There has been wide ranging debate on the topic of the mind and its connection with the brain and the body. The participants in this discourse fall into one of two categories. They believe that humanity is composed of basically two types of substance, the dualist, or they believe that humanity is composed of one basic substance, the monists. While evidence exists to support some of the claims of both parties there are extremists in each position that clearly miss the truth.
I believe the theory postulated by John Cooper (1989) called functional holism is the best and most Biblical framework within which to handle the data concerning this issue. Cooper (1989) states there are two basic types of components that make up human beings, yet while alive the human person is such an indivisible unity that mind and body mutually influence one another constantly and intimately. The superiority of this position over other theories such as Cartesian dualism, Hebraic monism, and materialism lies in the fact that functional holism best accounts for all the evidence available, not just some of it. Functional holism can explain the medical data that shows that the mind and brain are inseparable in living human beings, and yet provides a framework wherein the Biblical teachings of soul, afterlife, the intermediate state, and the resurrection do not need to be compromised.
From this theoretical framework I will then integrate scientific and Biblical data, as well as, critiquing the Artificial Intelligence (AI) movement, and its requisite materialist presuppositional underpinnings. I will conclude that since AI's presuppositions are found wanting, then its stated goals of creating machines that are truly intelligent and of making computer copies, or uploads, of individuals are unattainable.
What are we? This question has been argued over, written about, and spoken on for as long as human beings have existed. The arguments have swung, like a pendulum, from one pole to the other, sweeping through every conceivable combination, permutation, and reaction in between. One aspect of this eternal question concerns the paradox known as the Mind-Body Problem. The difficulty is this: how can we, being physical entities, possess seemingly non-physical components, such as mind, emotions, and thoughts. The ultimate question, then, is "What is the nature of our soul?"
There are two primary ways this dilemma can be handled. One can assert that there is ultimately only one type of substance that composes human beings -- either immaterial or material. The second asserts both types of substances compose human beings. Most Christians (evangelical and otherwise) currently and throughout history have held dualism to be the orthodox position. That, however, is not the case for all Christians, especially not for all evangelical / fundamental Christians. Many Christians today are postulating a Hebrew view of humanity that stresses the unity of humanity to such an extent that they rule out the possibility of any immaterial portion of humans. They contend that matter is the ultimate substance, out of which the mental and other immaterial aspects of persons arise. This position is really not new. Classical Greek philosophers taught similar theories, and many modern scientists assume that materialism (that humans are composed solely of matter) is a valid and true position.
While Christian monism and materialism, seem, at first glance, to contradict large portions of the Bible that refer to soul, spirit, and mind, the dualism proposed by many Christians, which grows out of the Platonic or Cartesian traditions, is no more Biblical than Christian monism. A careful, reasoned look at the Scriptures shows that the Bible emphasizes both the dual nature of humanity (soul / spirit and body) and the functional unity of the entity during earthly life. One does not find the Platonic notion in the Bible of an eternal, uncreated, invisible soul that is connected to the body only in a cursory manner and occupies itself solely with cognition, emotion, and decision-making. The truly Biblical path that successfully navigates this slippery terrain is a middle position that acknowledges the psycho-physical unity of human beings while not denying the Biblical teaching about humanity's composition.
The implications of one's conclusions concerning this issue are far-reaching and grave. One's conclusions about the Mind-Body Problem inform beliefs about what happens to a person after they die, about what role humanity plays in this world, about the uniqueness of the individual, about the uniqueness of humankind, in general, and about the possibility of intelligent life-forms that are not human, but instead either computer copies of once human persons or robots and computers that are intelligent in their own right.
William Dembski (1990) states that there are three possible views on the mind-body problem. One can hold to: 1) a type of Cartesian dualism, the ghost in the machine theory; 2) materialistic monism; or 3) the historical view, that is, that matter and spirit come together to form a unified soul, the separation of which is death. What Dembski calls the historical view historically has not always been the view held by the church. In fact, quite often the church has been more influenced by the sacred / secular dichotomy or by Descartes's dichotomy than by the teaching of Scripture. Dembski (1990) also claims that due to the complexity of the brain's behavior, no one is really entirely sure what is going on. Some suggest that our minds have certain cognitive limits that render our minds incapable of fully conceiving of our own minds. While I contend that some type of dualism best explains all the data available, the second position above is not without support.
The medical field is brimming with research in the area of holistic health. The holistic health movement grows out of a critique of the mechanical one-sided view of the body that has ruled the medical field, and refers to the belief that mind and body are so intimately connected that one's state of mind actually influences one's physical health. This critique had its genesis in the late 19th century with Freud, who insisted that psychosomatic illnesses showed conclusively that the mind can make the body sick. This belief is also based in part on strong recent research.
