Battle reports concerning the battle of Elkhorn Tavern (Pea Ridge), March 6-8, 1862:
From the O.R., Series I, Volume 8, Battle of Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn Tavern, Ark.
:No. 2. -- Reports of Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis, U.S. Army, commanding Army of the Southwest, correspondence with the Confederate commander.........
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTHWEST,
Near Bentonville, Ark., March 13, 1862.
CAPTAIN: I visited Bentonville yesterday. Everything is quiet in the vicinity. During the battle we lost six guns, but we recovered all back and took five from the enemy. I have also taken a large number of small-arms which the rebels threw away. My loss of killed and wounded will exceed my estimate of 1,000. General Pike commanded the Indian forces. They shot arrows as well as rifles, and tomahawked and scalped prisoners. I am credibly informed that Colonel Rector, of Arkansas, has disbanded his regiment.
Was my dispatch of the 5th instant, telling you of the approach of the enemy and my arrangements to receive him, taken by the enemy or received at headquarters? Much mail matter was taken by him.
SAML. R. CURTIS,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Capt. J.C. KELTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT,
Van Buren, Ark., March 14, 1862.
General SAMUEL R. CURTIS:
GENERAL: I am instructed by Major-General Van Dorn, commanding this district, to express to you his thanks and gratification on account of the courtesy extended by yourself and the officers under your command to the burial party sent by him to your camp on the 9th instant.
He is pained to learn by your letter brought to him by the commanding officer of the party that the remains of some of your soldiers have been reported to you to have been scalped, tomahawked, and otherwise mutilated.
He hopes you have been misinformed with regard to this matter, the Indians who formed part of his forces having for many years been regarded as civilized people. He will, however, most cordially unite with you in repressing the horrors of this unnatural war, and that you may co-operate with him to this end more effectually he desires me to inform you that many of our men who surrendered themselves prisoners of war were reported to him as having been murdered in cold blood by their captors, who were alleged to be Germans.
The general commanding feels sure that you will do your part, as he will in preventing such atrocities in future, and that the perpetrators of them will be brought to justice, whether German or Choctaw.
The privileges which you extend to our medical officers will be reciprocated, and as soon as possible means will be taken for an exchange of prisoners.
I am sir, very respectfully, yours,
DABNEY H. MAURY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
No. 36. -- Report of Brig. Gen. Albert Pike, C.S. Army, commanding Department of Indian Territory.
DWIGHT MISSION, CHEROKEE NATION, IND. T.,
March 14, 1862.
SIR: On February 25 I reached Cantonment Davis, near Fort Gibson, with Colonel Cooper’s Choctaw and Chickasaw battalion, which had been encamped near the mouth of the Canadian. The same evening Col. D.N. McIntosh’s regiment of Creeks arrived at the same point. I had in charge a large amount of coin and other moneys for the different Indian tribes, and found delegations of the Osages, Comanches, and Reserve Indians awaiting me, and the disposition of the moneys left unexpectedly in my hands, together with the dealings with the Indian tribes, detained me there three days.
The Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Creeks refused to march until they were paid off, and as by their treaties with us they could not be taken out of the Indian country without their consent, I had no alterative but to submit. The payment of the Choctaws and Chickasaws occupied three days.
On the morning of the third day I left them behind at Fort Gibson, except O.G. Welch’s squadron of Texans, part of the First Choctaw and Chickasaw Regiment, with which, and the Creek regiment, whom I persuaded to move by the promise that they should be paid at the Illinois River, I marched to Park Hill, near that river, remained there one day, and not being overtaken, as I expected to be, by the Choctaw and Chickasaw troops, moved the next day, Monday, March 3, towards Evansville, and the next day to Cincinnati, on the Cherokee line, where I overtook Col. Stand Watie’s regiment of Cherokees.
The next day, Wednesday, with Colonel Watie’s regiment and Captain Welch’s squadron, I reached Freschlag’s Mill, and on Thursday overtook Colonel Drew’s regiment of Cherokees at Smith’s Mill, and caught up with the rear of General McCulloch’s division late in the afternoon. That night I encamped within 2 miles of Camp Stephens, and a 9:30 o’clock received General Van Dorn’s order, to the effect that the army would move at 8 o’clock and that I would follow General McCulloch’s division. I sent to General McCulloch to ascertain at what hour the road would be clear for me to move, and received his reply that it would be clear at 12 o’clock and that his train would not move until daylight. At 12 o’clock I marched with my command, overtook and passed General McCulloch’s train, which was in motion, and had to wait until sunrise a little south of Sugar Creek until his infantry had passed it on a little bridge of rails. We followed closely in his rear until the head of my command had passed the houses on what is called Pea Vine Ridge, where we were halted, and Colonel Sims’ Texas regiment, countermarching, passed us to the rear, an officer informing me that I was to countermarch and follow the other troops. I did so, and we were then marched off the Bentonville road to the south through the woods. Soon after Captain Lomax, of General McCulloch’s staff, informed me that the enemy had fortified a little place called Leetown, about 4 1/2 miles to the south, which we were marching to attack, and that General McCulloch’s orders were that my command, on reaching the spot, should form in line in rear of General McIntosh’s brigade, which would itself be in rear of a line of infantry, and that when the firing should begin all were to dismount and charge together.
We had marched from the road in a southeasterly direction about a mile from the point where we left it, and were passing along a narrow road, between a piece of woods on our left and a fenced field on our right, when we discovered in front of us, at the distance of about 300 yards, a battery of three guns, protected by five companies of regular cavalry. A fence ran from east to west through the woods, and behind this we formed in line, with Colonel Sims’ regiment on the right, the squadron of Captain Welch next to him, and the regiments of Colonels Watie and Drew in continuation of the line on the left. The enemy were in a small prairie, about 250 yards across, on the right of which was the fenced field, and on our left it extended to a large prairie field, bounded on the east by a ridge. In rear of the battery was a thicket of underbrush, and on its right, a little to the rear, a body of timber.
