FUGITIVES
BY LAURA SECOR
One afternoon
in June, three days before Iran's Presidential elections, thousands of young
reformists gathered in Tehran University's soccer stadium. Their candidate,
Mustafa Mom, was sure to lose, but the crowd was jubilantly defiant. "Free
the political prisoners!" people shouted, in a country where citizens are
often afraid to speak openly on their private telephones. "Democracy and
freedom are on the way!"
Saeed Hajjarian
approached a podium that was covered in Persian carpets. The crowd broke into
applause. Hajjarian had once been an Islamic
revolutionary
and a top intelligence-ministry official, but as Iran's autocratic regime
hardened he had grown more liberal, becoming a key architect of the reform
movement, which rose to prominence in 1997. That year, Hajjarian had helped
secure the election of Mo-hammad Khatami, whose two-term Presidency was now
ending. In the late nineteen-nineties, a string of Iranian dissidents were
mysteriously murdered, and a few journalists linked those murders to the
intelligence ministry, which was still controlled by hardliners; Hajjarian's
adversaries, fearing the extent of his knowledge of the regime's inner workings,
presumed that he was the journalists' informant. In March, 2000, Hajjarian
was shot in the face outside Tehran's city council. He survived a long coma but
awoke paralyzed. He recently started to walk again.
As Hajjarian prepared
to speak, a chant rose from me crowd: "Down with political
assassination!" Hajjarian implored the crowd to remember Akbar Garjji—a
dissident journalist who was in prison, on an extended hunger strike— and others
"who can't be here because they are in prison or in Heaven." The crowd
whistled in approval. In the distance, behind the city's veil of smog, were
the austere peaks of the Elburz Mountains, which loom over Tehran, a Middle
Eastern Los Angeles of low-lying sprawl and traffic-choked boulevards.
I sat on the
soccer field, behind a bale of folded carpets. Two boys of eleven or twelve,
who wore headbands with campaign slogans in their gelled hair, flung
themselves, belly first, onto the rugs, laughing. On either side of the podium
were vertical banners with images of Moin—a gray-haired man with a narrow face
and an expression of kindly intelligence. Moin had been the country's minister
of higher education in 1999, when, at Tehran University, Iranian security
forces attacked students who were protesting the closure of a newspaper;
several students were killed and dozens wounded. In protest, Moin offered his resignation.
President Khatami, however, had been nearly silent—an act of submission that
left many young Iranians cynical about the reform movement.
After Hajjarian
finished speaking, a pop band took the stage. "The song I'm going to sing
is against fascist dictatorship, assassination, and torture," the singer
announced. 'It's dedicated to Akbar Ganji and Saeed Hajjarian." In the
bleachers, a man in a blue short-sleeved shirt, with an Iranian flag tied
around his head, swung his arms extravagantly above him, clapping to the
music.
I left the
rally as dusk fell. The streets surrounding the stadium were packed with police
and members of the Revolutionary Guard Corps—the regime's paramilitary force.
The guards, in dark-green fatigues, were armed, and policemen stood near
parked vehicles filled with riot gear.
An Iranian
friend once told me, "We have freedom of expression. We just don't have
freedom after expression."
***
The eight years
of Mohammad Khatami's Presidency created an illusion of openness in Iran. The
country's stringent social codes gradually relaxed. Young men and women could
mix almost freely, women's head scarves inched backward; chadors and loose
black cloaks gave way to close-fitting, colorful manteaus. Dozens of newspapers
opened, and activists demonstrated in the streets and on campuses to make
demands of a President they thought was accountable to them.
Though Khatami had
been elected in a landslide, he and reformist members of parliament were
stymied by the overweening power of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, who controls the country's security forces and judiciary, and can
effectively overrule the decisions of elected officials. The Guardian Council,
an appointed twelve -member body dose to Khamenei, vetoed a hundred and eleven
of the two hundred and ninety-seven bills that Khatami endorsed as President.
Meanwhile, from 1999 through 2004, the clerical establishment closed more than
a hundred newspapers and magazines, and hundreds of student activists and
journalists were imprisoned, often under terrible conditions. The rules of
Iranian public discourse have remained fixed and unforgiving: you cannot
criticize the Supreme Leader, the clergy, or the judiciary. The government
frequently circulates a list of specific "red-lined," or forbidden,
subjects to the country's media.
Iran's reform
movement, for all its courage, was the loyal opposition in a fascist state. It
sought not to dismantle or secularize the Islamic Republic—which was
established in 1979—but to improve it. Khatami and other politicians drew on
the work of Iranian philosophers who made painstaking theological arguments
for incorporating human rights and democratic freedoms into an Islamic
framework. These thinkers also questioned the doctrine of Vclayat-e Faqih, established
by Ayatollah Khomeini after the Islamic revolution, which decreed that a Shiite
cleric, a Supreme Leader, must oversee the country. Khatami and other reformist
politicians accepted that the state rested on two unequal pillars: one
clerical, the other republican. But they believed that by taking hold of the
republican elements of the state the people could chip away at authoritarian
ism. They articulated their strategy as one of applying pressure from below and
negotiating at the top. And there were some improvements. Khatami appointed
moderates to run the ministries, which make decisions that reacli deep into
Iranians' daily lives. As the reformist intellectual Saeed Laylaz told me when
I visited Iran in October, 2004, 'Ten years ago, if you were in opposition to
the government, they killed you. Now they just make some legal trouble for
you."
Nevertheless,
by that fall the reformist project was widely perceived to be foundering. The
reformists had lost control of parliament, in part because clerics hud
disqualified forty-tour per cent of the prospective candidates, most of them
reformists. And many of Khatami's young supporters felt betrayed, believing
that their loyalty had merely burnished the image of a repressive regime. As
Khatami prepared to leave office, Iran's largest student groups announced a
boycott of the June election—virtually guaranteeing that Moin, Khatami's heir
apparent, would lose.
Mohammad Ali
Abtahi, a reformist cleric who served as Vice-Presidcnt under Khatami, told me
that he understood why Iran's young people were frustrated with his movement.
"We disagreed with dosing the newspapers, but the government dosed most
of them," he said. "We disagreed with arresting political dissidents,
but they did it -anyway. This is the truth about Iran. Given the situation of
our society, I don't think that our movement was slow. But the society
expected more."
