Success of the Malaysian experiment
MY intention is to present a broad picture of the state of Malaysia's economic
and financial situation. In 1997-98, the economy experienced a trauma so
devastating that even with recovery from the current 2nd quarter, the absolute
size of real gross national product (GNP) this year will remain at about
the level
in 1996.
But in US dollar terms, because of the 50% devaluation of the ringgit,
it will be a
third smaller. It is as if we had lost two years of our lives just living
through this
crisis.
Imagine if you will, the trauma for the US in the event the US dollar suddenly
devalued against the yen by 50% (from 120 to 80) and falling and, at the
same
time, the Dow and the rest of the New York equity market fell 80% leading
to a
loss in market capitalisation of some US$10.5 trillion or 1.2 times the
size of
your current GNP.
In Malaysia's case, the stock market capitalisation loss was RM685bil or
a loss
in quoted equity wealth equivalent to 2.5 years GNP.
Imagine if you will, the disruptive impact that a shock of such vast magnitude
can exert to destabilise the political, economic, financial and social
fabric of
everyday life.
I just wanted to give you, at the outset, a feel of the gravity of the
impact and
the pervasiveness of its consequences.
After two difficult years, much is now history. Fortunately, we did emerge
early
enough leaner but wiser, certainly more resilient.
Let me make a number of observations.
* One: The worst is now behind us. We are not yet out of the woods but
we are
by no means floating either. The recovery you heard and read about is real.
We
do see the key indicators moving in the right direction and more important
we
feel the "fresh air" blowing through.
Each successive set of key macro economic indicators tell a consistent
story
of recovery - indeed, rather robust growth numbers from the second quarter,
and
early third quarter data appears to point in the direction of continuing
recovery.
Data on income and wealth, value added production, spending as well as
the
demand for and supply of money have all begun to come together to tell
a
coherent story of gathering strength in the growth process.
Indeed, the leading, coincident and lag indicators now suggest that the
emerging recovery is sustainable. Most important has been the return of
business confidence, of investors confidence and of late, consumer confidence.
Taking stock at mid-year, 8 consecutive quarters of trade surplus arising
from
persistently strong export growth have pushed the current BOP surplus to
exceed 12% of GNP. So much so that there is now enough international
reserves to finance 7 months of imports at a time when the nation remains
highly liquid, with a national liquidity ratio (relating these reserves
to short debt
plus principal repayments due within a year) of about 3, one of the highest
in
the world.
* Two: Malaysia's approach to recovery is by all counts unorthodox, using
a
combination of fiscal pump priming and easy monetary policy working within
a
new framework of a fixed exchange rate regime and supported by very selective
capital control measures to deal decisively with volatile short-term capital
flows.
Within a year, this experiment with what I like to call pragmatic "free
market
Keynesianism" (markets are good but not infallible; hence, pragmatic) has
achieved for now what the policymakers had set out to do, viz to re-establish
stability and instil confidence, and to get the economy moving again.
At the same time, the pre-requisite breathing space was realised through
the
pragmatic implementation of a "soft system" of selective exchange controls.
Within 6 months, the controversial measures were essentially lifted and
replaced by an exit levy on the repatriation of capital gains arising from
portfolio
equity investments.
Bear in mind that the ringgit was at no time at risk of becoming inconvertible.
Today, all controls have been lifted save for two major restrictions: first,
in order
to effectively maintain a credible fixed exchange rate regime, lending
by
non-residents in ringgit is disallowed; and second, continuing with the
time-tested prudential rule which discourages external borrowing to fund
the
purchase of shares and property development. What is left in exchange control
today is really no big deal!
* Three: Contrary to most expectations, the freedom of action accorded
by the
unconventional public policies was put to good use, viz to recapitalise
and
reform the banking system and to critically restructure the corporate sector.
Compared with the IMF wards in East Asia, the 4-prong strategy appears
to be
working well - indeed, well ahead of schedule.
First, to consolidate and rationalise the banking sector into 6 large and
strong
universal banking groups; second, to use a special purpose vehicle
(Danamodal) to assist banks to recapitalise using essentially domestic
resources; third, to use an asset management company (Danaharta) to acquire
and manage banks' NPLs; and fourth, to provide a central framework for
voluntary debt restructuring (especially for viable businesses facing temporary
cash flow problems) through a Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee
(CDRC).
Within a year, this single minded commitment to reform was pushed hard
to
yield results.
* Four: With bank reform, the new financial architeeture expected to emerge
in
Malaysia will have at its heart a core of 6 large, strong and well capitalised
and
managed banking institutions to spearhead development in an environment
of
efficiency and competition. At the same time, these institutions are expected
to
help: (i) broaden and deepen financial intermediation and markets; and
(ii)
accelerate the development of an active bond market in all its aspects
to
provide viable new avenues and mechanisms for the intermediation of funds
and
risks, thereby enhancing badly needed secondary market liquidity with
immense multiplier benefits to national development.
Herein lies the challenge for American financial institutions to work with
Malaysian banks through smart pannerships, strategic alliances, transfer
of
expertise and technology, and minority strategic investments (with
management leadership if needs be).
The core banks will need expertise, managerial skills, technology, and
global
and regional networking to succeed in their mission.
Indeed, their growing size and large appetite for new capital offers unique
opportunities to the US; banks interested in a presence in Malaysia ahead
of
WTO's next round.
The area which should attract particular interest must be the growing capital
market.
Here, the field is wide open to investment banks in particular since the
domestic market for medium to long-term private debt securities (PDS) and
securitisation is very much in its infancy.
Opportunities abound to structure, issue, underwrite and place issues as
well
as invest in them, including assisting the 6 core banks in making an active
secondary market in these bonds.
The next step must be to seize the opportunities.
To conclude, I see a sound, progressive and resilient banking structure
emerging from the throes of the recent crisis. This augers well for the
future.