There are many proofs or evidences that point to this intimate relationship between mind and body. First, it has been found that deeply felt emotions, whether positive or negative, have an effect on the body by increasing the activity of the immune system. Nicholas Hall, as quoted in Grukin (1993), did a study of method actors who worked themselves into the desired emotion for the part they were playing. He found that these actors actually had all the physiological signs of emotional arousal, actually felt the emotions, and had a corresponding immune response. Another example of how deeply felt emotions affect the body and health is exemplified in the well-known anecdote of the strong-willed patient. Studies have shown that a patient's will to live makes a significant difference in their likelihood of recovering from their illness (Grukin, 1993). Viktor Frankl, a Jewish concentration camp survivor, noticed during his time in one of the Nazi concentration camps that those prisoners who had a strong will to live were more likely to stay healthy and to make it through the ordeal alive, whereas the other prisoners who did not have a strong will to live got sick more often and many did not live long enough to be liberated by the Allied forces.
The class of chemicals known as neuropeptides, seems to provide a link between the body and emotion. Neuropeptides are a special class of peptides, which are strings of amino acids, that were originally found only in the brain, but later discovered throughout the entire body. In fact, each cell in the body has a receptor for neuropeptides (Grukin, 1993). It seems that the brain secretes neuropeptides which are then picked up by certain cells in the body. It is believed that neuropeptides are the mechanisms by which the brain directs where the body is to pay attention (Grukin, 1993).
Neuropeptides are called the "biochemicals of emotion" (Grukin, 1993). They are secreted in areas of the brain that mediate emotion, and during emotional states (Grukin, 1993). In addition to directing the body's attention, neuropeptides also control the opening or constriction of blood flow, thus accounting for the flush that accompanies strongly felt emotion (Grukin, 1993). The moods, thoughts, and emotions in the brain are translated to the body through the neuropeptides (Grukin, 1993). Because of their dual role of controlling physiological arousal and mediating emotion, neuropeptides seem to be an important component in the interaction between mind and body.
A third evidence of mind-body interaction is manifested in the phenomenon of biofeedback (Grukin, 1993). By focusing one's attention on a machine that gives one feedback concerning certain biological measures, such as heart rate, body temperature, or galvanic skin resistance (GSR), the electrical conductivity of the skin, a person can learn to control these unconscious aspects of their physiology through concentration and the utilization of relaxation techniques. The biofeedback phenomenon is strong evidence for the mind's connection to the body.
Fourth, is the well-documented fact that brain damage affects mental functions (Killheffer, 1993). A strict Cartesian or Platonic duality cannot adequately explain why consciousness should be interrupted or impaired by drugs, sleep, or a blow to the head (Hasker, 1982).
There is also evidence from medical experiments that hints at the existence of the mind. In 1975 Wilder Penfield, a neurophysiologist, performed surgery on 1,132 epileptics. He would anesthetize them, cut open their skull, and then bring them back to consciousness (Gilder, 1996). After that he poked around in their brain with an electrode to discover the areas of their brain that were causing the epilepsy. Once those areas were found, he would remove or lesion the area, thus reducing the number of seizures (Gilder, 1996). What is most interesting for the discussion at hand, however, is the collateral material that Penfield collected about the connection between the mind and the brain. "Nowhere in the brain did he discover any evidence of mind: the consciously deciding, willing, imagining, and creative force in human thought (Gilder, 1996, p. 10)." The contents of consciousness (which body parts moved, which memories one remembered, or which sensory experience one had) could be altered by the probe, but the person's mind remained aloof, that is, the patient could always distinguish between thoughts, movements, and so on caused by him or herself and those caused by the electrode (Gilder, 1996). "Stampedes of electrons could not cause a conscious whim in the mind, but a whim of consciousness could cause a stampede of organized electrical and chemical activity in the brain (Gilder, 1996, p. 11)." While this is an argument from silence, and thus does not conclusively prove the existence of mind, it is compelling.
Horgan (1994) states that the "binding problem of neuroscience" is determining how the various firings of neurons are turned into a unified perception. He suggests that the final dissolution of this problem may lie in the fact that distinctions between matter and energy no longer occur at certain levels, as suggested by the famous Law of Relativity (E=mc2). Horgan (1994) cites two studies done by Libet on the connection between mind and perceptual awareness.
In Libet's first study, he stimulated a section of a subject's brain responsible for tactile sensation half a second before actually stimulating the skin, but when the subject was questioned about how long his or her skin had been stimulated the subject reported feeling stimulation for the full second. Libet referred to this as the "backward referral in time."