The night that
Iran's first-round Presidential-election results were announced, I had dinner
at the home of Roozbeh Mirebrahimi. He lived on the south side of Tehran, in a
warren of residential alleys where modest storefronts cast wide rectangles of
yellow light onto the narrow streets. A twenty-six-vear-old with a trimmed
goatee, Mirebrahimi is one of many defiant Iranian newspaper reporters who have
started blogs to circumvent the state censors. Last fall, during a crackdown
on Internet postings, he was imprisoned for two months. After the serial
assassinations of the late nineteen-nincties, Khatami had purged a number of
hard-line officials from the intelligence ministry, but these agents began
working in secret with members of the Islamic judiciary, running a network of
shadow prisons. Mirebrahimi was held in one of these prisons; its precise location
remains a mysterv to him, because he was driven there blindfolded.
Mirebrahimi and
his wife, Solmaz Sharif, who is also a reporter, shared a cramped apartment. A
glass-fronted corner cabinet displayed a collection of wineglasses and
figurines; bluc-and-white plates hung on a wall. An enormous wedding
photograph in a gilt frame loomed over the two facing couches that crowded the
living room. 1 studied the photograph for some time. Mirebrahimi, slight and
black-haired, with a bright, shy gaze, wore a red flower in his lapel. Sharif
gripped his shoulder. She is twenty-three, round-faced, with full lips and dark
eyes. She, too, has taken to blogging. She calls her site Fararec— "a
fugitive act." When I asked her what she was fleeing, she said, "Everything."
When I arrived,
Mirebrahimi shared some news: Moin had lost. In the second round of the
election, All Akbar Hash-emi Rafsanjani, who had been Iran's President between
1989 and 1997, would Face Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the mayor of Tehran—a
little-known politician with roots in the country's volunteer Islamic militia,
and an ardent supporter of the Supreme Leader. A week later, Ahmadinejad would
be elected President— deniiling the reform movement, bringing Iran's decade of
liberalization to an abrupt end, and leaving millions of young people
unmoored.
"I felt
hopeless today, for the Iranian people and for going on living here,"
Mirebrahimi said listlessly. He sat in the corner of his couch, looking small
and birdlike; he wore pale-colored clothing and house slippers. "There
won't be any space to breathe anymore."
'Today,
everyone was teasing me, asking, 'Are you ready for your husband to 20 back
to prison?'" Sharif said from the kitchen. She had a pleasant laugh, and
the suppressed liveliness of a young person forced too early into adult
troubles.
Mirebrahimi
brooded. The reformists, he told me, had to change their tactics and
establish more direct bonds with Iranians. "We know that political reform
has failed," he said. "After the election, we should sit -and talk to
our people. In a taxi or the supermarket, we should make people learn about
their rights."
Mirebrahimi and
his wife were chronically short of paid work, because the government
eventually shut down every reformist newspaper they worked for. Sharif
complained that Western journalists who covered the newspaper closures rarely
mentioned that each time this happened some seventy employees lost their jobs.
She spent much of her time trying to extract paychecks from newspapers that no
longer existed.
The newspaper
that had most recently employed her had been dosed earlier that week. On the
day of our meeting, she had started a job at Ilamshahri, the newspaper
of the Tehran mayor's office. Since Ahmadinejad had become mayor, Hamshahri had
taken a conservative turn. I asked her about her first day, and she told me
that she had refused her employer's request that she wear a hooded hijab, which
covers the head more fully than the customary scarf. Her boss had told her that
she should write from home, which she had agreed to do.
Ahmadinejad had
not been a major figure in Iranian politics, but he had run an effective
populist campaign, focus-sing on the country's poor economic situation and
downplaying his religious agenda. His success had surprised journalists like
Sharif. "Even at Hamsbahri, the staff was upset," she said.
"They were saying, 'Who knows Ahmadinejad? Since when did he become so popular?'
They wondered how people who voted for Khatami could vote for him."
Mirebrahimi
told me that although he hoped Moin would win, he hadn't voted. Like many young
Iranians, he felt queasy about participating in a system that he fundamentally
opposed. But his position was oddly fatalistic, considering that he was in what
Farsi speakers call "a dangling situation"—a dire state of
uncertainty. Since he was released from custody, in December, Mirebrahimi had
grown accustomed to nearly constant surveillance and threats. And an Ahmadinejad
victory would very likely imperil his freedom.
Born in 1979,
he did not come from an educated or activist family. His father was a
taxi-driver and his mother was a seamstress in the Caspian city of Rasht, where
the men's cool passivity is so legendary that the city has become the butt of
endless cuckoldry jokes. In 1997, he moved to Tehran to study political science;
he soon became immersed in the city's journalistic community, where he met
Sharif. "I couldn't understand how he could be so bright and gentle,"
Sharif said. "I didn't see it in other guys. I thought maybe he's
depressed, or he's acting, or he's in love with someone. When I met him up
close, I got the answer to these questions, and I asked him to marry me."
Their families
were scandalized that Sharif had proposed) and by her refusal to accept the
customary payment that a groom's family offers his bride. (She eventually
succumbed to family pressure.) They married in 2004. The ensuing year,
scarred by Mirebrahimi's imprisonment, had been a trial for her. High-spirited
and mischievous, she found it hard to adjust to the anxiety of living
und«-(oiveiHance. She told me that the minute Iranian women were permitted to
drive motorcycles she would get one. Now, because they were being watched, the
couple did not even dare to throw parties on their birthdays.
Some young
activists called openly for an end to the Islamic Republic, but Mire-brahimi
feared that they were grandstanding, and endangering other young dissidents in
the process. "I am more conservative than the new generation," he
wrote on his blog, which is in Farsi. "They arc rule-breakers."
Mirebrahimi aligned himself with the reformists rather than with the young
radicals, and he continued to defend Khatami, despite his own deepening
reservations; he complained that too many reformists were willing to subordinate
democracy and human rights to the strictures of Islam, and although he was a
practicing Muslim, he privately believed that religion should not he a political
force. In the end, however, lie thought that incremental change from within the
Islamic system was the only way to bring democracy to Iran.
