INTRODUCTION
The outlines of the peasant revolt of 1784--85 in Transylvania are not
very difficult to establish. Unrest
was endemic in the southern portions of the province, where the mountains
harbored fugitives and
various highwaymen who periodically raided the traveling merchants.
On January 3, 1784, Emperor
Joseph II ordered a trial census of the peasantry for the purpose of
signing them up for the border
forces as auxiliary militiamen. This created a great deal of hope,
especially among the Rumanian
peasants of the Abrudbánya (Abrud, Gross-Schlatten) region,
that they would be freed of their feudal
obligations once they had joined the army. During the summer, however,
royal agents were sent to
calm the unrest among the peasants by assuring them that they would
have to continue serving their
lords and fulfilling their obligations to them. Obviously these agents
were not believed; in late October
or early November, open revolt began at the Zalatna (Zlatna) estate
of the treasury, spreading to the
adjoining mining districts, then into Hunyad and Krassó-Szörény
counties. By the end of the month,
peasants armed themselves against the lords in some villages of the
Maros River valley. The unrest
spread throughout the province. After some initial hesitation, the
imperial authorities decided to
intervene and sent regular troops against the rebellious people. They
successfully suppressed the revolt
by early December. The leaders were betrayed to the authorities by
some Rumanian peasants and
were caught later in the month; they were interrogated in January,
1785, and with one exception (who
either committed suicide or died of some unknown cause) were executed
in February in the presence
of representatives of a large number of villages. Their bodies (including
that of the one who died in jail)
were quartered and put on exhibit in various regions of the province
in order to provide an example for
future rebels. The causes of the unrest were then explored by the royal
commission, who placed the
blame partly on inept royal officials but mainly upon the shoulders
of a recalcitrant Hungarian nobility
for their alleged sabotage
of imperial reforms intended for the rationalization of the administration
of Transylvania. The revolt did
for the Rumanians of Transylvania what the massacre of Mádéfalva
had done for the Székelys in
1764,[1] namely, it brought home to them the realization that their
conationals across the Transylvanian
borders probably constituted a better guarantee of their well-being
than did the existing institutions of
the Habsburg state. In this way the unsuccessful revolt became a powerful
catalyst of early Rumanian
nationalism.
Peasant revolts in Europe's feudal age followed a recognizable pattern.[2]
Part of this pattern
concerned peasant beliefs that too many innovations --- usually in
the form of new tax regulations ---
were destroying a formerly "better" or even "freer" way of life. Revolts
of this nature usually began
when improvements in peasant life were promised but not delivered by
the authorities, creating
expectations that the authorities never really intended to fulfill.
It usually seemed to the peasantry that
royal intentions to improve their lot were being sabotaged by "bad
advisors" at court or by the local
nobility; they perceived that their foe was not the royal authority
but rather its underlings.
The leadership of peasant uprisings usually came from various social
strata, and only a few of the
leaders were peasants themselves. Most often the leaders were disgruntled
petty noblemen or priests,
or even craftsmen from nearby cities or towns, and sometimes discharged
soldiers. The often
indiscriminate looting and burning that accompanied peasant disturbances
as well as the attacks on
villages and individual peasants who refused to join the rebellion
resulted in the gradual loss of support
for the peasant warriors among their own social class and the isolation
of the rebels from the most
satisfied elements in peasant society. The demands of the rebellious
peasants were usually too
particularistic --- centering mainly on the solution to some local
problem --- to attract universal societal
support.[3]
Many such peasant revolts occurred from the fourteenth through the eighteenth
centuries, most notable
among them the English rising of 1381, the movement of the French Touchin
in the late fourteenth
century, the peasant rising of Bábolna in 1437--38 in Transylvania,
the Hungarian rebellion of György
Dózsa in 1514, the Karinthian peasant revolt of 1515, the great
German peasant war of 1525--26, and
the French, Russian, and Chinese risings of the seventeenth century.[4]
The Horea-Closca revolt of
1784--85 represented a late wave of these classic peasant movements.
This last uprising displayed many elements of classic peasant revolts.