General McIntosh’s cavalry had passed on into the large prairie field to our left and the infantry were quite across it, close to the ridge, about 600 yards from us. My whole command consisted of about 1,000 men, all Indians, except one squadron. The enemy opened fire into the woods where we were, the fence in front of us was thrown down, and the Indians (Watie’s regiment on foot and Drew’s on horseback), with part of Sims’ regiment, gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Quayle, charged full in front through the woods and into the open ground with loud yells, routed the cavalry, took the battery, fired upon and pursued the enemy, retreating through the fenced field on our right, and held the battery, which I afterwards had drawn by the Cherokees into the woods. Four of the horses of the battery alone remained on the ground, the others running off with the caissons, and for want of horses and harness we were unable to send the guns to the rear.
The officers of my staff, Captains Schwarzman and Hewitt and Lieutenant Pike, with Captain Lee, of Acting Brigadier-General Cooper’s staff, rode with us in the charge. Our loss was 2 of Colonel Drew’s men killed and 1 wounded. Colonel Sims had 1 man killed and 1 wounded. Of the enemy, between 30 and 40 were killed in the field and around the guns. The charge was made just at noon.
We remained at the battery for some twenty minutes, when Colonel Watie informed me that another battery was in our front, beyond the skirt of underbrush, protected by a heavy force of infantry. General McIntosh’s force was not near us, nor do I know where it then was. The infantry were still in their position near the ridge, across the large field on the left, and did not approach us; indeed, at one time moved farther off along the ridge. Colonel Drew’s regiment was in the field on our right, and around the taken battery was a mass of Indians and others in the utmost confusion, all talking, riding this way and that, and listening to no orders from any one. I directed Capt. Roswell W. Lee, of Acting Brigadier-General Cooper’s staff, always conspicuous for gallantry and coolness, to have the guns which had been taken faced to our front, that they might be used against the battery just discovered; but he could not induce a single man to assist in doing so.
At this moment the enemy sent two shells into the field, and the Indians retreated hurriedly into the woods out of which they had made the charge. Well aware that they would not face shells in the open ground, I directed them to dismount, take their horses to the rear, and each take to a tree, and this was done by both regiments, the men thus awaiting patiently and coolly the expected advance of the enemy, who now and for two hours and a half afterwards, until perhaps twenty minutes before the action ended, continued to fire shot and shell into the woods where the Indians were from their battery in front, but never advanced. This battery also was thus, with its supporting force, by the presence of the Indians, rendered useless to the enemy during the action.
In the mean time our artillery had come into action some distance to our left and front, beyond a large field, extending from the woods in which we were to a line of woods beyond it, which hid the conflict from our view. Leaving the Indians in the woods, I passed beyond them to the left into the open ground nearer the conflict, and remained some time.
About 1:30 o’clock there was a very heavy fire of musketry for about ten minutes, and soon after about two regiments of our cavalry came into the field on our left front and formed in line facing the woods on that side. Colonel Drew then came to me with his regiment, about 500 strong, and I sent him across the field, directing him to form in rear of the line of cavalry, and if they advanced through the woods to follow them, dismount his men near the other edge, and let them join in the fight in their own fashion. They crossed the field and took the position indicated.
It was just after this that I directed Sergeant-Major West, of Colonel Watie’s regiment, to take some of the Cherokees and drag the captured guns into the woods, which was done, the enemy still firing over them into the woods, where he placed a guard of Cherokees over the cannon.
Soon after the cavalry force crossed to our side of the field and formed in line in front of the woods in which the Indians were and remained there until the enemy threw a shot in that direction, when they also took shelter in the woods. During all this time I received no orders whatever nor any message from any one.
About 3 o’clock I rode towards the fenced field. I saw nothing of our cavalry, but found a body of our infantry halted on the road running along the fence by which we had originally come. It consisted of the regiments of Colonels Churchill, Hill, and Rector, and Major Whitfield’s battalion. Major Whitfield informed me that Generals McCulloch and McIntosh were both killed, and that 7,000 of the enemy’s infantry were marching to gain our left, one body of which, at least 3,000 strong, he had himself seen. Totally ignorant of the country and the roads, not knowing the number of the enemy, nor whether the whole or what portion of General McCulloch’s command had been detached from the main body for this action, I assumed command and prepared to repel the supposed movement of the enemy.
To our left, beyond the field where our infantry had first been seen by me in the forenoon, was a wooded ridge of no great height, with a fence running along the foot of it on the west and northwest; between it and the Bentonville road was open and level ground. I marched the infantry, Welch’s squadron and Watie’s regiment, across the field, dismounted the horsemen, directed all to be posted behind the fences, and sent Major Boudinot, of Watie’s regiment, to inform General Van Dorn that I would try to hold the position; but upon riding up and along the ridge to the rear I found the position not tenable, as the enemy could cross it and descend upon our rear by an open road that ran over it.
At this time the firing on the field had ceased, and I saw coming into the road at the farm house a large body of cavalry and Good’s battery. It was evident enough that the field was left to the enemy, and as we were not in sufficient numbers to resist them and the ground afforded no defensive position I determined to withdraw the troops and lead them to General Van Dorn. Indeed, the officers assured me that the men were in such condition that it would be worse than useless to bring them into action again that day.
I accordingly sent orders to the artillery and cavalry to join me. What had become of the other troops engaged no one could inform me. I concluded they had retreated towards Camp Stephens, gaining the road by which we had come in the morning. Colonel Stone and Captain Good came to me, and I informed them of my purpose. Placing the squadron of Captain Welch in front, the infantry marching next, followed by Good’s battery, with the Cherokees on the flanks, and, as I supposed, Colonel Stone’s regiment in the rear, we gained the Bentonville road, and marched on it in perfect order to the Telegraph road. The order sent to the Cherokees to join us had not, by some accident, reached Colonel Drew, and his regiment remained in the woods, and after a time retreated towards Camp Stephens, where, he informs me, he found Colonel Stone’s regiment arrived before him. This regiment understanding, I have learned, that part of the enemy’s force was marching to attack the train, took that direction.
