PROLOGUE
Arrived Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, on August 25, 1942, from Special
Mission to Makin Island. Commenced refit on August 26, 1942, by
Submarine Base personnel. Completed refit on September 7, 1942.
Conducted sound listening tests on September 8, 1942. On September 9,
1942, was depermed and ran magnetic channel range; no training period.
1. NARRATIVE
September 10, 1942
0900 VW Departed Pearl Harbor with LITCHFIELD as escort.
1200 VW Made trim dive and rehearsed for battle surface. LITCHFIELD
commenced streaming target.
1315 VW Fired 20 rounds of target ammunition on battle surface. Gun 2
had trouble with firing lock. The range for this firing was bout 5000
yards and we had difficulty seeing target. Larger target should be
procured for this class of submarine.
1500 VW Swung ship for residuals. Upon completion LITCHFIELD ordered us
to zigzag which we did not desire nor was this compulsory according to
our operation order.
1930 W LITCHFIELD departed and ceased zigzagging.
2023 W Sighted steady white light on Kauai Island. It is estimated this
light was visible about twenty miles.
SEPTEMBER 11, 1942 TO SEPTEMBER 14, 1942
Uneventful. Made several training dives each day and fired three rounds
of target ammunition from each gun at night. Sighted friendly planes
each day.
SEPTEMBER 14, 1942
0716 Y Arrived Midway under escort of PT boats and planes and moored
alongside FULTON. Commenced fueling and repair of SD radar which has not
been working satisfactorily. Received C.T.F. 7 dispatch relative to
guarding additional areas and additional torpedoes. We did not have
necessary handling gear on board and hence made decision not to take
extra torpedoes. Reloading torpedoes from deck stowage tubes is
considered impracticable and unduly hazardous in enemy waters. FULTON
repair force and submarine base repair force could not locate trouble
with radar and eventually decision was made to depart Midway at daylight
on September 15, 1942.
SEPTEMBER 15, 1942
0530 Y Departed Midway escorted by two medium bombers and one PT boat.
Radar still not operating satisfactorily. Certainly Comsubron Eight, his
staff, and FULTON repair crew did everything in their power to correct
this deficiency.
0815 Y Sighted and contacted GUARDFISH and obtained information as to
most profitable spot in our areas.
0845 Y Released escort.
SEPTEMBER 16, 1942 TO SEPTEMBER 23, 1942
Uneventful. Made several training dives each day. Heavy head seas and
current cut our speed down from two to three knots. Closed flood valves to increase our speed and save fuel. Broken head studs and cracked
cylinder liners have caused the engineers to work day and night with
little rest. They are to be congratulated on their energy, zeal and
perseverance displayed during this trip.
SEPTEMBER 24, 1942
0753 K sighted ship (contact #1) bearing 060 relative; angle on bow 70d
P. Officer of the deck who was new on here dived.
0805 K Had first look at this ship and discovered range was over 16000
yards and that she was small, about 1000 tons.
0820 K surfaced and went ahead on all four engines to intercept this
ship.
0835 K Ship turned and headed for us at a range of about 5000 yards.
Decided he was undoubtedly a patrol vessel and was probably armed.
Opened both hatches and commenced firing both six inch guns (attack #1).
He then turned away and started zigzagging. We had difficulty getting on
at first due to high seas. One man was almost washed overboard on gun 2.
However, by 0845 K we were close making straddles and many hits were
made. Splashes could be seen caused by flying debris.
0848 K Enemy plane sighted distant 4 miles heading for us as we noticed
patrol vessel seemed to be sinking by stern. (Plane contact #1). Radar
showed plane at 3 / miles. Guns were partially secured and at 0850 K
submerged to 100 feet. At this time it was noticed bow planes although
they rigged out were not operating. Inspection indicated that for some
unknown reason the studs holding bow plane tilting worm gear housing in
anchor windlass room to the foundation had sheared and allowed the
housing to raise above the foundation and turn in azimuth. We remained
at 100 feet controlling the boat by stern planes while new studs could be
manufactured and housing could be eased into place.
1244 K Sound picked up screws which sounded like destroyer bearing 289
relative (contact #2). Went to 200 feet by use of stern planes.
1310 K Screws faded out.
1655 K Bow planes were back in commission and ordered periscope depth.
1748 K Surfaced.
2034 K Sighted sampan (contact #3) and avoided because guns were in no
condition to fire.
2200 K Entered patrol area.
SEPTEMBER 25, 1942
0209 K Sighted lights of sampan (contact #4).
0901 K Submerged. Decided to remain submerged while engineers repaired
broken head studs and renewed cylinder liner and electricians worked on
grounded leads to forward ammunition hoist and repair crew attempted to
place after hoist in operation condition.
1845 K Surfaced, forward hoist repaired, unable to operate after hoist.
2057 K Sighted what appeared to be a tanker which had us in moonstreak
(contact #5) and for nest hour attempted to get him in moonstreak and
attack but lost him due to his speed and rain squalls.
2329 K sighted 200 ton sampan which also sighted us and attempted to run
away (contact #6). Ordered 50 caliber machine gun mounted and gave chase. Commenced firing at a range of about 2000 yards making many hits
(attack #2).
SEPTEMBER 26, 1942
By midnight we had stopped the sampan and went into about 200 yards and
strafed his entire length.
0015 K Sampan burst into flames, increasing in intensity until at 0055 K
she was observed to sink. Sighted several more sampans during night but
avoided.
0510 K Sighted red light which apparently had us in sight as he was
trailing us (contact #7).
0545 K Submerged and this vessel continued towards us.
0630 K Started approach on her but broke off attack when it was decided
she was too small, about 1000 tons. Sighted sampans continually during
day.
1845 K surfaced.
1938 K sighted several lights on coast of Honshu.
2151 K Sighted darkened sampan (contact #8). Did not attack due to low
visibility at time.
2340 K Sighted sampan about 400 tons and changed course to intercept
(contact #9).
2355 K Commenced firing with machine gun and hit immediately (attack #3).
SEPTEMBER 27, 1942
Sampan started to maneuver to avoid fire and for next half hour chased
her firing when we could get 50 caliber to bear.
0040 K We put her engines out of commission and tried to set her on fire
with incendiary ammunition, succeeded once but her crew immediately
extinguished it. Ordered six inch ready and made two hits but did not
set her on fire.
0120 K Ordered bucket of fuel oil and rags to bridge. Sent men down on
deck who threw flaming rags on board and by 0145 K she was burning
furiously.
0217 K An explosion was observed on her after which she sank.
0619 K Submerged heading for 100 fathom curve due east of Kuro Saki.
Sighted several sampans in close to beach during the day.
1900 K surfaced nine miles due ease of Kuro Saki and changed course to
head up coast on 335 true. Sighted many lights on beach during night
although it is blacked out.
2231 K sighted an escorted convoy of about six ships heading south along
coast bearing from 280 true to 303 true (contact #10). A cargo passenger
ship similar to the SHOEI MARU about 9000 tons seemed to be having engine
trouble and her smoke could be easily seen and she was bout 3000 yards
astern of convoy. Commenced approach on the surface on this vessel
although unfortunately we were silhouetted in the moonlight, however, in
order to attain attack position, surface speed was necessary.
2259 K At a range of 900 yards fired two torpedoes (attack #4). Neither
torpedo took the gyro angle of twelve degrees right generated by the T.D.C. but went out on zero gyro. It is believed that during the process
of getting the tubes ready the new men in the torpedo room became excited
and knocked against the hand wheel which withdrew the spindles from the
torpedoes. Steps have been taken to prevent a recurrence and a
recommendation in the premise will be forwarded by separate
correspondence.
2305 K Ordered gyro on zero on one tube forward and tried to fire but
this tube misfired.
2306 K Maneuvered to use stern tube in attempt to keep target on steady
course and at 2309 K fired stern tube but target maneuvered and avoided.
2313 K this torpedo hit something in close to the beach and exploded.
2319 K Target laid out a heavy smoke screen and kept changing course
continuously to keep NAUTILUS bearing 180d.
2335 K Was in position to fire with a large port track and fired but just
as we fired target turned right and wake of torpedo was seen to touch his
port side as it barely missed. Commenced another approach.
2341 K Ordered battle stations surface for gun one, after ammunition
hoist out of commission. All during this time screws could be heard from
other ships of the convoy and the escort appeared to be heading towards
us but abruptly turned away. With target making only about two knots
distant 600 yards and angle on bow 90 port at 2348 K fired number one
tube - misfire.