His troubles
with the regime began in die summer of 2003, when Zahra Kazemi, a Canadian
journalist, was caught taking photographs outside Tehran's notorious Evin
prison; she was accused of espionage and beaten to death in state custody. The
news stunned the Iranian public, but Mirebrahirni, who was twenty-four years
old and the political editor of the newspaper Etemaad, found reason for
optimism. Anecdotal evidence suggested that the hard-line Iranian
judiciary—particularly the chief prosecutor of Tehran, Saeed Mortazavi—was
implicated in Kazemi's killing and a subsequent coverup. If the reformists
prosecuted the case, they would show Iranians that they were willing to stand
up for human rights.
Mortazavi, a
stocky man with a jet-black beard, was a baleful figure to reformist
journalists like Mirebrahimi. One Iranian intellectual has described him as
"a psychopath, a hanging judge, detested even by the conservatives." An overseer of the press
before he was promoted to chief prosecutor, he had shut down dozens of
newspapers and jailed so many journalists that he became known as "the
butcher of the press." Mortazavi was widely suspected of having initiated
Kazemi's detention and even of interrogating her himself. He allegedly
coerced the information ministry into announcing that Kazemi had died of a
stroke, medical evidence to the contrary.
The
reformist-led parliament set up a committee to investigate the Kazemi case. On
October 28,2003, a member of the committee read its report at an open hearing,
which was broadcast live on Tehran's state-run radio. The parliamentarians
left little doubt that Kazemi had been severely beaten by judiciary officials
and died from blows to her head. They also quoted from testimony linking
Mortazavi to intimidation, threats, and evidence-tampering in the investigation
of the case.
Although Kazemi's
family requested a criminal probe, Mortazavi was never disciplined, and only
one newspaper in Tehran printed the committee's statement. The others,
including Etemaad, didn't so much as report the findings. Mirebrahimi
learned that Mortazavi had called all of Tehran's editors and threatened to
close their newspapers if they covered the committee's finding. Soon after,
Mirebrahimi took a call from a reporter for Radio Farda, the
American-sponsored Farsi equivalent of Radio Free Europe. The reporter asked
him why Tehran's newspapers had not reported on the commission's findings.
"I said that Mortazavi was responsible," Mirebrahimi recalled.
"And I remember that there was no one to back me up. No other editor came
forward to say, 'We know— Mortazavi called us, too.' I was all alone."
Within a week,
Mirebrahimi was summoned to the ministry of intelligence and security, where
he was told that Mortazavi had complained. He was reprimanded and released.
By the summer
of 2004, Mirebrahimi had joined another newspaper, Jomhouriat, which
was soon shut down by the regime. He turned his attention to his blog, called
Shabnameh, which means "night letter." ("Before the Internet,
messages were disseminated through the city at night," he explained.) On
his
blog,
Mirebrahimi implored his readers not to forget the plights of political prisoners,
and he provided updates on imperilled dissidents.
Iran has an
estimated three million to seven million Internet users, the most in the Middle
East. Some sixty-five thousand Iranians post blogs, many of them evading
government filters by jumping from server to server. In 2004, however, the
hard-liners began cracking down on Internet dissent, using both filtering technology
and old-fashioned harassment. By October, twenty-one Iranians were imprisoned
in connection with blogs. Most were technical administrators of Web sites, but
seven were political writers. At eight in the morning on September 29th,
Mirebrahimi and Sharif were awakened by the police. Mirebrahimi was handcuffed
and blindfolded at his bedside, and taken away. As he later recalled,
"Solmaz tried not to show that she was upset in front of me, so I could go
with a strong heart."
Mrebrahimi
spent sixty days alone n a cell that was the length and width of his prone
body. His interrogators repeatedly questioned him about the Radio Farda
interview, and they said that his statements would be presented to Mortazavi.
He was not permitted to write, and he was blindfolded three times a day, when
he was taken to the bathroom and then ordered to perform his ablutions and
prayers. He was unwilling to discuss the details of his treatment— "I aged
thirty years in prison" was all he would say. But a Human Rights Watch
researcher involved with his case told me that the bloggers were beaten,
tortured, forced to strip, and sexually taunted.
By late
December, foreign pressure was mounting on the Iranian government to release
the bloggers, who had not been charged with any crime. Mirebrahimi was
released on the night of December 26th. The following day, an emissary from
Mortazavi's office told him that he could secure the release of two others. To
do so, he recalled, "I had to sign something promising that I wouldn't
write the blog anymore. These two bloggers were my friends. I was ready to do
anything to get them out. So I signed a letter Mortazavi had written.
Afterward, Mortazavi went to the others and said, 'Mkebrahimi signed this, so
you should do it, too.' One by one, each bloggerwho
signed it was
released. It was a very hard time in my life."
The statement
that Mirebrahimi had signed was published in Etemaad. It read, in part:
I, Roozbeh
Mirebrahimi, have been one of the accused in connection with the file of
Internet sites.... During the past few years, I and others like me had fallen
into the hands of those .. . who made use of people like me in order to
implement their evil projects.... Unfortunately, whatever I wrote during that
period ... undermined the reputation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. ... I
strongly attacked various pillars of the system, especially the judiciary, by
making various allegations against them, and I have portrayed them as being
against human rights....
During the past
few years, there existed... a frightful network, one end of which was inside
the country and the other end outside its borders.... Due to my weakness, I
also joined that network.... I was the source of reports and interviews with
foreign and counter-revolutionary radio stations... .The involvement of some
organizations and individuals from outside the country for supporting
individuals such as me is shameful, because people like me have trampled upon
the laws of this country....
The claim that I
was in solitary confinement is not true. Throughout the period of my detention
I experienced nothing but kindness and respect from those who were dealing
with us. Here, I wish to express my gratitude for the kindness of those
individuals and to pray to God Almighty for their success and well-being.
Mirebrahimi was
a free man, but he was now an admitted spy. Worse, the prosecutor wouldn't
leave him alone. "During those first twenty days, the police called me
fifteen times, for stupid reasons," he told me. "If, on the other
side of the world, someone wrote something about me, they called me in. My
family and I were under constant pressure." Mortazavi also relayed a
threat to Mirebrahimi: it would be very easy for an accident to befall him on
the street.
