More recently the topic of human consciousness has again become academically acceptable. Accepting that consciousness exists, can we also assume that it has evolved and continues to do so, and if so how might this happen? This article theorises that human consciousness does evolve and proposes a model for this evolution, based on the theory of implicate and explicate orders developed by the late eminent physicist David Bohm. It is argued that Bohm's implicate (hidden) order is Mind, and that consciousness is of the explicate (spatio-temporal) order. In this model, evolution is viewed as the unfolding of the implicate order into the explicate order. This unfolding has produced the tangible world of the senses including what we call consciousness. It is further argued that a stasis has been reached in the unfolding of human consciousness, and a way out of this is suggested with discussion on the nature of the next step in the evolution of consciousness.

Of all the topics that are currently occupying the attention of philosophers, the mind­body problem is centre stage (Warner & Szubka, 1994.) This resurgence of interest in the mind­body problem has, in its turn, reawakened an interest in the topic of consciousness. The difficulties faced by researchers into consciousness is underscored by the number of disparate disciplines that are needed to make a vital contribution. Despite the challenge that consciousness presents, it has, more recently, gained acceptability as a topic for debate and research. The Editorial of the inaugural issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies states "That consciousness is back on the academic agenda after nearly a century in exile, there is little doubt" (Goguen & Forman, 1994, page 4.)

Consciousness is something that we all experience, and yet is so difficult to understand and explain. Dennet (1991) noted that consciousness is at one and the same time the most obvious and most mysterious feature of our minds. Nagel (1974, page 166) more ironically remarks "Without consciousness the mind­body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless." Indeed, as Davies & Humphreys (1993) imply, perhaps consciousness falls completely outside of any rational enquiry, defying both philosophical and scientific explanation.

This may, ultimately, prove to be the case. But, at present, the case has not closed and jury is still out.

That consciousness is back on the academic agenda spells some promise for those who are interested in its evolution. Not only are we faced with the enigma of consciousness itself, we are faced with questions about its role in human evolution. If consciousness exists, and is a legitimate topic for reputable research, then surmise about it origins, its purpose and its future are legitimate too. That consciousness evolved has been a topic for debate for some time, and considerable evidence has been offered in support of this view (Coan, 1987; Crook, 1980; Dewart, 1989 and Martindale, 1977­78.) This article attempts to contribute to this debate by offering a model for the evolution of human consciousness.

Before dealing with the evolution of human consciousness there is a need to look at and broadly define some related concepts and terminology. In particular, there is the overall relationship between four key terms; mind, consciousness, awareness and cognition. In the model offered here, mind is seen as the all embracing entity that is hierarchically senior to its related terms. It is not a synonym for consciousness, cognition, mentation or similar terms. In the context of this article is more closely aligned with the Greek term noumenon. The word consciousness derives from the Latin con­scientia, which has the connotation of inside knowledge, as opposed to scientia or knowledge of things external. Thus, consciousness implies self­awareness. Awareness appears to be a function of consciousness rather than being synonymous with it, in that there is no implication of self­awareness. All sentient beings have some degree of awareness. Only humans appear to have full self­awareness. Although cognition derives from the Latin cognitio, meaning to be acquainted with, psychology has seized this term, giving it a more technical and specialised meaning in which it stands for modes of mentally processing sense derived data. It is argued here that cognition is hierarchically junior to consciousness, being one of its functions.

The model discussed here is based on the theory developed by the late David Bohm, a theoretical physicist (Bohm; 1957, 1973 & 1980.) Bohm did not accept the Copenhagen interpretation of the findings in quantum physical experiments, arguing against a purely mathematical probabilistic basis of reality. He was a realist, and sought to reconcile the seeming paradoxes of quantum physics, and unify the quantum, classical and relativistic paradigms by proposing an implicate­order and an explicate­order.

Bohm's implicate order is a real but supra­physical realm that contains within it infinite possibilities. It is not amenable to measurement, being non spatio­temporal. It enfolds all that could be explicated or unfolded into space­time existence.

Conversely, the explicate order is all that we regard as the world of matter, being tangible, knowable and measurable, whether by unaided senses or by instrumentation. It is the result of a process of explication of the implicate order and contains all spatio­temporal structures ranging from subatomic entities, through molecular arrangements and biological organisms to stellar bodies. Bohm's theory is not dualistic in that he does not subscribe to the Cartesian paradigm. In his view, the explicate order is a derivation of the implicate order, rather than something separate from it. Also, Bohm is not a physicalist­reductionist, in that the implicate order is not a physical realm and the notion of reducibility of mind to physical matter is based on illusions about thexplicate order.

