."
Blair attends church nearly every Sunday and is said to read the Bible daily
(he has even said that he's read the Koran three times, including once when he
was on vacation in Portugal), yet he learned over time to avoid mentioning
religion in a political context. Statements like "Jesus was a
modernizer"--which sounded to some as if the leader of New Labour had
brought the Son of God into his fold--caused him enormous grief. In contrast to
the United States, where it is nearly a requirement for high office to advertise
belief, only seven per cent of the British population attends church regularly,
and displays of public piety are scorned as sanctimonious. In 2003, Blair
drafted his speech to the nation on Iraq, closing with a solemn "God bless
you." His aides, a fairly godless lot, replaced the offending phrase with
a simple "Thank you." But the staff cannot undo the image. The
satirical magazine Private Eye still calls Blair "the Vicar of St.
Albion," and the television interviewers Jeremy Paxman and David Frost
have both tried to get a rise out of him by asking if he prayed with George
Bush--an idea sure to unnerve many Britons. In one of our interviews, I tried
to ask Blair about his religious background, and, predictably, he would not
answer. "It leads to all sorts of highways and byways having nothing to do
with politics," he said. "I learned my lesson when I actually gave an
interview about religion and I was asked the question three times: 'Are you
saying that if you are a Christian you have to vote Labour?' Each time, I said
no, and the headline was something like 'If You're a Christian, You Have to
Vote Labour, Says Blair.' The fact is, you never, ever, ever, in our politics,
get into this argument and get out of it without people misconstruing it."
Blair saves his high principles for large occasions. Faced with humanitarian
crises in the Balkans and in Sierra Leone, he began to invoke his
nineteenth-century predecessors and to make a moral case for military action.
On a trip to Bulgaria in 1999, he talked about Gladstone's campaign in the
eighteen-seventies to bring attention to atrocities committed there by the
Turks. "Today, we face the same questions that confronted Gladstone over
one hundred and twenty years ago," he said. "Does one nation or
people have the right to impose its will on another? Is there ever a
justification for a policy based on the ethnic supremacy of one ethnic group?
Can the outside world simply stand by when a rogue state brutally abuses the
basic rights of those it governs? Gladstone's answer in 1876 was clear. And so
is mine today."
In many ways, Thatcher had prepared the way for New Labour. Not only had she
presided over the privatization of major utilities and the contraction of
failing industries such as coal and steel; she also showed how a Prime Minister
could answer Dean Acheson's postwar challenge when he said that Britain
"has lost an empire and has not yet found a role." Like Harold
Macmillan before her, Thatcher saw Britain's role as America's closest
ally--British Athens playing wise man to the Roman-American superpower.
During the Second World War, the choice, rooted in national interest, had
been clear. Churchill told de Gaulle, "Each time I have to choose between
you and Roosevelt, I shall always choose Roosevelt." Afterward, Britain
wavered between contradictory impulses, between its European allies and its
Atlantic alliance. In 1956, during the Suez crisis, when Britain, France, and
Israel colluded to seize the canal from Egypt, Anthony Eden acted without
Washington's support--a miscalculation that provoked President Eisenhower to
unprecedented anger. Britain was forced to withdraw from the canal, and the
crisis left the country with a warning: that it should never again ignore
America's interest or defy Washington. During the Vietnam War, however, Harold
Wilson turned down Lyndon Johnson's request to send troops to Southeast Asia.
Then, in the eighties and early nineties, the trend shifted once more.
Thatcher's embrace of Ronald Reagan was absolute, a Tory-Republican version of
the Athens-Rome model; and, after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Thatcher
bolstered George H. W. Bush's confidence in the run-up to the Gulf War, telling
him, "This is no time to go wobbly."
In the late nineties, when the Europeans and the Clinton Administration were
slow to act in Kosovo, Blair repeatedly urged the West to move more forcefully.
His remonstrations helped bring on the first major deployment of nato troops
since the pact was signed, a half century earlier. The action in Kosovo raised
new questions about the conduct of foreign policy, particularly the use of
force against sovereign states that had not attacked a neighbor. In 1879, when
Gladstone was facing similar questions about humanitarian intervention, he made
the Victorian moralist's case:
Remember the rights of the savage, as we call him. Remember that the
happiness of his humble home, remember that the sanctity of life in the hill
villages of Afghanistan, among the winter snows, is as inviolable in the eye of
Almighty God as can be your own.