Mirebrahimi and
other bloggers who had been threatened decided that the only way to clear their
names and to combat the threat to their Eves would be to publicize what had
happened to them. "We decided to place our trust in President
Khatami," Mirebrahimi told me.
Officials in
Khatami’s office instructed the bloggers to present their case to a special
commission on human rights, which would then report to the President. When
Mirebrahimi addressed the commission, he recalled, 'The first thing I said was
that when we leave this place,; if any accident happens to us, just
know that Mortazavi is responsible. After we rs. Even some clerics. Some parts
of our story were so terrible that 1 asked my wife to leave the room."
After
Mirebrahimi testified, Mor-tazavi tried to hunt him down. "We couldn't go
home for a week," he recalled. "We couldn't go to our families'
homes. We were homeless in east Tehran, We stayed in friends' houses for short
periods of time."
One official
who had heard the blog-gers' testimony was Mohammad All Ab-tahi, who was then
an adviser to President Khatami; he posted an account of the meeting on his
own blog. {Abtahi's Web site is one of the most popular in the Farsi language.)
It was soon public knowledge that Mirebrahimi had been tortured and forced to
sign a confession, and that the reformists in the administration had heard his
story and lent it credence.
In the
meantime, the commission made its report to Khatami, who approached Iran's
Chief Justice, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi, a cleric who had provided
religious training to Khamenei. Though his political views were conservative,
Shahrudi had acquired a reputation for pragmatism and independence. A
government source told Mirebrahimi about Khatami's exchange with Shahrudi. Khatami
reportedly informed the Chief Justice that the public believed that the
bloggers were tortured in prison.
Shahrudi
replied that Mortazavi had assured him that the bloggers were lying. As
Mirebrahimi told the story, "Khatami took a strong position against
Mortazavi for the first time during his Presidency. He announced that his
investigations showed that we were tortured in prison, and that is not good for
the regime. He even said that some people who were handling this case—meaning
Mortazavi— were guilty themselves.11
Shahrudi
arranged to meet with the bloggers on January 10, 2005. "Our meeting
lasted two hours," Mirebrahimi told me. "He listened to what we said,
and some of it upset him gready. He was saying,fAllah akbar!
Allah akbar!'" When the bloggers were finished, Mirebrahimi recalled,
"Shahrudi said, 'If anyone calls you and asks you to go somewhere, don't
go. Tell them that you just met with me, and 1 know everything. "
After that
meeting, Shahrudi, over Mortazavi's objections, appointed a committee of three
judges to review the bloggers' files. The committee cleared seventeen but
kept the files of four open. Among them was Mirebrahimi's. "I'm still
frightened," Mirebrahimi told me. "It's like there's a sword hanging
over my head,"
And yet, in
Mirebrahimi's eyes, the conservative Chief Justice, by his actions, had become
a force for reform. Shahrudi issued a public letter in which he denounced the
bloggers' treatment in prison. "For the first time in twenty-six years of
the Islamic Republic, they announced that the courts had done something
wrong," Mirebrahimi said. But he added that the Presidential elections
were likely to render this advance nearly irrelevant. "If Ahmadinejad is
President, the only reformist left in government will be Shahrudi," he
said.
The Artists'
House is a gallery and cafe in central Tehran, around the corner from the
former American Embassy. It is a gathering place for young artists, intellectuals,
and bohemians. Abdollah Momeni, the twenty-eight-year-old leader of Iran's most
prominent student-activist group, met me there one afternoon in June.
Moment's
organization, Daftar-e Tahkirn-e Vahdat—the Office for the Consolidation of
Unity—was founded in 1979. During the first decade of the Islamic Republic, the
group functioned as an arm of the new regime, helping to put ge the
universities of people and ideas deemed contrary to Islam. In the nineteen-nine
ties, Daftar-c Tahkim-e Vahdat aligned itself with the reform movement, but it
broke away when Khatami failed to condemn the 1999 crackdown at Tehran
University.
We sat at a
table on the cafe's terrace. Momeni told me that he had been imprisoned twice
and summoned to court fifteen times. Like Mirebrahimi's, his court files are
still open. But, whereas Mircbrahimi seemed solitary and vulnerable, Momeni
spoke confidently, in the first-person plural. He also appeared preoccupied,
making phone calls or reading the newspaper from time to time as we spoke.
During the
spring, Momeni had become the public face of the student-led election boycott.
1 asked him about his group's decision. "We aren't interested in seeing
who will be President," he said. "We are just interested in
constructing democracy." Reformist politicians such as Khatami were mere
"window dressing for the regime.'1 They provided a veneer of
legitimacy to a system that was, ultimately, impervious to reform.
In 2003, Momeni
and six other activist leaders, with the support of Iranian exiles abroad,
began promoting the idea of holding a public referendum on the continued
existence of the Islamic Republic.
The Islamic Republic had been established by popular referendum; a new vote
would allow the people to revoke the system's legitimacy in die same way they'd
granted it. Thirty-five thousand people signed an online petition culling tor
such a referendum..
!t was
impossible to imagine that Khamenei's regime, heavily armed and flush with oil
money, would agree anytime soon to hold a plebiscite on its own survival,
concede defeat, and disappear. But, next to the muddle and compromise of the
reform movement, the referendum offered a refreshing clarity—a willingness to
go straight to rhe heart ot'its supporters' desires, and a rejection of the
Islamic Republic's democratic pretenses. Perhaps in time, some exiles have
suggested, it activists could somehow mobilize a mass civil-disobedience
movement against the government, a referendum could facilitate the end of the
regime.
Momeni
respected the work of reformist philosophers who sought to reconcile Islam
with liberalism. But he told me that lie was inspired, above all, by the German
philosopher Jiirgen Ilabermas, who has written about the importance of creating
a "public sphere" for open debate. "No revolution will happen,
not by force," Momeni told me. "We know that a government that comes
by force must use force in order to survive. We don't want such a government
here anymore." Instead, like Mirebrahimi, he supported building strong
human-rights groups and democracy organizations outside government.
