Bush’s Lost Year
By James
Fallows
|
By deciding to invade Iraq, the Bush Administration
decided not to do many other things: not to reconstruct Afghanistan, not to
deal with the threats posed by North Korea and Iran, and not to wage an
effective war on terror. An inventory of opportunities lost |
I remember distinctly the way 2002 began in Washington. New Year's Day was below freezing and blustery. The next day was worse. That day, January 2, I trudged several hundred yards across the vast parking lots of the Pentagon. I was being pulled apart by the wind and was ready to feel sorry for myself, until I was shamed by the sight of miserable, frozen Army sentries at the numerous outdoor security posts that had been manned non-stop since the September 11 attacks.
I was going for an interview with Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of
defense. At the time, Wolfowitz's name and face were not yet familiar
worldwide. He was known in Washington for offering big-picture explanations of
the Administration's foreign-policy goals-a task for which the President was
unsuited, the Vice President was unavailable, and most other senior
Administration officials were, for various reasons, inappropriate. The National
Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, was still playing a background role; the
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was mainly dealing with immediate
operational questions in his daily briefings about the war in Afghanistan; the
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, was already known to be on the losing side of
most internal policy struggles.
After the interview I wrote a short article about Wolfowitz and his views
for the March 2002 issue of this magazine. In some ways the outlook and choices
he described then still fit the world situation two and a half years later.
Even at the time, the possibility that the Administration's next move in the
war on terror would be against Iraq, whether or not Iraq proved to be involved
in the 9/11 hijackings, was under active discussion. When talking with me
Wolfowitz touched briefly on the case for removing Saddam Hussein, in the
context of the general need to reduce tyranny in the Arab-Islamic world.
But in most ways the assumptions and tone of the conversation now seem
impossibly remote. At the beginning of 2002 the United States still operated in
a climate of worldwide sympathy and solidarity. A broad range of allies
supported its anti-Taliban efforts in Afghanistan, and virtually no
international Muslim leaders had denounced them. President Bush was still being
celebrated for his eloquent speech expressing American resolve, before a joint
session of Congress on September 20. His deftness in managing domestic and
international symbols was typified by his hosting an end-of-Ramadan ceremony at
the White House in mid-December, even as battle raged in the Tora Bora region
of Afghanistan, on the Pakistani border. At the start of 2002 fewer than 10,000
U.S. soldiers were deployed overseas as part of the war on terror, and a dozen
Americans had died in combat. The United States had not captured Osama bin
Laden, but it had routed the Taliban leadership that sheltered him, and seemed
to have put al-Qaeda on the run.
Because of the quick and, for Americans, nearly bloodless victory over the
Taliban, the Administration's national-security team had come to epitomize
competence. During our talk Wolfowitz referred to "one reason this group
of people work very well together," by which he meant that Cheney,
Rumsfeld, Powell, and many others, including himself, had collaborated for
years, from the Reagan Administration through the 1991 Gulf War and afterward.
From this experience they had developed a shared understanding of the nuances
of "how to use force effectively," which they were now applying. In
retrospect, the remarkable thing about Wolfowitz's comment was the
assumption-which I then had no reason to challenge-that Bush's foreign-policy
team was like a great business or sporting dynasty, which should be examined
for secrets of success.
As I listen to the tape of that interview now, something else stands out:
how expansive and unhurried even Wolfowitz sounded. "Even" Wolfowitz
because since then he has become the symbol of an unrelenting drive toward war
with Iraq. We now know that within the Administration he was urging the case
for "regime change" there immediately after 9/11. But when speaking
for the record, more than a year before that war began, he stressed how broad a
range of challenges the United States would have to address, and over how many
years, if it wanted to contain the sources of terrorism. It would need to find
ways to "lance the boil" of growing anti-Americanism, as it had done
during the Reagan years by supporting democratic reform in South Korea and the
Philippines. It would have to lead the Western world in celebrating and
welcoming Turkey as the most successfully modernized Muslim country. It would
need to understand that in the long run the most important part of America's
policy was its moral example-that America stands for things "the rest of
the world wants for itself."
I also remember the way 2002 ended. By late December some 200,000 members of
the U.S. armed forces were en route to staging areas surrounding Iraq. Hundreds
of thousands of people had turned out on the streets of London, Rome, Madrid,
and other cities to protest the impending war. That it was impending was
obvious, despite ongoing negotiations at the United Nations. Within weeks of
the 9/11 attacks President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld had asked to see plans
for a possible invasion of Iraq. Congress voted to authorize the war in
October. Immediately after the vote, planning bureaus inside the Pentagon were
told to be ready for combat at any point between then and the following April.
(Operation Iraqi Freedom actually began on March 19.) Declaring that it was
impossible to make predictions about a war that might not occur, the
Administration refused to discuss plans for the war's aftermath-or its
potential cost. In December the President fired Lawrence Lindsey, his chief
economic adviser, after Lindsey offered a guess that the total cost might be
$100 billion to $200 billion. As it happened, Lindsey's controversial estimate
held up very well. By this summer, fifteen months after fighting began in Iraq,
appropriations for war and occupation there totaled about $150 billion. With
more than 100,000 U.S. soldiers still based in Iraq, the outlays will continue
indefinitely at a rate of about $5 billion a month-much of it for fuel,
ammunition, spare parts, and other operational needs. All this is at striking
variance with the pre-war insistence by Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz that
Iraq's oil money, plus contributions from allies, would minimize the financial
burden on Americans.
Despite the rout of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, terror attacks, especially
against Americans and Europeans, were rising at the end of 2002 and would
continue to rise through 2003. Some 400 people worldwide had died in terror
attacks in 2000, and some 300 in 2001, apart from the 3,000-plus killed on
September 11. In 2002 more than 700 were killed, including 200 when a bomb
exploded outside a Bali nightclub in October.
Whereas at the beginning of the year Paul Wolfowitz had sounded expansive
about the many avenues the United States had to pursue in order to meet the
terror threat, by the end of the year the focus was solely on Iraq, and the
Administration's tone was urgent. "Simply stated, there is no doubt that
Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction," Vice President Cheney
said in a major speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars just before Labor Day.
"There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against
our allies, and against us." Two weeks later, as Congress prepared for its
vote to authorize the war, Condoleezza Rice said on CNN, "We do know that
[Saddam Hussein] is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon . . . We don't want the
smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud."