If he was right about being "morally forced" toward intervention,
Gladstone wrote in his diary, then he could consider his work in politics the
"great and high election of God."
In 1999, Blair led an England that would brook no mention of the Almighty in
politics and had long ago lost the capacities of an imperial power;
nevertheless, he was prepared to urge on the world--the new
"interdependent world," as he said constantly--an end to Realpolitik
and the revival of a morally based interventionism. Blair wrote a speech
entitled "Doctrine of the International Community," which he
delivered at the Economic Club of Chicago. The modern world, Blair said, could
no longer avoid intervening in the sort of crises that it had seen in Bosnia
and Rwanda. He laid out five criteria for action:
First, are we sure of our case? War is an imperfect instrument for righting
humanitarian distress; but armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing
with dictators. Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? We should always
give peace every chance as we have in the case of Kosovo. Third, on the basis
of a practical assessment of the situation, are there military operations we
can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long
term? In the past, we talked too much of exit strategies. But, having made a
commitment, we cannot simply walk away once the fight is over; better to stay
with moderate numbers of troops than return for repeat performances with large
numbers. And, finally, do we have national interests involved? The mass
expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo demanded the notice of the rest of
the world. But it does make a difference that this is taking place in such a
combustible part of Europe.
During the 2000 U.S. election campaign, Blair's circle was fairly indiscreet
in betraying its hope that Al Gore would defeat George Bush. The Clinton-Blair
relationship had been one of like-minded brothers (with Clinton in the role of
the wise, if erratic, older brother), and Blair's lieutenants, including his
chief of staff, Jonathan Powell, had learned many of their campaign techniques
and media gambits by observing James Carville, George Stephanopoulos, and Paul
Begala in Clinton's first campaign, in 1992. Together, they promoted a fuzzy
"third way"--liberal on social issues such as abortion, the
environment, and race, centrist on economic issues, such as welfare and deficit
spending, and increasingly interventionist abroad.
Initially, there seemed little chance that a Bush foreign policy would, in
any way, resemble the tenets laid out in Blair's Chicago speech. In 2000,
Condoleezza Rice published an article in Foreign Affairs, "Promoting the
National Interest," which was Kissingerian in its emphasis on national
interests and its disdain for "humanitarian intervention" and
nation-building. And yet the first piece of advice that Clinton gave Blair
after Bush, in effect, was declared President by the Supreme Court was
distinctly nonpartisan. "Be his friend," Clinton told Blair at Chequers,
the Prime Minister's weekend retreat. "Be his best friend. Be the guy he
turns to."
After Blair held his first serious meeting with Bush, at Camp David in
February, 2001, he told an aide that Bush was "strong, straightforward,
with an underlying seriousness. You know where you are with him. I like
him." As Bush said at their press conference, "He put the charm
offensive on me." Asked whether they shared some interests, Bush cracked,
"Well, we both use Colgate toothpaste."
One morning, Blair and his entourage set off to campaign in the town of
Gravesend, east of London. The ostensible aim was to promote the development of
industries and infrastructure along the banks of the Thames, but the real
reason was to reach the swing votes of the county of Kent. Blair got into the
back seat of his car--a bottle-green Jaguar Sovereign--and, along with his
press aides, David Hill and Hilary Coffman, and some other assistants, I
climbed into a van. After a breakneck, bendy ride to Canary Wharf, we boarded a
kind of bateau mouche and embarked on an hour-long journey on the river. All
along the way, Blair gave a string of interviews, careful always to repeat key
facts about the multibillion-dollar Thames Gateway development project. He
repeated the same phrases--"biggest brownfield project in Western
Europe," "concern for the environmental questions," etc.--with
precision. He had mastered the briefing book.
David Hill stood off to the side and, with an ironic glint of admiration,
watched his man at work in front of the cameras and tape recorders.
"You familiarize him, then you wind him up and let him go," he
said.
The Blair team disembarked at Gravesend, did a public event on the pier with
local pols and businesspeople about the development program, took a walkabout
along "the historic High Street" (snap, snap, sound bite, sound
bite), and then we hustled back to the waiting vans. In the rush, we almost
lost track of Blair's Jaguar.
"Do you remember that episode of 'The West Wing' when Josh and Toby
miss the motorcade and they're left behind in Indiana?" Hilary Coffman
said. "We can relate."
