1. NARRATIVE
(a) August 8, 1942
0900 VW Underway in company with ARGONAUT and PC 476.
1500 VW ARGONAUT and NAUTILUS dived for trim and tightness.
2015 W ARGONAUT left formation.
2100 W PC 476 was released as escort.
(b) August 9, 1942.
0821 W Made dive for trim and tightness.
0837 W Exercised crew at stations for battle surface and fired five
rounds from each gun.
0840 W Exercised marines on deck for twenty minutes.
1017 W Fired machine gun for training.
1601 X Made dive for trim and training.
2000 X Exercised marines on deck.
(c) August 10, 1942.
0905 X Exercised marines on deck.
0948 X Made dive for trim and training.
0955 X Held battle surface drill. Increased speed to 335 RPM in order
to arrive in assigned area on time.
2000 X Exercised marines on deck.
(d) August 11, 1942.
0830 X Held battle surface drill.
0900 X Exercised marines on deck. Did not dive due to urgency of
making as much distance towards area as possible. Today at 1200 X
we still had 1019 miles to go and task group commander considers it
essential we dive the last two days enroute.
1930 Y Exercised marines on deck.
(e) August 12, 1942.
No dives made. Exercised marines on deck in the morning and at dark.
Held night battle surface drill.
(f) august 14, 1942.
0920 m Dived and surfaced at 1650 M.
1930 M Exercised marines on deck and took suction through boat.
(g) August 15, 1942.
0701 M Dived.
1702 M surfaced after much deliberation.
1920 M Exercised marines on deck and took suction through boat.
(h) August 16, 1942.
0309 M Sighted little Makin Island on starboard bow; set course so as
to pass northwest coast of Makin one and one-half miles abeam to
starboard.
0538 M Commenced a periscope reconnaissance of Makin Island.
Discovered that eastern tangent must be inaccurate on chart. Very few
prominent objects were noted to establish position. Range and bearing
on Ukiangong Point seemed to be best for fixing position of vessel.
Decided to try and round Ukiangong Point and proceed submerged to
reconnoiter a lagoon entrance at Plink Point.
1555 M Decided it would be impossible to round Ukiangong Point and be
in position for rendezvous with ARGONAUT at 2100 M bearing in mind
necessity for charging batteries enroute rendezvous.
1924 M Surfaced and proceeded to rendezvous.
2027 M Sighted large object in moonstreak distance about 7000 yards.
I believe this was ARGONAUT but could not be sure, before we could
verify whether it was the ARGONAUT or not an intense rain squall set
in making visibility zero.
2037 M Arrived at rendezvous and commenced circling.
2105 M Visibility increased and at 2116 M sighted ARGONAUT.
Maneuvered to pass plan for attack on Little Makin and other plans to
ARGONAUT upon completion started steering various courses approaching
Point Baker; ARGONAUT following movements of this vessel.
(i) August 17, 1942.
0140 M Commenced making preparations for disembarkation of raiders.
NAUTILUS personnel standing by for battle surface.
0328 M Company A left the ARGONAUT.
0334 M Company A arrived NAUTILUS.
0408 M All boats clear of ship except we are having difficulty having
a boat come alongside for Colonel Carlson and his runner.
0421 M All raiders clear of ship.
0513 M Established voice radio communication with raiders on shore.
0543 M Had message from Colonel "Everything lousy".
0547 M Had message from Colonel "Situation expected to be well in hand
shortly". From this time until 0656 M we had difficulty with voice
radio and received parts of messages that indicated marines wanted us
to open fire on Ukiangong Point Lake area where Japanese reserves were
supposed to be located. More information was not forthcoming hence at
0703 M this vessel opened fire on Ukiangong Point, hitting after
second salvo.
0710 M Received word that a merchant ship was in harbor 8000 yards
from government pier.
0711 M Checked fire. Our vision was obscured by trees and indirect
fire had to be used. At this time the frequency was jammed and we
could not contact our prearranged spotter. However, at 0716 M
steadied on course 262 and with bearing of 84 degrees relative, range
14000 yards, opened fire on lagoon. Trying continuously to contact
spotter to no avail so used the idea of many changes in range and
deflection to make sure entire lagoon was covered, hoping that luck
would be with us.