On the last day of the year President Bush told reporters at his ranch in
Texas, "I hope this Iraq situation will be resolved peacefully. One of my
New Year's resolutions is to work to deal with these situations in a way so
that they're resolved peacefully." As he spoke, every operating branch of
the government was preparing for war.
September 11, 2001, has so often been described as a "hinge event"
that it is tempting to think no other events could rival its significance.
Indeed, as a single shocking moment that changed Americans' previous
assumptions, the only modern comparisons are Pearl Harbor and the assassination
of John F. Kennedy. But as 9/11 enters history, it seems likely that the
aftermath, especially the decisions made during 2002, will prove to be as
significant as the attack itself. It is obviously too early to know the full
historical effect of the Iraq campaign. The biggest question about post-Saddam Iraq-whether
it is headed toward stability or toward new tyranny and chaos-may not be
answered for years.
But the biggest question about the United States-whether its response to
9/11 has made it safer or more vulnerable-can begin to be answered. Over the past
two years I have been talking with a group of people at the working level of
America's anti-terrorism efforts. Most are in the military, the intelligence
agencies, and the diplomatic service; some are in think tanks and
nongovernmental agencies. I have come to trust them, because most of them have
no partisan ax to grind with the Administration (in the nature of things,
soldiers and spies are mainly Republicans), and because they have so far been
proved right. In the year before combat started in Iraq, they warned that
occupying the country would be far harder than conquering it. As the occupation
began, they pointed out the existence of plans and warnings the Administration
seemed determined to ignore.
As a political matter, whether the United States is now safer or more
vulnerable is of course ferociously controversial. That the war was
necessary-and beneficial-is the Bush Administration's central claim. That it
was not is the central claim of its critics. But among national-security
professionals there is surprisingly little controversy. Except for those in
government and in the opinion industries whose job it is to defend the
Administration's record, they tend to see America's response to 9/11 as a
catastrophe. I have sat through arguments among soldiers and scholars about
whether the invasion of Iraq should be considered the worst strategic error in
American history-or only the worst since Vietnam. Some of these people argue
that the United States had no choice but to fight, given a pre-war consensus among
its intelligence agencies that Iraq actually had WMD supplies. Many say that
things in Iraq will eventually look much better than they do now. But about the
conduct and effect of the war in Iraq one view prevails: it has increased the
threats America faces, and has reduced the military, financial, and diplomatic
tools with which we can respond.
"Let me tell you my gut feeling," a senior figure at one of
America's military-sponsored think tanks told me recently, after we had talked
for twenty minutes about details of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.
"If I can be blunt, the Administration is full of shit. In my view we are
much, much worse off now than when we went into Iraq. That is not a partisan
position. I voted for these guys. But I think they are incompetent, and 1 have
had a very close perspective on what is happening. Certainly in the long run we
have harmed ourselves. We are playing to the enemy's political advantage.
Whatever tactical victories we may gain along the way, this will prove to be a
strategic blunder."
This man will not let me use his name, because he is still involved in
military policy. He cited the experiences of Joseph Wilson, Richard Clarke, and
Generals Eric Shinseki and Anthony Zinni to illustrate the personal risks of
openly expressing his dissenting view. But I am quoting him anonymously-as I
will quote some others-because his words are representative of what one hears
at the working level.
To a surprising extent their indictment doesn't concentrate on the aspect of
the problem most often discussed in public: exactly why the United States got
the WMD threat so wrong. Nor does it involve a problem I have previously
discussed in this magazine (see "Blind Into Baghdad,"
January/February Atlantic): the Administration's failure, whether deliberate or
inadvertent, to make use of the careful and extensive planning for postwar Iraq
that had been carried out by the State Department, the CIA, various branches of
the military, and many other organizations. Rather, these professionals argue
that by the end of 2002 the decisions the Administration had made-and avoided
making-through the course of the year had left the nation less safe, with fewer
positive options. Step by step through 2002 America's war on terror became
little more than its preparation for war in Iraq.
Because of that shift, the United States succeeded in removing Saddam
Hussein, but at this cost: The first front in the war on terror, Afghanistan,
was left to fester, as attention and money were drained toward Iraq. This in
turn left more havens in Afghanistan in which terrorist groups could
reconstitute themselves; a resurgent opium-poppy economy to finance them; and
more of the disorder and brutality the United States had hoped to eliminate.
Whether or not the strong international alliance that began the assault on the
Taliban might have brought real order to Afghanistan is impossible to say. It
never had the chance, because America's premature withdrawal soon fractured the
alliance and curtailed postwar reconstruction. Indeed, the campaign in
Afghanistan was warped and limited from the start, by a pre-existing desire to
save troops for Iraq.
A full inventory of the costs of war in Iraq goes on. President Bush began
2002 with a warning that North Korea and Iran, not just Iraq, threatened the
world because of the nuclear weapons they were developing. With the United
States preoccupied by Iraq, these other two countries surged ahead. They have
been playing a game of chess, or nerves, against America-and if they have not
exactly won, they have advanced by several moves. Because it lost time and
squandered resources, the United States now has no good options for dealing
with either country. It has fewer deployable soldiers and weapons; it has less
international leverage through the "soft power" of its alliances and
treaties; it even has worse intelligence, because so many resources are
directed toward Iraq.
At the beginning of 2002 the United States imported over 50 percent of its
oil. In two years we have increased that figure by nearly 10 percent. The need
for imported oil is the fundamental reason the United States must be
deferential in its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Revenue from that oil is the
fundamental reason that extremist groups based in Saudi Arabia were so rich. After
the first oil shocks, in the mid-1970s, the United States took steps that
reduced its imports of Persian Gulf oil. The Bush Administration could have
made similar steps a basic part of its anti-terrorism strategy, and could have
counted on making progress: through most of 2002 the Administration could
assume bipartisan support for nearly anything it proposed. But its only such
suggestion was drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.
Before America went to war in Iraq, its military power seemed limitless.