Libet's second study involved decision making. The subject was to decide to flex a finger and then note how long it took for the finger to actually flex after deciding. He found that the finger would flex two seconds after the decision had been made to move it, but Libet noticed that neurons began firing three seconds before the decision was made. The brain had moved before the mind was aware of it. The implications of this finding ought not be missed. In this experiment, the subject's brain was so intimately tied up with the workings of the mind that it actually began firing, making preparations for movement and so on before the subject was aware of that a decision had been made. This cannot be an example of Descartes's ghostly mind directing the actions of the mechanistic brain like a rider directs a horse. This finding is an astounding acknowledgment of the intimate link that the mind and body have, if they can even be spoken of as different substances.
Horgan (1994) continues his article by quoting Penrose who suggests that quantum mechanics might be able to best explain consciousness. Quantum effects would best explain some strange neural phenomena observed in the brain. It has been noted that some times when neurons in one part of the brain begin to fire in a pattern that neurons in a separate, unconnected portion of the brain begin to oscillate in sequence with the first group of neurons. Quantum mechanics calls this nonlocality, the ability of one portion of a quantum system to affect other parts instantaneously. These quantum effects are postulated to take place in thin strands of protein in the neurons called microtubules. Horgan (1994) suggests that this quantum explanation may be the solution to the binding problem. The difficulty with the quantum analysis is that supposedly quantum effects only occur at temperatures near absolute zero (-273 C). Horgan (1994) states that dualisms are possible, but only in the everyday world of appearances. The closer in we zoom, he argues, the fuzzier distinctions between mind and body become.
Daniel Dennett is an important theorist of consciousness and Artificial Intelligence (AI). Dennett developed the theory of the intentional stance. The intentional stance is a point of view, or way of looking at a computer or another human being that focuses on the entity's goals, beliefs, and strategies as opposed to: 1) the design stance, that is, looking at the construction of programs and the architecture of hardware; 2) the physical stance, that is, look at the electrical / chemical interactions that take place in a computer's transistors or a human's neurons (Sharples, Hogg, Hutchison, Torrance, & Young, 1990). The intentional stance is necessary to be able to use computers to perform their designed purposes, but it is merely a product of our own "predictive purposes," or expectations. Dennett argues that simply because we talk of intentionality, whether with regard to a computer or a human being, it does not mean that in a metaphysical sense there are actual intentions. Dennett hopes to eliminate the talk of feelings, beliefs, and intentions for both computers and humans (Sharples et al., 1990).
Daniel Dennett defines consciousness as the perception constructed after the fact influenced by all the competing factors in the brain (Beardsley, 1996). He echoes the findings of Libet insisting that human beings build their perceptions after all the data are in. This finding has been replicated in an experiment called the color phi-phenomenon (Beardsley, 1996). The phi-phenomenon is an optical illusion that occurs when two separate lights are flashed on and off. When they are turned off and on at the right frequency there no longer appears to be two lights, but instead one light seems to move from one side to the other. The color phi-phenomenon is performed when the two lights are different colors. The lights appear to blend in between as the light appears to move from the one position to the other. The brain constructs the perception of the blending colors after the second light has already flashed. Perception is not done in real time. This aspect of consciousness reflects our intentionality, Dennett says, because it reflects the brain's goal to perceive things in a unified manner (Beardsley, 1996). To do this, the brain waits for all the data to come in and then constructs the perception from the data. It is necessary for our consciousness to be, in a certain respect, discontinuous so that we can perceive our experiences with a sense of continuity (Killheffer, 1993).
Francis Crick, the famous biologist who cracked the secrets of the human DNA in the 1950's, has been devoting his attention recently to the study of consciousness. He defines consciousness as a combination of short term memory and attention (Voll, 1994). Crick believes that the key to understanding the soul is by understanding neurons, and he predicts that we will eventually have as much biological certainty about consciousness as we currently have about genes (Voll, 1994). He suggests that the mystery of consciousness would disappear if we could build machines that could mimic the brain (Voll, 1994). Attention, a component of consciousness, is related to one's senses. Therefore, Crick argues that the thalamus plays an important role in consciousness because all the senses, except smell, rely on connections to the thalamus (Voll, 1994).