A couple of minutes later, we arrived at a train that would take us from
Gravesend back to Charing Cross Station, very close to Downing Street. There
was no special train, not even a reserved car; the Blair crowd remarked on
"how non-White House" it all was. Blair took a seat near a window and
a few aides squished in next to him, including John Prescott, Blair's deputy
P.M. Prescott, who comes from a family of miners, railwaymen, and union officials,
attended Ruskin College, Oxford, on scholarship in his late twenties; as a
young man, he worked as a steward on a cruise ship, and when he won a seat in
the Commons Tory M.P.s like the toff Nicholas Soames used to shout at him,
"A whiskey-and-soda for me, Giovanni! And a gin-and-tonic for my
friend!" Prescott has a meaty, Old Labour face; he is tough and is a
skillful Party enforcer. Once, when Blair angered him, he called him a
"fucking Jesus Christ." One of Prescott's main tasks is to serve as
arbiter of the dysfunctional partnership between Blair and Gordon Brown. As the
train rolled along, I could hear Hill quietly briefing Blair on some upcoming
events, at one point saying, "And the message is . . ." Blair took
notes on a white legal pad. As the train picked up more passengers, he
cheerfully told his security guards to let some in to fill the few empty seats
in our part of the car. "As opposed to the right wing, we need all
positive messages," Hill was saying. "Clear . . . refined message . .
. forward . . ."
The commuters seemed underwhelmed to be in the presence of their Prime
Minister. A man carrying the Daily Telegraph sat down, glanced once at Blair,
opened his paper, and never stopped reading. A little girl asked her mother,
"Mummy, is that Tony Blair?" Sensing an interest, Blair invited her
to come over and take a picture with her cell-phone camera. The mother, an
Italian immigrant, told Blair that Silvio Berlusconi would never take such a
train.
"I imagine not," Blair said.
For much of the hour-long trip into town, I was able to sit near Blair and
ask him about Iraq. From almost the day he took office, Blair had been telling
visitors to No. 10 that he was appalled by the intelligence reports he was
reading on Saddam's intentions and his weapons programs. "I don't
understand why the French and others don't understand this," he said in
1997 to Paddy Ashdown, then the leader of the Liberal Democrats. "We
cannot let him get away with it."
The Al Qaeda attacks in New York and Washington marked the end of the Bush
Administration's hope of running the inward-looking foreign policy envisioned
in Rice's Foreign Affairs article. "We are all internationalists
now," Blair had said in Chicago, and, as Clinton had advised, Blair
quickly became Bush's most steadfast ally, signing on for the military efforts
in Afghanistan and Iraq. No other country provided nearly as many troops for
the U.S.-led incursions. I asked Blair if he thought the United States could
have gone to war in Iraq without Britain, which had given the invasion at least
the appearance of an international coalition.
"I don't know," Blair said. "I think the United States, in
the end, would do whatever was necessary for its own security. But it was
important that we did not leave this up to the United States alone. I also
profoundly believe that September 11th was an attack on the free world, not on
the United States. It was an attack on America because America is the leading
power of the free world. If America hadn't been, and Britain was, it would have
been an attack on Britain. Let's not be daft about this. This alliance with
America has stood my country in good stead."
Part of Blair's problem is that despite his differences with the Administration
over everything from the Kyoto environmental accord to foreign aid, to say
nothing of Labour's far more liberal domestic policies, much of the British
public now sees his brand of interventionism as indistinguishable from the
neoconservatism of the White House "Vulcans." And yet Blair seemed
not to mind.
"What I think is interesting is that people can come to the same
position from different perspectives," he said. "The idea that our
ultimate security lies in the spread of the values of democracy and freedom is
an idea I feel very comfortable with as a progressive. Now, that doesn't mean
you go and alter every regime in the world that doesn't correspond with those
principles. But it does mean that where we have taken those steps to intervene
you do have faith in the people--whether it's in Iraq or in Afghanistan or,
indeed, in Palestine and the Lebanon--to decide their own future."
Is there in fact much difference between the American neoconservatives and
Blair's liberal interventionism?
"I don't spend too much time trying to analyze that," he said.
"I just say what I think is right in a situation. And in the end we had to
take a decision on Saddam. You could have left him there or you could have
removed him, and I thought it was better to remove him. . . . What used to be
just a moral cause is now also a cause in our own self-interest, which is why
the conservatives and the progressives can unite around it."