There was less need to actually apply it when all adversaries knew that any
time we did so we would win. Now the limits on our military's manpower and
sustainability are all too obvious. For example, the Administration announced
this summer that in order to maintain troop levels in Iraq, it would withdraw
12,500 soldiers from South Korea. The North Koreans, the Chinese, the Iranians,
the Syrians, and others who have always needed to take into account the chance
of U.S. military intervention now realize that America has no stomach for
additional wars. Before Iraq the U.S. military was turning away qualified
applicants. Now it applies "stop-loss" policies that forbid
retirement or resignation by volunteers, and it has mobilized the National
Guard and Reserves in a way not seen since World War II.
Because of outlays for Iraq, the United States cannot spend $150 billion for
other defensive purposes. Some nine million shipping containers enter American
ports each year; only two percent of them are physically inspected, because
inspecting more would be too expensive. The Department of Homeland security,
created after 9/11, is a vast grab-bag of federal agencies, from the Coast
Guard to the Border Patrol to the former Immigration and Naturalization Service;
ongoing operations in Iraq cost significantly more each month than all Homeland
Security expenses combined. The department has sought to help cities large and
small to improve their "first responder" systems, especially with
better communications for their fire and emergency medical services. This
summer a survey by the U.S. Conference of Mayors found that fewer than a
quarter of 231 major cities under review had received any of the aid they
expected. An internal budget memo from the Administration was leaked this past
spring. It said that outlays for virtually all domestic programs, including
homeland security, would have to be cut in 2005-and the federal budget deficit
would still be more than $450 billion.
Worst of all, the government-wide effort to wage war in Iraq crowded out
efforts to design a broader strategy against Islamic extremists and terrorists;
to this day the Administration has articulated no comprehensive long-term plan.
It dismissed out of hand any connection between policies toward the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and increasing tension with many Islamic states. Regime change in
Iraq, it said, would have a sweeping symbolic effect on worldwide sources of
terror. That seems to have been true-but in the opposite way from what the
President intended. It is hard to find a counterterrorism specialist who thinks
that the Iraq War has reduced rather than increased the threat to the United
States.
And here is the startling part. There is no evidence that the President and
those closest to him ever talked systematically about the "opportunity
costs" and tradeoffs in their decision to invade Iraq. No one has pointed
to a meeting, a memo, a full set of discussions, about what America would gain
and lose.
THE PRELUDE: LATE 2001
Success in war requires an understanding of who the enemy is, what resources
can be used against him, and how victory will be defined. In the immediate
aftermath of 9/11 America's expert agencies concluded that Osama bin Laden and
al-Qaeda were almost certainly responsible for the attacks-and that the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan was providing them with sanctuary. Within the government
there was almost no dispute, then or later, about the legitimacy and importance
of destroying that stronghold. Indeed, the main criticism of the initial
anti-Taliban campaign was that it took so long to start.
In his book Against All Enemies the former terrorism adviser Richard Clarke
says it was "plainly obvious" after September 11 that "al
Qaeda's sanctuary in Taliban-run Afghanistan had to be occupied by U.S. forces
and the al Qaeda leaders killed." It was therefore unfortunate that the
move against the Taliban was "slow and small." Soon after the attacks
President Bush created an interagency Campaign Coordination Committee to devise
responses to al-Qaeda, and named Clarke its co-chairman. Clarke told me that
this group urged a "rapid, no-holds-barred" retaliation in
Afghanistan-including an immediate dispatch of troops to Afghanistan's borders
to cut off al-Qaeda escape routes.
But the Administration was unwilling to use overwhelming power in
Afghanistan. The only authorized account of how the "principals"-the
big shots of the Administration-felt and thought at this time is in Bob
Woodward's books Bush at War (2002) and Plan of Attack (2004), both based on
interviews with the President and his senior advisers. To judge by Bush at War,
Woodward's more laudatory account, a major reason for delay in attacking the
Taliban had to do with "CSAR"-combat search and rescue teams. These
were meant to be in place before the first aerial missions, so that they could
go to the aid of any American pilot who might be downed. Preparations took
weeks. They involved negotiations with the governments of Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan for basing rights, the slow process of creating and equipping
support airstrips in remote mountainous regions, and the redeployment of
far-flung aircraft carriers to the Persian Gulf.
"The slowness was in part because the military weren't ready and they
needed to move in the logistics support, the refueling aircraft, all of
that," Richard Clarke told me. "But through this time the President
kept saying to the Taliban, 'You still have an opportunity to come clean with
us.' Which I thought-and the State Department thought-was silly. We'd already
told them in advance that if this happened we were going to hold them
personally responsible." Laurence Pope, a former ambassador to Chad, made
a similar point when I spoke with him. Through the late 1990s Pope was the
political adviser to General Zinni, who as the head of U.S. Central Command was
responsible for Iraq and Afghanistan. Pope had run war games concerning
assaults on both countries. "We had warned the Taliban repeatedly about
Osama bin Laden," he told me, referring to the late Clinton years.
"There was no question [after 9/11] that we had to take them on and deny
that sanctuary to al-Qaeda. We should have focused like a laser on bin Laden
and taking down al-Qaeda, breaking crockery in the neighborhood if
necessary."
The crockery he was referring to included the government of Pakistan, which
viewed the Pashtun tribal areas along the Afghan border as ungovernable. In the
view of Pope and some others, the United States should have insisted on going
into these areas right away, either with Pakistani troops or on its
own-equipped with money to buy support, weapons, or both. This might have
caused some regional and international disruption-but less than later invading
Iraq.
It was on October 6, three and a half weeks after the attacks, that
President Bush issued his final warning that "time was running out"
for the Taliban to turn over bin Laden. The first cruise-missile strikes
occurred the next day. The first paramilitary teams from the CIA and Special
Forces arrived shortly thereafter; the first regular U.S. combat troops were
deployed in late November. Thus, while the United States prepared for its
response, Osama bin Laden, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the rest of their
ruling Shura Council had almost two months to flee and hide.
Opinions vary about exactly how much difference it would have made if the
United States had killed or captured al-Qaeda's leaders while the World Trade
Center ruins were still smoldering. But no one disputes that the United States
needed to move immediately against al-Qaeda, and in the most complete and
decisive way possible. And there is little disagreement about what happened
next. The military and diplomatic effort in Afghanistan was handicapped from
the start because the Administration had other concerns, and it ended badly
even though it started well.