2352 K Ordered gun one to commence firing. Hit continuously after first
shot and ordered rapid fire. After ten shots forward ammunition hoist
became inoperative. Ordered ammunition up through gun access hatch and
ordered tubes reloaded. By 0001 K had once again obtained good firing
position and tried to fire number 4 tube - misfire.
0003 K Fired number 2 tube - misfire.
0005 K Tried with no luck to fire number 4 tube. At this point target
speeded up, turned toward us and tried to ram, causing NAUTILUS to back
emergency, cleared by about two hundred yards. She then showed us a port
angle on the bow and while firing and hitting with six inch gun at 0007
fired number two tube which torpedo hit.
0010 K Target was observed to be going down by the stern, streaming oil
and on fire amidships and aft. Also they had abandoned ship, two of
their life boats were within 50 yards of us.
0012 K A shore battery fired a salvo of two large caliber shells at us
and made a straddle. The shore was to windward and for a full minute we
were enveloped on spray which seemed like a heavy rain drenching all
hands topside. At same time an antisubmarine vessel, probably a
destroyer from her appearance, which had been previously sighted burning
a red light and heading for us from the north, turned her searchlight on
us at a range of about 1200 yards. Without securing gun ordered gun crew
below and dived in 39 fathoms of water as the destroyer started firing a
machine gun at us. It is estimated that at least 16 six inch hits were
made on this merchantman.
0021 K Depth charge attack began which lasted continuously until 0540 K.
It is believed that some of the charges were dropped by planes and two
antisubmarine vessels were heard pinging. Total of 32 charges, some
close.
0100 K Sound reported on true bearing of merchantman the crackling noise
which we now know to be associated with the sinking of a ship. This continued for fifteen or twenty minutes and then ceased. It is believed
the ship sank at this time.
0145 K After a lull of some thirty minutes ordered periscope depth and
took a look, nothing in sight, although visibility was good. Ordered
sixty foot depth and took a good look, nothing in sight. However, while
making this observation depth charge attack continued quite close.
Ordered 160 feet and remained there, heading for 100 fathom curve which
was 18 miles distant.
1907 K Surfaced. Decided to reconnoiter Erimo Saki and south coast of
Hokkaido.
1923 K Had a good radar contact at 10 1/2 miles (plane contact #3). After
about a half hour this contact faded out, getting no closer. Avoided all
lights during night due to necessity for charging batteries.
2020 K Sighted searchlight bearing 300 d True.
SEPTEMBER 29, 1942
0420 K Sighted Erimo Saki Light regular characteristics distant about 25
miles.
0543 K submerged southwest of Erimo Saki Light heading up coast on 290
True thinking we would be set in towards beach, however, a strong set
southeast was encountered. Several sampans were sighted during the day.
1636 K sighted a two mast ship bearing 299 True (contact #11) started
approach but discontinued when it was discovered ship was too small.
1903 K surfaced and decided to run to east coast of Hokkaido. Several
sampans sighted during night.
SEPTEMBER 30, 1942
At daylight sky was overcast and the shore line very indistinct so
decided to remain on surface. By 0647 K visibility had increased,
submerged northeast of Erimo Saki Light.
1329 K Sighted a freighter of about 6500 tons heading southwest (contact
#12). Started approach.
1432 K Fired two torpedoes, one with a 1 1/2 degree offset to the left at a
range of about 1550 yards (attack #5) Attempted to fire another torpedo
with a right offset but both misfired due to gyro spindles being jammed.
No hits were heard or observed. Data on the T.D.C. had checked for
almost an hour,. It is not understood why we did not hit.
1435 K Target abruptly changed course to the right and headed directly
for the beach although there is no port nor anchorage at that location.
She was followed in until a range of about 16000 yards was obtained.
According to our position which was quite accurate at the time this range
would have put her on the beach. Sound tracked both torpedoes converging
towards target and torpedoes were no longer heard after running a minute
and a half. First torpedo was checked as going out on 012 gyro, second
on zero which was correct T.D.C. setup. The possibility of an exploder
failure is submitted and that one torpedo or both hit the merchants
ship's side and holed her causing her to run towards beach.
1850 K surfaced and sighted no less than twenty five sampans during
night, all seemed to be heading in a northerly direction, generally in
groups of five or six and in column. Some were equipped with
searchlights.
OCTOBER 1, 1942
Decided to head down towards Shiriya Saki Light.
0515 K Sighted a darkened vessel apparently a patrol vessel (contact #13)
in towards Shiriya Saki Light.
0536 K submerged.
0635 K sighted smoke bearing 058 True and after determining which way
bearing was drawing changed course to intercept (contact #14).
0740 K Target was made out to be a single stack freighter of about 6500
tons with goal posts both forward and aft and masts above the goal posts.
0757 K Decided to close distance to track a little more and due to glassy
sea went deep. Sound reported she sounded like a twin screw ship.
0807 K Tried to ping a range several times without success.
0815 K Sound reported pinging.
0818 K Commenced firing 3 torpedoes (attack #6) 12 second firing
interval. 2d offset. Two hits observed and heard. She was apparently
drawing more than our estimated 22 feet because both were contact hits
and the resultant explosions covered her with spray and smoke practically
her entire length.
0822 K Target had taken a big list and had started to settle.
0823 K Large life boat was observed in water astern and probably 25 men
in it.
0824 K Definite sounds of the ship sinking and breaking up were heard
gradually becoming more intense. Echo ranging was continuous.
0913 K Came to periscope depth and ship had completely disappeared.
Nothing in sight.
0943 K Depth charge attack continued. Ordered deep submergence. Echo
ranging continued. A total of 11 depth charges were dropped some fairly
close. Remained at deep submergence until 1612 K due to glassy sea,
planes searching area and apparently small light vessel echo ranging
which vessel was never seen.
1904 K Surfaced.
OCTOBER 2, 1942
0356 K Radar land contacts at 8, 12, and 14 miles.
0418 K Sighted a red light bearing 062 True (contact #15).
0430 K This vessel started giving us a challenge by white light, turned
away when we knew he saw us.
0535 K submerged near Benton Bana.
0617 K sighted smoke on horizon bearing 073 True (contact #16).
0644 K Broke off approach when it was found to be impossible to get to
firing range. Ship was on a northerly course and quite a distance to
seaward of us.
0846 K Sighted two vessels equipped with sails and engines bearing 108
True. These are probably patrol vessels (contact #17). 1904 K Surfaced intending to patrol parallel to coast line on one hundred
fathom curve.
1905 K sighted darkened patrol vessel on port quarter (contact #18).
1908 K sighted light of patrol vessel bearing 223 True which vessel
apparently sighted us as he started challenging us (contact #19).
Decided to run east into dark sector until batteries were charged. 2300
K Reversed course and headed for Benton Bana.
OCTOBER 3, 1942
0045 K Commenced patrolling along 100 fathom curve.
0400 K Sighted smoke of ship bearing 296 True (contact #20). He had us
in moonstreak and had apparently seen us at same time because he
challenged us. We attempted to maneuver at full speed to put him in
moonstreak but before we were able to do so he played a searchlight on
us. At this time he was made out to be a destroyer.
0404 K Submerged.
0408 K while raising periscope to get a look depth charge attack began
some charges close.
0420 K continuous pinging until 0730 K.
0904 K Screws were heard bearing 280 relative (contact #21).
0914 K sighted destroyer of AMAGIRI class and commenced approach. She
was making about 18 knots and would stop intermittently to listen, no
pinging. At a range of 3500 yards she changed course and showed us a
angle on the bow of 180 and soon disappeared. Broke off attack.
1203 K sighted patrolling sampan bearing 288 relative (contact #22).
1222 K Sighted masts of large destroyer bearing 282 True (contact #23)
commenced approach. When range reached 4000 yards she zigged 25 degrees
away and we could not close.
1301 K Broke off attack.
1715 K Seas became so bad that it was impossible to maintain periscope
depth.
1903 K surfaced in a very rough sea and high wind. Taking seas over
bridge. Made decision to clear coast of Honshu for a few days because at
present it is so well patrolled that it is impossible to get in
unobserved. Also it was practically essential we put seas astern.
2213 K Sighted white light on horizon (contact #24).
OCTOBER 4, 1942
0535 K Submerged and tried to maintain periscope depth and found it
impossible. Ran with difficulty at 100 feet. Headed on course zero for
100 fathom curve south of Kushiro. Seas continue to be heavy.