Sometimes, I said, it seems as if Blair has more admirers in the United
States than at home.
"It's kind of people to be good about me in the United States, but
right now I need that here," Blair said. "Iraq has been a very
divisive issue. There's no point in disputing that. The most important thing
now is to concentrate on the future, though, because it must be the case that
in a battle between the Iraqi people--and it's now clear that the Iraqi people
want democracy with all the guarantees and rights and freedoms that we take for
granted--and a gang of terrorists and insurgents, it's pretty obvious whose
side we should be on, even for those people who opposed the original conflict.
I think there is a sense now of change spreading across the Middle East. Let's
leave aside what the reasons for that are, but what's happening in the Lebanon,
the announcement made by the President of Egypt about democratic elections,
what's already happened in a country like Afghanistan is amazing after decades
and decades of brutal repression.
"Sometimes these issues have to be judged on a long time scale and you have
to accept that. I hope and believe that when people look back they will see
this as something that brought about change, as something good not only for
Iraq and the region but also for our country here."
In the months preceding the war, Blair repeatedly denounced the history and
the nature of the Baathist dictatorship, but he built his case for war on a
legalistic argument that Saddam had repeatedly defied U.N. resolutions on the
possession and development of weapons of mass destruction. After the invasion,
when no such weapons were found, Blair was attacked by politicians and public
figures across the political spectrum--including in his own Cabinet--for
selling the war on the basis of dubious intelligence. Two independent
inquiries, the Hutton and Butler reports, cleared Blair of the charge that he
had deliberately lied to the British people, but his credibility suffered
immeasurably. What happened?
"I don't know," Blair said as the train rolled past the fenced-in
back yards of suburban London. "The best that I can go on is what the Iraq
Survey Group has found. Two things we do know: Saddam had W.M.D. and we haven't
found them."
If he had known that Iraq's weapons program was so diminished, would he have
gone to war based on Saddam's "intentions" to build more W.M.D. and
on a human-rights case?
"The legal case for war rested on breaches of U.N. resolutions, but in
February, 2003, I made a speech in Glasgow where I described the relevance of
the nature of the regime," he said. "And the truth is, what the
relevance of the nature of the regime did mean was that, one, obviously, any
risk of W.M.D. in the hands of a regime such as this was greater than W.M.D. in
the hands of a relatively benign regime. And, secondly, it meant that removing
that regime was in itself not a bad thing to do. On the contrary, it's a good
thing to do. Now, the legal case had to be based on the breaches of U.N.
resolutions. That's the distinction, really. Again, contrary to the history of
this, I think that, for all of us looking at this, the nature of the regime was
a very important context in which that legal case was examined. In terms of the
legal case, ah, it was about W.M.D."
Blair squirmed at this line of questioning. He could not, politically or
otherwise, bring himself to say that the war was fought on a false premise.
"So you are saying no, in other words?" I said.
"In the end, the issue was to do with breaches of U.N. resolutions with
respect to W.M.D.," Blair said. "A better way of putting this
question is: 'But for September 11th, is this a discussion we would have been
having?' And the answer to that is no. What September 11th did was change my
thinking fundamentally. I then thought that all those worries I'd had about
W.M.D. and proliferation were thrown into sharp relief and I thought, No, the
one thing we must make absolutely sure of is that this nexus of repressive
states, the development of W.M.D., the development of this type of virulent and
extreme form of terrorism--you've got to put a stop to it. What does that mean?
It means take the security measures that are necessary. It means sending a
signal right across the world that from now on in if you develop this in the
face of U.N. resolutions you're going to face trouble. Now, that was the reason
for taking on Iraq. It wasn't because I suddenly thought Iraq was going to
invade Britain. I didn't. We never put the case on that basis. But the
importance of enforcing the international will vis-a-vis W.M.D. was brought
home to me by September 11th and therefore the place to start was Iraq, because
Iraq was in breach of U.N. resolutions going back a number of years."
Blair paused and then continued, "Now, I personally think that since
then there has been an imperfect dialogue with Iran, but at least Europe and
America are working together on it. Libya is giving up its W.M.D. The A.Q. Khan
network, which was very dangerous indeed, has been effectively shut down. North
Korea is an issue, but the world is focussed on it. It's not been allowed to
fester. The security reason, for me, for taking the action--and without the
security reason you couldn't have taken it simply on human-rights grounds--the
security reason was very much linked to my perception that, post-September
11th, the whole game had changed. The balance of risk had changed. If, in the
situation previously, the balance of doubt was toward inaction, after September
11th the balance of doubt, always, for me, fell with action."