These included unfulfilled
expectations for the abolition of feudal obligations, for a possibly
freer life for the peasants as
militiamen in
the border regiments, and for the general betterment of life for the
entire peasantry. An added feature
that made the short-lived uprising so significant, foreshadowing later
popular movements in Eastern
Europe, was the issue of an early Rumanian nationalism. There was also
the problem of religious
discrimination against Orthodox Christians in Transylvania, the majority
of whom belonged to the
ethnically Rumanian population.[5]
To be sure, we cannot as yet speak in terms of a modern-day national
consciousness dominating the
thinking and aspirations of the Transylvanian Rumanian peasants who
made up the bulk of the warriors
in 1784; but the fact was that they regarded the nobility, whose majority
happened to be Hungarian, as
the chief agents of their oppression.[6] At the same time, since the
geographic boundaries of the
Rumanian language roughly corresponded to the boundaries of the Orthodox
faith in Transylvania, the
common opponents of the faith and of nationality appeared to be the
non-Orthodox, Roman Catholic, or
Protestant Hungarians as a whole.[7]
When exploring the issues in Transylvania in 1784, we will want to know
more, first of all, about the
social conditions of the population as a whole; this will help us understand
the bases of peasant
grievances. We will also want to explore the leadership of the revolt,
to find out who the peasant
leaders really were, what goals were set by them, and what the short-term
and long-range
consequences of their movement were. In a short essay such as this,
the author does not intend to
provide a more detailed description of the actual course of events
than the short account above but will
concentrate on these questions, being fully aware of the tentative
nature of the answers provided by
the available sources.
THE SOCIAL ISSUES
By the late eighteenth century, the population of Transylvania, now
part of the Habsburg Empire but
administered separately from Hungary, was 1.45 million inhabitants.[8]
In comparison with the situation
a century before, this figure represented the doubling of the population.
However, the increase was
only partly the result of natural growth; most of it came from immigration,
largely from the Danubian
Principalities, consisting mainly of Rumanian peasants.[9] There was
also a reverse movement of
Hungarians, especially Székelys, leaving Transylvania for the
Moldavian lands. Consequently, by the
mid-eighteenth century, over half, or fifty-five percent, of the population
were ethnically Rumanian;
about thirty percent were Hungarian, another
ten percent were Saxons, while the rest were South Slavs. One peculiarity
of the social composition of
the population was the fact that only about 52,000 people lived in
the cities and towns, while the rest
resided in villages. This pointed to an important social characteristic
that was to plague the entire region
for the next two centuries, namely, the fact that it lacked an urban
middle class.
Accordingly, the two economically, politically, and socially important
branches of society consisted of
the nobility and the peasantry. The nobility made up an unusually large
segment of the population ---
close to ten percent --- including women and children. The majority
of the nobles were ethnically
Hungarian, although there were many Rumanian noblemen, and a narrow
stratum of Saxon patricians
may also be considered in this category. But the nobility as such was
not a homogeneous stratum.
About 260 of the richest, most powerful families were the so-called
magnates, possessing the largest
estates in the province, dominating practically every facet of social
life in Transylvania. The rest of the
nobility lived under more modest conditions, sometimes not very different
from those of the
peasantry.[10]
The policies of the Habsburg administration in Transylvania were openly
exploitative, representing an
early colonial regime, throughout the entire eighteenth century. These
policies were devised to syphon
off the wealth of the province through a system of tariffs and taxes,
regardless of the consequences of
such policies on the economic base that was already strained by the
population increase. In order to be
able to derive the maximum income from Transylvania for the royal treasury,
the administration's first
task appeared to be to free the peasants from landlord control ---
and from the accompanying feudal
obligations paid to the nobility. It was at this point that the interests
of the peasantry and the royal
representatives seemed to coincide. But this was only apparent. In
fact, the Habsburg rulers were not
that much interested in easing the burdens of the peasants; they simply
wanted to free them from
landlord control in order to have them exploited by the state.[11]
These policies, of course, ran directly
counter to the very survival of the nobility as a social group.