Momeni believed
that Iran's activists could be bolstered by diplomatic pressure from the
international community. But Western powers, he lamented, were excessively
preoccupied with the country's nuclear program. (Iranian authorities insist
that the country is developing nuclear technology as an energy source, hut outside
experts fear that the country may produce weapons within the decade.) Momeni
suggested that the European Union press Iran to improve its human-rights record
rather than halt its nuclear production. In his view, American calls for
democratic change in the Muslim world were useful for the Iranian democracy
movement, but he had no illusions about their sincerity. "Foreign powers
like the United States want democracy for the Middle East not because of the people
but because they want to locate the terrorist bases," he told me.
"They want to install a government they'll find predictable. They aren't
interested in the national dignity of Iran."
I asked Momeni
if he felt that he was being watched or followed. "One hundred per
cent," he replied. "These two guys next to us are here for me. Whenever
I go home, most of the time I see someone behind me."
I looked at the
table to our right, where two older men with scruffy beards, mobile phones, and
briefcases sat over tea, looking sorely out of place among the café’s
cosmopolitan crowd. My translator told me that the men had been sitting there
for some time, but one had stared at her so fixedly that she could not signal
us even with her eyes. Another bearded man paced the terrace behind us, and yet
another, inside the building, peered over my shoulder from a window, cell phone
in hand.
Momeni left
first. When my driver pulled up, the bearded men surrounded the car and took
down the license-plate number. There was not even the pretense of stealth.
***
The moment that
Khatami came power, Ayatollah Khamcnei and Ms clerical elite worried that the
universities would become centers of dissent. They turned to the Basij, a
hard-line mi-
litia of young
fundamentalists who provided physical enforcement for the conservatives. The
Basij was created in 1979; during the Iran-Iraq War, it dispatched volunteers
to the front, and later the militia manned checkpoints along the streets of
Tehran, searching cars for banned Western music or pictures of uncovered women.
Parliamentary hardliners established a Basij unit in ever)' Iranian university
in the nineteen-nine-ties. After the 1999 clash with students, the Basij
aggressively restored "order" throughout the universities in Tehran.
When I visited
the Tehran University faculty of social sciences this summer, I met with some
Basij leaders in a sweltering empty classroom equipped with a whirring but
ineffectual air-conditioner. Sajad Saftar-Harandi, the head of the faculty's
Basij force, said that his team consisted of eighty to ninety registered
Basi-jis and around a hundred others, who "help."Twenty-two years
old, he wore the beard, long-sleeved sliirt, and pants characteristic of the
militia. He looked like a teen-ager, and had a sharp, handsome face, a slight
frame, and hard eyes, which the student who brought me to him sternly
instructed me not to look into.
'The Basij is
the heart and soul of the Islamic revolution in Iran, particularly the
university Basijis," Saffar-Harandi told me. "We are the keepers and
protectors of the movement through generations." He lamented that the Kha-tami administration had
led Iran astray from the Islamic Republic's founding values. An Ahmadinejad
Presidency, he said, would put a stop to that. "The dress code is not a
priority in this term," he asserted. "The priority is to be sure we
are governing completely based on the values of Islam." A few weeks after
I left Tehran, Ahmadinejad appointed Saffar-Harandi's father, Mohammad Hossein
Saffar-Harandi, at that time the editor-in-chief of the hard-line daily Kayhan,
to the powerful position of minister of culture and Islamic guidance.
Saffar-Harandi
left me to his underling, who was less polished and more fervent. Ali
Belashabadi, the son of a carpet weaver who was disabled in the Iran-Iraq
War, was
studying social communications in the hope of becoming a journalist. An
Ahmadinejad administration, he told me, would not stop young Iranians from
evaluating the government, just as long as they did so in a
"constructive" way. "It won't be like Khatami's Presidency,
when freedom was so indefinable that lots of people had their own definitions
of freedom and did things in the name of social and political freedom that
aren't desirable and are far from the values of the Islamic Republic," he
said. "Ahmadinejad's term will be about moderate freedom."
Under Khatami,
he explained disapprovingly, some political activists, in the name of freedom,
had questioned the role of the Supreme Leader. "I am so sad that these
groups are trying to weaken the position of the Supreme Leadership, the thing
we are most loyal to," he said. "This is our identity as Muslims."
Ahmadinejad would
reverse that trend, he predicted, and he would eventually restore the dress
code. "Even in the university, we see the young generation of women
dressing in a way that is meant to attract attention," Belashabadi said.
"This is an academic atmosphere, and the men can't pay attention. Even
non-Muslims, if they were here, would be attracted to this kind of
fashion." Islam, he told me, disapproves of women who wear makeup,
perfume, or alluring clothes for anyone but their husbands. "These are
fundamental values," he said. "We had a revolution for these
values."
I asked
Belashabadi what he thought should be done about the satellite channels on
which Iranians watch illicit fare such ah
music videos, Western movies, and political commentary from Iranian
exiles abroad. "The majority of the population is young," he said.
"Young people by nature are horny. Because they are horny, they like to
watch satellite channels where there are films or programs they can jerk off
to." The regime could filter the channels, he suggested, or it could try-
to educate the people to tune in to more wholesome programming. He concluded,
"We have to do something about satellite television to keep society free
from this horny jerk-off situation."
My translator
implored me, in a jaw-clenched monotone, "Please do not laugh right now.
This is a very sensitive moment."
The food court
at Jaam-e Jam, an upscale shopping mall in north Tehran, looks like a
shopping-mall food court anywhere, with its colorful plastic chairs attached to
glass-topped tables. An array of counters sell fast food that is billed as
Mexican or Italian but invariably tastes more or less Persian. Nevertheless,
it is one of the more expensive places to eat in Tehran, and it is a gathering
spot tor fashionable Iranian girls, who come in their skimpiest hijabs. I
saw young women wearing three-quarter-length sleeves, cropped pants, and
high-heeled sandals. One young woman had a sequinned purse and a tight denim
manteau that had jeans-style pockets on the backside.
A man who asked
to be identified as Arash, a twenty-five-year-old from an upper-middle-class
family, was trying to help me identify "Javads"—a common male name
that has become derisive slang among Iranian youth for people who, as Arash put
it, "think they're very modern and very cool and great but are not."