According to Peter Stothard's book "Thirty Days," one of several
informative accounts of the debate over Iraq in Britain, less than a week
before the Commons voted on the war Blair told one of his aides, Sally Morgan,
"What amazes me is how many people are happy for Saddam to stay. They ask
why don't we get rid of Mugabe, why not the Burmese lot. Yes, let's get rid of
them all. I don't because I can't, but when you can you should."
That remark, and others like it, showed Blair's increasing disenchantment
with the left. Even though, in Clintonian fashion, he had moved his party to
the center, he never imagined in 1997 that so many readers of the Guardian,
say, would abandon him. (Similarly, many readers of the Guardian would never
have imagined that a Labour Prime Minister would tighten up on civil liberties
or court Rupert Murdoch, the uber-purveyor of right-leaning media, as
assiduously as Blair has.)
When I asked Blair about his exasperated remark at Downing Street, he said,
"The biggest scandal in progressive politics is that you do not have
people with placards out in the street on North Korea. I mean, that is a
disgusting regime. The people are kept in a form of slavery, twenty-three
million of them, and no one protests! You get a hundred thousand people out in
the street of just about any European capital to protest about America, which,
for all its faults, is a free country!
"The left has two impulses, which come into conflict with each other,
though both of those impulses are perfectly good," Blair went on.
"One is peace, and the other is intervention to help people. Peace is
great. But, if you're living with a tyrannical regime, you don't have much
peace."
I asked Blair about all the mistakes and even disasters that followed the
fall of Saddam: the American failure to anticipate mass looting, the
insurgency, the unending casualties, the torture at Abu Ghraib prison.
"On that I take a slightly heretical view," he said. "I think
that when anything like that happens it's ghastly and terrible and should be
condemned immediately and dealt with. But I also think that people are cleverer
in the Middle East, in Iraq and places like that, than we often give them
credit for. And what they see is something terrible happening and the U.S.
acting on it, the U.S. politicians under pressure, the U.S. soldiers
responsible being prosecuted. I think people say these things happen, but the
difference between a democracy and a dictatorship is that in a democracy when
something terrible happens someone is held to account and in a dictatorship
they're not.
"I had meeting after meeting about postwar planning, but all the postwar
planning was really on the basis of humanitarian collapse," Blair
continued. "I mean, that's what one thought was going to happen. That's
what we were warned about." Only if the coalition successfully provided
Iraq with the rudiments of a working, secure democracy, Blair said, would the
insurgents fade. "Because how can they then turn toward the people in the
Middle East and elsewhere, to Muslims the world over, and say, 'This is the
terrible Satan exploiting and demeaning our people and preventing us from
having our religion,' when people in Iraq are actually freer to worship in Iraq
than they were and they've got a democracy!"
Blair's own frustrations were clear. The absence of W.M.D. in Iraq had left
him feeling unmoored, evasive. I thought of McEwan's Perowne and his attempt to
get behind Blair's earnest mask in the days before the war:
Perowne wonders if such moments, stabs of cold panicky doubt, are an
increasing part of the Prime Minister's days, or nights. There might not be a
second UN resolution. The next weapons inspectors' report could also be
inconclusive. The Iraqis might use biological weapons against the invasion
force. Or, as one former inspector keeps insisting, there might no longer be
any weapons of mass destruction at all. There's talk of famine and three
million refugees, and they're already preparing the reception camps in Syria
and Iran. The UN is predicting hundreds of thousands of Iraqi deaths. There
could be revenge attacks on London. And still the Americans remain vague about
their post-war plans. Perhaps they have none. In all, Saddam could be
overthrown at too high a cost. It's a future no one can read. Government
ministers speak up loyally, various newspapers back the war, there's a fair
degree of anxious support in the country along with the dissent, but no one
really doubts that in Britain one man alone is driving the matter forward.
Night sweats, hideous dreams, the wild, lurching fantasies of sleeplessness?