In comparison with the life style of similar social groups in Hungary
proper and in the Austrian
crownlands, the Transylvanian nobles were poor indeed. With the exception
of the magnates, their sole
means of survival as nobles depended upon the services and obligations
rendered by the serfs. In order
to increase their income and "catch up" with the nobility of the rest
of the Habsburg Empire, many
Transylvanian nobles (following the example of their fellow nobles
elsewhere in the Habsburg lands)
gradually altered peasant obligations until, during
the second half of the eighteenth century, the peasants' burdens were
considerably increased.[12]
What was especially injurious was the steep increase in the number
of days required of the peasants to
work on their lord's land; by the second half of the century, most
of the workweek of peasants was
spent on the robot, leaving them little time to work their own plots.[13]
While the Habsburg
administration tried by various means to lower the peasants' obligations
to the nobility, the nobles
naturally resisted these efforts as a direct attack upon their lifestyle
and social status, and tried to
achieve just the opposite.
However, the situation was not the same on all noble estates. On the
lands of the magnates, for
instance, there was enough ploughland available for the use of the
peasants, and they were permitted
to till these lands for their own benefit after the fulfillment of
their obligations. But the lesser nobles felt
forced to exclude many peasants from lands that the latter had used
for generations, as these nobles
saw greater profits if they used these lands themselves. At the same
time, they demanded more days
of labor from the serfs. Furthermore, while the magnates were generally
away from their estates most
of the year, the lesser nobles were in daily contact with the serfs,
who saw in them the personification
of their exploitation. It must be emphasized once again that most lesser
nobles were Hungarians, while
a large number of serfs were ethnically Rumanian. Not only did they
belong to different language
groups, but to different religious denominations as well. No wonder
that the fury of the revolt of
1784--85 was to be directed against the lesser nobility, i.e., the
Hungarians.
There also existed a great deal of arbitrariness in peasant-landlord
relations, and not only in
Transylvania, but throughout the entire Habsburg Empire. The demands
of the lords varied not only
from province to province, but sometimes even within individual estates.
This was the case not only in
privately held estates, but also on lands controlled by the royal treasury,
such as, for instance, the estate
of Zalatna, where the spark of the revolt was eventually struck. Arbitrariness
not only fostered
dissatisfaction and tension in the countryside, but it seriously interfered
with the orderly administration
of the province, especially the collection of taxes.[14]
Vienna realized early in the eighteenth century that no systematic taxation
could be devised without the
uniform regulation of landlord-peasant relations. In the views of Maria
Theresa and her son, Joseph II,
"enlightened rule" in the empire required the reduction or even elimination
of peasant obligations to the
landlords, in order to free peasant resources for the purposes of the
state.[15] Nor could the empire
create a strong military organization, one that it increasingly
needed in the face of challenges from France, Prussia, and Russia, without
drawing upon the masses
of the peasantry for soldiers, if not for the regular army, at least
for the border guards. Since the
peasants were, for the most part, under the jurisdiction of the nobles,
the evident aim of the enlightened
absolutist Habsburg state was to transform and restrict the system
of serfdom that, in these instances,
seemed to have outlived its usefulness.[16] But the stiff opposition
of the nobility, centering on the
county administrations that they controlled, slowed down or even sabotaged
all royal attempts at
reform.[17]
The peasantry itself was divided into several social strata ethnically
as well as economically. There
were Rumanian peasants following the Orthodox faith, or of the Uniate
church; there were also
Hungarian, Saxon, and South Slav peasants living in the province, belonging
to other religious
denominations. They were either dominicales (tenant farmers), having
a contractual relationship with
their landlords, or were ordinary iobagiones (serfs), settled on and
tied to the land. Although a tenant
was theoretically free to move and did not need his lord's permission
to get married, and his sons were
free to chose a craft if they so pleased (all these restrictions were
applied to the serfs), the tenant was
subject to the lord's juridical and administrative authority.[18] The
Habsburg emperors tried, first of all,
to set limits on the amount of peasant obligations due the landlords.
Thus, Maria Theresa attempted to
equalize peasant status by declaring all peasants to be free tenants.[19]
When Joseph II came to rule
alone, he was determined to further reduce the weight of feudalism
in his realms. Between 1783 and
1785, he not only declared all serf obligations to be abolished in
Transylvania and Hungary proper (also
in Bohemia and the crownlands), but also ended the age-old restrictions
on marriage, on the freedom to
move, and of occupation. At the same time, he issued a decree imposing
a thirty percent tax on
peasant incomes in lieu of the former feudal obligations.[20] Although
this was a severe demand, since
the peasants possessed little cash money, the overall intentions of
the emperor were interpreted by the
people, especially the Rumanian peasants, as proof of his good will
towards them. In turn, the nobility's
opposition to the royal decrees (never cleared by the duly constituted
legal authorities) was regarded by
the peasants as an openly hostile act not only against the emperor
but also against themselves.