1844 K surfaced in rough sea and continued heading north.
2058 K sound reported what appeared to be a single ping bearing 240
relative. Visibility was low, sky overcast.
2114 K sighted what we believed was a destroyer heading south range 5000
yards broad on port bow. (contact #25). He was making high speed and was
out of sight before we could do anything about it. 2140 K Sighted light of sampan broad on port beam (contact #26).
OCTOBER 5, 1942
0150 K Sighted light of sampan bearing 300 True (contact #27).
0422 K sighted light of sampan bearing 161.5 True (contact #28).
0525 K Submerged on course zero.
0759 K sighted sampan bearing 319 true (contact #29).
0820 K sighted several flags on bamboo poles in water attended by sampan
in lat. 42-28.8, long. 144-40 (contact #30).
1630 K Sighted sampan baring 171 True (contact #31).
1900 K surfaced.
1911 K sighted lights of sampan bearing 251 true (contact #32) and
another bearing 290 True and continued to sight many sampans during
night.
OCTOBER 6, 1942
0535K Submerged south of Kushiro. Sighted many sampans during day.
1255 K Fathometer reading of 60 fathoms.
1512 K sighted enemy patrol plane altitude 700 feet, heading towards
Kushiro (plane contact #4).
1605 K sighted enemy plane on northerly course heading for us, attitude
1000 feet (plane contact #5) ordered 100 feet.
1715 K Came to periscope depth, glassy sea.
1852 K Surfaced and as usual most of night was spent dodging sampans.
OCTOBER 7, 1942
0120 K sighted small enemy patrol vessel darkened, bearing 260 True
(contact #33).
0535 K Still dark and rainy but a sampan caused us to submerge.
Continued on course north to 50 fathom curve.
1157 K Sighted a two masted vessel and commenced approach (contact #34).
Broke off attack when vessel was thought to be too small for torpedo.
1717 K Sighted sampan bearing 029 True and at 1807 K another bearing 147
True (contact #35).
1846 K surfaced with at least 15 sampans in sight astern of us distance
two to four miles. Seas continue to be rough. We have now remained in
the vicinity of Kushiro for three days and have seen nothing except
sampans. Made decision to spend the night proceeding to Erimo Saki.
OCTOBER 8, 1942
0440 K Sighted the lights of the town of Biroo, Hokkaido.
0508 K sighted Erimo Saki Light bearing 221 True, sounding 70 fathoms.
0532 K Submerged. The ship rolled 10 to 15 degrees a side at 70 foot
depth. 0645 K Depth control at periscope depth became impossible, we broached
and a depth of 100 feet was ordered.
1020 K Control could not be maintained at 100 feet and went to 135 feet.
1510 K Without warning the ship increased depth in twenty seconds to 180
feet before she could be stopped. Ran at 150 feet remainder of day when
occasionally we rolled as much as 10 degrees aside. It is believed we
are very close to the center of a typhoon.
1857 K surfaced in a gale and mountainous seas 50 to 60 feet high.
Decided to run with the sea.
2300 K turned to head back for Erimo Saki and decided sea was too high.
OCTOBER 9, 1942
0015 K Slowed to two thirds speed and headed for Erimo Saki, seas had be
now abated somewhat.
0530 K submerged heading for Erimo Saki.
1402 K Reached 100 fathom curve. Depth control at periscope depth has
been maintained with difficulty, rolling as much as 15 degrees to a side.
1856 K Surfaced in very heavy swells and decided to proceed to Shiriya
Saki Light. Seas became progressively worse during night.
OCTOBER 10, 1942
0536 K Submerged off Shiriya Saki Light in rough sea. Impossible to run
at periscope depth.
0800 K Attempted to run at periscope depth, broached and went to 100
feet.
0903 K Had to increase depth to 140 feet.
1433 K Attempted to get a look at periscope depth, broached, and once
more went deep.
1856 K surfaced in mountainous seas, largest any of us have ever seen.
Set courses during the night to ride out storm.
OCTOBER 11, 1942
0302 K Sighted white light bearing 293 True, (contact #36) did not
investigate due to state of sea. Torpedoes would rot run in this sea.
0557 K Submerged mainly to give us a respite from heavy seas. Could not
maintain periscope depth, ran with difficulty at 140 feet. During the
time we broached a good periscope look was obtained, seas were
mountainous and sky heavily overcast.
1846 K Surfaced in heavy seas and set course to best ride out storm and
still close the coast of Honshu. Barometer is now rising and storm
center seems to have passed.
OCTOBER 12, 1942
0428 K Sighted side lights of sampan bearing 024 True (contact #37). He
seemed to be on a course of 220 trying to keep astern and ride out storm.
0602 K Submerged and once more could not control a periscope depth, ran
at 100 feet where we rolled five to ten degrees aside. Heading for
Shiriya Saki. 1330 K Ordered periscope depth and with much difficulty took a good look.
Coast of Honshu in clear sight, seas still high and even with ten feet of
periscope exposed seas block vision ninety percent of time. Ordered 90
feet.
1607 K Heard screws bearing 044 relative (contact #38) came to periscope
depth and could see nothing. Screws passed down starboard side at high
speed.
1650 K Heard echo ranging at 032 relative and came to periscope depth and
changed course to intercept (contact #39).
1655 K Depth control was uncertain, waves high but sighted what appeared
to be two freighters both with goal posts forward and aft bearing 045
relative. Commenced approach on closest one (attack #7). Echo ranging
continuous but could not see the source, nor could accurate ranges be
obtained even with ten feet of periscope exposed. However, at 1716 K we
had a setup on T.D.C. and fired two torpedoes, noticed target zig away
shortly after firing. We either fired on the knuckle of a zig, he
sighted periscope or he sighted the wake of the torpedoes. Attempted to
fire another torpedo offset to take care of this course change but it
misfired. Both torpedoes missed. The source of the pinging could now be
seen as a destroyer heading for us, close, angle on bow zero.
1719 K Ordered 150 feet.
1722 K three depth charges were dropped close but were overhead, probably
set for 50 feet. Ordered 200 feet.
1727 K three more depth charted were dropped, seemed closer than before.
1731 K Four more depth charges were dropped close but above us.
1738 K Two more depth charges were dropped as he was clearly heard
throughout ship passing directly over us. Once again the charges were
set too shallow although they shook us considerably. At this time
another antisubmarine vessel started pinging on us.
1750 K Echo ranging bearing 250 relative and by 1808 K he shifted to
automatic keying and heading in at us at high speed. It was easy to tell
that he was maintaining continuous contact, the pigs seemed to penetrate
our hull. Attempted evasive tactics to no avail, went to 250 feet.
1810 K A total of five depth charges were dropped, directly overhead, two
were probably set at 100 feet and did not hurt us much, three must have
been set at 150 or 200 feet and the exploded directly overhead. At this
time his screws could be clearly heard for the second time passing
directly over the ship. This is the worst depth charging this vessel has
undergone even worse that the first patrol, damage is listed under major
defects. Pinging once more started and by 1840 K he sounded as though he
had once again contacted us, all idea of coming to periscope depth for an
attack was now abandoned and a depth of 300 feet ordered and maneuvered
to put him astern and keep him there. NAUTILUS could now use these
tactics because this headed her away from coast of Honshu and deep water.
2007 K Could hear no screws but pinging was heard 270 relative.
2026 K Came up to 200 feet.
2037 K Came to 170 feet.
2053 K Pinging became louder and it now bore 305 relative. It appeared
that he must be on a course almost parallel to ours, going up port side,
so NAUTILUS came left to present as little angle to him as possible. By
this time gravity was getting low and we knew we could not stay down
another 24 hours. By 2220 K he had crossed our bow and was now bearing 40 relative. Many times it sounded as though he had once again contacted
us.
2221 K He was bearing 110 relative and periscope depth was ordered. He
was now between NAUTILUS and Honshu. At 2233 K while he was bearing 150
relative NAUTILUS surfaced knowing there was no moon and went ahead full
speed on all engines. After about half an hour pinging was lost in our
screws. Decision was made to head east for a few days to check damage.
OCTOBER 13, 1942
Sighted several white lights during night undoubtedly from sampans.
0533 K Submerged and ran at 90 feet most all day with occasional
periscope looks. Running at periscope depth difficult due to seas which
had once again increased although they had been fairly calm during the
night. Passed several sampans during day.
1835 K surfaced. We have many noises in hull caused by typhoon and depth
charging, source of these noises cannot be located. Sighted at least
fifteen sampans during the night, operating in groups.
