The Status of Minority Rights
in Transilvania
3. The Status of Minority Rights in Transylvania:
International
Legal Expectations and Rumanian Realities
by BULCSU VERESS
In examining the ways in which the international system works or does not work to protect the rights of
national minorities, my underlying assumptions are that the institution of human rights is a good thing;
that ethnicity, mother tongue, and native culture are some of the most powerful elements of
identification and self-definition and that they are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.
Furthermore, the deprivation of one's ethnic identity is in itself a deprivation, if not of life, at least of
liberty, and certainly of the pursuit of happiness. Oppression of minorities in the long run is inimical to
the interest of majorities also, and only pluralism and tolerance will provide a solution to this problem
that is consistent with progress and human dignity.
Many other scholars in the field probably hold similar commitments. The research on the subject of
human rights is so interwoven with normative commitments that it is wise to summarize the underlying
assumptions at the outset.
The study is mainly concerned with so-called positive minority rights and only to a limited extent with
the right to nondiscriminatory treatment. Nondiscrimination is the first step, of course, but is not
peculiar to national minorities. It is forbidden to discriminate because of race, sex, religion, color, or
social origin. Minority protection proper involves a further step: granting minorities the right, as well as
the suitable means, to preserve and develop their national identity, traditions, and culture.
This paper takes into consideration the actual conditions and status of Rumania's national minorities,
most of whom are concentrated in the region of Transylvania, as compared to the standards of
international law. There is unfortunately no comprehensive international code of minority rights, which
still suffer the consequences of the collapse of the League of Nations system. Minority protection was
part of that interwar system, shared its weaknesses, and went down with it amidst the general
disintegration that led to World War II. The
cynical manipulation and abuse of the minority question by Hitler cast a shadow over the whole idea
for many years, and recovery has been very slow. Even today mistrust remains. Conor Cruise O'Brien,
who spent many years at the United Nations working on this problem, described this phenomenon in
the following manner:
As a matter of experience I have found... that people who are all in favor of human rights generally
speaking are very likely to sit up and look suspicious where there is any question of minority rights.
Human rights is a pleasing abstraction impregnated with our notion of our own benevolence. But
minority rights evoke a sudden sharp picture of "that lot" with their regrettable habits, extravagant
claims, ridiculous complaints, and suspect intentions. Special rights for them? Not likely. Governments
are representative, of course, either of majorities or more often of ruling minorities which of course do
not think of themselves as minorities ever. It is therefore unlikely that an international association on
the scale of the United Nations will promulgate an effective code giving protection to minorities.1
In spite of these pessimistic, even slightly bitter words, there is very slow, very incremental, but
continuous progress in "international legislation" concerning minority rights. It works in many ways. It is
very interesting to observe, for instance, the transformation that the "Universal Declaration of Human
Rights" is undergoing. There is the ever growing consensus that by now the Declaration has solidified
into an international code of conduct instead of just a declaration of intention. Its specific rules have the
weight of legal obligations. More importantly, while originally it was thought that the Universal
Declaration did not include any reference to the rights of national minorities beyond the prohibition of
discrimination, some recent interpretations strongly disagree with this view.[2] They argue that the idea
of freedom of choice pervades the entire Declaration, and that Article 26 on the right to education or
Article 27 on the right to participate in the cultural life of the community can have no interpretation
other than that which includes the right to education in the mother tongue and the right to one's native
culture, and all that it involves. It is very difficult to argue against this interpretation. This change in
interpretation is similar to what happened to the American Constitution: even where the language did
not change, it is a very different document from the one accepted almost 200 years ago.
Beside the reinterpreted Universal Declaration, there are numerous other documents defining
international standards for treatment of minorities. Without going into the details, the "International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" should be mentioned, especially its Article 27, which explicitly
provides for the cultural, religious, and linguistic rights of minorities. The "International Covenant on
Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights" is also relevant, as well as the "International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination." The UNESCO "Convention Against Discrimination in
Education" includes provisions recognizing the right of national minorities to their own educational
system. Finally, the Helsinki Agreement contains three paragraphs on the rights of national minorities.
While it is understood that the latter agreement is not legally binding on the parties, its political
significance is beyond doubt in light of the parties' accountability for its implementation.