WINTER 2001-2002: WAR ON THE CHEAP
By the beginning of 2002 U.S. and Northern Alliance forces had beaten the
Taliban but lost bin Laden. At that point the United States faced a
consequential choice: to bear down even harder in Afghanistan, or to shift the
emphasis in the global war on terror (GWOT, as it is known in the trade)
somewhere else.
A version of this choice between Afghanistan and "somewhere else"
had in fact been made at the very start of the Administration's response to the
9/11 attacks. As Clarke, Woodward, and others have reported, during the
top-level meetings at Camp David immediately after the attacks Paul Wolfowitz
forcefully argued that Saddam Hussein was so threatening, and his overthrow was
so "doable," that he had to be included in the initial military
response. "The 'Afghanistan first' argument prevailed, basically for the
reasons that Colin Powell advocated," Richard Clarke told me. "He
said that the American people just aren't going to understand if you don't do
something in Afghanistan right away-and that the lack of causal connection
between Iraq and 9/11 would make it difficult to make the case for that
war."
But Afghanistan first did not mean Afghanistan only. Clarke reminded me that
he had prepared a memo on anti-terrorism strategy for the President's review
before September 11. When it came back, on September 17, Clarke noticed only
one significant change: the addition of a paragraph asking the Defense
Department to prepare war plans for Iraq. Throughout the fall and winter, as
U.S. troops were deployed in Afghanistan, Bush asked for and received
increasingly detailed briefings from General Tommy Franks about the forces that
might later be necessary in Iraq. According to many people who observed the
process, the stated and unstated need to be ready for Saddam Hussein put a
serious crimp in the U.S. effort against bin Laden and the Taliban.
The need to reserve troops for a likely second front in Iraq was one factor,
though not the only one, in the design of the U.S. battle plan for Afghanistan.
Many in the press (including me) marveled at America's rapid move against the
Taliban for the ingenuity of its tactics. Instead of sending in many thousands
of soldiers, the Administration left much of the actual fighting to the tribes
of the Northern Alliance. Although the U.S. forces proved unable to go in fast,
they certainly went in light-the Special Forces soldiers who chose targets for
circling B-52s while picking their way through mountains on horseback being the
most famous example. And they very quickly won. All this was exactly in keeping
with the "transformation" doctrine that Donald Rumsfeld had been
emphasizing in the Pentagon, and it reflected Rumsfeld's determination to show
that a transformed military could substitute precision, technology, and
imagination for sheer manpower.
But as would later become so obvious in Iraq, ousting a regime is one thing,
and controlling or even pacifying a country is something else. For a
significant group of military and diplomatic officials within the U.S.
government, winning this "second war," for post-combat stability in
Afghanistan, was a crucial step in the Administration's long-term efforts
against al-Qaeda. Afghanistan had, after all, been the site of al-Qaeda's main
training camps. The Taliban who harbored al-Qaeda had originally come to power
as an alternative to warlordism and an economy based on extortion and drugs, so
the United States could ill afford to let the country revert to the same rule
and economy.
In removing the Taliban, the United States had acted as a genuine liberator.
It came to the task with clean hands and broad international support. It had
learned from the Soviet Union the folly of trying to hold Afghanistan by force.
But it did not have to control the entire country to show that U.S.
intervention could have lasting positive effects. What it needed, according to
the "second war" group, was a sustained military, financial, and
diplomatic effort to keep Afghanistan from sinking back toward chaos and thus
becoming a terrorist haven once again.
"Had we seen Afghanistan as anything other than a sideshow," says
Larry Goodson, a scholar at the Army War College who spent much of 2002 in
Afghanistan, "we could have stepped up both the economic and security
presence much more quickly than we did. Had Iraq not been what we were ginning
up for in 2002, when the security situation in Afghanistan was collapsing, we
might have come much more quickly to the peacekeeping and 'nation-building'
strategy we're beginning to employ now." Iraq, of course, was what we were
ginning up for, and the effects on Afghanistan were more important, if subtler,
than has generally been discussed.
I asked officials, soldiers, and spies whether they had witnessed
tradeoffs-specific transfers of manpower-that materially affected U.S. success
in Afghanistan, and the response of Thomas White was typical: not really.
During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, White was Secretary of the Army. Like
most other people I spoke with, he offered an example or two of
Iraq-Afghanistan tradeoffs, mainly involving strain on Special Forces or limits
on electronic intelligence from the National Security Agency. Another man told
me that NSA satellites had to be "boreholed" in a different direction-that
is, aimed directly at sites in Iraq, rather than at Afghanistan. But no one
said that changes like these had really been decisive. What did matter,
according to White and nearly everyone else I spoke with, was the knowledge
that the "center of gravity" of the anti-terrorism campaign was about
to shift to Iraq. That dictated not just the vaunted "lightness" of
the invasion but also the decision to designate allies for crucial tasks: the
Northern Alliance for initial combat, and the Pakistanis for closing the border
so that al-Qaeda leaders would not escape. In the end neither ally performed
its duty the way the Americans had hoped. The Northern Alliance was far more
motivated to seize Kabul than to hunt for bin Laden. The Pakistanis barely
pretended to patrol the border. In its recent "after-action reports"
the U.S. military has been increasingly critical of its own management of this
campaign, but delegating the real work to less motivated allies seems to have
been the uncorrectable error.
The desire to limit U.S. commitment had at least as great an effect on what
happened after the fall of the Taliban. James Dobbins, who was the Bush
Administration's special envoy for Afghanistan and its first representative in
liberated Kabul, told me that three decisions in the early months "really
shaped" the outcome in Afghanistan. "One was that U.S. forces were
not going to do peacekeeping of any sort, under any circumstances. They would
remain available to hunt down Osama bin Laden and find renegade Taliban, but they
were not going to have any role in providing security for the country at large.
The second was that we would oppose anybody else's playing this role outside
Kabul. And this was at a time when there was a good deal of interest from other
countries in doing so." A significant reason for refusing help, according
to Dobbins, was that accepting it would inevitably have tied up more American
resources in Afghanistan, especially for airlifting donated supplies to
foreign-led peacekeeping stations in the hinterland. The third decision was
that U.S. forces would not engage in any counter-narcotics activities. One
effect these policies had was to prolong the disorder in Afghanistan and
increase the odds against a stable government. The absence of American or international
peacekeepers guaranteed that the writ of the new Karzai government would
extend, at best, to Kabul itself.