OCTOBER 14, 1942
0619 K submerged on course 270 headed for Benton Bana. Prior to diving
looked for oil slick and we seem to be leaving slight oil slick.
Difficult to ascertain due to seas.
1100 K Depth control at periscope depth once more impossible, ordered
ninety feet.
1537 K Came to periscope depth and remained there with difficulty.
1700 K Sound reported screws bearing 355 relative (contact #40).
1703 K Eventually sighted sampan of about 400 tons.
1830 K surfaced during evening twilight so we could get a good look at
bow planes and try to find source of some of our noises. Thought that
maybe bow planes were not operating satisfactorily and hence was reason
why we cannot maintain periscope depth. Bow planes seem to be operating
satisfactorily. Headed for Benten Bana.
2348 K Sighted bright glow of searchlight bearing 319 True (contact #41).
OCTOBER 15, 1942
0000 K On 50 fathom curve off Benten Bana patrolling on courses parallel
to beach.
0128 K Sighted bright beam of searchlight trained up in the air distant
about 12 miles bearing 003 True (contact #42). He sent AO MR KR KR. We
probably should have investigated this light but still had no desire to
run into a destroyer at this time not knowing how badly we were damaged.
Sighted several lights on coast during night.
0545 K Submerged near Benten Bana and found depth control at periscope
depth impossible due to heavy swells.
0708 K Sound reported screws at 060 relative.
0712 K With eight feet of periscope exposed finally with difficulty saw
the masts of a ship bearing 053 relative (contact #43). Started approach
and made out target to be a destroyer of the AMAGIRI class on course 270.
Depth control extremely difficult and with eight feet of periscope
exposed ship coming up and down as much as three feet it was impossible to obtain a range. Decided it would be a waste of torpedoes to fire. He
probably came as close as 3000 yards. Ordered 90 feet and found that
difficult. At one time ship reached 60 feet before it could be stopped
with the use of negative tank. Went to 140 feet where we still had
considerable motion.
1847 K surfaced, ran east during charge, then headed back for Benten
Bana, seas seem to go down at night.
OCTOBER 16, 1942
0055 K sighted light on beach.
0158 K Commenced patrolling parallel to beach, one town was brightly
illuminated, exact distance to shore unknown. Cannot use fathometer due
to presence of patrolling destroyers.
0208 K Seemed to be set in close to shore, entire shore line plainly
visible as well as several sampans probably patrolling in close to beach.
Headed away from beach for half an hour.
0240 K sighted dark object later identified as destroyer (contact #44)
bearing 120 True on southerly course making at least 18 knots distant
about 4000 yards. Lost him shortly thereafter in area of low visibility.
0350 K sighted red light on sampan about 3000 yards bearing 188 True
(contact #45) certain this is a patrol vessel.
0540 K Submerged on course 160 True headed east (plane contact #6).
1330 K Heard echo ranging from two different bearings, 170 True and 150
true. Lasted about one half hour and not heard again, nothing in sight
although high seas make it difficult to see.
1845 K surfaced in rough sea and bright moonlight.
OCTOBER 17, 1942
0545 K Submerged in 85 fathoms of water near Benten Bana.
0610 K Became impossible to control the boat at periscope depth.
0616 K Echo ranging was heard bearing 180 True (contact #46).
0757 K Took periscope look; could see shore line plainly. Had to use 10
feet of periscope to see over waves.
0859 K Heard echo ranging bearing 210 True, nothing in sight.
Maintaining periscope depth with difficulty.
0954 K Broached and ordered 90 feet. Came to periscope depth several
more times during the day, broached each time and had to use negative to
take us down.
1837 K surfaced in high seas, sky completely overcast, barometer falling.
2125 K sighted white light of sampan bearing 021 True. Probably
patrolling. He could not be doing much fishing in this weather (contact
#47).
OCTOBER 18, 1942
0516 K sighted what appeared to be two distinct torpedo tracks dead ahead
running east and west perpendicular to our course. Night was extremely
dark, nothing in sight. 0625 K Visibility improved, sighted coast.
0642 K visibility practically unlimited; submerged.
1017 K Sound reported screws very close as 146 relative (contact #49).
Upon gaining periscope depth nothing could be seen. We then broached and
a freighter could be seen, angle on bow 180, range 4000 yards. Negative
and high speed had to be used to keep us from surfacing. No other ship
was in sight but sound reported a lighter screw in same vicinity.
1119 K sound reported possible screws at 235 relative, sounds like
destroyer (contact #50). Came to periscope depth, broached and while
going back down made out source of screws as patrolling sampan, now close
aboard and dead ahead. Decided that sound conditions being such that
screws cannot be heard over 3500 yards and depth control at periscope
depth is impossible that torpedo attacks today would surely result in
misses from deep submergence and that periscope approach would be
extremely hazardous because we would certainly broach.
1844 K surfaced in a rough sea and commenced patrolling parallel to
coast.
1904 K Sighted a patrolling sampan bearing 312.5 True (contact #51).
Maneuvered to avoid detection because visibility is practically unlimited
with moon so bright.
2125 K sighted patrolling sampan bearing 010 True. (contact #52). He
had us in moonstreak and immediately extinguished his light.
OCTOBER 19, 1942
0110 K sighted light of another sampan bearing 214 True (contact #53).
0553 K submerged.
0908 K Sighted smoke bearing 182 True (contact #54). Due to heavy seas
we could not make out the source of this smoke until 1000 K when her
angle on bow seemed to be 70 starboard. With difficulty obtained range
of 5500 yards. She was a freighter of about 6500 tons escorted by a
single stack destroyer which took position astern of her. Could not get
in so broke off attack and once again the seas have robbed us of a
merchantman. We were continuously bobbing up and down between 64 feet to
70 feet and periscope was submerged most of the time.
1107 K Heard and felt the detonation of a bomb, water rushing through
superstructure indicated it was fairly close. This must have been a
plane and he may have sighted our oil slick. Went to 150 feet.
1250 K Sound reported screws bearing 300 True, sounds like sampan
(contact #55). Nothing in sight at time although seas continue to
restrict periscope observations.
1847 K surfaced. Upon surfacing seas were fairly calm and what appeared
to be a heavy oil sludge was sighted on our starboard side. This
appeared to be blown out of middle group on surfacing.
1858 K Radar echo at four miles coming (plane contact #7) at practically
the same time sighted a formation of three planes, with running lights
on, heading west; cleared bridge except for Commanding Officer and O.O.D.
When they were 2 miles distant, submerged to 80 feet in as much as we
were in moonstreak and visibility was practically unlimited.
1925 K Came to periscope depth and took careful look.
1953 K Surfaced and once more noticed what appeared to be oil on our
starboard side. OCTOBER 20, 1942
0603 K Submerged; have not been able to determine cause of sludge seen
last night. Looked for air and oil leaks and discovered we have many air
leaks outboard, which undoubtedly have been giving our position away.
Found we have leaks into main ballast tanks. This is the first day since
the bad depth charging that seas have permitted a good inspection for
leaks. Made decision to patrol quieter spot in our area.
0830 K sighted smoke bearing 323 True. Commenced approach but broke it
off when source of smoke turned out to be patrolling sampan (contact
#56).
1221 K sighted smoke bearing 002 True eventually made out to be a sampan.
(contact #57).
1341 K Sighted fishing sampan with nets marked with red flags.
1457 K Sighted what appeared to be a small freighter, started approach
but discontinued when it was found to be too small for a torpedo (contact
#58). Sighted several more sampans during day.
1843 K Surfaced in bright moonlight with three lighted sampans in sight
and two darkened ones astern.
2137 K sighted dark object later identified to be a sampan. He had
sighted us before we saw him (contact #59). Sighted several more sampans
during night.
OCTOBER 21, 1942
0000 K Set course for a line between Erimo Saki and Shiriya Saki.
0546 K Submerged.
0800 K Sighted a freighter similar in appearance to the LYONS MARU, 7000
tons, (contact #60), bearing 033.5 True, course 165 True. Commenced
approach. He was apparently swinging ship for residuals because he made
many changes in course, never steady on one for more than three or four
minutes. We could run in at high speed as close as 4500 yards and then
he would reverse course or change by 60 or 90 degrees. We kept chasing
him until at 1013 K at a range of 7000 yards he took a course of 060
True, Speed 10 knots, angle on the bow 150 starboard and was soon lost.
1837 K Surfaced in bright moonlight. Sighted several sampans during
night.