The sources consulted for this study include official Rumanian publications, often propaganda material
intended to demonstrate the enlightened nature of Rumania's minority policies.[3] Also utilized are the
few published studies on the subject, particularly the one by Robert R. King and the one by George
Schöpflin.[4] Personal discussions with the above authors provided additional information and insights.
A third source has been provided by the samizdats written by Hungarian officials within Rumania who
became dissatisfied with the treatment of their fellow nationals and let their views be known in letters
of protest against what they perceive as mistreatment of the minorities. The personal risks they took by
protesting these conditions is a sufficient guarantee of the veracity of their accounts. One such
samizdat, a document of about 16,000 words, was written under a pseudonym but was found highly
reliable by Western experts and commentators.[5] Other sources are articles in the Western press[6]
and, finally, interviews with well over 100 present and former residents of Rumania about their
personal experiences. The most interesting of these interviews is one with a Rumanian sociologist who,
as a member of a Rumanian government research institution, was one of the authors of a little
propaganda booklet on the situation of the Hungarian nationality in Rumania. This booklet was
published in several languages in 1976 and distributed around the world. The sociologist subsequently
defected and today lives in New York City. His account on the factual basis of that booklet and the
methods employed in writing it are highly enlightening.
For the illustration of the problems of minority protection, few examples could give as complete a
picture as that of the Hungarians in Rumania. They are the largest national minority in Europe. They
are an ethnic, linguistic, and religious minority at the same time, very distinct from the majority in all
three aspects. In some parts of Rumania their population is concentrated in compact settlements, while
in other areas they are interspersed with the Rumanians and the German minority population. Just
across one border they do have a so-called mother country, which might be a source of protection and
comfort,
but is instead often a cause of further friction and tension. Finally, Rumania is a totalitarian country
where the government exercises full control over every aspect of the life of the population. Since the
life of the minorities is under total government control, the intentions of government interference cannot
be misinterpreted. Thus, the Hungarian minority situation is a classroom example of minority conditions,
like the proverbial horse at the veterinary school, which has all the illnesses a horse might possibly
have.
Given the geographical, ethnographical, historical factors, the multinational region of Transylvania could
be a model for the coexistence of diverse nationalities in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance and
understanding. Unfortunately, the Rumanian leadership seems to have chosen a different path.
Before reviewing several aspects of the Hungarian minority's existence, the overall pattern should be
outlined. The individual elements of Rumania's minority policies can not be viewed as distinct or
isolated phenomena. The evidence is overwhelming that they are the interrelated components of a
planned and consistently executed policy, which is more than the mere sum of its parts. This policy is
based on a deep sense of insecurity that the Rumanian leadership feels about the problem as a whole.
They are clearly uncomfortable with the existence of 3 million non-Rumanian inhabitants in the
country. There is no room for these people in the neo-fascist mythology of the new Rumanian
nationalism. The expression "neo-fascist" is used advisedly, not just as an expletive. A recent article on
Rumanian history by a very authoritative source, President Ceausescu's brother, Ilie Ceausescu,
borrowed a great deal of its vocabulary from Alfred Rosenberg's Der Mythus des. 20. Jahrhunderts.
Ceausescu claims that the Rumanian people "had to fulfill a heroic, uneasy and glorious historical
destiny during an existence of nearly two millenia." He also assures his readers of the racial purity of
the Rumanian people by asserting that they "never did merge or mix with other peoples which moved
into the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic region."[7] This basic insecurity, reflected in the fabrication of
history, has cultural and political roots. At the time of their merger, Transylvania and the Old Kingdom
had fundamentally different cultural orientations, and they differed also in their degrees of cultural
development. These differences made it difficult for Rumania to digest the new acquisition. The
political root of this insecurity is the dubious legitimacy of the acquisition of Transylvania, and of the
right of sovereignty over millions of people who belong to other nations. In spite of all the efforts of
Rumanian historians to pretend that some sort of divine justice was done at the close of World War I,
the fact remains that an imperialist peace was written in Versailles by world leaders who were
ignorant about local conditions and likely could not have cared less anyway. Allies, as well as those
who timed their switch to the side of the victors, were rewarded well, while the people who were
thrown to an alien sovereignty were ignored. Not that all this was necessarily unjust; even justice may
accidentally prevail when territorial adjustments are made at the conclusion of a major war. But it was
done in a manner that has raised serious doubts about its legitimacy ever since. If legitimacy is missing
at the outset, it can be acquired subsequently; it depends only on the consent of the ruled. A case in
point is Yugoslavia, which not only treats its minorities fairly but plays an effective leadership role in
trying to bring about an international code of minority protection. Rumania, on the other hand, regards
its minority citizens as living question marks of the legitimacy of its rule over territory and population
acquired sixty-five years ago. As a consequence, every aspect of minority existence is totally
politicized and controlled. The government looks at Hungarian volumes of innocent poetry as time
bombs and confiscates them at the border as contraband. Throwing the purity of the race so cherished
by Ilie Ceausescu to the wind, it attempts to force its minorities to assimilate into the Rumanian
population by gradually curtailing and eliminating the cultural opportunities and institutions of the
minorities and by any other means at its disposal.