0723 M Ceased firing having expended 65 rounds of ammunition and in as
much as we could not observe our fall of shot it seemed to be an
unwarranted expenditure of ammunition. However, it appears that luck
was with us and that we sank two ships according to evidence brought
back by the marines whose statements are quoted herewith.
Statement made by James C. Green, Private first class USMC:
"Our squad, numbering only twelve men made an accidental landing
behind the Japanese lines. After moving up on them and killing many
of their number we were located and caught in a cross-fire from two
machine guns. During a lull in firing, upon looking out toward the
lagoon side of the island, I noticed what appeared to be either a
cargo ship or a troop transport. This caused me much consternation
because I knew that if the Japanese landed reinforcements our small
group would have very little chance to escape.
I was kept well occupied for the next half hour dodging bullets
and keeping under cover and did not get a chance to look again. It
was soon after that, that I heard the dull booming of what I thought
was the submarines guns.
When we were give word to retreat and all but three out of our
group had escaped I once more had a chance to glance toward the
lagoon. I could see no sign of the ship that I had seen a short
time ago but the horizon was covered with black rolling smoke. I
gave a silent prayer of thanks for the destruction of this ship
because without its destruction I am sure we could not have
escaped."
Statement made by Walter D Carroll, Sergeant, USMC:
"0700 Got into position on right flank near lagoon side. Saw two
ships in lagoon. One seemed to be a tanker or transport, the other
a gun boat. Both just at edge of lagoon. Both at anchor at that
time. Guns started firing and they started running circles in
lagoon. Tried to head out towards sea and the tanker was hit near
water line and burst into flames a little later. Gun boat sank
after being hit in lagoon.
There was a white ship in lagoon also which was smaller than
others, carried sails and was not hit. Saw tanker sink near island
in lagoon entrance."
Other marines state they saw this action also. Colonel Carlson states
that the transport was about 3500 tons. The gun boat about half that
size.
0814 M Heard Marines trying to contact us. Reported merchant ship in
harbor, range 3000 yards, bearing 350 magnetic from King's wharf.
0850 M ARGONAUT acknowledged for range and bearing.
0901 M Radar contact and plane sighted.
0904 M Emergency dive.
0958 M Surfaced.
1003 M Observed smoke rising from island.
1022 M ARGONAUT acknowledged message for orders to fire on merchant
ship.
1030 M Asked marines if entrance to lagoon was protected and was
informed there was no evidence. Decided to run over to lagoon
entrance and fire on merchant ship by direct fire or if possible with
torpedoes while ARGONAUT was firing indirect fire.
1039 M Sighted a two winged plane off port beam and dived.
1253 M Surfaced.
1255 M Contacts by radar at 12 miles and 14 miles moving in. OOD
sighted about 12 planes flying at high altitude, reported he thought
we had been seen.
1256 M Dived to 90 feet and told ARGONAUT not to surface due to enemy
air activity. ARGONAUT was given orders by group commander to proceed
to Point Baker submerged and NAUTILUS was ordered to remain submerged
until 1830 M.
1843 M Surfaced.
1900 M Mounted machine gun; heading for Point Baker. Marines were due
to leave the beach at 1930 M.
2046 M Sighted several rubber boats heading our way and by 2121 M had
received 53 marines in 4 boats. ARGONAUT had three boats. For
remainder of night maneuvered to remain as close to beach as possible
in effort to locate other boats. Stories of marines received on board
indicated that all boats had apparently tried to leave but experienced
great difficulty in riding the surf outbound, that many had turned
over and weapons were lost or ruined. The task group commander
ordered ARGONAUT to send rescue boat with volunteers to beach which
boat never did get off. Decided to scour the beach at daylight and to
run as close as safety would permit. At 0651 M sighted several boats
with men apparently making preparations to come out. One was already
headed out. NAUTILUS headed for this boat until fathometer readings
and cut indicated one half mile off reef.