OCTOBER 22, 1942
0554 K sighted what appeared to be a wake on port bow (contact #61),
submerged as we were silhouetted in the dawn. Sound picked up screws
passing from port to starboard as we submerged.
0559 K Sighted a darkened sampan passing close aboard down our starboard
side. Sighted several more sampans during day.
1840 K surfaced in bright moonlight. Sighted many sampans during night.
OCTOBER 23, 1942
0555 K submerged northeast of Erimo Saki. Headed in close to beach and
then took course south to parallel in 50 fathoms of water. Many sampans
sighted and many flags, probably marking fishing grounds, which caused us
to do much maneuvering. 1835 K surfaced and made decision to run towards Shiriya Saki Light in
last effort to increase our tonnage for this trip regardless of oil and
air leaks. We have had no difficulty maintaining periscope depth the
last few days. If sea is glassy we will run seaward away from shore.
1841 K Erimo Saki Light was sighted much reduced in brilliance. Sighted
several lighted and one darkened sampan during night.
OCTOBER 24, 1942
No sights were possible during night due to cold, dreary, rainy, weather
but D.R.I. indicated we had not made the desired speed during night due
to heavy head seas. Visibility was so bad remained on surface until at
0609 K submerged heading for Shiriya Saki Light.
1314 K Sighted freighter of about 7200 tons similar to the LONDON MARU
and commenced approach (contact #62).
1342 K Commenced firing 3 torpedoes. Two hits observed and heard (attack
#8). First torpedo to hit must have been magnetic because explosion was
barely heard and probably did not explode until it was on far side,
second was a contact shot clearly heard.
1350 K Loud explosion heard probably on target.
1405 K Target was observed to be sinking, bow and stern high in air,
screw completely out of water. She was broken amidships. Foremast and
mainmast leaning towards each other.
1435 K Desired to give several more men a chance to see a sinking ship
but upon raising periscope ship was no longer in sight. At same time
sound heard the crackling of the ship breaking up similar to the other
ships we have sunk.
1830 K Surfaced in a rough sea and poor visibility. Sighted several
lighted and darkened sampans during night.
OCTOBER 25, 1942
0600 K Made decision to run on surface and clear area hoping we might
sight vessels enroute to Alaska.
0800 K Clear area.
1010 K Sighted sampan of about 350 tons bearing 067 True on routine
periscope observation (contact #63). Changed course to intercept.
1038 K Opened fire with machine gun. Started hitting with no apparent
damage except that he stopped and all hands on board seemed to disappear.
Probably went below. (attach #9). 1047 K Sent gun one to stations for battle surface.
1056 K after much difficulty was encountered in training, that gun fired
one round at 300 yards which was a perfect hit, debris flying everywhere
and a large fire started immediately. This particular shell had been in
the gun since the sinking of the freighter during night action had had
been subjected to 160 feet of water pressure and still exploded.
NAUTILUS lay to waiting for the crew to come topside until finally
practically the entire ship was engulfed in flames.
1122 K Left the ship burning furiously.
1215 K several explosions were seen after which she apparently sank.
OCTOBER 26 TO NOVEMBER 1, 1942
Surface running. On October 28 made six hour battery discharge which
indicated that after battery needs working over in as much as the low
voltage limit on several cells was reached forty five minutes early and
discharge was discontinued. Meters may be giving erroneous readings due
to depth charging. On October 31, 1942, met patrol yacht BEYRL about
sixteen miles from Midway. No planes, friendly or enemy, were sighted
during entire trip. Arrived Midway at 1346 Yoke after a very rough
passage which caused all hands considerable discomfort. At Midway,
Commander Submarine Base and his officers did everything in their power
for us and were most helpful. Ship's engineers had to renew several head
studs. Departed Midway at 0730 Y November first, escorted for thirty
miles by BERYL. At 0645 Y received a contact report from escort that
enemy submarine had been sighted, giving latitude and longitude but no
other information, hence held course and speed.
NOVEMBER 2, TO NOVEMBER 5, 1942
Make training dives each forenoon and one deep submergence to located
leaks. Practiced stopped trim for one half hour. At 1317 on November 3,
1942, sighted dark object later identified as large glass float, and then
sighted heavy oil slick; stopped all main engines. Sound man reported
fast screws like torpedo, bearing 140 relative, which changed quickly to
dead astern. Immediately went ahead emergency. O.O.D. was taking
routine periscope look at time and called to bridge "torpedo sighted".
He also thought we would be hit. There was no wake but he is certain he
saw a torpedo, yellowish in color, cross close to our stern. Sea was
glassy calm with light swells. Sound man became excited upon hearing
torpedo so close that he did not continue to follow bearing but held on
to stanchion thinking that explosion would occur momentarily. The sound
man has had considerable experiences in hearing torpedoes running and it
is believed a torpedo was fired with a large track. No periscope was
sighted but several other floats were sighted in the vicinity. Sent
contact report but could not get NPM nor could San Francisco raise NPM.
After two hours gave report to San Francisco. At 0630 VW November 5,
1942, met escort and proceeded to Pearl Harbor.
2. WEATHER
Of the 31 days on station, 16 days were stormy, the sea frequently being
too rough for this ship to maintain periscope depth. The ration of rough
to calm days is normal for October in this area. During the first week
the weather was good, the sea calm. During the next two weeks (6 - 18
October) a typhoon was encountered. During the last week the weather was
moderate, sea from south and temperature low. Enroute to and from
station high seas and wink caused reduction of speed of 2-3 knots.
The typhoon encountered was typical, being preceded by two days of low
barometer, glassy seas and brilliant sunsets. Fishing sampans closed the
coast in great numbers. The next week brought mountainous seas, heavy
rains and a low barometer. Wind shifted from SW to N to NE to E.
Estimate storm center passed 50-100 miles to westward of ship. During
the worst of the storm the NAUTILUS rolled considerable at 140 feet and
depth control at a less depth was not possible.
Temperature required heavy winter clothing.
3. TIDAL INFORMATION
Currents corresponded closely to those shown on the pilot chart, local
charts and coast pilots. No relation between the local tides and ocean
currents was noted.
4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
ERIMO SAKI Light appeared with regular characteristics except on one
occasion when it showed with reduced brilliancy. SHIRIYA SAKI Light
appeared with regular characteristics and full brilliancy. SAME KAKU
Light had regular characteristics but reduced brilliancy during the night
a convoy stood out of HACHINOE BAY.
Lights appeared along the coast and were useful in determining distance
off the coast. Soundings were taken at irregular intervals when near the
coast. Curves of soundings appeared correct except near BENTEN BANA
where 100 fathom curve is a few miles closer to the beach than shown on
H.O. chart 5490. Mountain peaks are accurately charted and of great
assistance as are the sketches in Japan Pilot Vol. I (reprint of Br.
Admiralty Publication). Sketch on p. 255 of this book should read TOYONI
YAMA instead of SARURU YAMA. Photographs were taken of the HOKKAIDO
coast 20 miles NE of ERIMO SAKI.
5. DESCRIPTION OF SHIPS SIGHTED
(not transcribed)
6. DESCRIPTION OF PLANES SIGHTED
(not transcribed)
7. SUMMARY OF SUBMARINE ATTACKS
Attacks by torpedoes submitted on form provided with original of patrol
report to comsubpac.
Attack No. 1 40-41 N 146-36 E
Sighted 1000 ton vessel at 0753 K on September 24, 1942 and dived. Made
battle surface after closing range to 8000 yards. Enemy vessel immediately turned toward submarine upon sighting us. Appeared to be a
patrol vessel so fire was opened at 4700 yards. Target kept closing for
first eight salvos, and then turned away and zigged wildly. Several hits
definitely observed by flying debris. At 0848 K sighted enemy patrol
plane and made quick dive leaving guns partially secured.
Attack No. 2 39-47 N 142-40 E
Sight 200 ton sampan at 2329 K on September 25, 1942 and manned 50
caliber machine gun. Commenced firing at about 2000 yards using armor
piercing ammunition for 150 rounds. Subsequent ammunition was a special
belt of tracer, ball, incendiary, and armor piercing. Closed range to
200 yards by 0000, September 26, 1942, and strafed entire length of
sampan. At 0015, sampan burst into flames. Observed to sink at 0055.
Attack No. 3 38-43 N 142-20 E
sighted large sampan of about 500 tons at 2340 K on September 26, 1942,
and manned 50 caliber machine gun. Commenced firing at 2355 and hit
immediately. Sampan maneuvered to avoid. Used ammunition with
incendiary projectiles and started one fire at 0040, September 27, 1942,
but the crew put it out. As there was one projectile remaining in gun 2,
a reduced charge was brought up and that gun unloaded at the sampan.