The military situation in the Balkan peninsula after the expulsion of
the Turks from Hungary at the end
of the seventeenth century demanded that the empire build up its border
forces. In turn, the state
needed more soldiers to man the outposts of the realm. More soldiers
naturally meant the need for
more money for their maintenance; this
could only be achieved through the reorganization of the empire's taxation
policies and through the
partial elimination of special privileges that exempted the largest
group of the wealthiest inhabitants, the
nobility, from the tax rolls.
As early as 1762, Maria Theresa had tried to establish a new system
of border defenses in
Transylvania (similar to the military border created in the Croatian
lands of the empire), which led to
the resistance and massacre of the free Székelys by the regular
Habsburg army at Mádéfalva.[21] On
the other hand, large numbers of Rumanian serfs welcomed the establishment
of border regiments,
since by joining these forces they expected to gain freedom from their
serf obligations. When Joseph II
opened recruitment on a trial basis in 1784, the Rumanian peasants
of the Beszterce (Bistritz, Bistrita)
region signed up en masse, as did the male population from numerous
villages near Gyulafehérvár, the
capital of Transylvania, and from some villages in the Maros River
valley. This only strengthened the
nobles' resolve to oppose the establishment of the border regiments,
since they regarded the
recruitment of peasants without their permission as evidence of the
high-handedness of the Habsburg
state. Accordingly, they did everything in their power to stop the
peasants from joining the army. At the
same time, the imperial authorities became alarmed by the apparent
success of their own initiative;
they were surprised at the intensity of peasant response to their call
and began canceling the
recruitment drive.[22]
By then, the emperor's reforms included decrees for religious toleration
in Hungary and Transylvania,
orders for the unification of the chancelleries of the two political
entities, and the creation of new
administrative districts, replacing the age-old system of county government.
Joseph II also declared
that ability, not birth, was to be the basis of future appointments
to government offices and that German
would replace Latin as the language of the administration in his domains,
including Transylvania, within
three years.
Many of the Rumanian peasants greeted these reforms with jubilation.
At a stroke of the emperor's
pen, their religion gained equal status with the other religions of
Transylvania,[23] their status as serfs
had been greatly eased, and once again they were called to sign up
for the border forces. They cared
little about changes in the official language, which was alien to them
in any case. When the
administrators tried to intervene with their signing up for the army,
they regarded this as a conspiracy
against the emperor's orders. But long-simmering discontent did not
break out into open rebellion on the
lands controlled by the nobility. Actual trouble started on the estate
of the treasury at Zalatna.
Peasant unrest was, of course, not a new phenomenon in Transylvania.
Peasants-turned-highwaymen
periodically raided villages and small towns. After each raid they
withdrew into the mountains or, if the
pursuit were too vigorous, they moved into Moldavia or Wallachia through
the mountain passes. Entire
counties were made unsafe by these highwaymen during the eighteenth
century. In Arad and Zaránd
counties, few merchants ventured on the open road without strong escort,
and the villages paid regular
tribute to the highwaymen.[24] Nor were the robbers lacking in local
sympathy. They were often
considered the successors to the legendary fighters against the Turks
who had freed captive peasants
and took vengeance on the Muslim enemy. For many peasants, the highwaymen
were now simply
fighting another oppressor who happened to be either an Austrian official
or a Hungarian
nobleman.[25]
Many of the bands were made up of former soldiers who had found army
life too demanding and thus
deserted. They were resourceful men who were thoroughly familiar with
the locality in which they
operated and often knew the administrators on a personal basis. In
Arad County, they even captured
the head of the county administration, Count András Forray,
and held him for ransom and for a pledge
of amnesty.[26] Most highwaymen were ethnically Rumanian; according
to some reports, entire
districts were involved in their affairs, the peasants accepting and
selling their loot and providing safe
havens for them between raids.[27] Some of the highwaymen were to play
an important role in the
revolt of 1784--85.