0719 M First boat alongside.
0737 M Second boat alongside. Task group commander decided to send
this boat back with volunteers, extra guns, paddles and line throwing
gun to assist in rescue. We had been informed that most of the
paddles and motors had been lost the previous evening. Information
was to be given Lt. Col. Carlson that if we were forced down we would
be back at 1930 M and remain there indefinitely. Apparently one man
swam ashore from this boat, gave Lt. Col. Carlson the message and swam
back. Nothing more has been heard of these men - five in number. Lt.
Col. Carlson is sure these men were strafed by aircraft machine guns.
Two more boats were headed out by 0740 M so task group commander
ordered ARGONAUT to pick up these boats. By 0800 M ARGONAUT had
picked up both boats.
0821 M The ARGONAUT dived on what the thought to be a sight plane
contact. This plane was not seen by this vessel.
0825 M Decided to make a trim dive while ARGONAUT was down and dived.
0901 M Surfaced and ARGONAUT came up shortly thereafter.
0914 M Radar contact at 11 miles followed it in to 5 miles, trying to
sight planes but could not pick them up due to clouds.
0917 M Dived to 80 feet.
0920 M Two bombs were dropped by high altitude bombing but missed
NAUTILUS by a great distance. Ordered 150 feet and in as much as
group commander had ordered us to remain submerged all day if we were
forced down, remained at that depth.
1405 M Came to periscope depth to fix position and head back for Point
Baker.
1536 M Started hearing what appeared to be screws, called ARGONAUT
with no response. Screws were heard continuously until we surfaced at
1810 M.
1824 M Sighted ARGONAUT surfacing about five miles south of us. I
believe it was the ARGONAUT screws we heard. Both vessels now headed
for Point Baker and by 1930 M we were one-half to three quarters of a
mile off the reef trying to contact the marines. Saw signaling from
beach which proved to be Lt. Col. Carlson telling us to meet him at
the lagoon entrance at Flink Point at 2130 M.
2005 M Started for Flink Point.
2127 M Arrived near Flink Point and called the beach by Aldis Lamp.
2213 M Had first contact with marines.
2308 M Four rubber boats and one native boat came alongside. Marines
embarked and at 2353 M on orders of the group commander started for
Pearl.
(j) August 19, 1942.
Ran on surface all day. Doctor MacCracken operated on five seriously
wounded men all day.
(k) August 20, 1942.
No remarks.
(m) August 22, 1942.
Received word that ARGONAUT would rendezvous August 26. In as much as
we were now a day ahead of her, Task group commander ordered us to
rendezvous independently.
(n) August 23, 1942.
Made four dives for training.
1333 W sighted navy PBY heading for Pearl, distant about 8 miles.
Picked up on radar at 5 miles.
(o) August 24, 1942.
0715 W Sighted navy PBY distant about 9 miles on port beam,
course about 240.
0720 W sighted Navy PBY distant about 9 miles on starboard beam,
course about 240.
1558 VW Sighted navy PBY on course 060, distant about 9 miles on port
beam. None of the above planes were picked up on radar due probably
to low altitude flying. I do not believe we were sighted.
1705 VW Sighted navy PBY, distant about 9 miles on starboard beam
course 060. This plane had more altitude and was picked up on radar
at 8.5 miles.
(p) August 25, 1942.
Arrived Pearl Harbor.
2. WEATHER
Weather followed closely the predictions on the Pilot Chart for the
operating area, Pearl Harbor to Makin Island, Gilbert Group. South of 10d
north latitude, rain squalls of short duration averaged twice daily.
Except for these periods, visibility was excellent. At the area of meeting
of the NE and SE tracks (about 8d N) sharp squalls were experienced.
Sea from east, force 1, existed at time of disembarkation of raiders.
Even this moderate sea make boating from ship to shore difficult on the
weather (south) coast of Makin Island. Re-embarkation of raiders against
this sea and the existing wind (E, force 2) was dangerous and several boats
overturned. Re-embarkation was finally made on the lee (western) side of
the island where boating was little affected by the weather.