Projectile made nipper hit on the starboard gunwale. Gun 2 was secured
and gun 1 manned as only the forward ammunition hoist was operative.
Fired three additional rounds and made 2 hits in the superstructure, but
did not set her on fire. Sent men on deck with burning oil soaked rags
and set her afire. At 0217 there was an explosion and sampan sank.
Attack No. 4
Sighted an escorted convoy at 2231 K September 27, 1942. 300 yards
astern of the convoy a passenger cargo ship of the SHOEI MARU type of
about 9000 tons was smoking badly. Commenced approach, being silhouetted
in the moonlight. At 2259 fired two torpedoes. These did not take the
angle generated by the TDC and missed ahead. The fault is attributed to
personnel in inadvertently retracting the gyro spindles while getting the
tubes ready. Only one torpedoman in the room had been in battle before,
and it is assumed that they were nervous. The contact makers to shot the
gyro spindles in, were grounded, which prevented the TDC operator from
knowing that the spindles were out ant the torpedoes were not taking the
angle being set by the mechanism. Ordered the gyros set on zero and
changed course to bring target on the firing bearing. Tube 1 misfired.
Reason: the 200 pound air service had dropped in pressure due to failure
of the pressure regulator. This was not suspected as tubes 3 and 4 had
previously fired. It was thought that the fault was in the gyro
extracting mechanism as the stop bolt rod seemed to stick as if by
friction after traveling about two thirds of its distance. At 2306
changed course to use the stern tubes, and fired tube 5 at 2309. Target
maneuvered to avoid, and wake was seen to pass up port side of target.
This torpedo hit something and exploded at 2316. Target laid a smoke
screen and ran away zig zagging toward the beach. At 2335 fired tube 3
(apparently the friction in the stop bolt rod on this tube allowed the
low 200 pound line pressure to fire it). The tactical diameter of the
torpedo was used to give a 150 port track with a 30 right gyro angel.
Missed by inches as the torpedo wake was seen to touch the side of the
target. This is further evidence that the magnetic exploder will not
function on a sharp track. Ordered battle stations surface for gun 1.
The after ammunition hoist was out of commission and it was desired to
keep the torpedo armament ready for use which the manning of both guns
makes impossible. Commenced firing at 2352 and hit continuously as the
range was point blank. After ten rounds a bucket broke in the forward
hoist and the clutch filled the magazine with smoke. Remaining ten
rounds of ammunition were brought up by hand which is very slow. Target
lost speed and was noted on fire on one place just in the forward part of
superstructure. By 0001, on September 26, 1942, had reached a good
firing position and attempted to fire tubes four and two. Misfired due
to low firing air pressure as before. Target then attempted to ram, and
this vessel was backed emergency. At 0007 after avoiding the attempted ramming, fired successfully tube 2. This torpedo hit in after half of
ship. One boat of passengers was noted in the water aft of the ship, and
others on board were abandoning ship. At 0012 two heavy caliber shells
straddled. The one to windward raised such a splash that bridge
personnel were wet for about one minute with spray. These shells came
from a shore battery. At 0014 an antisubmarine vessel turned on a
searchlight. The people in the lifeboats cheered, and the gun crew
cleared the decks leaving the gun trained out., and with a projectile in
the barrel. Dived as soon as gun access door was closed, and was machine
gunned on the way down. The last sight of the target showed her down by
the stern streaming oil and on fire amidships and aft. Depth charging
attack followed which lasted until 0540 K, September 28, 1942. At 0100
the sound operator reported, while on the known true bearing of the
merchantman, the crackling noise known to be associated with the breaking
up of a sinking ship. It is believed that the vessel sank at that time.
Attack No. 5 42-11 N 143-25 E
sighted a cargo vessel of about 6500 tons headed down the coast at 1329
K, September 30, 1942. Ran in for 110 track, straight bow shot.
Excellent control data was obtained showing the course to be 210d True
and the speed 9 knots. The turn count was 81 rpm. Fired at a range of
1500 yards, gyro 012d R, track 110d port. Second torpedo was given a
divergent spread of 1 1/2 d left. Third torpedo misfired. Cause of
misfire believed due to backing off on tail buffer too much as torpedo
tended to drift aft in the tube with muzzle door open and slack failed to
appear when expected by the torpedoman. Rubber tail buffers permit more
turning than the old buffers which were backed off a quarter turn.
Satisfactory results are now obtained by backing off a half turn before
opening the outer door. Neither torpedo was heard to explode. The cause
of this is not understood due to excellence of the control data, and the
fact that the torpedoes were seen to take their angle. The target headed
for and ran to the beach. The torpedoes were not heard after running a
minute and a half. They can normally be heard for their entire run.
Attack No. 6 41-20 N 141-35 E
Sighted smoke bearing 059 True at 0635 K on October 1, 1942. At 0740
made out a single stack freighter of about 6500 tons. Sea was glassy,
and distance to track large so went deep and ran at standard speed.
Control data was good. Target was on course 215 True, speed 9 knots,
single screw, turn count 78 rpm. Had succeeded in closing the range to
permit a fair shot by 0807 and decided to attempt a range by QC. Several
attempts failed. At 0815 echo ranging was heard. At 0818 reached a
range of 1860 yards and fired three torpedoes with a two degree divergent
spread. Gyro angle 25 left; track averaged 97 starboard. Two torpedoes
hit; one a bullseye. Both explosions were contact shots as there was
much spray on the near side of the target. This indicated that the
estimated draft was in error due probably to heavy loading of the ship.
At 0822 the ship had taken a big list and was sinking.
Attack No. 7 41-05 N 141-58 E
At 1650 K, October 12, 1942, echo ranging was heard on the sound gear.
The seas were extremely heavy and with ten feet of periscope out could
just make out two freighters with goal posts forward and aft. Could not
make out any source of the echo ranging. Took ranges as best as could be
done and bearings during the 10 per cent of the time it was possible to
see with the periscope up. At 1716 reached an estimated range of 2250
yards, target course 111 True, speed 8 knots and fired two torpedoes,
second with a 2d right offset. Gyro angle 3d left; 97d starboard track.
A third tube misfired which was to have a 2d left offset. This tube
failed to fire as water leaked into the gyro extraction unit housing and
then acted as a hydraulic brake to prevent the gyro housing spindle from
extracting which in turn prevented the stop bolt rod from realigning the
spilling valve and firing the tube. It was found that the leak occurred
between the spindle and the spindle sleeve. These two pieces are made
tight by soldering. The target was observed to change course shortly after the torpedoes were fired and neither torpedo exploded. Heard echo
ranging again and made out a destroyer headed directly at the submarine
at high speed. Could not bring torpedo to bear as Mark 15 torpedoes are
limited to 90d gyro angles so went to deep submergence. Depth charging
which followed was most violent; the attacking destroyer passed directly
overhead twice.
Attack No. 8 41-24.5 N 141-50 E
Sighted the masts and stack of a merchant vessel of the LONDON MARU class
of 1314 K on October 24, 1942. The sea was very rough, but depth control
was good. Was forced to run at high speed to close the range, and
control date was accordingly sacrificed. Speed was obtained by a range
and angle on the bow followed by a series of bearings to get a correct
bearing rate. By this procedure the range was closed to 2200 yards at
the time of firing and the TDC operator had a speed of 6.7 knots. Three
torpedoes were fired at 12 second intervals with a 2d divergent spread.
Target course was estimated at 356d True. Gyro angle 7d left, track 95d
starboard. Fired at 2342 and two explosions were heard; the first
muffled, and the second quite load, and a large splash was observed on
the near side of the target indicating a contact hit. The first hit was
a bullseye, the second slightly forward. The ship broke in tow in the
middle; the single screw and the bow were sticking up in the air with the
middle under water. The sound operator reported that crackling sound
that attends a sinking ship and at 1350 a loud explosion was heard. At
1435 the ship was observed to have sunk. The crackling noise persisted
for some minutes after that time.