Although Bohm hinted at it, he never said that mind was a characteristic of his implicate order. Also, he never adapted his theories to an explanation of the evolutionary process. In the model presented here Bohm's basic concepts have been somewhat modified and extended in order to deal with mind (hence, consciousness) and evolution. As mind is seen to be the key characteristic of Bohm's implicate order, and the model proposed here argues that consciousness is a derivate of mind, then this model is also is non­dualistic and non physicalist­reductionist.

It is argued that consciousness is of the explicate order, and thus is derived from mind (an aspect of the implicate order.) In locating consciousness in the explicate realm, it gives consciousness spatio­temporal properties, but does not make it simply a by­product of neural activity. It is contended that consciousness is an entity in its own right. In the psychological literature (eg, Eccles, 1981; Burns, 1990) there appear to be two basic ways of viewing consciousness. In one view it is regarded as the sum of a collection of component parts such as awareness, cognition, memory and so on. In the other view it is regarded as some diffuse thing that permeates its various psychical structures. In the first view there is an indifference to the interconnections of the parts and to any meta­aspect. The second view seems to oppose the locating of consciousness in the body, such that consciousness is not regarded as a natural phenomenon because it is utterly transcendent, refusing to consciousness its own structur integrity. It is argued here that neither of these approaches is correct. Consciousness is regarded as existent in its own right, as having a hierarchical order and as being the meta structure that integrates the parts without being the sum of them, and as being expressible through a physical form (on this planet, a brain.) It is further argued that consciousness is not a transcendent entity, but that it is a space­time explication of the implicate order.

In adapting Bohm's original concept of an implicate and explicate order to the evolution of consciousness, three major stages emerge. The implicate order, by definition, was there long before an explicate order came into being. It is argued here that the very first explication from the implicate order was space­time. This was necessary for the explications that were to follow.

The process of unfolding into explication would have been automatic at first, somewhat like a spring unwinding under the control of an escapement mechanism as found in a clockwork timepiece. With space­time unfolded, there followed the unfolding of quanta and molecular structures. Again, this process was somewhat mechanistic and automatic, not involving any feedback from the explicate order. That is, the implicate order followed its own natural laws and was not influenced by what it was explicating. This phase covered vast periods of geological time. For this solar system, the initial phase of explicating space­time itself would have bn an event far in its past, before even our sun was born! The forms at this stage were firstly sub­atomic quanta, followed by atomic structures then inorganic structures ranging from the simplest chemical compounds up to complex chemical structures such as crystalline forms and viral­type structures.

This earlier automatic mode of unfolding of the implicate order changed with the explication of biological structures, and entailed some form of feedback from the explicate into the implicate, such that the explication became some function of what had already been explicated. This feedback occurred as these early biological structures decayed and their essence was reabsorbed into the implicate order. The explicated forms in this stage were simple biological structures ranging from the first simple cells, through multi­cellular forms to the more complex forms of the earliest plant­life. The nature of the feedback was consonant with the simplicity of structures that were not mobile and had no active influence on their environment. However, this feedback had the effect of accelerating the rate of increase of complexity. In the earliest stages of this new phase, however, there was not even the rudimentary traces of consciousness.

The third stage of unfolding demanded a more sophisticated form of feedback because the explicated forms ranged from the earliest animals (eg, the protoplasm) through the reptilian forms and more recent phyla to humankind. As each phyla unfolded, the succession of animals across evolutionary time had increasing degrees of mobility and interaction with their environment. The experiences undergone by the animal were stored in its central nervous system and released into the implicate order at the animal's death. This permitted the earliest explications of consciousness, and began the complex interchange between consciousness and its mechanism, the brain. At this new stage, the feedback between explicate and implicate shifted up to a new level such that consciousness itself became a partner to the process of biological evolution. With the arrival of the primate, the brain structure had become complex enough to permit the explication of a sophisticated consciousness, thus enhancing many fold the quality of expernced stored and fedback. This took a whole new direction with the arrival of homo sapiens sapiens, a talking thinking animal with a highly autonomous consciousness. It is in this third and current stage that it becomes sensible to talk about the evolution of consciousness, wherein we can view consciousness as a spectrum ranging from the simple awareness of a reptile, for example, through the advanced consciousness of a domestic cat, to that of the primates, us especially.