The infantry had in three days marched 60 miles, had been on foot all the preceding night, and fought that day without water, and Colonel Churchill begged me to leave them where they could procure it. When we reached the Telegraph road I was about to conduct them to headquarters; but unable to learn the position of the two armies or how the road came upon the field, and learning that where our forces were there was no water and that there was a running stream on the Pineville road about a mile and a half from the point where the Bentonville road descends into the valley, I led them to and on the Pineville road, intending to halt at the water, and letting the men have that at least;, as they had nothing to eat, to join the main army early in the morning. Orders from General Van Dorn caused us to retrace our steps and march to his headquarters, which we reached long after dark.
On Saturday morning I was directed by General Van Dorn to post part of Colonel Watie’s men, who were my whole command, except Captain Welch’s squadron, on the high ridge to our right and the residue on another ridge on the left, to observe the enemy and give him information if any attempt was made by them in force to turn his left flank. I accompanied those sent on the ridge to the right, and sent Capt. Fayette Hewitt, of my staff, to post the others. To Captain Welch I gave permission to join any Texan regiment he chose; and he joined that of Colonel Greer and remained with it until the action ended.
After remaining for some two hours near the foot of the ridge, on the south side observing the enemy’s infantry, heavy columns of which were in the fields beyond and the fire of their batteries in full view of me and seeing no movement of the infantry to the left, I recrossed the ridge, descended it, and went towards General Van Dorn’s headquarters. Being told that he and General Price were in the field to the left of his headquarters, I took the road that led there and halted on the first hill below headquarters, where a battery was posted, facing the Telegraph road, and which I was told had been sent to the rear for ammunition. Here I heard that orders had been given for the army to fall back and take a new position. Another battery came up and the captain asked me for orders. I told him he had better place his battery in position in line with the others to play upon the road, and then send to General Van Dorn for orders. In the mean time I sent two officers to the general to deliver him message and myself remained with the batteries.
We now heard long-continued cheering in front. Bodies of our troops had come across the ridge on the right and down the Hospital Hollow, in good order apparently, and I suppose they were marching to the left to repel perhaps the attempt upon our left flank, apprehended by General Van Dorn in the morning. Seeing no fugitives on the Telegraph road we supposed the cheering to proceed from our own troops and that the day was ours, when an officer rode down and informed me that the field was occupied by Federal troops; and soon after another came and told me that no one had seen either General Van Dorn or General Price for some time and it was supposed they were captured, as the field where they were last seen was full of Federals; and he remarked to me, “You are not safe here, for the enemy’s cavalry are within 150 yards of you.”
The troops that had come across the ridge and down the Hospital Hollow were now below us on the Telegraph road. Colonel Watie had sent to me for orders. I had sent to him to bring his men from the ridge down into the valley and there halt for orders, and I supposed he had done so; but he did not receive the order and remained on the mountain, from which he went direct to Camp Stephens.
Just at this moment the two batteries close to me commenced to wheel and hurried down the hill into the road. I do not know that any one gave them any order to fall back. The captain of one battery said that some one ordered it, but I think that the information of the capture of our generals was overheard and that no order was given. No one was there to give an order. The batteries rattled down the steep hill and along the Telegraph road, and as I rode by the side of them I heard an officer cry out, “Close up, close up, or you will all be cut to pieces.”
On reaching the road I rode past the batteries to reach a point at which to make a stand, for, having passed the road but once, and then in the night, it was all an unknown land to me. When we reached the first open level ground I halted the leading gun, directed the captain of the company in front to come into battery, facing to the rear, on the right of the plain going northward. The battery in the rear I knew had no ammunition. Saw the first gun so placed in position, rode back to the second battery and directed the only officer I could find to do the same on the left of the plain, and when I turned around to go to the front found that the gun faced to the rear had been again turned into the road, and that the whole concern was again going up the road northward. I rode again to the front and halted the leading battery at the foot of the next level, ordered it into line, facing to the rear, gave the necessary commands myself, and had three guns brought into position. Two regiments of infantry were standing there in lines ranging up and down the valley, the flank of each to the enemy. I directed them to form in the rear of the batteries; but at this moment a shell was sent by the enemy up the road from the point of the hill around which we had just passed. The cry of “The cavalry are coming” was raised, and everything became confusion.
It was impossible to bring the other guns into battery. Those already faced turned again into the road; and supposing that of course they would take the Bentonville road, which, at leaving the other, ascends a steep hill, and thinking I could certainly halt them, after a slow ascent, on its summit, I galloped through the bottom and up the ravine on the left of the hill, dismounted, and climbed the hill on foot, remounted at the summit, rode to the brow of the hill, looked down into the road, and found that our retreating troops, batteries and all, had passed by on the Telegraph road, the enemy’s cavalry pursuing, en route for Springfield, Mo.
Captain Hewitt and my aide-de-camp, Lieut. W.L. Pike, had followed me, and, except half a dozen stragglers, we were alone. We waited a few moments on the brow of the hill uncertain what course to pursue, when, on our right, as we faced the valley, and at a distance of about 100 yards, a gun of the enemy sent a shot into the valley, and another on the other side, farther off, replied with another.
We then turned and rode up the road towards Bentonville, and after riding about a mile found that the enemy’s cavalry were pursuing at full speed. Leaving them in the rear by rapid riding, we turned into the woods on the right, passed around the farm house on the Pea Vine Ridge, and road westward between the Pineville and Bentonville roads.
We had been informed by my brigade commissary, who had come up from Camp Stephens about 10 o’clock, that our whole train had been turned back and was encamped at Pea Vine Ridge.