"I can't prove this, but I believe they didn't want to put in a lot of
regular infantry because they wanted to hold it in reserve," Richard Clarke
explains. "And the issue is the infantry. A rational military planner who
was told to stabilize Afghanistan after the Taliban was gone, and who was not
told that we might soon be doing Iraq, would probably have put in three times
the number of infantry, plus all the logistics support 'tail.' He would have
put in more civil-affairs units, too. Based on everything I heard at the time,
I believe I can make a good guess that the plan for Afghanistan was affected by
a predisposition to go into Iraq. The result of that is that they didn't have
enough people to go in and stabilize the country, nor enough people to make
sure these guys didn't get out."
The Administration later placed great emphasis on making Iraq a showcase of
Islamic progress: a society that, once freed from tyranny, would demonstrate
steady advancement toward civil order, economic improvement, and, ultimately,
democracy. Although Afghanistan is a far wilder, poorer country, it might have
provided a better showcase, and sooner. There was no controversy about
America's involvement; the rest of the world was ready to provide aid; if it
wasn't going to become rich, it could become demonstrably less poor. The amount
of money and manpower sufficient to transform Afghanistan would have been a
tiny fraction of what America decided to commit in Iraq. But the opportunity
was missed, and Afghanistan began a descent to its pre-Taliban warlord state.
SPRING 2002: CHAOS AND CLOSED MINDS
Early 2002 was the Administration's first chance to look beyond its initial
retaliation in Afghanistan. This could have been a time to think broadly about
America's vulnerabilities and to ask what problems might have been overlooked
in the immediate response to 9/11. At this point the United States still had
comfortable reserves of all elements of international power, "hard"
and "soft" alike.
As the fighting wound down in Tora Bora, the Administration could in
principle have matched a list of serious problems with a list of possible
solutions. In his State of the Union speech, in late January, President Bush
had named Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an "axis of evil." The
Administration might have weighed the relative urgency of those three threats,
including uncontested evidence that North Korea was furthest along in
developing nuclear weapons. It might have launched an all-out effort to
understand al-Qaeda's strengths and weaknesses-and to exploit the weak points.
It might have asked whether relations with Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia
needed fundamental reconsideration. For decades we had struck an inglorious
bargain with the regimes in those countries: we would overlook their internal
repression and their role as havens for Islamic extremists; they would not
oppose us on first-order foreign-policy issues-demonstrating, for instance, a
relative moderation toward Israel. And the Saudis would be cooperative about
providing oil. Maybe, after serious examination, this bargain would still seem
to be the right one, despite the newly manifest dangers of Islamic extremism.
But the time to ask the question was early in 2002.
The Administration might also have asked whether its approach to Israel and
the Palestinians needed reconsideration. Before 9/11 it had declared a
hands-off policy toward Israel and the PLO, but sooner or later all Bush's
predecessors had come around to a "land for peace" bargain as the
only plausible solution in the Middle East. The new Administration would never
have more leverage or a more opportune moment for imposing such a deal than
soon after it was attacked.
Conceivably the Administration could have asked other questions-about energy
policy, about manpower in the military, about the fiscal base for a sustained
war. This was an opportunity created by crisis. At the top level of the
Administration attention swung fast, and with little discussion, exclusively to
Iraq. This sent a signal to the working levels, where daily routines
increasingly gave way to preparations for war, steadily denuding the
organizations that might have been thinking about other challenges.
The Administration apparently did not consider questions like "If we
pursue the war on terror by invading Iraq, might we incite even more terror in
the long run?" and "If we commit so many of our troops this way, what
possibilities will we be giving up?" But Bush "did not think of this,
intellectually, as a comparative decision," I was told by Senator Bob
Graham, of Florida, who voted against the war resolution for fear it would hurt
the fight against terrorism. "It was a single decision: he saw Saddam Hussein
as an evil person who had to be removed." The firsthand accounts of the
Administration's decision-making indicate that the President spent most of his
time looking at evidence of Saddam Hussein's threat, and significant but
smaller amounts of time trying to build his coalition and hearing about the
invasion plans. A man who participated in high-level planning for both
Afghanistan and Iraq-and who is unnamed here because he still works for the
government-told me, "There was absolutely no debate in the normal sense.
There are only six or eight of them who make the decisions, and they only talk
to each other. And if you disagree with them in public, they'll come after you,
the way they did with Shinseki."
The three known exceptions to this pattern actually underscore the limits on
top-level talks. One was the discussions at Camp David just after 9/11: they
led to "Afghanistan first," which delayed rather than forestalled the
concentration on Iraq. The second was Colin Powell's "You break it, you've
bought it" warning to the President in the summer of 2002: far from
leading to serious questions about the war, it did not even persuade the
Administration to use the postwar plans devised by the State Department, the
Army, and the CIA. The third was a long memo from Rumsfeld to Bush a few months
before the war began, when a campaign against Iraq was a foregone conclusion.
As excerpted in Plan of Attack, it listed twenty-nine ways in which an invasion
could backfire. "Iraq could successfully best the U.S. in public relations
and persuade the world that it was a war against Muslims" was one.
"There could be higher than expected collateral damage" was another.
But even this memo was couched in terms of "making sure that we had done
everything humanly possible to prepare [the President] for what could go wrong,
to prepare so things would go right," Rumsfeld explained to Bob Woodward.
And its only apparent effect was that Bush called in his military commanders to
look at the war plans.
Discussions at the top were distorted in yet another way-by an unspoken
effect of disagreements over the Middle East. Some connections between Iraq
policy and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute are obvious. One pro-war argument
was "The road to Jerusalem runs through Baghdad"-that is, once the
United States had removed Saddam Hussein and the threat he posed to Israel, it
could lean more effectively on Ariel Sharon and the Likud government to accept
the right deal. According to this logic, America could also lean more
effectively on the Palestinians and their supporters, because of the new
strength it would have demonstrated by liberating Iraq. The contrary
argument-"The road to Baghdad leads through Jerusalem"-appears to
have been raised mainly by Tony Blair. Its point was that if the United States
first took a tougher line with Sharon and recognized that the Palestinians,
too, had grievances, it would have a much easier time getting allied support
and Arab acquiescence for removing Saddam Hussein. There is no evidence that
this was ever significantly discussed inside the Administration.