Now, with the main fighting likely over, it remains unclear how history will
judge Blair. Conor Gearty, a human-rights advocate who works in the same law
chambers as Cherie Blair, told me that he was against the war and Blair's
conduct of it, and yet he will sometimes ask his students at the London School
of Economics if they can imagine Blair and Bush one day being declared heroes,
for having opened the way to a democratizing wave in the authoritarian states
of the Middle East. "My students just laugh," Gearty said. "But
I admit it's not inconceivable."
In all the best accounts of Blair's diplomacy--Stothard's "Thirty
Days," Peter Riddell's "Hug Them Close," John Kampfner's
"Blair's Wars," the Hutton and Butler reports, and the BBC
documentary "Iraq, Tony & the Truth"--the Prime Minister is
convinced that Saddam is in violation of U.N. resolutions. He is not
deliberately misleading Britain, but, at the same time, he appears too willing
to accept unsubstantiated intelligence as absolute and to advertise that
evidence as fact to the public. "At the heart of the problem was a culture
clash: between the worlds of John le Carre's George Smiley and 'The West Wing,'
between cautious words, caveats, and nuances of the Joint Intelligence
Committee and the megaphone communications of 'spin doctors' and the
twenty-four-hour news cycle," Peter Riddell, a columnist for the London
Times, wrote. "The more public intelligence assessments are, the more that
any qualifications and uncertainties disappear. Tony Blair and the Government
were certainly at fault in not highlighting the doubts."
Even some of Blair's closest advisers appeared to know that they were
playing a reckless game in preparing a dubious dossier for the leadership and
for public consumption. In an e-mail that was sent in September, 2002--and came
out a year later--Jonathan Powell, Blair's chief of staff, told the chairman of
the Joint Intelligence Committee, John Scarlett, that while the "dossier
is good and convincing for those who are prepared to be convinced . . . the
document does nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent threat,
from Saddam."
Peter Oborne, the political editor of the conservative Spectator, told me he
thought that Blair could be a "broken" man as a result of the loss of
trust. "This all matters because of a hundred thousand Iraqis killed, Abu
Ghraib, a shameful thing for which no one was sacked," Oborne, who has
just published a book on lying in British politics, said. "The readiness
to break international law, to lie to voters and the international community,
to ignore proper process, the sheer arrogance. It is the most evil and
destructive and barbaric act of my lifetime and it has shaken my faith. Those
W.M.D. did not exist and we were told that they did. . . . As a result, the
entire political system has suffered a catastrophic collapse in trust in Blair
himself."
Although some historians might well agree with Blair that the destruction of
the Baathist regime--despite the casualties, the terrible postwar planning, Abu
Ghraib--prevented further violence by Saddam and his sons and led to regional
change, the antipathy to, even hatred of, George Bush among some Britons is so
intense that Blair's most unforgivable sin seems to be his second-banana role
in the Anglo-American
alliance. This impression was only exacerbated when, in early 2003, Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told the press that the coalition could live without
British military help, or when White House aides such as Scooter Libby,
Vice-President Dick Cheney's chief of staff, openly mocked Blair's calls for a
(doomed) second resolution in the Security Council. "Oh, dear, we'd better
not do that or we might upset the Prime Minister," Libby said, according
to Philip Stephens's biography of Blair.
The British have not soured on the United States so much as they have come
to long for a Prime Minister who will remove the taint of subservience from the
relationship. Last year, English audiences went to see "Love
Actually," a lighter-than-air comedy starring Hugh Grant as an improbably
handsome, love-starved Prime Minister. People broke out in applause during a
scene in which Prime Minister Grant, during a joint press conference at No. 10
with a libidinous (Clintonian), cowboy (Bushian) American President, played by
Billy Bob Thornton, says that the relationship is no longer special. "I
fear that this has become a bad relationship," he says, "a
relationship based on the President taking exactly what he wants and casually
ignoring all those things that really matter to Britain." And yet those
applauding audiences knew that the "Love Actually" moment was as
improbable under Tony Blair, or any modern Prime Minister, as Don Corleone's
ascension to the papacy. Around the Downing Street offices, aides are quite
sure that Blair will win, but they do not pretend that the Bush-Blair quandary
has fully receded. "The problem is Bush," one of his senior advisers
told me. "The monumental obligation to Bush has brought out latent
anti-Americanism. People are concerned about trust and Blair's judgment. The
fact that he has done the wrong thing on Iraq means they have grave concerns
about his judgment."