The above medical and scientific evidence is compelling, but it doesn't account for all the data. My primary presuppositions closely follow the outline of Francis Schaeffer's philosophy. I believe there is a personal Creator God, who is really there. God exists. Secondarily, I believe that this God spoke to humanity for the purpose of revealing Himself to us. This spoken revelation has been preserved in the Bible. The Bible makes mention of aspects to our humanity that are not purely physical. There are well over several hundred references to mind, soul, and spirit in the Old and New Testaments. One of the basic teachings of the Bible is that there is a usually invisible spiritual reality orthogonal to and just as real as our visible material reality. The primary means of learning about this spiritual dimension of humanity and the universe is by studying what the Bible teaches about it since it cannot be subjected to the classic empirical modes of gaining knowledge: observation or experimental manipulation. Because of my presuppositions I am compelled to acknowledge the existence of this reality despite the fact that I cannot see it. Apart from the teachings of the Bible the spiritual realm can be known by experiencing it. God, through the Holy Spirit, influences the lives of His followers. However, the primary standard for understanding the spiritual realm is through the authority of the Bible.
Two psychologists, James Beck and David Myers, provide a microcosm of the debate going on among Christian psychologists about the nature of the mind's relation to the body. David Myers, a Christian monist, argues that many of the ideas Christians have today of the soul, an immortal substance distinct from the body, are elements of Greek philosophy that have crept into Christian doctrine (Beck, 1991a). Beck (1991a) has charged Myers of changing his theology simply to fit in with his psychology, but Myers argues that his beliefs have changed as a result of the challenges of other people's theology (Myers, 1991). Even so, Myers states, given the unity of all truth there is nothing wrong with re-examining one's theological beliefs in light of truth from science (Myers, 1991).
Beck (1991a) critiques Myers on two main points. First, Myers's concept of Hebraic monism, which he postulates is the Biblical position, versus Greek dualism is overly simplified (Beck, 1991a). Greek thought was more diversified than Myers suggests, and Hebraic monism incorporated a form of dualism, there was a concept of the separation of the soul and body after death, while it focused on the unity of human experience (Beck, 1991a). Second, there are passages in the New Testament, such as Philippians 1:21-23 or 2 Corinthians 5:1-10, that a monistic interpretation of the Bible cannot adequately handle (Beck, 1991a). Beck (1991b) argues that one wouldn't come to the interpretations of the Bible that a monist suggests inductively, that is, by reading meaning out of the text instead of putting your ideas into the text.
While there are problems with the Hebraic monistic interpretation of the Bible there are some valid points that it raises. The recent emphasis on monism among Christians is, in part, a reaction against Cartesian dualism (Beck, 1991a). The Hebraic model focuses on the unity of personal experience. Psychological functions are so closely related to physiological functions in the Old Testament that they are localized in specific body parts (Boivin, 1991).
The Hebraic model also focuses on human behavior within its natural social context, thus denying the concept of context-free free will, this concept of free will is a necessary assumption to conceive of a purely physical realm where cause and effect operate unhindered (Boivin, 1991). These emphases offer a much needed balance to the dualisms prevalent in our culture today.
From the examination of the evidence there seems to be two conflicting views concerning the Mind-Body problem, and each view has supporting evidence. A careful examination of the Bible is necessary to determine what exactly is being taught. James Cooper, in his book Body, soul, and life everlasting, defends a view he calls functional holism. He defines holism as a situation where an entity is a functional unity not a compound system created by linking two or more functional systems (Cooper, 1989). Since holism is marked by functional unity, it doesn't necessarily entail monism, the belief in only one substance (Cooper, 1989). It is a middle position between the extremes of materialistic monism and idealistic dualism. Cooper's (1989) basic premise is if one can show that both the Old and New Testaments teach an intermediate afterlife between death and resurrection, then we must conclude some type of dualism exists. The nature of this dualism is not Platonic or Cartesian because of the emphasis throughout the Bible of the unity of conscious experience. "[T]he truth combines elements of the two extremes -- that the Hebrew view of human nature strongly emphasizes living a full and integrated existence before God in this world, but that it unquestionably also includes the belief in continued existence after biological death (Cooper, 1989, 40)."
Cooper (1989) contends if Hebrew anthropology, teaching about man, were to be articulated philosophically it would be most similar to the Aristotelian notion of form and matter. Neither form nor matter are a substance alone, but only when the two combine to form some particular object do they become substantial. The human soul or mind would correspond to form, which organizes and directs the matter. Cooper (1989) believes this would be a better philosophical framework for organizing the Hebrew anthropology than the current materialistic theories. There are some portions of Aristotle's philosophy that do not comport well with Biblical teaching, namely that matter is uncreated and that death necessitates annihilation (Cooper, 1989).
While the Old Testament is not explicit in its teaching on the afterlife, there are hints and clear indications of a belief in continued existence after death. There are clusters of beliefs that reinforce this position: belief in Sheol, belief in the Rephaim, or shades, and belief in resurrection and a hope beyond Sheol.