What had begun as a purely automatic process in the first stage, in this third and present stage has become a very complex process of interaction between implicate and explicate orders. This is most evident in the case of homo sapiens sapiens where it is argued that a communication path had been established between the explicated consciousness and mind (as a quality of the implicate order.) It is speculated that this pathway first appeared in an embryonic form with the appearance of the mammalian forms. It is important not to confuse this pathway with the pre­existing feedback process on the death of an animal. That was a one­way communication from explicate to implicate. With the introduction of the pathway discussed here, information could proceed in either direction. The information communicated down this embryonic pathway was at first limited in two senses. Firstly, it had a narrow bandwidth and so could carry only a limited amount of information (quantity and quality.) Secondly, the relatively primitiveeural structures at this early stage restricted the amount of information that could be processed. These limitations diminished as the evolution of consciousness proceeded, with its concomitant increase in the complexity of brains in the mammalian species. The bandwidth increased and neural complexity increased.

Eventually, with the appearance of proto­humans, brains had reached a high degree of complexity, and consciousness had acquired a fair degree of autonomy. It is with the appearance of the hominids that we see the communication pathway really coming into its own. Mind could directly influence consciousness, and consciousness itself could influence the further unfolding of mind. As the stage of hominid development referred to here is pre­speech, the exchange down this pathway would, therefore, have been non­verbal, partially unconscious and perhaps at the dream level. Julian Jaynes (1976) provides a useful notion for the stage of hominid development at which speech first appeared. His bicameral mind seems to be describing the state occupied by those hominids on the verge of acquiring speech, rather than as he claims the pre­Homeric Greeks. The time we are probably talking about here is early Neanderthalensis, who probably did not have the neural structures necessary for speech according to cranial records, wheas the later Cro­Magnon (us!) definitely had speech as evidenced by the cranial imprints of Wernicke's and Broca's areas (Maxwell, 1984.)

A point must have arisen where the embryonic structures that were to become Wernicke's and Broca's areas emerged. At this very early stage in the evolution of human speech, the voices referred to in Jaynes notion could not have had the degree of complexity (syntactic or semantic) of modern human speech. One might speculate that such voices amounted to simple verb­noun combinations (eg, run­danger.) The use by mind of imposed voices was necessary at this stage of hominid evolution because, while consciousness had considerable powers and autonomy, guidance was needed for a species that had virtually no natural defences and was living in a harsh and hostile world, where highly organised and efficient predators abounded.

With the full unfolding of human speech and other qualities, the mode of direct communications by means of heard voices ceased, and (to use Jaynes' term) the bicameral mind broke down, and humans asserted their own freedom. This assertiveness was especially the outcome of speech acquisition, as Dewart (1989) so ably argues. Thus, with Homo sapiens sapiens, we see the full flowering of conscious autonomy. This led to a much reduced use of the direct communication pathway from mind to its outpost (consciousness), and greater amounts of decision­making began to occur within the consciousness of the individual.

In modern humans, the degree of conscious autonomy has reached a zenith, wherein consciousness is fully autonomous, and virtually all decisions are made at the local (explicate) level. However, this is not to say that mind (as implicate) no longer has influence. It does, especially via dreams and all those subconscious urges that influence our behaviour. It is argued that the degree of autonomy we experience has led to a situation in which, for the most part, the interaction is now between consciousness and the brain, where the two entities act together as a complete stand­alone unit. The focus is outward into the sensory world and so consciousness­brain has become heavily sense­conditioned, having all that it needs for survival in this modern world.

At this advanced evolutionary stage, the communications path need not be used by humans in order to conduct their lives in the explicate realm. This greatly reduced use of more direct communications between mind and its explicate is the price we have had to pay for the very high level of conscious autonomy we have acquired as a species.

Thus, direct contact with mind can be lost and consciousness forfeits the ability to tap the vast resources of the implicate order. While this breaking free from the parenthood of mind can be seen as a sign of maturation, it carries with it the danger of imbalance, and atrophication of the creative well­spring of the human psyche.

While, as a species, we may have the autonomy we need to survive, there is a difference between survival and continued evolution. We run the risk of standing still if we continue in this present mode because, in the model presented here, mind is crucial to the further unfolding of consciousness and hence to human evolution. We know from studies of the evolution of earlier species that there is a high price to be paid for standing still (Foley, 1991; Gould, 1977 and Jerrison, 1973.) Adaptability has been a major factor in determining which species continue to evolve and those that go under. It is argued that, if we are not careful as a species, our wonderful adaptability could lead to a rigid adaptation to the world we have created. This could result in having created an evolutionary cul­de­sac for ourselves, with little chance of escape.