The problems of the estate of Zalatna were not new either, and they
reflected peasant discontent in a
microcosm. The administrators of the estate pressed the peasants for
more and more days of labor. At
the same time, they were involved in a scheme to deprive the treasury
of some of its income from the
estate, a scheme discovered during 1784. After the scandal, the administrators
were replaced by new
ones, who tried to press the peasants to fulfill their obligations
to the estate in order to erase the
memory of the past. Another problem was that the peasants were forbidden
to clear forest lands for
cultivation, since the trees were needed for the mines administered
by the estate. Given contemporary
agrarian techniques and an expanding population, the peasants did need
more land; their interests, thus,
clashed sharply with those of the estate. The estate also demanded
higher taxes from its serfs for the
support of the ever-expanding population of officials and of the village
judges who served both the
estate and the county authorities. A long-standing peasant grievance
came to the fore in early 1784,
when the peasants protested the authorities' discriminatory practices
against the Orthodox faith. This had already caused a minor disturbance at the estate in the 1740s.[28]
Yet, the immediate cause of the outbreak was a seemingly insignificant
dispute over peasant
innkeeping rights. Such disputes were, naturally, inherent in the system
of serfdom. These rights were
included in patents originally issued by the Princes Báthory
of Transylvania in the sixteenth century, but
were gradually forgotten and disregarded. In 1784, the estate leased
innkeeping rights to certain
merchants. When copies of the original patents were found and submitted
by the peasants to the
governor of the estate, they were told that their rights were no longer
valid and that the estate was
entitled to lease the innkeeping privileges to whomever it chose. This
argument was accepted by the
county administration.
THE LEADERS
Nicola-Vasilii Urs, nicknamed Hora (Horea) for his strong voice,[29]
was born around 1730 in Zaránd
County. He is called a serf by all sources, but he certainly was not
an ordinary peasant. He was
actually a carpenter by trade; according to the customs of the time,
he travelled a great deal, seeking
work and becoming well-acquainted with conditions of life among the
simple people. By the time he
appeared on the scene, he was regarded as spokesman for the Rumanian
peasants at the Zalatna
estate and was considered a troublemaker by the officials.[30] It seems
that he remained a great
traveler; sources maintain that he visited Vienna four times,[31] each
time seeking and gaining an
audience with the emperor --- an unlikely possibility --- requesting
imperial help against the exploitation
of the peasants by the estate officials and the Hungarian nobles.[32]
It would be well to reiterate that Horea was not a peasant in the ordinary
sense of the term; he did not
make his living by tilling the soil or raising animals. Despite the
undoubtedly broader perspective that he
gained during his travels, he failed to grasp the full meaning of imperial
policies in Transylvania. He
was absolutely, if naively, convinced that the running conflict of
the emperor with the nobility placed
the ruler in the same camp with the peasants. He expected imperial
approval --- if not outright, direct
support --- in the coming peasant uprising against the "common enemy."
He believed that the emperor's
sympathies were strong enough to stay the hands of local military commanders
at least until the
peasants succeeded in eliminating the influence of the Hungarian nobles
from the Transylvanian
province once and for all.
Ion Oarga, or Closca, was a serf from the village of Carpinis, located
near Abrudbánya. He was
seventeen years Horea's junior when the uprising began. He was loyal
to Horea to the very end; their
friendship may have begun (and became cemented) during Horea's journeys
to Vienna, on which
Closca probably accompanied him. He was the most likely author of the
document presenting peasant
demands during the uprising. Although we know very little of Closca's
life, he certainly did not appear
to have been just another ordinary peasant of the eighteenth century
either.[33]
Giurgu Marcu, called Crisan, the third leader of the peasant uprising,
was a former professional soldier.
We do not know if he was discharged from the army or if he simply deserted;
we only know that he
was about Horea's age. He was the military organizer of the uprising,
an excellent tactician, and a
sharp-eyed strategist. It was probably Crisan who organized the distribution
and movement of the
peasant forces during the uprising; he foresaw that only through simultaneous
attacks in various regions
could the uprising gain enough momentum for success. We know that he,
too, was originally from
Zaránd County, but there is little else in the documents about
his earlier life.[34]
The nineteen-year-old son of Nicola-Vasilii Urs, Ion Horea, was the
fourth major leader of the revolt.
He worked closely with Closca at the outbreak of the uprising, but
he gained an independent command
as the fighting progressed. However, he was nicknamed after his father;
this shows that he did not
have enough time to assume a separate identity and, thus, remained
the least important of the four
leaders of the uprising.