In order to win back the left, the official said, Blair has to show that he
is pushing the Americans to act more forcefully on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute,
on aid to Africa, on climate change. "It doesn't balance Iraq," the
official said, "but if you are a voter who needs permission to vote for
Blair, even grudgingly, you can say at least he is O.K. on the Palestinian
question or public service." For conservative voters, Blair needs to show
that he is active in what another official called "Rudy Giuliani
politics": getting rid of public drunkenness, eradicating annoyances like
graffiti, getting control of discipline in the schools. The leaders of the Conservative
Party concede that they can win only through apathy and protest votes; their
over-all voice in this campaign, one Tory M.P. told me, is "more Dole in
'96 than Bush in 2000, more bleak than hopeful." And that should be
telling. Simon Jenkins, who writes a column in the Times that regularly attacks
Blair, told me that, as long as the economy stays at its current level,
"people feel quite good. And they are prepared to give credit to the
smiling chap at the top. There is no one else but Tony Blair."
President Bush has not paid much of a price for the mistakes that
accompanied the Iraq war. The Abu Ghraib torture scandal outraged world
opinion, yet Rumsfeld had to endure little more than a day's questioning on
Capitol Hill. Recent government investigations showed the entire intelligence
bureaucracy to have been utterly mistaken on the question of Iraqi W.M.D. But
there were no resignations of consequence--George Tenet stepped down as C.I.A.
chief, but then was awarded the Medal of Freedom. During the Presidential
debates, Bush could not name a major mistake that he had made in his first
term; the words "Abu Ghraib" were never uttered in the debates by
either Bush or John Kerry.
Blair has endured far more criticism, but he, too, may pay a minimal price
at the polls. Recently, I was watching him on a television chat show called
"The Wright Stuff," in which an unctuous host named Matthew Wright
put the Prime Minister through yet another hour of the masochism campaign. (He
called him Tony no fewer than twenty times.) At one point, Wright ran a tape
for Blair of voters telling the camera what they wanted from him:
Woman: I would like Tony Blair to get rid of bureaucracy in hospitals, so
that nurses could actually get on with their job. . . .Man: I want equal rights
for fathers.Young Woman: I want Tony Blair to improve schools by giving
teachers more power.Man: I want smoking banned in public.Woman: I want
university fees abolished.Woman: I want honesty from the government.Man: I want
regional government for the Northwest.Man: I want immigrants not to be treated
like criminals.Young Woman: I want Tony Blair to introduce congestion charges
all over Britain, so it will encourage people to use public transport.Young
Woman in Head Scarf: I want Tony Blair to stop doing what the American
government says, and more what the British public thinks.Woman: I want Tony
Blair to stop putting pressure on moms like me to go back to work.
"It's a long list," Blair said. But he could only be pleased. Only
one person, the woman wearing a hijab, said a word about foreign policy;
everything else was domestic bread and butter.
Blair is concentrating on winning his way back into the affections of the
British public inch by inch. He will take any meeting, it seems. A reception
for the British Society of Magazine Editors at Downing Street did not appear to
feature the opinion magazines--The New Statesman, The Spectator, or Prospect.
It cast a wider net: CosmoGirl!, Waitrose Food Illustrated, Motorcycle News,
fashion magazines, travel magazines. I sat next to the editor of Spirit &
Destiny. I asked her what was in her magazine and she said, "Alternate
life style, health, and just a hint of witchcraft." Blair opened the
meeting by saying, "A special thanks to the lady from Flower Arranger magazine
who brought some flowers for Cherie."
Some of the questions were serious--about human rights in China, European
alliances, the campaign--but there were more on things like "the BikeSafe
campaign" and, more than once, the Prime Minister's opinion of Turkey
Twizzlers. Then someone asked Blair whom he would choose as Chancellor of the
Exchequer "if Gordon Brown were to be hit by a bus."
Blair is unshakable, and yet he paused, as if to catch his breath.
"Well, that would be a really good one to speculate on," he said.
"Actually, I saw him this morning and he is in very good health."
When the group of editors had fairly exhausted their cache of questions,
something in Blair clicked--"Be a good host! Show them around!"--and,
with a tinge of been-there-before irony, he gave the briefest of No. 10 house
tours.