However, I do not believe that the communications pathway can atrophy. Information still comes down it from the implicate order (we still have intuitions about how things might be) and returns back along it (we create and implement novelty in science, art, politics and so on.) But we seem to be forfeiting the conscious use of that pathway. I believe, however, that this need not become a permanent condition, but merely a transitional stage to some new turn of the spiral. As discussed before, at the earlier phase of the development of human consciousness, around the time when human speech was being acquired, mind (as implicate) directed the further explication of consciousness, and the communications path became fully active. However, the individual was, for the most part, a passive recipient. The situation has changed dramatically since that time, and modern humans have sufficient conscious autonomy now to actively use this communications path and establish a dynamic two­way interaction between their consciouess and mind.

It is argued that extensive and planet­wide usage of the communications path would give rise to a level of interaction between mind (as of the implicate order) and humanity (as of the explicate order) such that humankind becomes the conscious focus of evolution. That is, humankind cooperates actively with the implicate order to knowingly further the process of evolution. If this is a valid viewpoint, then one can ask what the next step in that evolution might be. My speculations are based on the characteristics of the model presented here, where the nature of mind is the key factor. I suggest that the next step in the evolution of consciousness would best be described in terms of the highly developed presence of two qualities:

a mature awareness of wholeness in all its forms

the active emergence of and allegiance to inwardly derived values rather than obedience to externally enforced laws.

I speculate thus, because wholeness and inwardness are essential qualities of mind (as implicate.) I am not saying that these two qualities are not possessed at the conscious level by present day humans. However, I am saying that, at present, these essential qualities have made only an embryonic appearance in most humans. At the level of the individual, awareness of wholeness would engender an intrinsic respect for other life forms (human and non­human) and foster an attitude that would lead away from those actions which harm others and endanger the planet. Such a degree of sensed wholeness implies a very high level of empathy with all that lives, giving rise to a deep respect for all those life forms we share this planet with. Because of this, in my opinion, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for one who was strongly motivated by such a sense of wholeness to act deliberately in a truly life­negating way.

The allegiance to inward values would encourage a movement toward intellectual and spiritual autonomy, and away from the herdlike following of imposed credos (whether political, religious or otherwise.)

This is not to say that one possessing this level of consciousness would disobey the laws of society without due regard to their reasonableness. The first quality (wholeness) would mitigate against such wanton action. However, as this inwardness derives from the source of all that is (mind), it would give its possessor a fine sense of discrimination in regard to societal norms (and the rules/laws that derive from them.) Beyond this, it would lead to a re­evaluation of societal norms. What I am saying here is that the ethical sense, and moral personhood would no longer be an issue of obedience to some imposed law (human or otherwise), but would arise naturally from within.

It might seem, at first glance, that these two characteristics (awareness of wholeness and allegiance to inwardly derived values) are in opposition, or at least might create some conflict. But this is to fail to see that both derive from mind. Mind, it is argued is most likely the highest region of the implicate order, and seeks to unify what was initially explicated under the more automatic and unconsciousness mode, and this it does through consciousness. Thus, manifestations of mind are, by their very nature, wholesome and life­affirming. It is only our recent and temporary abuse of conscious autonomy that has led to behaviours and situations that are life­negating. It is argued that mind is the essence of all that is truly creative and novel, and opposed to that which stultifies. Thus, there is no conflict because the values that emerge as more of mind unfolds within the individual could only lead to life­affirming actions, where these actions would be guided by wholeness and not by separatedness.

The type of individuality that would arise were the above conditions to be met is not to be confused with present­day individualism, with its inherent selfishness. Rather, I talk of an individual in the sense of being intellectually and spiritually free, who can make truly informed choices regarding his/her actions. These choices would reflect both the individual need and the needs of the whole. I would see the actions of such individuals as leading to an emphasis on cooperation, and on the restructuring of global socio­economics such as to bring about a fully harmonious use of the planet's resources. In this, individuals would retain their individuality and yet find unity in their diversity. In this way I see that the polar extremes of the tyranny of destructive individualism and the tyranny of the mindless collective would be avoided, where these polar opposites are transcended.

References

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