In Hebrew theology, Sheol was the place of the ethereal existence of the dead. It is underground -- as far from high heaven as one can get -- and is the common lot of all those who die. It is similar to the Greek mythological notion of Hades. Several passages from the Bible highlight the fact that existence in Sheol is marked by overwhelming lethargy. In Job 3:13, Job laments his birth in agony, wondering why he had not died before he was born, saying, "For now I would have lain still and been quiet, I would have been asleep; Then I would have been at rest." In Ecclesiastes 9:10, the Preacher says, "Whatever your hand finds to do, do it with your might; for there is no work or device or knowledge or wisdom in the grave where you are going."
While the shades in Sheol are marked by their inactivity, there are times when they are active. One example is in Isaiah 14:9-10 where the inhabitants of Sheol (Hell) are anticipating the arrival of the evil king of Babylon: "Hell from beneath is excited about you, To meet you at your coming; It stirs up the dead for you, All the chief ones of the earth; It has raised up from their thrones All the kings of the nations. They all shall speak and say to you: Have you also become as weak as we? Have you become like us?'" From this example one can see that in Sheol there is a continuance of personal existence. People remember their status and are aware of their present weakened condition (Cooper, 1989).
The most striking example of activity by a resident of Sheol is found in 1 Samuel 28, when King Saul visits the Witch of En Dor for the purpose of conjuring up Samuel's spirit to ask him for advice. In this narrative Samuel is awakened from his rest in Sheol to visit Saul. We can learn four things from this vignette. First, it is clear that there is continuity of personality after death; Samuel was recognizable and actually existed. Second, Samuel was a usual inhabitant of Sheol. We know God had not preserved him until this moment for some special purpose because Saul would be with Samuel in Sheol the next day. Third, even though Samuel was resting, it was possible to awaken him. Finally, Samuel is a shade or ghost, not a Platonic soul or Cartesian mind. He had some sort of ethereal body; he was even wearing a robe.
The second complex of Hebrew beliefs that assume an afterlife are those doctrines concerning the Rephaim, or the departed souls living in Sheol. This term is almost always used to refer to disembodied persons after death. It most likely comes from a Canaanite word for ancestral healing spirits, thus connoting the Rephaim's non-material existence, but it may also be related to the word raphah, which is Hebrew for "weak" (Cooper, 1989). The fact that the Hebrews had a word for persons who have died, but have some sort of continued existence argues explicitly for the possibility that they believed and that the Old Testament teaches a type of dualism.
The third cluster of beliefs centers around the issue of resurrection and hope of escape from Sheol. Resurrection is not taught as explicitly in the Old Testament as it is in the New Testament, yet there are several passages that definitely hint at some of the specifics of resurrection and future redemption from Sheol. Psalm 49:14-15 state, "Like sheep they are laid in the grave; Death shall feed on them; The upright shall have dominion over them in the morning; And their beauty shall be consumed in the grave, far from their dwelling. But God will redeem my soul from the power of the grave, For He shall receive me." The Psalmist truly believed and had hope in the future redemption of the righteous from the grave, that is Sheol, by God, but the nature of this redemption is not articulated. Another more explicit passage is Daniel 12:2, which says, "And many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, Some to everlasting life, Some to shame and everlasting contempt. Those who are wise shall shine Like the brightness of the firmament, And those who turn many to righteousness Like the stars forever and ever." Here we have God teaching, through Daniel, that all persons will be resurrected, but that the outcome of each individual's resurrection will not necessarily be the same. There is still some uncertainty, though. This passage is not explicit about who will be resurrected. It is not necessarily the Rephaim as we have conceived of them (Cooper, 1989). A passage that leaves little doubt about who will be resurrected is Isaiah 26:14-19: "They are dead, they will not live; They are deceased, they will not rise. Therefore You have punished and destroyed them, And made all their memory to perish . . . Your dead shall live; Together with my dead body they shall arise. Awake and sing, you who dwell in dust; For your dew is like the dew of herbs, And the earth shall cast out the dead." In this passage the prophet is talking about God's chastisement and judgement of His people, Israel. They have died and gone down to the realm of Sheol so that they are no longer remembered here on earth, but these same dead will someday be spewed out of the earth to arise to new life. The Hebrew word for those who are going to rise, the "dead," is rephaim (Cooper, 1989). This passage brings together all the strings of teaching in the Old Testament we've covered here concerning the resurrection.