Three miles from the Telegraph road we saw a small body of our retreating horsemen fired upon by the enemy’s infantry, and concluded, as they had evidently anticipated our retreat and made every arrangement necessary in view of it to destroy our retreating forces, that General Sigel, returning by the route up Sugar Creek, by which he had retreated, was in front of our train and it was lost.
Owing to the circuit which we were constrained to make and to the fatigued condition of our starved horses, we were unable to gain the front of our retreating forces until after they had left Elm Springs; and learning that the Indian troops had marched from that point to Cincinnati, we joined them at that place.
The enemy, I learn, had been encamped at Pea Vine Ridge for three weeks, and Sigel’s advance was but a ruse to induce our forces to march northward and give them battle in positions selected by themselves.
I may add that in their pursuit of our retreating train they followed no farther than Bentonville and returned from that point. I was within 5 miles of that place on Monday morning and was misled by information that they had taken it that morning; but they did not enter it until the afternoon.
I did not know until I reached Cincinnati what had become of the main body of our troops. I there met Captain Schwarzman and Major Lanigan, who informed me of their retreat, and that Generals Van Dorn and Price were marching from Huntsville to Van Buren, and also heard of the order to burn all the wagons on the Cove Creek road that could not cross Boston Mountains.
Just before night, Saturday afternoon, I had met Colonel Rector in the hills, who told me had about 500 men with him; that they were in such condition that they could not go more than 6 or 8 miles a day, and that he thought he would take them into the mountains, hide their arms in a secure place, and, as he could not keep them together and feed them, let them disperse. He asked my opinion as to this, and I told him that no one knew where the rest of the army was; that Generals Van Dorn and Price were supposed to be captured and the train taken; that if his men dispersed with their arms they would throw them away, and that I thought the course he proposed was the wisest one under the circumstance. The enemy were pursuing on all the roads, and as it was almost impossible for even a dozen men in a body to procure food, I still do not see what better he could have done.
General Cooper, with his regiment and battalion of Choctaws and Chickasaws, and Colonel McIntosh, with 200 men of his regiment of Creeks, came up with our retreating train at Camp Stephens, where they found Colonel Drew’s regiment, and remained with General Green, protecting the train until it reached Elm Springs, where they were all ordered to march with their own train to Cincinnati.
I am, captain, very respectfully, yours,
Brigadier-General, Comdg. Department of Indian Territory.
Capt. D.H. MAURY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
No. 43. - Report of Col. Henry Little, commanding First Brigade Missouri Volunteers (Confederate).
HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, MO. VOLS., C.S.,
Camp Ben. McCulloch, Ark., March 18, 1862.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the First Brigade on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of the present month:
[material omitted here by KEB]
..........Early on the morning of the 8th our line was formed on the verge of the timber according to the following order: Colonel Burbridge’s regiment took position immediately to the right, his left resting on the edge of the road. Immediately on the left and next the road Wade’s battery was placed in mask. Next to the left of the battery Colonel Rives’ regiment formed in line, and farther to their left was stationed a portion of Frost’s brigade, under Colonels Greene and Shaler, our front being completed by Colonel Hill’s Arkansas regiment deployed in line. In the rear of Colonel Rives’ regiment was placed Major Whitfield’s battalion of dismounted cavalry. To the right and about three hundred yards to the rear of Colonel Burbridges’s command were stationed three regiments of Arkansas troops, under Colonel Churchill.
The full light of morning revealed to us a caisson, with 5 horses attached, which had been abandoned by the enemy the previous night. It lay in the space between the opposing armies. A detachment from Wade’s battery led it into our lines.
Until near 7 o’clock no gun had been fired. Each army was engaged deploying its columns for a decisive contest. A battery of the enemy now advanced into the open field and took position in front of their line and in full view of our men. During this operation they received no molestation; but no sooner had they opened fire upon our line than they were answered by Tull’s battery, which, having come up, was assigned a position between Rives’ regiment and General [Martin E.] Green’s command. Few shots had been interchanged until Wade’s battery entered the list.
The enemy, not counting on such odds, limbered up and hastily left the field. For a short interval the report of an occasional shot from our batteries was the only sound that broke the calm stillness of the morning. After a short time the appearance of the enemy’s batteries moving into position over against our right proved they had not been loitering, and when they opened fire on our lines from their new stand-point the explosion of their shells above the ground occupied by Burbridge’s regiment proved that they had not been posted so far from our position as that we might consider ourselves out of range, as I had at first supposed.
Captain Good’s battery, now coming up, was placed to the right of Burbridge’s regiment, and opened fire upon the enemy’s battery from its position. The enemy, having got the range of our lines, threw in the shells with great precision and rapidity, concentrating their fire on one point. Wade’s battery was ordered up to Good’s support, but had scarcely unlimbered when Good’s battery retired from the ground. Hart’s battery was now ordered to take the place evacuated by Good. Hart’s battery did not prove more steady than its predecessor under the enemy’s fire, and immediately left the field. Wade’s battery, having exhausted its ammunition and several horses, was now ordered to retire to the rear and replenish the caissons. Wade’s battery and position was supplied by Captain Clark’s battery, which continued to answer the enemy’s fire until, by slacking his previous impetuosity, it became evident that a new maneuver was contemplated by the enemy.
From close observation I concluded that we might expect momentarily to be assailed by a charge of infantry. The enemy’s line extended for nearly a mile and was supported by heavy reserves. Having ordered the left of my line to move close to the fence on the left of the woods and Whitfield’s battalion to the support of Burbridge’s regiment, on the right, I reported the expected advance of the enemy’s infantry to General Van Dorn, who, in reply, ordered me to hold my position as long as possible.
The enemy advanced. On, on they came, in overwhelming numbers, line after line; but they were met with the same determined courage which this protracted contest had taught them to appreciate. For more than half an hour our greatly diminished and exhausted troops held their hosts in check. Their intention of turning our flanks by their widely-extended line becoming now clearly evident, we slowly fell back from our advanced position, disputing every inch of ground which we relinquished.