Attack No. 9 41-45 N 145-32 E
sighted a large sampan fishing vessel at 1010 K on October 25, 1942 and
set course to intercept it. Manned 50 caliber machine gun, and opened
fire at a range of 600 yards with armor piercing ammunition. Made hits
with no apparent damage except the vessel stopped and the crew
disappeared. Ordered battle surface for gun 1 at 1047 and fired one shot
at 300 yards range with a reduced powder charge. The projectile had been
in the gun since September 24, or two days less than one month. The
projectile hit and exploded at the base of the superstructure just above
the gunwale. Debris flew in all directions and the vessel immediately
caught on fire. This shell had been in the gun at depths of up to 240
feet for long periods of time during depth charge attacks. Lay to
waiting for survivors to come topside and get away from fire, but none
appeared. At 1122 left the vessel entirely engulfed in flames. At 1215
several explosions were seen. Vessel sank shortly thereafter.
8. ENEMY ANTISUBMARINE MEASURES
Enemy antisubmarine measures encountered in this patrol area were more
intense than reported previously by other vessels. The increased number
of sampans sighted both lighted and darkened seems significant. Many
contacts with sampans have not been listed with the idea of attempting to
keep the report as brief as possible. It is believed we had probably as
many as two hundred fifty contacts with sampans both lighted and
darkened, probably a great many more that were darkened were never seen
due to their small silhouette in some cases. They all are equipped with
radios and must be used for patrol work in addition to fishing. They
were sighted all over our area, everywhere we went and made it
practically impossible on clear moonlight nights to patrol in close to
the coast without being observed. The number contacted along the coast
of Hokkaido and Honshu increased after we had made attacks in those
locations.
The one large convoy sighted was apparently escorted by only one
destroyer and took a route close to the coast following the contour of
the coast line, and time of getting underway was apparently picked so the
moon was in the east and any attack on this convoy along the northeast
coast of Honshu would most certainly have to come from that direction.
It is further believed that they are not escorted to their destination but only when in the close proximity of Honshu. The escorts returning to
their base or to patrol in the vicinity of Honshu. In all cases the
escort seems to take a position astern of the vessel or vessels escorted.
Merchantmen are not escorted off the coast of Hokkaido, however, this is
not a very productive area and the increased number of sampans in this
area make an unobserved periscope approach difficult.
All shipping does not remain in close to the coast, they have apparently
many different routes and during this patrol were seen as far as twenty
miles off the coast.
Planes are being used for patrol and for nuisance depth charging. It is
believed that at least two large destroyers of the AMAGIRI class or
similar, and one single stack destroyer plus smaller lighter vessels are
used to patrol this area.
The attack by the large destroyer on October 12, 1942, was a work of art,
not only was he able to establish contact by echo ranging twice and run
over us twice in waters that are purported by scientists to be bad for
sound work, but his estimate as to the correct lead to use was extremely
accurate. The only thing that saved us was his estimate of our depth, he
set his charges a little too shallow.
9. DESCRIPTION OF MINESWEEPING
No minesweeping operations were observed.
10. MAJOR DEFECTS
1. Cylinder liners - main engines: Five main engine cylinder liners
cracked and were replaced. This item is covered in separate
correspondence.
2. Cylinder head stud bolts - main engines: Seven (7) cylinder head stud
bolts were broken and were replaced by spares. This item is covered
in separate correspondence.
3. Main motor bearings oil seal glands: Two of these glands developed
leaks as a result of depth charging.
4. Pitometer log: The bellows in the pitometer log transmitter was
ruptured as a result of depth charging. A spare was installed and was
elongated by pressure due to another depth charging. This bellows was
repaired and worked with fair satisfaction.
5. Fuel oil compensating system: Leaks past fuel and compensating valves
of fuel system developed, resulting in taking fuel from certain tanks
which were not on service.
6. Diving alarm: Main engine room diving alarm diaphragm ruptured during
depth charge attack.
7. Steering fear: Steering control line developed leak in silver
soldered joint causing air binding and erratic rudder operation.
Depth charge attack caused groaning and seizing of packing around
tiller operating rods and excessive clearance in the tiller end
bushings.
8. Bow planes: Bow diving planes failed completely on an emergency dive
and stuck on 15d rise. The worm gear housing had pulled away from the
deck breaking eight 3/4" studs. At a later date the tilt indication
housing broke which rendered the pilot circuit for zero tilt useless.
9. Pressure regulator (Grove) - 200 pound line: Failed during night
attack which caused six torpedo tube misfires after two successful
firings.
10. Ammunition hoists: forward hoist jammed twice during combat as a
result of breakage of bucket aligning pins. After hoist inboard chain
broke during combat and the sudden strain of jamming broke key holding
worm wheel on hoist drive shaft. One projectile remained in hoist.
11. Deck firing torpedo tubes: Gage on breech drain line on tube no. 9
showed sea pressure on dives and tube was therefore considered
flooded. When surfaced this line drained only a small amount. It is
therefore assumed that the breech drain line is ruptured in the superstructure, and that the torpedo in the tube is unsafe to shoot as
it is probably flooded. Impulse system on tube no. 8 developed leak
into sea after depth charging. Tubes 8 and 10 developed leaks into
tubes from sea after depth charge attack. Impulse stop valves are
difficult to operate.
12. Magazine flood system: Flood valve leaked into the forward magazine
at 240 feet.
13. Deck guns: Water sea gaskets crushed during depth charging from
extreme pressure. Training became difficult on both guns and
impossible abaft the beams on gun one. Gas ejection air valve froze
open once. Firing mechanism jammed once due to loss of lock in
stationary pedal.
14. Superstructure: Deck gratings over the starboard boat island carried
away. This makes useless the upper starboard deck stowage tubes.
Gratings were loosened by gunfire and depth charging. Deck tube
loading cradle supports 1/4 in. High.
15. Periscopes: Horizontal and vertical stadimeters were jarred off zero
by depth charging shock. Small specks appeared in the fields at the
same time. Upper bearings to no. 1 periscope knocked slightly out of
line as it became difficult to train.
16. Main ballast tank vent system: Port side vent system developed leak.
Vessel took port list of about 1d per hour when riding the vents.
17. Flood valves: Some few flood valves in forward starboard part of
ship were knocked loose during depth charging.
18. Depth gages: All became slightly erratic; after gage in control room
was knocked out of commission after depth charging.
19. Submerged torpedo tubes: Outboard vent valve leaked after depth
charging. Gyro spindles became disengaged while making tubes 3 and 4
ready. Personnel are at fault, but it is intended to install a
positive catch arrangement to prevent inadvertent operation of the
gyro retraction lever. Water leaked between spindle and sleeve on
tube no. 4 and then acted as a hydraulic brake on retraction of the
spindle which prevented the tube firing on one attack. Quick opening
vents operate with much difficulty, probably result of depth charging.
Poppet operating unit did not cock once on tube no. 4; clearances are
improper. Contact makers on tubes 3 and 4 failed due to moisture and
subsequent corrosion. Failed to give warning that spindles were
disengaged on one attack. Stop bolt alignment has become sufficiently
out to make operation of these units unreliable. Depth setting units
on tubes 2 and 3 are out of alignment. Speed setting on tube 3 in out
of alignment. Roller trip unit on tube 1 and 6 leak air badly. Some
grease fittings are inaccessible and require extensions. Stop bolt
housing on tube 3 is out of alignment. Numerous bolts have worked
loose. No. 1 gyro spindle does not engage enough. Outer doors
operate stiffly on tubes 1 and 2. Tube rollers out of alignment on
tube 2. NOTE: Tube nest was shaken violently during depth charge
attack.
20. Radar (SD): Diplexing unit got out of adjustment which mismatched
transmitter to antenna and produced hum in other ship's receivers.
Repair force of U.S.S. FULTON was unable to adjust diplexing unit.
Ship's force then grounded both ends of the TBL feeder and made
adjustment of grid and cathode frames and locking voltage to obtain
best reflections at left edge of trace. Receiver r.f. stages were
aligned which placed the equipment in good condition.
21. Auxiliary tank preservative: The white plastic tank preservative
becomes detached from the tank boundaries and is deposited in various
lines, strainers, valves, and in the trim pump itself.
22. Degaussing gear: Connection boxes for the M coil in the wardroom and
motor room leak water indicating a leak into the M coil cable itself.
23. Inboard hull ventilation valve: Difficult to operate. As all points
of movement have been greased, it is believed that the unit suffered
misalignment from depth charging.
LIST OF DAMAGE DURING DEPTH CHARGE ATTACK ON OCTOBER 12, 1942:
HIGH PRESSURE AIR: Leak at threads on connection to forward separator.
RUDDER: Packing around tiller operating rod groans and seizes. Tiller
bushings pounded to excessive clearance. (Same condition as last patrol
to Japan)
TORPEDO TUBES: Forward and after submerged nest shaken violently;
possible minor misalignment. Tubes 8 and 10 developed leaks into tubes
from sea. Operating rods to muzzle flood valve and door leaked. Damaged
gages are listed under pressure gages. Outboard air leak in impulse
system to tube 8.