3. TIDAL INFORMATION
No change from the tidal data listed in the British Pilot of the
Gilbert Islands was observed i.e. H.W.F. and C. 4 hours, 10 minutes, range
about 5 feet. The time of high tide was chosen for landing on the south
(weather) side of Makin. For coming off this island, low tide was found to
be the best time in a similar state of wind (S E force 2) and sea (from E,
force 1).
Currents enroute to and around Makin: The counterequatorial current
was met at 6d N instead of 9d N, as shown on the Pilot chart for August.
No rip tides were seen at the area of juncture, but the other indications
of the current reversal were squall area, change in rudder carried to steer
the course, and increase in weight of the boat (submerged, of 7000 pounds.
During the day of reconnoitering the south coast of Makin, august 16, 1942,
a set of 340d, drift 1.2 knots was experienced. This set the ship into
bight which forms the southern coast of Makin and made it necessary to
exercise extreme care in approaching this disembarkation area. South of
Ukiangong Point to a distance of 18 miles current set 340d, drift 1.4
knots. At the entrance of Makin Lagoon, on the west side of the island, no
current was found, contrary to the prediction of the British Pilot which
gives a strong westerly set off the entrance.
4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
The south coast of Makin is without any landmarks whatever except for
the tangents, Ukiangong Point and the SE point at Tanimaiaki. Ranges and
bearings on trees were used in the southern bight where the landing was
made and the sonic depth finder was used when close to the beach. Nearest
approach to beach was 400 yards where sounding of 145 fathoms was obtained.
The steep-to beach gives little warning shoaling, the depth decreasing from
1000 to 145 fathoms in 1/4 mile. No pinnacles were found. The southern
coast has not been surveyed.
The Chart of Makin prepared by Sortie Army 2 from aerial photographs
and dated July 23, 1942, proved to be more accurate than H.O. chart 121.
The SE corner of the island is shown on H.O. 121 to extend about one mile
farther to the south than it projects on the army photo chart. Actually
there is a compromise; this SE corner extending about 1/4 mile farther south
than shown on army photo chart. This is important when using this SE
corner as a danger bearing on entering the bight. Although the outline of
Makin is in other respects excellent on the army photo chart, the
orientation does not appear to be right. The south coast appears on the
army chart to have a slope of 065d - 245d. The slope plotted more nearly
080d - 260d.
5. DESCRIPTION OF ALL ENEMY WARSHIPS SIGHTED
None.
6. DESCRIPTION OF ALL AIRCRAFT SIGHTED
all planes contacted were in the vicinity of Makin Island. A biplane
was seen by lookout but no further description was obtained. Twelve small
land planes flying in formation in groups of 3 were seen at high altitude
on August 17. Marines saw and destroyed one 4 engine seaplane and one
small float seaplane in Makin Lagoon on August 17. Other planes were not
sighted but radar gave warnings of all approaches.
7. SUMMARY OF SUBMARINE ATTACKS
Torpedo: None.
Gunfire:
0703 M August 17, 1942, commenced firing on Ukiangong Point area on
Makin Island. Covered area by shifting sights in range and deflection.
0711 M Checked fire.
0716 M August 17, 1942, commenced firing on ship anchorage area of
Makin Island. Radio spotting circuit was jammed or ineffective. Covered
area as thoroughly as possible by shifting sights in range and deflection
as necessary. 0723 M Checked fire, a total of 65 rounds of ammunition
having been expended.
8. ENEMY ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES
None of any consequence. All planes seemed to fly at high altitude
and we were bombed twice. Bombs missing by a great margin.
9. MAJOR DEFECTS NOTED
(a) Trim manifold valve, pump discharge to sea failed. Valve disc
came off its stem. Repaired by ship.
(b) Spot air conditioning unit in after torpedo room failed.
Condenser developed leak, and system lost gas. Repaired on board.
(c) Section of pipe in ship's refrigeration system failed. Pipe was
in salt water cooling system causing large leak into the boat.
Repaired on board.
(d) Silver soldered joint in after starboard power vent group failed.
(e) Magnetic compass periscope fogged.
(f) After ammunition hoist failed. Worm wheel drive assembly broke.
Ammunition for servicing after gun was passed by hand from forward
hoist.
(g) regulating governor #1 main engine could not be controlled from
control stand. Engine was operated by hand.