It was at this critical juncture that the gallant Rives fell mortally wounded, and, as though fortune sought to dispossess our resolutions by multiplying disasters, within a few minutes after the fall of Rives we suffered an irreparable loss in the fall of the young and chivalrous Clark, whose battery kept up a galling fire on the advancing foe as our lines retired; and as we had now fallen back on a line with his position, being ordered to withdraw his guns, he fell, decapitated by a round shot while executing this maneuver; the last battery in action. Captain MacDonald, was now compelled to retire by the intervention of our retiring line between him and enemy, and it was with regret the order was issued for him to cease firing, so gallant was the conduct of the commander and his men, so terrible was the effect of every round which he delivered into the advancing lines of the enemy with a coolness and courage unsurpassed.
Our latest order from General Van Dorn directed our line to retire by the Huntsville road. To accomplish this movement with safety and success it was first necessary to withdraw Burbridge’s and Whitfield’s commands from our right wing across the main road, on which their left rested. This movement was successfully effected by their respective commanders after they had retained the enemy in check a sufficiently long time for Captain MacDonald’s battery to limber up and retire.
During this movement three companies of Burbridge’s regiment became detached from their command, and most happily effected their retreat under direction of their captains, P.S. Senteny, George Butler, and Thomas M. Carter, following the artillery, which had retreated up the Telegraph road. Being here threatened by a charge of the enemy’s cavalry, now in pursuit, these three companies formed into line and delivered so severe a fire into the advancing squadron as to effectively repulse their charge and leave the artillery force to pursue its march..............
[material omitted here by KEB]
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HENRY LITTLE,
Colonel, Commanding First Brigade
Capt. W.H. BRAND,
Assistant Adjutant-General
Notes on the battle of Elkhorn Tavern (Pea Ridge), March 6-8, 1862 taken from the book by William L. Shea and Earl J. Hess, Pea Ridge. Civil War Campaign in the West (1992), pages 92-271:
The disastrous battle at Elkhorn Tavern (Pea Ridge), Arkansas on March 6-8, 1862 had much to do with the Confederate soldiers in the Army of the West referring to their commanding officer, Major General Earl Van Dorn, as “General Damn Born” after their defeat. Their defeat by the Federal Army of the Southwest, commanded by Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis, showed the folly of coupling aggressive tactics with poor logistical planning.
The Federal Army of the Southwest had approximately 10,250 and 49 cannons at the Battle of Elkhorn Tavern, Mar. 6-8, 1862. Its 1st (Colonel Peter J. Osterhaus) and 2nd (Brigadier General Alexander S. Asboth) Divisions were commanded by Brigadier General Franz Sigel -- men in these two divisions were largely German or other European immigrants from the state of Missouri. The 3rd Division was commanded by then Colonel Jefferson C. Davis and the 4th Division by Colonel Eugene A. Carr; additional units were attached as so-called “Headquarters Units” (24th Missouri Infantry, 3rd Iowa Cavalry, Bowen’s Missouri Cavalry Battalion).
On the Confederate side, the 17th Arkansas Infantry, commanded by Colonel Frank A. Rector, was within the infantry brigade (5,700 men) of Colonel Louis Hébert and the division of Brigadier General Benjamin McCulloch; McCulloch’s Division also included the cavalry brigade (3,000 men) of Brigadier General James M. McIntosh and 18 cannons. Major General Sterling Price’s Division (6,800 men and 47 cannons) contained both Confederate units and Missouri State Guard units. In addition, about 900 men under the command of Brigadier General Albert J. Pike made up Pike’s Indian Brigade; these were Native Americans from the Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma) and were attached to Brigadier General McCulloch’s Division. The Confederate Army of the West commanded by Major General Van Dorn began its campaign against the Federal army on March 4, 1862 with a minimum of 16,000 men and 65 cannons -- a 3:2 manpower advantage and a 4:3 artillery advantage over the Federal Army of the Southwest. Poor leadership exhibited by Van Dorn diminished those numbers by the time actual battle was being fought on March 7-8.
Practicing a sort of “burn and retreat” strategy, Brigadier General McCulloch had lured the Federals deep across the Missouri-Arkansas border, burning Fayetteville and its stores/supplies on Feb. 21, 1862 so the pursuing Federals in the Army of the Southwest would find nothing to eat. Participating in this so-called “Sack of Fayetteville” by Confederate soldiers was then Lieutenant-Colonel John Griffith of the 17th Arkansas Infantry and his 3 younger brothers, Private M. Ellis Ringold Griffith, Private Benjamin H. Griffith, and Corporal Samuel A. “Moss” Griffith, all in Company B of that same regiment. On Feb. 22, suddenly realizing he was about 200 miles from his supply base in Missouri and now very vulnerable to Confederate counterattack, Federal Brigadier General Curtis decided to stand and fight at Little Sugar Creek Valley, approximately 25 miles north of Fayetteville.
Despite having a fever, Major General Van Dorn arrived from Pocahontas, Arkansas on Mar. 3 and met with his two division commanders, Sterling Price and Ben McCulloch, at Strickler’s Station located on the Telegraph Road. Despite the bitter cold of early March in the Ozarks, Van Dorn ordered that his soldiers “would move fast and travel light”-- each man would carry only his weapons, 40 rounds of ammo, 3 days ration, and a single blanket. Any and all tents, bedding, extra clothes, and cooking gear were to be left behind. This order, which defied logistical reality, would have terrible consequences for the Confederate Army of the West.