"Five
years ago, the sure sign of a Javad was driving a Nissan Maxima," he
explained. "In non -Javad communities, that was a sign that your dad was a
motherfucker who had become very rich after the revolution, but whn was from a
poor-culture family." Today, with the relaxing of tlie dress codes, Iran's
nouveaux riches are harder to spot, but Arash offered some additional examples:
"A girl who has some enormous makeup that's unnecessary for the
situation, high heels, hut she's a virgin and has no boyfriend and wants an
arranged marriage. Or a person who looks very modern but can't speak English,
and who likes Farsi music from Los Angeles."
For Arash, who
has never been to the United States, being truly modern was all about being
American. Born the year after the revolution, he speaks profane but excellent
English, littered with slang he has gleaned from contraband hip-hop. The
rappers 50 Cent and The Game surely never imagined that the line "the
underdog's on top," from "Hate It or Love It," a gleeful rap
about their own success, would capture the frustration of the onetiine Iranian
elite under the rule of backward mullahs. But, to Arash, American hip-hop is
rich with Iranian social criticism.
Arash told me
that he hated living in Iran. "These mullahs fucked up this country. The
country is sick right now. I can't live in a sick situation. For that reason, \
couldn't vote yesterday. Td give my life for America, but not for Iran. Because,
if I work a lot there, I may achieve something. In Iran, when you want
something, plan for it, work your ass off for it, you cannot make it and have
no clear future." If he had voted, I suggested, he at least might have
helped prevent the country from falling entirely under the control of
hard-liners. Arash offered an analogy. "If America one day became a
dictatorship—if everything changed overnight and Hezbollah came to rule the
country—are you going to enter politics and help Hexbollah?" he asked.
"Or do you just not enter politics?"
Arash worked
for an environmental group, but he could not advance far in bis career without
establishing connections in clerical circles. His Western style of dress also
marked him as an outsider. He had a passion for Iran's rugged landscape—he had
done a lot of backpacking—and he loved its people, especially the nomads and
villagers he had met during his travels. Still, he wanted to see the world,
and in order to go almost anyplace other than Turkey he'd need a visa, which
was hard for an Iranian to come by. Arash complained bitterly that foreign
embassies would assume that he was a terrorist. He longed for contact with
foreigners, but he quit a job as a tour guide when he discovered that he was
required to spy on his clients. The rap music and Western movies he loved were
available only on
the black
market. And Iranian sexual culture, he said, was suffocating.
The enforced
sexual repression of the Islamic Republic had spawned a culture of
extremes—virginity and arranged marriages on the one hand, sexual libertinism
on the other. For young people from Iran's middle and upper classes,
promiscuous experimentation was the norm. Even though young Iranians live with
their families until marriage, Arash said, "this generation has the
Internet, films, satellite television, porno. You can't force them to be
fanatics." Unfortunately, he added, young Iranian women, in their efforts
to be modern, had succeeded only in becoming vulgar. 'The girls here have no
clue that you mustn't talk about sex 24/7," he said. The male role in this
dynamic didn't much appeal to Arash, either. "It's a male-dominated
society, and I hate it," he said. Iranian men, he said, were expected to
be both promiscuous and "psycho-jealous." He went on, "There is
no culture where you and your girlfriend can be together, live together. It's
the worst thing."
Sex segregation
in Iranian schools compounded the gender divide. Once, when Arash was a college
student, he was arrested for walking down die street with a female classmate.
The penalty was ninety-nine lashes, but Arash escaped it by paying the
authorities a hundred and fifty dollars. "Everything we do is
against the law," he told me. "It can change in a minute, and that
minute is not definable. Back then, there were hundreds of checkpoints on the
streets. "Who is this girl with you? What are these CDs, books, pictures?'
We are all outlaws."
The outlaw
life, for many young Iranians, involves all-night parties and illegal drugs.
In a country where alcohol is illegal and opium flows easily across the long
Afghan border, recreational drug use has reached epidemic proportions. Iran has
the highest rate of opiate addiction in the world. "Iran is like the
United States in the sixties and seventies," Arash told me. At parties I
attended, some Iranians smoked opium as casually as Americans smoke
marijuana. Although only fifteen per cent of the drugs that enter Iran are
impounded by the police, this amount includes about eighty-five per cent of all
the opiates seized globally.
In Arash's
world, drug abuse reflected the apathy, boredom, and impotence of a middle
class that had become increasingly alienated in the twenty-six years since the
revolution. "The Iranian situation has made us passive," he said.
"We are not active anymore. 'Inshallah'•—this is killing us. We do
nothing and leave everything to God."
In school,
Arash recalled, students were forced to stand in rows and shout slogans;
"Long live Khomeini!" and "Death to America!" Sometimes
they would be directed to step on an American flag chalked onto the asphalt.
"I was always feeling very bad," Arash told me. "I'd be
thinking, I like American culture! Why am I saying, Down with this?"
At first,
America was a place where Arash imagined he could have a big farm and raise
horses. As he grew older, black America would become his fantasy within a
fantasy—a space where he could be both the free man he wanted to be and the
underdog he considered himself to be. He confided that he'd ex-changed e-mail messages with a black woman
in Ohio, whom he hoped to marry so that he could get a green card. The night I
met Arash, on the way to a party in the north of Tehran, we'd talked about
"8 Mile," the movie starring Em-incm. As he explained the film, 'It's
about growing up in a place you don't like and working your ass oft" to
get out of it."
His dreams of
flight had begun the first time he left Iran, just a few years earlier, for a
short trip to Istanbul. Everything thrilled him. He went to clubs with live
d.j.s. He saw American movies. lie wore hip-hop clothes without fear of harassment.
"Something lit up in my soul," he said. "For a person always in
prison, seeing the free world—for me, my life started the minute I left
Iran." Since his return, he has thought of nothing but going abroad again.
As we left Jaam-c Jam, Arash rattled off a list of desired destinations: China,
France, Italy. He then added, in a tossed-off manner that stopped me cold,
"But none of these countries will ever give me a visa. So I'll probably
die here with my dreams."
Two days before
the runoff election between Ahmadinejad and Rafsan-jani, Arash and 1 attended
an evening gathering of friends and family in north Tehran, near Vanak Square.
At two in the morning, we heard shouting outside the host's apartment, and we
went out for a drive to look around. The Rafsanjani campaign had dispatched
scores of young people, their faces painted, to shout from motorcycles and
distribute bumper stickers and posters, which they scattered like confetti.