10. RADIO RECEPTION
(a) VOICE RADIO
The TBX voice transmitter and the RAS-1 receiver with preselector were
used aboard ship to communicate with the marines ashore. The marines
had portable radios of the type BC-611-A. Great difficulty was
experienced in talking to the marines because of the low signal
strength of their BC-611-A sets and because the marine sets were
separated from the ship by a half mile of dense foliage and woods plus
two miles of water.
(b) INTERFERENCE
No enemy interference was experienced. However, gunnery spots from
shore spotters were frequently not received because of high background
noise caused by increase of sensitivity of the shipboard RAS-1.
Sensitivity was increased in an attempt to receive the very weak
signal from the marines ashore. NPM on 4115 Kcs. Was also heard when
sensitivity was increased.
(c) THE UNDERWATER LOOP ANTENNA
The underwater loop antenna gave good daytime reception in the
Hawaiian area to a depth of sixty-five feet, but in the Makin area we
could get no reception during daylight when loop was submerged. No
night test submerged was made.
(d) SCHEDULES
Reception of Pearl schedules was good with the exception of late
evenings when static made it necessary to shift to 8230 Kcs. Slight
fading was encountered on 8230 Kcs. In Makin area.
(e) PERSONNEL
The number of reliable receiving personnel aboard was insufficient.
Three sound operators and three reliable radio operators are a minimum
requirement. It is believed that reliable radio operators should be
furnished to submarines. There is no opportunity for training radio
operators aboard an operating submarine and unreliable men can not be
used.
(f) FREQUENCIES
The Ship to shore frequency of 4035 Kcs. Used with the marines was
satisfactory. When gunfire support is anticipated a spotting
frequency should be assigned and a set of sufficient power carried
ashore to reach the ship.
11. SOUND CONDITIONS AND DENSITY LAYERS
(a) SOUND CONDITIONS
Sound conditions were poor close to Makin Island, probably due mostly
to a strong current and heavy surf. Surf was heard at 3000 yards
while approaching the island several times.
Surface communication by QC with ARGONAUT was very poor. Signals
faded entirely out much of the time. The ship rolled moderately, and
neither submarine made sufficient speed for its propellers to be hear.
Consequently the operator was unable to keep the projector trained on
the other ship.
There was no difficulty communicating submerged at 11,000 yards. This
range was determined by "Relay Echo Ranging".
(b) DENSITY LAYERS
At the area of meeting of the north equatorial and the
counterequatorial currents (about 6d N) the ship was running submerged
and gained about 7000 pounds in weight. The change of water
temperature experienced (1d, 84d F to 85d F) accounts for only 1472
lbs. The balance must have been the result of a decrease in density
of the sea water in the counterequatorial current.
12. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY
Spot air conditioner units were installed in the torpedo rooms to offset
the effects on temperature and humidity of increased personnel and warmer
sea water. These units were inadequate. Cooling water for these units
came from WRT tanks and had to be changed frequently in the tanks.
Temperatures in living spaces were 93d with a relative humidity 85
percent on the hottest dive, 91d with relative humidity 90 percent on
coolest dive. Throttling of air conditioners to decrease humidity
brought a little improvement. The air supply in the forward torpedo room
was poor. This compartment gained in personnel about 800 percent. A
suitable booster blower will solve this problem.
Dives were sufficiently short so that the limits of carbon dioxide and
oxygen percentages were not reached. After 12 hours the CO2 percentage
reached 1.5 throughout the ship. Fifteen hours would be a maximum
without use of CO2 absorbent, and about sixteen for steps to add oxygen.
An oxygen measuring device is being requested.
The commanding officer resorted to "ventilating through the boat" to
quickly clean out the old air and lower the temperature inside the boat.
This proved of great value.
The men were ordered topside whenever possible for exercise and fresh
air. During this short trip to the operating area (8 days) there was no
lowering of health of crew or passengers. For longer trips it is
essential that air conditioning be improved.
13. MILES STEAMED ENROUTE TO AND FROM STATION
TO 2020 miles
FROM 2029 miles
TOTAL 4058 miles
14. FUEL OIL EXPENDED
Expended 74,630 gallons fuel oil.
15. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
(a) Torpedoes - none expended, 10 remain.
(b) Fuel - 61,000 gallons, four engine speed was sued both to and from
station.
(c) Provisions - 35 days.
(d) Fresh water- 4,000 gallons, 271 hours remain on each of two stills
and 400 hours remain on third still.
(e) Personnel days - fourteen. As usual this is a difficult item to
estimate, the men seemed more tired after these operations than at
any time during the first patrol. This was caused by lack of sleep
and the extreme heat of all day dives. Prickly heat was much in
evidence and with more diving may have become serious.
16. FACTOR WHICH CAUSED ENDING PATROL
Loss of armament and equipment of marines and orders of task group
commander caused ending of this patrol.
17. REMARKS
(a) Many valuable lessons were learned incident to the operations just
completed. Among the outstanding items are:
(1) Where two or more submarines are operating with raiders, raider
boats should not rendezvous at a single submarine, each submarine
should be complete in itself and not need boats from another
submarine to pick up personnel.
(2) Better radio communication is essential. Communication via TBX
was excellent between this vessel and ARGONAUT but communication
with the raiders on shore left much to be desired. A special
communication unit equipped with a TBX should be utilized. As a
stand-by the raiders on the beach should be given certain times
during the night to send messages by Aldis Lamp. A group of flags
flying on the beach could be used during daytime to mean certain
important phrases such as change time of departure and etc.
(3) Submarines should carry one hundred spare boats and armament.
(4) Submarines should be equipped with one diesel powered motor whale
boat.
(5) Submarines should be equipped with more air conditioning.
(6) Submarines should have their entire bunk installation modified.
(7) Small kedge anchors with line and line throwing gun should be
provided submarines as standby equipment.
(8) Bombardment ammunition should be provided for six inch guns.
(9) Marines should not be given a definite time of withdrawal but
withdraw when the job is completed.
(10) This vessel could have used and additional day for
reconnaissance, in which case the lagoon near Flink Point could have
been reconnoitered probably giving us much valuable information.
(11) Limber holes in vicinity of ladders where boats tie up should be
blanked off.
(b) The commanding officer wishes to commend the officers and crew of
this vessel for their fine work during the time on station, the
majority were without sleep for some seventy hours. The gun crews
seemed always ready in the hatch without sounding general quarters.
The work of the navigator, Lt. Comdr. Roonay, is worth of special
mention. Lt. Lynch assisted him to a great extent and Lt. Comdr.
Hogan the diving officer was always in attendance.
(c) It was especially noted that the marines turned to with a will at
standing watches and other duties assigned them and soon became
proficient in their work. It was a pleasure to have them aboard. It
is strongly recommended that submarine orders be issued the officers
and men for the time on board so that they will get the benefits of
submarine pay.
FB5-42/A4-3 SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY TWO
Serial (041) In Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
August 31, 1942.
CONFIDENTIAL
From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY TWO.
To : The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. NAUTILUS - Report of Second War Patrol.
1. As in the case of the ARGONAUT this was a special mission rather than
a war patrol and remarks concerning the activities of this vessel
during the period of the operation are covered in the report made by
Commander Task Group 7.15.
2. The recommendations made in the subject report are concurred in.
3. Under paragraph 16 - Factor Which Caused Ending of Patrol - a more
correct statement would be that the successful accomplishment of the
mission terminated the patrol.
4. The condition of personnel at the end of the expedition was hard to
estimate but in general it may be said that although habitability
conditions were bad and fatigue was more evident than on previous
occasions, the fatigue was not as deep-seated and personnel can be
expected to recuperate more readily in this instance.
FC5-4/A16-3 SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR
Serial (0259) August 31, 1942.
CONFIDENTIAL
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To : The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. NAUTILUS Second War Patrol - Comments on.
1. The second war patrol of the NAUTILUS was carried out successfully.
The sinking of two ships and bombardment of the island clearly
demonstrated the power of these six inch guns and their value in a
submarine of this type.
2. The material condition of the NAUTILUS upon return from patrol was
very good.
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