Van Dorn’s army left camp at Strickler’s Station on Mar. 4; led by McIntosh’s Cavalry Brigade, then Price’s Division, and finally Colonel Rector’s 17th Arkansas Infantry within Hébert’s Infantry Brigade. Only a small ammunition and supply train accompanied the advance north on the Telegraph Road; the still feverish Van Dorn rode in his ambulance, bouncing along at a rapid clip and apparently unaware of his struggling men’s efforts to keep pace. As one soldier said afterwards, “Van Dorn had forgotten that he was riding and we were walking”. A blizzard hit the marching column of men, horses, and wagons south of Fayetteville where Van Dorn halted for the night; high-ranking officers including Van Dorn slept indoors while his tentless men wrapped themselves in their blankets and bivouacked anywhere they could find shelter from the cold wind and snow. The 4 Griffith brothers and their suffering comrades in the 17th Arkansas Infantry probably had some second thoughts about Van Dorn’s leadership starting at about this time.
March 5 saw the Confederates move out with McIntosh’s cavalry capturing 10 wagons and 40 men of a Yankee foraging party near Mudtown, about 11 miles north of Fayetteville. The next day, Mar. 6, Federals under direct command of Brigadier General Franz Sigel were almost captured by rapidly advancing Rebel cavalry in Bentonville. Horsemen led by Brigadier General McIntosh pursued the rapidly retreating Federals through Little Sugar Creek until they reached safety at Curtis’ main defenses where the Telegraph Road crossed Little Sugar Creek. Here, extensive earthworks and fortifications were emplaced along the high ground north of the creek by the entrenched Federals, who were now ready to fight.
The Confederates made camp approximately 3 miles west of the Federal position along Little Sugar Creek, near the intersection of the Bentonville Detour Road; this encampment was called Camp Stephens. Here the cold, hungry, and exhausted men of Van Dorn’s army straggled into camp as sunlight faded on Mar. 6; again, no tents were available, so they huddled together around fires and slept on the ground. At this time, the 900 or so Native Americans in Brigadier General Pike’s Indian Brigade (1st and 2nd Cherokee Mounted Rifles and Welch’s Texas Squadron) arrived at Camp Stephens.
Despite the fact that food and forage for his army was now gone, Van Dorn now decided to envelop Curtis’ Federals rather than outflank them as proposed by Brigadier General McCulloch. This plan would require the tired, hungry, and frozen Confederates to march northeast along the Bentonville Detour and block the Federal army in Cross Timber Hollow, 5 miles north of Curtis’ position astride the Telegraph Road and just beyond Elkhorn Tavern. Amazingly, Van Dorn ordered an immediate night march, much to the stunned disbelief of both McCulloch and Price; McCulloch supposedly pleaded with Van Dorn, “For God’s sake, let the poor, worn-out and hungry soldiers rest tonight and attack the next morning!” Van Dorn was adamant, the night march would commence as soon as possible.
At about this same time, the commander of the Federal 1st Brigade, Colonel Grenville Dodge suggested to Curtis that the Bentonville Detour be blockaded to prevent any rapid Rebel movements around their right flank. With Curtis’ blessing, Dodge took 6 companies of the 4th Iowa Infantry and 1 company of the 3rd Illinois Cavalry to chop down trees along the road. This they did and returned to Curtis’ headquarters at Pratt Store (near Little Sugar Creek) at 2:00 in the morning of Mar. 7. These felled trees delayed the advance of Price’s Division by some 4 hours and allowed time for Curtis to realign his forces so they could face the Confederate forces coming against their rear. By 8:00 a.m., it was now obvious to Van Dorn that his original plan’s timetable would not be met, so he decided to split his forces: Price’s Missourians would continue to Cross Timber Hollow and Elkhorn Tavern as per his original plan, but McCulloch’s Division, including the 17th Arkansas Infantry within Hébert’s Infantry Brigade, would now turn southeast onto the Ford Road and intersect Telegraph Road just south of Elkhorn Tavern.
In effect, Van Dorn was sending Price’s Division around the north side of Big Mountain and up Cross Timber Hollow to Elkhorn Tavern while McCulloch’s force was being sent around the south side of Big Mountain along the Ford Road. These new orders were received by McCulloch after the advance troops in his column had already passed beyond Twelve Corner Church, where the Ford Road took off to the southeast; he then ordered a countermarch back along the narrow Bentonville Detour -- this took more time. By mid-morning, McCulloch’s Division had turned southeast onto the Ford Road and marched around the western end of Big Mountain just prior to noon;at this point, Elkhorn Tavern was only 2 1/2 miles away to the east.
This change of plans might have possibly worked if not for the fact that Federal pickets under Major Eli Weston had already detected McCulloch’s column west of Big Mountain and along the Bentonville Detour earlier that morning. During a discussion with his subordinate officers, Curtis was stunned by another bit of news at around 10:30 a.m. -- there was a Confederate column in Cross Timber Hollow about 1 mile north of Elkhorn Tavern (the advance troops of Price’s Division). Curtis now had the impossible task of taking his army, now facing south along Little Sugar Creek, and turning it 180o to face Van Dorn’s attack from the north -- all with little or no time to maneuver. By 11:00 a.m., Curtis deployed his junior officers as they attempted to do just that : Carr’s Division to Elkhorn Tavern in the north, and Osterhaus’ Brigade to Leetown in the northwest.
By 11:30 a.m., Osterhaus had moved the 600 men and 3 cannons of Colonel Cyrus Bussey’s 3rd Iowa Cavalry north of Leetown to a belt of trees just south of Foster’s Farm; while deploying they could hear the booming of artillery from Elkhorn Tavern as Carr’s Division tangled with Price’s Confederates. As an afterthought, Osterhaus sent Colonel Nicholas Greusel and his 36th Illinois Infantry to Oberson’s field just south of the belt of trees. Advancing to just south of the Foster Farm, Osterhaus saw the massive column of Brigadier General Benjamin McCulloch, now about 7,000 men, marching east along the Ford Road towards Elkhorn Tavern. Despite his small numbers, Osterhaus knew he had to attack immediately even if it meant sacrificing his men in order to save those Federals already engaged at Elkhorn Tavern. At about noon, Captain Gustavus M. Elbert of the 1st Missouri Flying Battery emerged from the belt of trees and opened fire with 3 rifled James cannons upon the Rebel force, only about 600 yards to the northeast. Elbert’s guns were supported by 1 company of the 1st Missouri Cavalry, 5 companies of the 3rd Iowa Cavalry (Bussey), and 4 companies of the 5th Missouri Cavalry.