From this brief survey of Hebrew theology we see that the Hebrews believed in a place where the dead go after they die called Sheol. Existence in this realm is marked by a lack of vitality, and the inhabitants, known as Rephaim, are the same persons as they were in life, only they lead a partial, ethereal existence. The Hebrews had hope in a future resurrection from Sheol to renewed bodily life. These findings dispel the myth that the Hebrews were ontological monists. It shows clearly that the emphases in the Old Testament on the psycho-physical unity of humanity, life in the present, and human interaction within a specified social context do not preclude a belief in ontic duality and an intermediate state between death and resurrection.
I will highlight two New Testament passages that clearly illustrate the Biblical teaching of a discarnate ethereal existence after death and consequently the teaching of a non-material component of human composition. The first passage, found in Luke 24:37-40, is the narrative of Christ's appearance before the disciples. "Now as they said these things, Jesus Himself stood in the midst of them, and said to them, "Peace to you." But they were terrified and frightened, and supposed they had seen a spirit. And He said to them, "Why are you troubled? And why do doubts arise in your hearts? "Behold My hands and My feet, that it is I Myself. Handle Me and see, for a spirit does not have flesh and bones as you see I have." When He had said this, He showed them His hands and His feet." In this passage, the Greek word pneuma, or spirit, is used to refer to a discarnate person visible in human form (Cooper, 1989). Jesus reassures them that he is no such entity by showing them he does, in fact, have a real physical body as a result of His resurrection.
The second passage that I will refer to is found in Matthew 10:28. "And do not fear those who kill the body [soma] but cannot kill the soul [psyche]. But rather fear Him who is able to destroy both soul [psyche] and body [soma] in hell." Jesus appears to be making a distinction between the body and the soul. Some monists argue against this type of interpretation by making reference to the literary device of synecdoche (Cooper, 1989). A synecdoche is used to make a part of something stand for the whole. An example of synecdoche would be calling someone who is intelligent "a real brain." This argument, however, does not dilute the affect of the dualistic interpretation of Matthew 10:28 because if synecdoche were being used in that passage then body and soul would refer to the same thing and thus the statement of who we should fear would be nonsense (Cooper, 1989). For Jesus's statement to make any sense there must be a difference between body and soul and between who can kill the body and who can kill both body and soul in hell.
I believe Cooper's anthropology provides an excellent framework within which to integratively think about the Mind-Body Problem. It is able to explain scientific findings that affirm the unity of experience between our soul and our mind, and yet also explicates the role of Biblical teaching on dualism, the afterlife, and resurrection. In the next section I will use this framework to evaluate the AI enterprise and draw some conclusions about the extent AI will progress in the future and the legitimacy of it presuppositions and goals. "Not all questions have been answered. Not all problems have been solved. Not all mysteries have been dispelled. But it seems reasonable at this point to assert that a holistic-dualism anthropology is not obviously incompatible with the findings of establishment science or with various contemporary approaches to philosophy (Cooper, 1989, p. 252)."
What is Artificial Intelligence? Sharples et al. (1990) define AI as an interdisciplinary study that combines psychology, philosophy and computer science in an effort to get below human behavior to discover the processes, the systems, and the principles that make intelligent behavior possible. Computers are needed tools for the modeling of these states and processes. AI can also be defined as attempting to understand how the mind works by investigating the problem of designing machines that have abilities that are traditionally only possessed by humans.
An important and necessary assumption on the part of those involved in the AI movement is that the brain at some level is a purely computational symbol manipulator. That is, humanity's consciousness is based entirely on matter -- the necessary assumption is materialism. This is a reoccurring theme among the theorists in the artificial intelligence field. Many theorists and philosophers, including Babbage, the man who invented the first computer, did not believe that computers could think because they could not creatively come up with new ideas, but when George Boole developed his set of rules of thought, known as Boolean Logic, it became possible to mechanize reasoning as symbols (Sharples et al., 1990). Therefore, machines could create new theorems on their own by manipulating a set of symbolic axioms (Sharples et al., 1990). The movement has continued up to today where the newest development in AI is something called the neural computer. This is a different type of computer architecture from the normal digital computer where several processors are linked together much like neurons in the human brain (Sharples et al., 1990). In all its efforts the AI mentality has maintained the assumption that if intelligence could be represented symbolically it could be represented on a computer.
A difficulty for AI is the concept of subjective experience. If having subjective states of awareness, such as feeling pain, is a requirement of having a mind, then one cannot necessarily conclude that just because a machine behaves intelligently that it has a mind (Sharples et al., 1990). In fact, the rise of "smart machines" that can mimic human behavior makes the question of subjective experience (feelings, sensations, emotions, self-consciousness) even more stark (Wright, 1996). Apparently human-type behavior can occur without these experiences (Wright, 1996). One cannot help being struck by the apparent "extra-ness" of consciousness, and yet the better these soul-less machines get at doing human tasks the more plausible it becomes that humans could be soul-less machines (Wright, 1996).