The minority situation in Rumania is examined here in the following areas of concern:
1. Recognition
2. Political rights
3. Cultural and linguistic rights
4. Religious rights
5. Economic rights
6. Legal remedy
RECOGNITION
The obvious first condition for the fair and just treatment of national minorities is the government's
recognition of their existence. Some governments try to preempt the problem by denying that minorities
exist within the jurisdiction of the state. While the Rumanian government recognizes the existence of its
minorities, it does this with some qualifications. One is the obvious underrepresentation of the minority
population in the official census statistics.
According to these figures, between 1956 and 1966 the non-Hungarian
population of Rumania grew by 9.9 percent, at a rate almost five times greater than the alleged
Hungarian growth rate of 2.0 percent. Similarly, between 1966 and 1977 the total population of
Rumania, excluding Hungarians, supposedly grew by 13.5 percent, while the growth rate of Hungarians
was only 5.4 percent.[8] In reality, aside from statistical juggling, there is no circumstance that can be
cited to justify such vast differences in growth rates.
One tactic involves the demographic questionnaire used to compile census data, of which the most
recent was gathered in January, 1977. The form contains three spaces requiring identification as to
"citizenship," "nationality," and "mother tongue," in that order. The census taker is instructed not to
complete the "nationality" blank, as if he had forgotten to pose that question. As "citizenship" is
obviously Rumanian, where "mother tongue" is Hungarian, the blank is later filled in as follows:
"Nationality: Hungarian-speaking Rumanian." This artificial distinction between nationality and mother
tongue, together with the "correction" of census returns, thus serves the dual purposes of understating
the size of the Hungarian population and increasing the number of Rumanians. This practice was
uncovered by the International Commission of Jurists[9] and confirmed by an interview with a former
census taker.[10]
There is considerable pressure on minority persons who achieve international fame in arts, sports, or
other endeavors to change their names to Rumanian-sounding ones. The domestic press often
Rumanianizes these names even without the permission of those involved. Persons of achievement
from among the minorities are often denoted as Rumanians who speak and write in Hungarian.
Hungarian writers are deeply offended by being referred to as "Hungarian-speaking Rumanian writers"
in the press. Even the official name of the minorities, "coinhabiting nationalities," strikes many minority
individuals as implying their secondary dependent status to the "inhabiting nationality," the only really
legitimate inhabitants of the country.[11] This may be just semantics, but this secondary, dependent,
appendix status is powerfully demonstrated by the way the whole network of cultural institutions is set
up in Rumania, which is discussed later.
POLITICAL RIGHTS
One of the most sensitive areas of international relations concerns the political rights of national
minorities. It strikes at the core of the existence, sovereignty, and legitimacy of regimes. In descending
order, the right of self-determination has to be dealt with first. If all United
Nations resolutions, declarations, and covenants were to be taken literally, the minorities in Rumania
would have the right to determine under what sovereignty they want to live; for instance, that they
might want to secede from Rumania and join Hungary. However, self-determination is not a right, it is
hardly more than a political slogan that has two functions. It has given legitimacy to the
decolonialization movement, as well as to secession movements, not necessarily to those whose claim
was justified, but to those that had superior firepower and --- like Bangladesh --- prevailed. The other
function is to send chills up the spines of majority regimes and thereby serve as a bargaining tool in the
hands of recalcitrant minorities. Political science still owes the world the answer to whose claim to
secession is justified and whose is not. International politics not only can afford hypocrisy, it is one of
the major currencies of the trade. Scholarship, however, cannot afford it. This paper does not have the
answer, but secession is certainly a breakdown that results in the minority being driven to the point of
desperation. It is hardly to be recommended as a general solution. A gradual depolitization of ethnicity,
dissolution of borders, is a much more attractive alternative. Formerly very "hot" European borders are
hardly noticeable today, in terms of the life of the peoples they divide.