Ahmadinejad supporters had come out, too, and transformed affluent north Tehran
into a Basij rail}'. As we nosed through the crowded streets, earnest
beardedyoung men slapped Ahmadinejad posters onto our car's windshield and
tossed CDs in through the open windows. They seemed to outnumber the
Rafsanjani campaigners, whose slogans were becoming increasingly absurdist.
"D.J. Ali Akbar!" one group of campaigners shouted to Arash's
delight.
Revolutionary
Guards directed traffic at chaotic intersections. A car ahead of us had affixed
a poster to its rear window. According to Arash, it read, "Fellow Mom
supporters: Because we do not want to allow the country to choke and end up in the hands of die Basij, now
vote for Rafsanjani."
Even Arash,
despite his disavowal of politics, was thinking of voting for Rafsanjani.
"Somehow I've gotta work with this country, if I don't leave," he
said. But, in the end, he couldn't bring himself to cast a ballot.
At three in the
morning, we reached Ahmadinejad's campaign headquarters on Fereshteh, an
upscale street. The headquarters were still open, showing videos of the
candidate's biography on a large television screen and serving pineapple juice
on metal tables in a stone courtyard. Arash picked up a campaign flyer and
translated it for me. It listed the reasons that Ahmadinejad's rivals might
believe that the Teliran Mayor shouldn't be President: that his clothing was
less expensive than that of his security detail, for example, or that instead
of rewarding loyal cronies for their services the Mayor arranged loans for
young married couples. Compared with Rafsanjani—who had become notorious,
during his earlier Presidency, for his wealth and corruption—Ahmadinejad
appeared to be a humble outsider. He managed to appeal not only to militants
and conservatives, or even just to the legions of frustrated poor; he also
captured some of the protest vote, from people who saw Rafsanjani as the
embodiment of the stams quo. That morning, a waiter in the restaurant at my
hotel had explained this to me without even the benefit of a common language,
"Rafsanjani," he said, and made a face, pantomiming rolls of fat at
his waist and a turban on his head. "Ahmadinejad," he said, smiling,
and tugged on his own clothes, holding out a level hand equal to his own
height.
At
Ahmadincjad's campaign headquarters, Arash and I met Mohammad Mahdi, a nine
teen-year-old volunteer widi enormous eyes, tousled hair, a worn yellow
T-shirt, and a sweet smile. "I am speaking as a true Basiji who loves my
country from the depths of my heart," he informed us. He came from a
working-class Telirani family and studied industrial management at the
university. He praised Ahmadinejad's commitment to improving education and
economic opportunities for young people. Mahdi was sure that his candidate
posed no threat to the people's freedom. In fact, he had voted for Khatami in
2001, and now reproached the outgoing President. "We really respected
Khatami, but he couldn't use the popular support he had. Khatami promised to
improve political freedom, but he couldn't do it."
Soon, a
campaign higher-up pulled Mahdi away, admonishing him not to talk to an
American. Still, Mahdi managed to steal back to our table before we left.
'When you meet Ahmadinejad, he's so humble that you almost think you're the
boss and he's the one who wants something from you," he confided.
The morning
after Ahmadinejad's victory, I went to visit Arash at his parents' apartment.
When I arrived, he wasn't dressed; his mother and aunt served me breakfast
while he was in the shower. He emerged wearing a sleeveless basketball iersey
and long, baggy shorts.
"Wassup,
homey?" Arash said cheerfully when he saw me.
"You have
a new President," I said.
I had assumed
rhat he knew. Confused, he sank down onto the couch. His aunt spoke up
hoarsely. "Ahma-dincjad" was all she said.
Arash, who
normally talked himself to the point of exhaustion, said nothing. He sat with
his head in his hands for nearly ten minutes. The bread that liis mother had
warmed cooled on the table. He kneaded his forehead, blinked, stared at the
floor. Finally, he said, "Everything is finished."
Later that day,
I went to see a man who is perhaps Iran's most famous and most endangered
dissident, for whom the stakes of Ahmadinejad's victory were unimaginably
high. Hashem Aghajari, a historian at Tehran's Tar-biat Modares University, is
a popular hero in Iran, especially among students. A revolutionary religious
intellectual, Aghajari had lost a leg fighting in the Iran-Iraq War. But in a
2002 speech in Hamadan, the city he's from, Aghajari called for a reformation
of Shiite Islam and proclaimed that Muslims were not "monkeys" who
should "blindly follow" religious leaders. He was convicted of
apostasy and sentenced to death by hanging.
Aghajari's
sentence provoked a national crisis. Demonstrating students clashed with
hard-line militias in the streets. The case also attracted international
attention; in 2003, Aghajari was widely believed to be a finalist for the Nobel
Peace Prize. Capitulating to the pressure, Ayatollah Khamenei intervened; and
there was a retrial. The historian's sentence was eventually commuted to five
years in prison, of which he served two before being released on bail, in July,
2004.
I went to see
Aghajari in his office at the university, a pale brick compound with grassy
courtyards and layers of security at the gate. He was gracious and
soft-spoken, with thinning gray hair. Pulling on a pipe from rime to time, he
told me that, after the Cold War, American-style democracy had become globally
ascendant. He hoped that the democracy which would one day emerge in Iran
would be one based on Islamic ethics and spirituality. That would be Khatami's
Islam, not the Islam of hard-line clerics. As for the support of outsiders, he
said, "We should defend all nations' rights to control their own destiny,
and to achieve democracy and freedom. Hut this defense is not military. It is
moral and political."
Unlike many of
the other reformist intellectuals I'd met, Aghajari had supported the student
boycott of the election and criticized the reformists for fielding Presidential
candidates. He also supported the referendum on the legitimacy of die Islamic
Republic. "But we have to find a good route to get there," he added.
"Putting the referendum petition on the Internet was a little premature,
in my opinion. But the situation is such that there is not much more time for
us. I hear some reformists saying that within six hundred years there will be
democracy. That's like saying, during the age of computers, that to
have our own computer we will have to start with the wheel."
Ahmadincjad won
the election with seventeen million votes; Rafsanjani received ten million.