There was a sizeable contingent of soldiers and highwaymen --- about
150 or so out of 4,000--5,000
fighters --- who made up the second echelon of the leadership of the
peasant troops. They provided the
tactical know-how for the insurgent army, teaching the peasants the
swift, organized movements that
characterized their type of warfare. Their major problem was the poor
armament of their troops. As
long as they faced only the frightened and disorganized nobility, they
had an easy and victorious
campaign; however, as soon as they had to contend with the troops of
the regular army, their fighting
spirit quickly disappeared.
The demands of the insurgents were formulated as the revolt progressed.
At first, in the white heat of
hatreds that accumulated over the years, the only desire of the peasants
was to kill the nobles, burn
their castles or houses together with the documents of peasant servitude,
and carry away as much of
the nobles' property as could be found. However, after the initial
fury of the revolt was spent, Horea
and
Closca proceeded to formulate more precise --- if simplistic --- aims
that, they seemed to believe,
corresponded to the ideas of the reform-minded emperor.
The demands were few and to the point. First of all, the peasants asked
for the abolition of the
privileges of the nobility. This meant that the peasants were no longer
to be required to provide a living
for the noblemen. However, mindful that the nobles would need a way
to make a living, they
suggested, perhaps somewhat naively, that the nobles be given positions
in the imperial bureaucracy as
suited their individual abilities. This way the emperor's declaration
about ability as the basis for office
would have been fulfilled. The next demand was the confiscation of
all noble estates and their
distribution among the peasantry. Finally, the last demand argued that
the nobility, no longer being in a
privileged position, should be required to pay state taxes, as were
the rest of the population. By this, the
public burdens would be distributed more evenly among the population.[35]
In plain language, the
Rumanian peasants wanted political equality and land reform; if fulfilled,
these demands would have
automatically taken care of local grievances and ended serfdom in Transylvania
in fact as well as in
theory.
These demands also reflected the influence of the European Enlightenment
as it filtered down from the
royal court through the provincial administrators to the peasantry.
If Joseph II really wanted to
rationalize his administration, so the peasants seemed to reason, and
if the major obstacle in his way
was the resistance of the nobility, the peasants would not only eliminate
this obstacle by force, but
would make sure that the emperor would have enough men to choose from
to upgrade his
bureaucracy. If he were anxious to establish an equitable system of
taxation, the peasants would help
him in this endeavor by making all people equal. The demand for land
reform reflected the conviction
that land, the basis of all wealth and security in that age, should
be shared among those who could
derive the greatest benefits from it.
THE CONSEQUENCES
The immediate consequences of the revolt were not as severe as could
be expected or as the nobility
wanted them to be. Despite the hundreds of noble families indiscriminately
massacred by the
insurgents, the retributions were comparatively mild. It was true that
about thirty-seven men were
executed in a most barbaric manner (though not at all unusual in that
"enlightened" age) by the
authorities to instill in future would-be revolutionaries fear of the
power of the state.[36] But
the commission set up by Joseph II to examine the causes of the revolt
suggested leniency towards
ordinary participants, freeing many of them and commuting the sentences
of others. Joseph II believed
that the royal administration of Transylvania was at least partly to
be blamed for the uprising, and he
also maintained that, had his reforms been executed without obstruction
by the nobility, the revolt could
have been avoided. Accordingly, the emperor urged the Transylvanian
administrators to proceed with
the execution of royal decrees without further delay as the best guarantee
of the social peace of the
province.[37]
But the long-range consequences of the uprising were more serious. They
included the intangible but
certainly greater consciousness of national hatreds and suspicion between
Rumanians and Hungarians
in general. Just as the Rumanian peasants and their spokesmen after
the uprising, the Orthodox priests,
and the emerging Rumanian intellectual class transferred their hatred
of the Hungarian nobility to all
Hungarians regardless of class, so the Hungarians reciprocated. Both
peoples were to enter an age of
strident, jingoistic nationalism. The ideologues of each nation were
eventually to deny the other nation's
right to existence. The struggle for national supremacy in Transylvania
was to be buttressed by all sorts
of myths and outright lies, usually based on the primitive argument
of "who was there first," as if ethnic
groups who have lived on a territory for nearly a millennium could
ever be regarded by anyone as
"newcomers."