Brigadier General McCulloch had been concentrating upon the sounds of battle up ahead at Elkhorn Tavern and was taken completely by surprise by the sudden shelling of his troops. Eighteen rounds of solid shot struck the massed Confederates along the Ford Road during the first few minutes; McCulloch recovered enough to order Hébert to move his infantry away from the guns and towards the rise between Big and Little Mountains (due east). McCulloch then ordered Brigadier General McIntosh to attack the Federal cannons with his cavalry brigade; in short order about 3,000 Rebel horsemen rode down upon the hapless men in Bussey’s command who were quickly overwhelmed. Simultaneously, Pike ordered his Cherokees and Texans against two companies of the 3rd Iowa Cavalry under Lt.-Colonel Henry H. Trimble. Trimble’s detachment was decimated and some of its wounded members killed and scalped by Pike’s excited Cherokee soldiers. This initial engagement at Foster’s Farm resulted in Federal casualties of 30 killed, 36 wounded, and 20 missing -- about 20% of the 235 Iowans deployed. Confederate losses have been calculated at 20 killed, 17 wounded, and 3 missing.
McCulloch had then been advised that there were more Federal soldiers south of the belt of trees bordering Foster’s Farm; he then sent a courier riding to Hébert with orders that Hébert now return his infantry, including Colonel Frank Rector’s 17th Arkansas Infantry and the 4 Griffith brothers, and prepare to attack the new Yankee threat to their south, towards Leetown. Meanwhile, Federal Colonel Greusel rapidly continued to align his forces along Oberson’s Field, just south of the belt of trees: from west to east they were the 36th Illinois Infantry, 4th Ohio Battery (6 guns), 12th Missouri Infantry, Welfley’s Missouri Battery (3 guns), and the 22nd Indiana Infantry -- approximately 1,600 infantry in the 3 regiments. This force was joined by retreating cavalry from Bussey’s command; they were placed west of the 36th Illinois’ position.
Tired of waiting, Greusel instructed his gunners to begin shelling the Confederates before they mounted their actual assault against his stressed-out Federals. Some of these shells exploded on the slopes of Big Mountain behind Hébert’s infantry as they marched up the rise between Big and Little Mountains; Hébert had them take cover on both sides of the road. Soon McCulloch’s orders arrived: those regiments west of the Leetown Road/Ford Road intersection, including the 17th Arkansas Infantry, were deployed in the open and just north of the belt of trees; those regiments east of the Leetown Road intersection were deployed in Morgan’s Woods just east of the Leetown Road. McCulloch assumed personal command of those infantry units west of Leetown road and Hébert retained command of those east of the road and in Morgan’s Woods.
For some strange reason, the former Texas Ranger and current commander of a division of the Confederate Army of the West, Brigadier General Benjamin McCulloch, took it upon himself to make a personal reconnaissance of the Federal position. He rode unescorted along the right side of his advancing forces as they entered the belt of trees, actually in front of the men of the 16th Arkansas Infantry -- he was promptly killed by a skirmisher in the 36th Illinois Infantry. Shortly thereafter, the second-in command officer of McCulloch’s Division, Brigadier General McIntosh was also shot and killed while in the advance lines next to the 2nd Arkansas Mounted Rifles. The now leaderless Confederate forces during this ill-fated assault west of the Leetown Road were accordingly disorganized and fell back to the north side of the belt of trees by 2:00 p.m.; the third-in command, Colonel Louis Hébert was actively engaged with his forces east of the Leetown Road and was not available for consultation -- he was soon to be captured by members of the 44th Illinois Infantry. Incredibly, McCulloch’s Division was now without any senior officers after approximately two hours of fighting.
Into this leadership void came the amateur soldier, Brigadier General Albert Pike, the commander of Pike’s Indian Brigade. At about 3:00 p.m., Pike took unofficial command of those regiments west of the Leetown road including Colonel Rector’s 17th Arkansas Infantry. Pike made no effort to aid Colonel Hébert and the fiercely engaged units under him in the Morgan Woods and east of the Leetown Road; instead he led the present units and led them northwest back towards Twelve Corner Church., leaving the Ford Farm area around 4:00 p.m. About 2,000 men went east with Pike towards Cross Timber Hollow in order to link up with Major General Van Dorn (within this group were the 17th Arkansas Infantry and the four Griffith brothers); another 1,200 men turned west and returned to guard the army’s trains at Camp Stephens.
To the east, Major General Van Dorn was totally unaware of the fate of McCulloch’s Division near Leetown; he and Brigadier General Price’s Division were heavily engaged with Federal forces under the command of Colonel Eugene A. Carr. At this time, Price’s Missouri Division consisted of approximately 5,000 soldiers -- survivors of Van Dorn’s forced march against the Yankee foe. Initially, 1,260 Federal soldiers, under the immediate command of Colonel Grenville Dodge and deployed on high ground overlooking the Confederates in Cross Timber Hollow, held off the surging Rebels from taking Elkhorn Tavern. The Confederate cannons outnumbered Carr/Dodge’s guns, 21 to 3, however, and the Southerners slowly but surely climbed up out of the hollow to the plateau above, pushing the stubborn Federals back. At 12:30 p.m. Federal reinforcements led by Colonel William Vandever arrived and counterattacked the right side of Van Dorn’s force. After 2:00 p.m., the stalled Confederates were jump-started by Colonel Henry Little and his 1st Missouri Brigade as they climbed uphill against the Federal right. Van Dorn then took command of the Confederate right wing while Price (earlier wounded in forearm) took charge of the Confederate left; at 4:30 p.m. a coordinated assault took the Rebels out of Cross Timber Hollow and up onto the Pea Ridge plateau, in sight of Elkhorn Tavern itself. After capture of their field hospital at Elkhorn Tavern, the demoralized Federal soldiers retreated south to the Ruddick field where their artillery stemmed the now reenergized Confederates. Fighting slowed at sunset and finally ended at about 7:30 p.m.