The AI movement is not without its critics. One especially outspoken antagonist of artificial intelligence is John Searle. His most famous polemic against AI is embodied in his Chinese Room thought experiment. In the Chinese Room there is a person who speaks only English with a pile of rules on index cards that govern the manipulation of a set of unintelligible symbols that are passed into and out of the room on other cards. The cards being passed into the room are worked on by the English speaker and then passed out of the room to a Chinese speaker who is able to decipher the meaning of the symbols on the cards. This whole set up is designed to symbolize the situation inside a digital computer. Searle argues that it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition that the operator who manipulates the arcane symbols according to a set of intelligible rules understands the transactions he or she is performing. The operator has only syntax. There is no semantics or understanding. Understanding in this case is provided by a human observer for whom the symbols on the cards are meaningful.
AI theorists counter Searle's Chinese Room by arguing that while the manipulator may not understand the symbols, the system as a whole does, but this argument is merely begging the question. How can understanding spontaneously arise out of parts that do not understand? AI theorists cannot adequately answer this question without both denying the existence of mind or soul as a separate entity; thus, demanding that understanding and consciousness arise from non-conscious component parts. William Dembski (1990) formulates the Law of Priority in Creation, which repudiates the endeavors of the most militant cognitive science and AI theorists. "The creator is always strictly greater than the creature . . . for the computers they build . . . all testify of a genius in man which surpasses the objects it creates (Dembski, 1990)."
While doing research for this paper, I came across several people on the Internet that not only advocated artificial intelligence, but went further than that to say that some day it will be possible for humans to be "uploaded" onto computers. The benefits of this would be that life would be extended beyond the death of the physical body, and that the cognitive capacities of the mind would be accentuated.
These theories follow the general framework of the Artificial Intelligence idea structure. Each of them started with the necessity of the assumption of materialism. The "evidence for materialism" follows a similar vein as the Evidence from Science given above, namely, the fact that nearly any aspect of the mind, whether temperament, memories, or appetite, can be disrupted by damage to specific areas of the brain. The flow of logic moves along in the following manner, if we assume that human beings are composed only of matter, then the mind is a "virtual" property of the brain. A person is identified as "the particular connections the synapses [of the neurons in the brain] make, the neuronal thresholds, the neuro-transmitter concentrations, and so on, irrespective of whether these are present in a biological system or in a computer emulation (Brouwer, 1995, brouwer_essay.html)." This means that mind is really just a set of physical conditions or the capacity to organize and work with information. Therefore, it follows that, "Once we establish the mind as a physical information-processing system, and that both information and physical systems may exist' within electronic media, then we must accept that it should be possible for the mind to exist in media other than the organic brain (Lateiner, 1992, consciousness.html#info)."
One site I discovered, called the Mind Uploading Home Page, is maintained by Joe Strout. This collection of web pages discusses the possibility of copying a person's mind onto a computer shortly before their body dies so that they will continue to exist. He addresses some of the problems of personal identity that are a consequence of the multiplication of one's mind. Strout (1996) says there are three explanations to resolve the difficulty of having multiple copies of a person's mind. First, both Person A and Person B are the same person, but this would mean A=B, suggesting that uploading would be impossible because that is untrue. Second, one could say that neither A, the original person, nor B, the computer upload, are the same person as A before uploading, but this is an inadequate explanation because somehow A stops being the same person simply through the process of copying. The third possibility employs an adjustment to Boolean Logic called Fuzzy Logic. Boolean Logic only allows full True or False truth values, but Fuzzy Logic allows truth values to be partial rather than entirely false or true (Strout, 1996). According to this explanation A and B are the same at the instant they are copied, but then, as time goes on, each copy will develop their own history, thus becoming more dissimilar (Strout, 1996). Strout (1996) believes that this explanation best resolves the problem of multiple copies of a person's mind, but he still can't escape the first explanation (A=B), which he himself condemned as inadequate to address the issue, because A and B are still the same at the instant A is copied. While sophisticated and interesting to read, Strout's attempt at justifying the possibility of mind uploading cannot escape the limits of his materialist assumptions.