Some twenty million Iranians didn't vote. "Those in power have many
serious struggles ahead," Aghajari predicted. "Thirty million Iranians
didn't vote for Ahmadinejad. The government can't put them aside and not see
them. These thirty million may keep quiet for the moment, but when the time is
right they will defend their rights."
Ahmadinejad
acted with apparent confidence in the first months of his Presidency, banning
foreign movies, purging the diplomatic corps of moderates, and adopting a
belligerent tone on foreign-policy matters. In a speech to the United Nations,
in September, he signalled that Iran would not abandon its quest for nuclear
technology, and in October, at a Tehran conference called "A World
Without Zionism,'' he declared that Israel should be "wiped oft the
map." Ahmadinejad has been comparatively quiet about Iraq, but Iran's
Revolutionary Guard, to which he remains particularly close, is suspected of
supporting Shiite Islamists there. Without Khatami, there is no brake on Iran's
most confrontational impulses. The regime, as Aghajari explained to me in
June, had "come together in one hand."
Now that the
hard-liners had com- ' plete control of the government, Aghajari said, they
would be held responsible for meeting the people's needs—it would no longer be
possible to blame the reformists. Soon enough, Aghajari said, the seventeen
million Iranians who had placed their hopes in Ahmadinejad would confront his
inability to make the economic changes he promised, even while the walls closed
in on Iran's cultural and political life. Within a year, Aghajari believed,
Ahmadinejad would face an angry and disappointed populace.
Indeed, the new
President's first months in office seemed to bear out Aghajari's predictions.
Ahmadinejad set aside more than a billion dollars for grants to newlyweds, but
such gestures will not resolve the country's economic problems. Foreign capital
is fleeing to Dubai, and Tehran's stock market has fallen by twenty per cent
since May. Curiously, Ayatollah Khamenei issued an edict in October that gave
sweeping new powers to Rafsanjani, who runs a government body known as the
Expediency Council—a move widely seen as an effort to rein in Ahmadinejad. The
new President, in other words, may be too hardline for even the Supreme
Leader.
In June, however,
Aghajari insisted that he was not in despair over Ahma-dinejad's victory. Tm
optimistic," he said.
"The
people of Iran should experience this period so that things go better in the
future. If the people hadn't experienced theocracy, they would still be waiting
for it. But now that we have experienced thu-ocracy, there is no future for it
here."
I had seen
Aghajari a week earlier, when he remarked that, if the "fascist!;"
controlled the entire government, he imagined that he would eventually suffer
the same fate as the assassinated dissidents of the late nineteen-nineties. I
asked him now whether he feared for his life.
Hu took his
pipe from his mouth and smiled. "We have a saying in Farsi," he replied,
" 'There is no shade darker than black.' The worst they can do is execute
me. I have prepared myself for that. If 1 am worried, it is not for myself.
It's for the Iranian people, for young people, today's generation and future
generations. My freedom and my life, and those of one or two people like me,
don't matter. They may take me to prison. Tm ready for that. In this society,
we have no freedom to speak or to write. This is a prison, too."
A year ago, after
I returned from a trip to Iran, I met in Washington with an official at the
State Department, who wus convinced that the Iranian regime was hardening even
then. "The regime will be even more secure when it's rid of
Khatami," the official told me. "He shook things up. At the time he
was elected, they were frightened. If he had been more forceful, there could
have been a civil war. He might have forced the issue. But he chose not to."
As a result, the official said, the reform movement that Washington had hoped
would be Iran's pcrcstroika had turned out to be its Prague Spring—a flowering
of freedom that quickly withered. Those who sought democratic change would now
be forced underground, where they would turn inward or on one another in the
years that it would take to devise a new, more potent strategy.
Roozbeh
Mirebrahimi sometimes wondered why he had volunteered for the role of
dissident. In August, he wrote an e-mail that said, 'Why must a guy like me, in
the throes of youth, work this hard for a minimum of rights? Just so others can
speak freely, so that they don't stammer with fear, and they can get their
very first rights. Sometimes when I sit alone and think, I ask myself why and
for whom it is that I'm milking such a sacrifice."
On his blog and
in his e-mails to me, Mirebrahimi sometimes resembled a bereaved man sorting
through the personal effects of a loved une who had unforgivably disappointed
him. The reform movement as he had known ir was dead. But whether ir had served
to advance or ro thwart the ambitions of young Iranians like himself remained
uncertain.
For
Mirebrahimi, Khatami embodied the movement's promise and its failure, and it was
with pained ambivalence that he watched die President leave office, on July
30th. He wrote on his blog, "I only feel sorrow for Mr. Khatami, that
everything he had in the palm of his hand in most regards will disappear into
the sky." Later, he questioned his own sorrow. Khatami held a ceremony
honoring his return to private life. At the event, he was asked about the
political prisoner Akbar Ganji. "The problem is more on Ganji's
side," Khatami said, blaming Ganji's extended incarceration on his refusal
to stop speaking out against the regime.
Mirebrahimi
wrote, "Truth be told, a while ago I wanted to get a letter to him
somehow, which 1 wrote upon the end of his Presidency, and thankhim and let him
know how well I appreciate the lasting accomplishments he made during his
term. Pd readied the letter a while back, but the position Khatami took about
Ganji made me abandon the idea of sending it," In the next election,
Mirebrahimi wrote ruefully, the reformists would most likely not even be
allowed ro put up posters.
Not long after the elections, he informed me, his wife was purged from the staff of another newspaper, Towseh, on account of her husband's activities. In fact, any publication that considered hiring Mirebrahimi or his wife was immediately subject to pressure and threats. "Nowadays, practically all it takes to close a newspaper is my entering into it," he said. By this fall, tin1 couple were in dire straits—a dangling situation— financially and professionally. "This is exactly what my enemies wanted for me," he wrote. Mirebrahimi told me that he spent bis days surfing the Internet and hoping for better times. "In Iran, we live in an environment that creates anxiety, and we endure these difficulties," he wrote. "We don't know what will happen tomorrow. I remember that you were at our home the night that Ahmadinejad won the first round of the elections. You asked me how I saw the future. I said, 'For the future, reform, and for Iran, illumination. But for us, difficulty and danger.' Then I said I would tolerate it. Yet today I see that it is more difficult and more dangerous than I’d imagined.”