Secession, of course, is only the most extreme result of the exercise of the right of self-determination.
A minority may well be satisfied with political rights it can exercise while remaining part of a given
state. The right to autonomy with a federal system is one of the strongest of such rights but it does not
apply in the present case, Rumania not being a federal state. The right of local autonomy, however, is
relevant. The Hungarian minority is fairly concentrated in some areas and could support an
autonomous political structure. A Hungarian Autonomous Province existed for almost two decades
until 1968, but it was autonomous in name only. It never had a statute and it hardly differed from the
other provinces. Since its abolition, every succeeding reorganization of the administrative structure
gerrymandered the provinces to deprive most of them of a Hungarian majority.
Even the simple right of representation, perhaps the most fundamental among the political rights of a
minority, is completely missing for the Hungarians. Minorities obviously have to have representation as
minorities, not only as individual elements of a heterogeneous population, in order to be able to
articulate their special concerns. Although there are officials of minority extraction at every
governmental level, they are permitted no meaningful voice in representing their own ethnic groups.
The Hungarian Nationality Workers Council was established in
1968 as the only body capable of serving the interests of the Hungarian minority. But the very
document establishing this council exposes it as an instrument of the state, acting to undermine minority
interests. The Council's stated purpose is "to assist the Party and the state, on both the central and local
levels, in mobilizing the nationalities to assume their responsibilities in the building of socialism, in
researching particular questions concerning the respective populations and in implementing the
nationality policies of the Party."[12]
Károly Király, vice president of the Council for ten years until his removal in March, 1978, furnished
ample evidence of the Council's abject ineffectiveness. In his letters to Party leaders, Király charged
that the Council's activities "have declined to zero";[13] repeatedly, but to no avail, he called upon the
government to "guarantee the proper organizational framework"[14] as a precondition to treating
minorities in the proper fashion. Hungarians are proportionately represented, but only in those state and
Party organs that are not allowed to exercise any real power, such as the showcase "Grand Assembly"
and the 500-member Party Central Committee. Hungarians are virtually excluded from any body that is
granted an effective role in matters affecting their own interests. Of the seven secretaries of the Party
Central Committee, who are the holders of real power aside from Ceausescu, not one is of minority
origin. The Secretary for Nationalities in the Party Central Committee cannot speak any minority
language, only Rumanian. In the leadership of such vital organs as the Department of Culture and the
Department of Education, not one Hungarian is to be found, even among the deputy ministers. On the
county level, the ineffectual People's Councils and Party Committees by and large do maintain
proportional representation. But where the real power lies, within the seven-eleven member Executive
Committees and Party "Bureaus," Hungarians are grossly underrepresented. Indeed, in several heavily
Hungarian-populated counties, such as Banat (Bánság), Arad, and Maramures (Máramaros), they are
completely excluded from the Party "Bureaus." "In the same way," Károly Király pointed out, "it is
nothing new that in cities where the majority of the population is Hungarian --- such as Nagyvárad,
Marosvásárhely Szováta, etc. --- Rumanians who speak no Hungarian are being appointed as
mayors."[15]
Of course, this deprivation of political rights has to be viewed in the context of a tightly controlled
Communist dictatorship. The Rumanian majority cannot exercise self-determination either. They are
also deprived of any possibility of making a political choice. What adds to the burden of the minority,
however, is that even the Communist
leadership of that minority does not have any decision-making authority in their own affairs. For the
minorities, therefore, nationalistic oppression comes on the top of the general political oppression, which
victimizes every Rumanian citizen regardless of ethnic background.
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