J. Lateiner postulates a second theory that attempts to defend the possibility of minds existing in other media besides the brain. He builds from Daniel Dennett's hypothesis that human beings are nothing more than a huge collection of memes that evolve and reproduce in an attempt to make the most of the available environment (Lateiner, 1992). A meme is defined as an idea capable of replicating itself; it is living information (Lateiner, 1992). The human brain is a favorable environment for the existence of memes because it is programmable, that is, not all its behaviors are hardwired into it, in other words, the brain is flexible (Lateiner, 1992). Memes are working to improve their interface with electronic media because cyberspace -- the realm of electronic information -- offers even more possibilities for meme evolution than the human brain (Lateiner, 1992). As interfaces with electronic media become increasingly more complex we may reach the day where the brain is directly linked to a computer, and many of one's thought processes will take place outside of one's brain in that computer (Lateiner, 1992). Lateiner (1992) concludes "If we are really nothing more than physically-based meme systems, then the potential for our minds to take up residence in alternate media exists (Lateiner, 1992, consciousness.html#conc)."
Evaluating this position from within the framework of functional holism, we find Lateiner's Meme-based model wanting. While Lateiner does not seem to deny the existence of the soul, there is a component of the person that can continue after their body dies, he does deny the traditional formulation of the afterlife. For him the afterlife is being connected to a computer so that the memes that make up you can continue to reproduce and evolve in cyberspace. This is nothing like what the Bible teaches.
Lateiner also runs into similar problems as Strout. He himself asks the question if large segments of your thinking are taking place outside your brain, then where is the locus of consciousness? He does not adequately resolve this conflict. By assuming that the brain is merely a meme system Lateiner has limited the amount of evidence that can be looked at or explained by his theory. The Bible clearly teaches that while the mind and the body are intimately interconnected they are still distinct types of entities. Lateiner denies this.
In conclusion, I believe that the functional holism theory best explains all the available data from science, philosophy, and theology. It offers a framework within which one can integrate data suggesting the unity of human experience without denying the evidence that shows there is more to the mind than just the brain. The Artificial Intelligence enterprise is based on faulty assumptions of materialism which denies a large portion of the available evidence on the relationship between the mind and the body. While AI has and will probably continue to accomplish astounding things with the computers and programs the engineers design, the grandiose goals of AI, creating a truly intelligent machine and making true copies of people's minds on computer, are unattainable because the foundation from which they spring is not true to life.
Beardsley, T. (1996). Dennett's dangerous idea. Scientific American, 274(2), 34-35.
Beck, J. R. (1991). Questioning the intermediate state: A case study in integrative
conflict. Journal of Christianity and Christianity, 10, 24-35.
Beck, J. R. (1991). A reply to Myers. Journal of Christianity and Psychology, 10, 39.
Boivin, M. J. (1991). The Hebraic model of the person: Toward a unified psychological
science among Christian helping professionals. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 19, 157-165.
Brouwer, A. (1995, January 2). Re: Uploading question. [On-line]. Available:
http://sunsite.unc.edu/jstrout/uploading/brouwer_essay.html.
Cooper, J. W. (1989). Body, soul, & life everlasting. Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company.
Dembski, W. A. (1990). Converting mind into matter: Alchemy and the philosopher's
stone in cognitive science. Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, 42, 202-226.
Emerson, A. & Forbes, C. (1989). The invasion of the computer culture. Downer's
Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press.
Gilder, G. (1996). The materialist superstition. The Intercollegiate Review, 31(2), 6-14.
Grukin, D. (Producer and Director), & Moyers, B. (Host). (1993). Healing and the
Mind [Film]. (Available from Ambrose Video Publishing, Inc., New York, NY 10023).
Horgan, J. (1994). Can science explain consciousness? Scientific American, 271(1), 88-94.
Killheffer, R. K. J. (1993, October). The consciousness wars. Omni, 16, 50-.
Lateiner, J. S. (1992). Of man, mind and machine: Meme-based models of mind and the
possibility for consciousness in alternate media. [On-line]. Available:
http://www.dataspace.com/WWW/documents/consciousness.html.
Myers, D. G. (1991). Are we body and soul? A response to James Beck. Journal of
Psychology and Christianity, 10, 36-38.
Pribram, K. H. (1979). Transcending the Mind/Body Problem. Zygon, 14, 103-124.
Sharples, M., Hogg, D., Hutchison, C., Torrance, S., & Young, D. (1990). Computers
and thought. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Strout, J. (1996, February 2). Mind uploading home page. [On-line]. Available:
http://sunsite.unc.edu/jstrout/uploading/MUHomePage.html.
Voll, D. (1994, February). Soul search with Francis Crick. Omni, 16, 46-55, 80-82.
Wright, R. (1996, March 25). Can machines think? Time, 147(3), 50-5