Dehydrated, hungry, and tired soldiers led by Brigadier General Albert Pike wandered into Van Dorn’s headquarters at Elkhorn Tavern sometime after dark; within this group was Lt.-Colonel John Griffith and his 3 younger brothers in the 17th Arkansas Infantry. This time, the soldiers had no blankets, knapsacks, or coats since they had discarded them before going into battle that morning at Ford’s Farm -- they huddled together by campfires or in the woods for warmth. During the night of March 7, Van Dorn did not order up his ordnance and supply trains from Camp Stephens -- an INCREDIBLE oversight. Meanwhile, all during the night, Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis saw to it that his men were taken proper care of. Federal soldiers supplied their troops from trains near Little Sugar Creek to the south. That cold night, every Yankee soldier received something to eat and drink, and each unit/battery had been resupplied with new ammunition. The Confederate soldiers were not so fortunate.
Van Dorn awoke the morning of March 8 to find his fever was gone and set about reorganizing his lines. He moved forward soldiers from McCulloch’s Division that Pike had brought with him the night before; these men were used to reinforce his center in front of the Ford Road/Telegraph Road junction. Men of Colonel Rector’s 17th Arkansas Infantry were placed immediately behind Colonel John F. Hill’s 16th Arkansas Infantry and to the left of Colonel Thomas J. Churchill’s 1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles; the 17th Arkansas was immediately east of the Ford Road/Telegraph Road intersection. Tull’s Battery (4 6-pounder guns) was positioned directly in front of the 16th Arkansas Infantry. Van Dorn’s army was in the shape of a “V” pointing south towards the Federal lines.
Curtis, by contrast, had formed his four divisions into a continuous line of infantry and artillery that stretched 3/4 of a mile. A two-hour artillery duel then ensued between Van Dorn’s guns, concentrated into a compact area within his “V” alignment, and the widely scattered Federal cannons. Federal gunners effectively enfiladed the Confederate batteries and concentrated their fire at one target, thus knocking them out of action one at a time. One Federal soldier counted over 1,800 discharges in the first hour before he lost count -- about one shot every 2 seconds. By 10:00 a.m., Clark’s Missouri Battery had moved up directly behind Colonel Rector’s 17th Arkansas Infantry; his energetic firing attracted the attention of the Federal gunners who now zeroed in on his position. Several of the Federal shells struck Confederate infantry near Clark’s Battery; since the 17th Arkansas Infantry was in immediately proximity, it may have been at this time when the younger brother of Lt.-Colonel John Griffith, Corporal Samuel A. “Moss” Griffith was mortally wounded on March 8 -- his service records are unclear. At the height of the artillery duel, Van Dorn was informed that his reserve ammunition was still at Camp Stephens, a minimum of 5 to 6 hours away.
Van Dorn, with tears in his eyes, then knew he must retreat or surrender; he ordered that the main body of his army would escape by marching east on the Huntsville Road, cross the White River, and turn south. About 10:30 a.m. the final Federal assault against Elkhorn Tavern began; Curtis’ divisions all converged on their focal point of Elkhorn Tavern and Van Dorn’s headquarters. The 1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles, 3 companies of the 2nd Missouri, and the 17th Arkansas Infantry did not retreat east along the Huntsville Road, but moved north along Telegraph Road and down into Cross Timber Hollow. The commander of Clark’s Battery, Captain Churchill Clark, stayed behind to maintain artillery fire against the advancing Yankees, only to be killed by a solid shot that ripped the top of his head off. About this time, Brigadier General Albert Pike was looking for Major General Van Dorn in the vicinity of Elkhorn Tavern; when Confederate artillerymen asked him for orders, he suggested that they stand fast since no one had told him that the Army of the West was now in full retreat. Chaos reigned and it was every battery for itself -- some artillerymen fled down the Huntsville Road while others descended down Telegraph Road into Cross Timber Hollow.
Curtis and Sigel noticed Confederates fleeing down into Cross Timber Hollow and sent the 1st Missouri Flying Battery after them. Brigadier General Pike then attempted to make a stand, organizing members of Colonel Rector’s 17th Arkansas Infantry and some batteries. Unfortunately, when the howitzers of the Flying Battery opened upon them, all order vanished and it was every man for himself once again as Federal cavalry had been sighted by the distraught Rebels in Cross Timber Hollow. Farther down the hollow, the batteries of Guibor and Good fired their last shells against the Federal horsemen, discouraging any further pursuit.
At Twelve Corner Church, Colonel Frank Rector of the 17th Arkansas Infantry informed Pike that he was disbanding his men after they hid their weapons; he reasoned they could move faster without carrying their rifles. The 17th Arkansas has apparently fled so rapidly that they left their regimental flag along the side of Telegraph Road down in Cross Timber Hollow. The flag was recovered by Missouri soldiers who took it with them to Van Buren, Arkansas; they refused to return to the 17th Arkansas, reasoning that “men who throw their colors away didn’t deserve any”. They finally returned the 17th Arkansas flag after being twice ordered to do so by Major General Van Dorn. Two days after the battle, Federal soldiers discovered a cache of about 200 firearms hidden by the 17th Arkansas Infantry in a “hollow” (cave?) near Bentonville.
Total Federal casualties at the Battle of Elkhorn Tavern (Pea Ridge) were 203 killed, 980 wounded, and 201 missing -- approximately 13% of the 10,250 man force. Confederate casualties have been conservatively estimated at about 2,000 killed/wounded/missing -- about 15% of men engaged. For the men of the 17th Arkansas Infantry, it appears that self-esteem was a casualty as well, not to be restored until its actions under Lt.-Colonel John Griffith at Iuka during September of 1862.
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