"Right," he said. "Well, we're in the state dining
room." He pointed to one side of the room. "There's the silver. It's
best to leave that alone." Then, pointing to a huge painting over his
shoulder. "There's a portrait of King George. When he was around, we still
had America."
Blair went back downstairs to his den. When I asked him what, if any,
criticisms he had of the Bush White House, he was, as ever, careful, even
indulgent. He said that the Administration's policies on everything from the
environment to aid for Africa were not so much right wing as they were victims
of bad press.
"The key is to understand where the Administration is coming
from," he said. "The Administration is not saying Africa is
unimportant. They are hardheaded about the need for good governance,
anti-corruption, conflict resolution, as well as debt relief. Contrary again to
what people think, they do accept the importance of tackling climate change and
moving beyond the carbon-based economy. But they are going to be very
hardheaded about how you do that and how it affects economic growth and living
standards.
"It's a question of persuasion and also understanding where America is
coming from, rather than reading about where the Americans are coming from,
because my experience is often completely different."
Blair's delicacy about the United States is such that he seemed to dismiss
the importance of anti-Americanism in Britain, especially in the universities
and among the political elites and the media.
"It's a fashion!" he said. "For people to run down the
relationship, to say Britain gets nothing out of it, to say I'm a poodle of
America and all that stuff. . . . If you listen to any of the people doing chat
shows or any of the rest of it, there's an underlying culture of mocking the
relationship, saying it doesn't matter, et cetera. That's just the way it is.
But if you are taking the long view and say, 'What's really in the interests of
the country,' you just have to stand up and properly explain to people why the
relationship is important and that we do share certain values.
"There's a part of the media in Britain that is anti-European, there's
part that's anti-American, and there's a part that is anti both
alliances," he continued. "Which is a bizarre position to try to put
yourself in with Britain in the early part of the twenty-first century, as
opposed to Britain at the end of the nineteenth century. . . . Sometimes you
have to bring people back to the fundamentals and say, O.K., so you don't like
this or that aspect of a policy. Are we really saying you want to give up this
relationship with Europe or America? Of course not. It would be daft. No
country in its senses would do that in this day and age, when, unless you are the
size of China, India, or the U.S., the very thing that gives you purchase on
all sorts of international situations which have a direct bearing on the
interests of your country are these alliances. These are the two pillars of
British foreign policy, and we'd be crackers to give up either."
Last spring, Blair was thinking about whether to stand again. In 1994, he
and Gordon Brown had a private dinner at a restaurant called Granita, in the
North London neighborhood of Islington--an event that is the folkloric mystery
of contemporary British politics. Both Blair and Brown have their designated
leakers; the Brown leakers contend that Blair promised Brown that, after two
terms as Prime Minister (or, alternatively, ten years as Party leader), Blair
would step aside for Brown; and, in the meantime, Brown would have
unprecedented authority in the broad realm of domestic policy. Blair told me,
as he has told everyone else, that "you don't make deals" with such
positions, and no such deal was made at Granita. What is clear is that Blair
saw what had happened to Thatcher, who had once said that she would go "on
and on"--a bit of presumption that was laid low when her own party threw
her out and then replaced her with John Major. And so Blair decided to run for
a third term but, unlike Thatcher, promised that he would not attempt a fourth.
"Nobody could go on for four terms," he said. "The country
wouldn't want it."
In the past couple of weeks, Brown and Blair have again closed ranks,
appearing together on the campaign trail and even in a gauzy ad put together by
Anthony Minghella, the director of "The English Patient." Brown's
televised support has helped Blair widen his lead.
In moments of crisis, the press often reaches for a bit of physical
description to match what it imagines must be Blair's exhaustion or despair. He
is "ashen-faced." His "hair is thinning." He has lost
weight. I didn't see any of that. He still looks preposterously youthful,
despite episodes in the past year of cardiac arrhythmia. Yet Blair did one the
favor of denying that he was always in absolute command even as the polls were
breaking his way.
The job "is utterly relentless," he said. "You are dealing
with a multiplicity of issues the whole time. And the decision-making process
stops with you. That's an amazing thing--when every decision stops with you.
How do you make sense of that? It's by recognizing that it's a privilege to do
it, that you can do it only for a limited time, and that the only way to make
the most of it is to keep your nerve, do what you think is right, recognize you
won't please all of the people all of the time--in fact, pleasing some of the
people some of the time is quite an achievement. And, whatever judgments are
made at the time, history may take another view."