"The groups on either side of the Iraq debate basically didn't trust
each other," a former senior official in the Administration told me-and
the people "on either side" he was speaking of all worked for George
Bush. (He, too, insisted on anonymity because he has ongoing dealings with the
government.) "If it wasn't clear why you were saying these skeptical
things about invading Iraq, there was naturally the suspicion that you were
saying [them] because you opposed the Israeli position. So any argument became
suspect." Suspicion ran just as strongly the other way-that officials were
steadfast for war because they supported the Israeli position. In this
(admittedly oversimplified) schema, the CIA, the State Department, and the
uniformed military were the most skeptical of war-and, in the view of war
supporters, were also the most critical of Israel. The White House (Bush,
Cheney, Rice) and the Defense Department's civilian leadership were the most
pro-war-and the most pro-Israel. Objectively, all these people agreed far more
than they differed, but their mutual suspicions further muted dissenting views.
At the next level down, different problems had the same effect: difficulty
in thinking broadly about threats and responses. An obscure-sounding
bureaucratic change contributed. At the start of his second term Bill Clinton
had signed PDD 56, a presidential decision directive about handling
international emergencies. The idea was that, like it or not, a chaotic world
would continually involve the United States in "complex contingency
operations." These were efforts, like the ones in the Balkans and East
Africa, in which soldiers, diplomats, relief workers, reconstruction experts,
economists, legal authorities, and many other officials from many different
institutions would need to work together if any of them were to succeed. The
directive set up a system for coordinating these campaigns, so that no one
organization dominated the others or operated unilaterally.
When it took office, the Bush Administration revoked this plan and began
working on a replacement. But nothing was on hand as of September 11. For
months the response to the attacks was managed by a variety of ad hoc groups.
The Campaign Coordination Committee, run by Richard Clarke and his colleague
Franklin Miller, oversaw strategies against al-Qaeda. The new Domestic
Preparedness Committee, run by John Ashcroft's deputy, Larry Thompson, oversaw
internal-security measures. And the "principals"-Bush, Cheney,
Rumsfeld, Powell, Rice, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, and a
few others, including Wolfowitz, Powell's deputy Richard Armitage, and Cheney's
aide Lewis "Scooter" Libby-met frequently to plan the showdown with
Iraq. There was no established way to make sure that State knew what Defense
was doing and vice versa, as became disastrously obvious after the fall of
Baghdad. And there was no recognized venue for opportunity-cost discussions
about the emerging Iraq policy, even if anyone had wanted them.
In the absence of other plans, initiative on every issue was increasingly
taken in the Pentagon. And within the Pentagon the emphasis increasingly moved
toward Iraq. In March of 2002, when U.S. troops were still engaged in Operation
Anaconda on the Afghan-Pakistani border, and combat in Iraq was still a year
away, inside the government Afghanistan had begun to seem like yesterday's
problem. When asked about Iraq at a press conference on March 13, Bush said
merely, "All options are on the table." By that time Tommy Franks had
answered Bush's request for battle plans and lists of potential bombing targets
in Iraq.
The more experienced in government the people I interviewed were, the more
likely they were to stress the importance of the mental shift in the spring of
2002. When I asked Richard Clarke whether preparations for Iraq had really
taken anything crucial from Afghanistan or other efforts, he said yes,
unquestionably. "They took one thing that people on the outside find hard
to believe or appreciate," he said. "Management time. We're a huge
government, and we have hundreds of thousands of people involved in national
security. Therefore you would think we could walk and chew gum at the same
time. I've never found that to be true. You've got one National security
Adviser and one CIA director, and they each have one deputy. The same is true
in Defense. Interestingly in terms of the military, both of these wars took
place in the same 'CINCdom'"- by which Clarke meant that both were in the
realm of Tommy Franks's Central Command, rather than in two different theaters.
"It just is not credible that the principals and the deputies paid as much
attention to Afghanistan or the war against al-Qaeda as they should have."
According to Michael Scheuer, a career CIA officer who spent the late 1990s
as head of the agency's anti-bin Laden team, the shift of attention had another
destructive effect on efforts to battle al-Qaeda: the diversion of members of
that team and the Agency's limited supply of Arabicspeakers and Middle East
specialists to support the mounting demand for intelligence on Iraq. (Because
Scheuer is still on active duty at the CIA, the Agency allowed him to publish
his recent book, Imperial Hubris, a harsh criticism of U.S. approaches to
controlling terrorism, only as "Anonymous." After we spoke, his
identity was disclosed by Jason Vest, in the Boston Phoenix; when I met him, he
declined to give his name and was introduced simply as "Mike.")
"With a finite number of people who have any kind of pertinent experience,"
Scheuer told me, "there is unquestionably a sucking away of resources from
Afghanistan and al-Qaeda to Iraq, just because it was a much bigger
effort."
Scheuer observed that George Tenet had claimed early in 2003 that there was
enough expertise and manpower to handle both Iraq and al-Qaeda. "From
inside the system that sounded like a very questionable judgment," Scheuer
said. "You start with a large group of people who have worked bin Laden
and al-Qaeda and Sunni terrorism for years-and worked it every day since 9/11.
Then you move a lot of people out to work the Iraq issue, and instead you have
a lot of people who come in for ninety days or one hundred and twenty days,
then leave. It's like any other profession. Over time you make connections. A
name comes up, and there's nothing on file in the last two years-but you
remember that five years ago there was a guy with that name doing acts in the
Philippines. If you don't have an institutional memory, you don't make the
connection. When they talk about connecting the dots, the computers are
important. But at the end of the day, the most important thing is that human
being who's been working this issue for five or six years. You can have the
best computers in the world, and you can have an ocean of information, but if
you have a guy who's only been there for three weeks or three months, you're
very weak."
Laurence Pope, the former ambassador, told me that Iraq monomania was
particularly destructive in the spring of 2002 because of the opportunity that came
and went in Afghanistan. "There was a moment of six months or so when we
could have put much more pressure on the tribal areas [to get al-Qaeda], and on
Pakistan, and done a better job of reconstruction in Afghanistan," he
said. "In reality, the Beltway can only do one thing at a time, and
because of the attention to Iraq, what should have happened in Afghanistan
didn't."
So by the spring, after six months in which to consider its strategy, the
Administration had radically narrowed its choices. Its expert staffers were
deflected toward Iraq-and away from Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea,
Israel-Palestine, the hunt for bin Laden, the assault on al-Qaeda, even China
and Taiwan. Its diplomats were not squeezing Pakistan as hard as possible about
chasing al-Qaeda, or Saudi Arabia about cracking down on extremists, because
the United States needed their help-or at least acquiescence-in the coming war
with Iraq. Its most senior officials were working out the operational details
of a plan whose fundamental wisdom they had seldom, if ever, stopped to
examine.
SUMMER AND FALL: THE ONE-FRONT WAR
President Bush's first major statement about his post9/11 foreign policy had
come in his State of the Union address. His second came on June 1, when he gave
the graduation speech at West Point. It carefully laid out the case for a new
doctrine of "pre-emptive" war. Bush didn't say "Iraq" or
"Saddam Hussein," but his meaning was unmistakable. "Containment
is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can
deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist
allies," he said. "We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants who
solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties and then systemically break them. If
we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long." A
few weeks later Condoleezza Rice presented a fuller version of the concept, and
Dick Cheney hammered home his warnings that Saddam Hussein had, beyond all
doubt, acquired weapons of mass destruction. In September, Donald Rumsfeld said
at a news conference that the link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda was
"not debatable." By October, Bush had practically stopped referring
to Osama bin Laden in his press statements; he said of Saddam Hussein, "This
is the guy that tried to kill my dad."
The Democrats still controlled the Senate, but on October 11 Majority Leader
Tom Daschle led John Kerry, John Edwards, and twenty-six other Democrats in
voting to authorize the war. (Authorization passed the Senate 77-23; most Democrats
in the House voted against it, but it still carried there, by 296 to 133.)
Democratic officials were desperate to get the vote behind them, so that in the
impending midterm elections they could not be blamed for hampering the war on
terrorism-in which, the Administration said, war in Iraq played an integral
part.
The Cyclops-like nature of the Administration's perception of risk became
more evident. Uncertain evidence about Iraq was read in the most pessimistic
fashion; much more reliable evidence about other threats was ignored. Of the
three members of the "axis of evil," Iraq had made the sketchiest
progress toward developing nuclear weapons. In October, just before the Iraq
War vote, a delegation of Americans in Pyongyang found that North Korea's nuclear-weapons
program was actually up and running. As the weeks wore on, North Korea became
more and more brazen. In December it reactivated a nuclear processing plant it
had closed eight years earlier as part of a deal with the United States. Soon
thereafter it kicked out inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency
and announced that it would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
North Korea was dropping even the pretense that it was not developing nuclear
bombs.
Meanwhile, in August of 2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed the
existence of two previously secret nuclear facilities, in Natanz and Arak. The
first was devoted to uranium enrichment, the second to heavy-water production,
which is a step toward producing plutonium. Months before the vote on war with
Iraq, then, the United States had very strong indications that Iran was
pursuing two paths toward atomic weaponry: uranium and plutonium. The
indications from North Korea were at least as strong. If the very worst pre-war
suspicions about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction had turned out to
be true, the nuclear stakes would still have been lower than those in North
Korea or Iran.
"How will history judge this period, in terms of the opportunity costs
of invading Iraq?" said John Pike, the director of GlobalSecurity.org,
when we spoke. "I think the opportunity cost is going to be North Korea
and Iran. I mean, in 2002 it became obvious that Iran has a full-blown
nuclear-weapons program under way, no ifs or buts. For the next eighteen months
or so, before it's running, we have the opportunity to blow it up. But this
Iraq adventure will give blowing up your enemies a bad name. The concern now
has to be that the 'Iraq syndrome' will make us flinch from blowing up people
who really need to be blown up."
Bombing North Korea's reactor has never been an option, since North Korea
has so many retaliatory forces so close to Seoul. But whatever choices the
United States had at the beginning of 2002, it has fewer and worse ones now.
The North Koreans are that much further along in their program; the U.S.
military is under that much more strain; international hostility to U.S.
policies is that much greater. "At the rate North Korea is pumping out
bomb material," Pike said, "the Japanese will realize that the
missile defense we've sold them will not save them. And they will conclude that
only weaponizing their plutonium will enable them to sleep easily at night. And
then you'll have South Korea and Taiwan ..." and on through other rippleeffect
scenarios. Pike says that the United States has little leverage to prevent any
of this, and therefore can't afford to waste any more time in acting against
North Korea.
"Are we better off in basic security than before we invaded Iraq?"
asks Jeffrey Record, a professor of strategy at the Air War College and the
author of the recent Dark Victory, a book about the Iraq War. "The answer
is no. An unnecessary war has consumed American Army and other ground
resources, to the point where we have nothing left in the cupboard for another
contingency-for instance, should the North Koreans decide that with the
Americans completely absorbed in Iraq, now is the time to do something."
"We really have four armies," an Army officer involved in Pentagon
planning for the Iraq War told me. "There's the one that's deployed in
Afghanistan and Iraq. There's the one that's left back home in Fort Hood and
other places. There's the 'modular Army,' of new brigade-sized units that are
supposed to be rotated in and out of locations easily. There's the Guard and
Reserve. And every one of them is being chewed up by the ops tempo."
"Ops tempo" means the pace of operations, and when it is too high,
equipment and supplies are being used faster than they can be replaced, troops
are being deployed far longer than they expected, and training is being pared
back further than it should. "We're really in dire straits with
resourcing," he said. "There's not enough armor for Humvees. There's
not enough fifty-caliber machine guns for the Hundred and First Airborne or the
Tenth Mountain Division. A country that can't field heavy machine guns for its
army-there's something wrong with the way we're doing business."
"The stress of war has hit all the services, but none harder than the
Army," Sydney Freedberg wrote recently in National Journal. "The
crucial shortfall is not in money or machines, but in manpower." More than
a third of the Army's 500,000 active-duty soldiers are in Iraq or Kuwait.
Freedberg referred to a study showing that fifteen of the Army's thirty-four
active-duty combat units were currently deployed overseas, and wrote,
"That means that nearly as many units are abroad as at home, when
historical experience shows that a long-term commitment, as with the British in
Northern Ireland, requires three or four units recuperating and training for
each one deployed." In the long run the U.S. military needs either more
people or fewer responsibilities. At the moment, because of Iraq, it has very
little slack for dealing with other emergencies that might arise.
WINTER: MISREADING THE ENEMY
President Bush's first major speech after 9/11, on September 20, 2001, was
one of the outstanding addresses given by a modern President. But it introduced
a destructive concept that Bush used more and more insistently through 2002.
"Why do they hate us?" he asked about the terrorists. He answered
that they hate what is best in us: "They hate what we see right here in
this chamber-a democratically elected government ... They hate our freedoms-our
freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble
and disagree with each other." As he boiled down this thought in
subsequent comments it became "They hate us for who we are" and
"They hate us because we are free."
There may be people who have studied, fought against, or tried to infiltrate
al-Qaeda and who agree with Bush's statement. But I have never met any. The
soldiers, spies, academics, and diplomats I have interviewed are unanimous in
saying that "They hate us for who we are" is dangerous claptrap.
Dangerous because it is so lazily self-justifying and self-deluding: the only
thing we could possibly be doing wrong is being so excellent. Claptrap because
it reflects so little knowledge of how Islamic extremism has evolved.
"There are very few people in the world who are going to kill
themselves so we can't vote in the Iowa caucuses," Michael Scheuer said to
me. "But there's a lot of them who are willing to die because we're
helping the Israelis, or because we're helping Putin against the Chechens, or
because we keep oil prices low so Muslims lose money." Jeffrey Record
said, "Clearly they do not like American society. They think it's far too
libertine, democratic, Christian. But that's not the reason they attack us. If
it were, they would have attacked a lot of other Western countries too. I don't
notice them putting bombs in Norway. It's a combination of who we are and also
our behavior."
This summer's report of the 9/11 Commission, without associating this view
with Bush, was emphatic in rejecting the "hate us for who we are"
view. The commission said this about the motivation of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad,
whom it identified as the "mastermind of the 9/11 attacks":
"KSM's animus toward the United States stemmed not from his experiences
there as a student, but rather from his violent disagreement with U.S. foreign
policy favoring Israel." In discussing long-term strategies for dealing
with extremist groups the commission said, "America's policy choices have
consequences. Right or wrong, it is simply a fact that American policy
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and American actions in Iraq are
dominant staples of popular commentary across the Arab and Muslim world."
The most striking aspect of the commission's analysis is that it offered any
thoughts at all about the right long-term response to Islamic extremists. The
9/11 Commission was one of several groups seeking to fill the void left by the
Administration's failure to put forward any comprehensive battle plan for a
long-term campaign against terrorism. By its actions the Administration showed
that the only terrorism problem it recognized was Saddam Hussein's regime, plus
the al-Qaeda leaders shown on its "most wanted" lists.
The distinction between who we are and what we do matters, because it bears
on the largest question about the Iraq War: Will it bring less or more Islamic
terrorism? If violent extremism is purely vengeful and irrational, there is no
hope except to crush it. Any brutality along the way is an unavoidable cost.
But if it is based on logic of any sort, a clear understanding of its
principles could help us to weaken its appeal-and to choose tactics that are
not self-defeating.
A later article will describe insights about controlling terrorism. For now
the point is the strong working-level consensus that terrorists are
"logical," if hideously brutal, and that the steps in 2002 that led
to war have broadened the extremists' base. In March of 2003, just after combat
began in Iraq, President Hosni Mubarak, of Egypt, warned that if the United
States invaded, "instead of having one bin Laden, we will have one hundred
bin Ladens." Six months later, when the combat was over, Rumsfeld wrote in
a confidential memo quoted in Plan of Attack, "We lack metrics to know if
we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or
deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas [Islamic
schools] and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against
us? ... The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the
terrorists' costs of millions." Six months after that, as violence surged
in occupied Iraq, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in London,
reported that al-Qaeda was galvanized by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As
of mid-2004 it had at least 18,000 operatives in sixty countries. "Al
Qaeda has fully reconstituted [and] set its sights firmly on the USA and its
closest Western allies in Europe," the report said. Meanwhile, a British parliamentary
report warns that Afghanistan is likely to "implode" for lack of
support.
"I have been saying for years, Osama bin Laden could never have done it
without us," a civilian adviser to the Pentagon told me this summer.
"We have continued to play to his political advantage and to confirm, in
the eyes of his constituency, the very claims he made about us." Those
claims are that the United States will travel far to suppress Muslims, that it
will occupy their holy sites, that it will oppose the rise of Islamic governments,
and that it will take their resources. "We got to Baghdad." Michael
Scheuer said, "and the first thing Rumsfeld said is, 'We'll accept any
government as long as it's not Islamic.' It draws their attention to bin
Laden's argument that the United States is leading the West to annihilate
Islam." The Administration had come a long way from the end-of-Ramadan
ceremony at the White House.
WHAT HAPPENED IN A YEAR
To govern is to choose, and the choices made in 2002 were fateful. The
United States began that year shocked and wounded, but with tremendous
strategic advantages. Its population was more closely united behind its
leadership than it had been in fifty years. World opinion was strongly
sympathetic. Longtime allies were eager to help; longtime antagonists were
silent. The federal budget was nearly in balance, making ambitious projects
feasible. The U.S. military was superbly equipped, trained, and prepared. An
immediate foe was evident-and vulnerable-in Afghanistan. For the longer-term
effort against Islamic extremism the Administration could draw on a mature
school of thought from academics, regional specialists, and its own
intelligence agencies. All that was required was to think broadly about the
threats to the country, and creatively about the responses.
The Bush Administration chose another path. Implicitly at the beginning of
2002, and as a matter of formal policy by the end, it placed all other
considerations second to regime change in Iraq. It hampered the campaign in
Afghanistan before fighting began and wound it down prematurely, along the way
losing the chance to capture Osama bin Laden. It turned a blind eye to misdeeds
in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and to WMD threats from North Korea and Iran far
more serious than any posed by Saddam Hussein, all in the name of moving toward
a showdown with Iraq. It overused and wore out its army in invading
Iraq-without committing enough troops for a successful occupation. It saddled
the United States with ongoing costs that dwarf its spending for domestic
security. And by every available measure it only worsened the risk of future
terrorism. In every sense 2002 was a lost year.