PITOMETER LOG: Ruptured bellows; erratic operation due inability to
accurately set this instrument at sea.
D.R. INDICATOR: Erratic after attack - appears normal now. Gives wrong
answer as pit log input is in error.
PRESSURE GAGES: All sea gages received severe shock. Following were
noticeably deranged: MBT 7 pressure gages (2) in C.O.C. and A.T.R.; Sea
pressure gage at forward tube nest; H.P. air gages on forward separator;
C.O.C. depth gage aft; Conning tower depth gage changed reading 2 feet;
#10 tube gage changed reading at zero to 8 lbs.; Poppet air forward
needle knocked off.
SEA VALVES: Outboard vent to forward tube nest leaked. Officer's W.C.
sea and stop valves in discharge line. Slight leak from sea through trim
manifold.
FUEL COMP. SYSTEM: Leak around threads of a nipple in a blank flange.
(Tee section at junction of compensating line, emergency compensation,
and secondary drain lines). Leak developed between #5 normal fuel and
#4B fuel ballast tank.
CONNING TOWER: Shock damage to instruments: Clock stopped; Both engine
order telegraphs knocked loose - dials rotated slightly - plate loosened;
Lighting receptacle face knocked off; Rudder angle indicator dial broken.
DECK GUNS: Training difficult to impossible. Water seal gaskets crushed
from extreme pressure.
BOW PLANES: Tilting motor clutch shocked out of engagement 3 times.
TANKS: Slight leaks in port battery fresh water tanks.
FLOOD VALVES: MBT 1A stbd. Sufficiently loose to knock as ship rolls.
ENGINES: Governor jammed on No. 3 engine. Could not stop from remote
control stand. Engine run by hand for 4 hours. Governor still erratic.
AIR CONDITIONING: Section in salt water discharge line from pump knocked
loose.
PROPELLER SHAFT: Guard over shaft coupling forward of port steady
bearing dislocated.
ELECTRICAL: Port main motor bearing oil seal packing jarred loose and
leaks oil. Port main motor kilowatt meter broken. Port main motor
revolutions transmitter knocks. Engine room diving alarm diaphragm
ruptured. All main control meters were shaken violently and will require
adjustment and calibration. Control circuit to No. 2 lighting Motor
Generator energized from shock which started that unit. Control circuit
to Port main motor ventilation set energized from shock which started
that unit. (both of above have Westinghouse type panels) PERISCOPES: No. 1 trains hard; bearings knocked out of alignment. Both
periscopes received shock damage to optical systems; horizontal and
vertical stadimeters not on zero; foreign matter on lens surfaces.
HULL VALVES: Inboard hull ventilation valve knocked out of alignment;
difficult to operate.
11. RADIO RECEPTION
Radio reception was complete with the exception of two submarine
schedules missed because of night diving incident to evasive tactics.
The missed schedules were the 1500 Zed broadcast on September 27, 1942,
and the 100 Zed on October 12, 1942. A little static was noticed at
times, but not to a troublesome degree.
Last consecutive serial sent Intern.
Last consecutive serial received Upstart.
12. SOUND CONDITIONS AND DENSITY LAYERS
Sound conditions off northeastern Honshu are generally poor, however,
echo ranging was heard at a distance as great as 20 thousand yards. On
one attack we picked up screws at 14000 yards. Again, on another attack,
we could not pick up screws until the range decreased to 2500 yards.
Temperature inversions and density layers were encountered as follows:
A. Density Layers:
1. At lat. 40-41 N. Long. 146-46 E. A strong density layer was
encountered at 130 foot depth.
2. Off Fuji Wan (lat. 40-11 N. Long 142-13 E) we encountered the
heaviest density layer for the cruise. At 160 feet depth it was
necessary to flood 7000 pounds into auxiliary instead of removing
7000 pounds from auxiliary as is customary - a total of 14000
pounds difference. Incidentally, once through this layer the
pursuing Japanese DD lost us and effective depth charging ceased.
In addition our sound gear lost the DD with the exception of echo
ranging. The surface temperature at the point was 67 degrees F.
A temperature gradient could not be obtained as the sea injection
valves were closed, rigged for depth charge attack.
3. Off Erimo Saki (lat. 41-57 N long. 143-44 E) encountered a
density layer in which the ship dropped 40 feet in depth quickly
- the trim previous was excellent.
B. Temperature Inversions:
1. Shiriya Saki area, at points 11 to 15 miles east of Shiriya Saki
light. Most noticeable change was a temperature 4 degrees warmer
at periscope depth than at the surface; 56 degrees F. At the
surface - 60 degrees at periscope depth. For six days a heavy
storm occurred in this area. The seas were so heavy that the
ship rolled 10d a side at 140 foot depth. After the storm,
conducted an attack on a convoy and the depth charge attack that
followed was the worst working over we had for the patrol. On
going deep the Japanese DD kept in contact with us by echo
ranging. Sound conditions were excellent. This substantiates
the theory that a storm thoroughly mixes the water, making it a
homogenous mixture for a few hundred feet in depth with resultant
excellent sound conditions.
13. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY
Health was excellent. Vitamins and sunlamps were used. Habitability was good. Temperature in boat moderate and humidity low.
Winter clothing for exposed personnel was not sufficient; the new
zippered water repellent clothing being insufficiently warm and becoming
soaked through after 2 hours of rain and spray, and the sheepskin coats
too bulky.
14. MILES STEAMED
Pearl Harbor to area 3285 miles
Patrolling on station 3748
Area to Pearl Harbor 3303
Total miles steamed 10,335 miles
14. FUEL EXPENDED
Pearl Harbor to area 51090 gallons
Patrolling on station 40790
Area to Pearl Harbor 53600
total fuel expended 145,480 gallons
16. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
Torpedoes - 15
Fuel - 24,800 gal. Remaining on arrival Midway.
Provisions - 30 days
Fresh Water:
Evaporators:
Hours in use- #1 329
#2 375
#3 220
Total distilled - 26,120 gallons
Total used - 40,604
On hand - 6,627
17. This patrol was terminated in compliance with Operations Order.
18. REMARKS
(a) The 50 caliber machine gun did not prove satisfactory against
sampans. Eventually the machine gun stopped the sampans and
enabled NAUTILUS to use other means to complete their
destruction. However, the amount of ammunition required to
accomplish this is prohibitive. All incendiary machine gun
ammunition was used up on two sampans, and started a good fire on
only one of these. Likewise, the six inch gun is not
satisfactory against them at night due to the small target
presented. The answer to the proper piece of armament seems to
be the 20 millimeter gun. If such a gun is installed it should
be installed so as to give the maximum area of train. Difficulty
was experienced in this regard with the 50 caliber machine gun.
(b) It is recommended that some equipment similar, though less
dangerous to handle, to the Molotov Cocktail be furnished
submarines for use against small ships in the same way we
employed oil soaked rags.
(c) The necessity for a tank similar to negative tank which NAUTILUS
would call a "positive tank" seems apparent. In separate
correspondence the NAUTILUS has recommended to the Bureau a
standby trim pump to use in case the present trim pump fails to
function. The action of the Bureau in this regard disapproved
the recommendation with a statement to the affect that this
vessel has more pump capacity than the 1500 ton class. This fact
will not help NAUTILUS as she is going deep undergoing depth
charge and is required to pump water out just as trim pump fails
to take a suction. Furthermore, the trim pump is one of the noisiest pieces of equipment on board. A tank to be known as a
noisiest pieces of equipment on board. A tank to be known as a
"positive tank" should be installed, which tank would normally be
kept full until deep submergence was necessary, whereupon
reaching desired depth the "positive tank" could be blown and a
trim obtained in a few seconds.
(d) The commanding officer understands that it has been recommended
that areas and be combined, this is not concurred in. It
is true that area is small when consideration is given to the
most productive part of that area. However, a submarine assigned
to area at same time that a submarine is in area is bound
to gain better results, because the antisubmarine vessels will be
kept bust in one area or the other enabling one of the submarines
to make successful attacks.
(e) The work of the entire ship's company during this patrol has
been excellent, all hands turned to with a will, especially
meritorious work was accomplished by the engineers, the gun's
crew and the men who corrected the major defect of the bow
planes. Certain officers and men performed especially
meritorious service and will be recommended for commendation by
separate correspondence.
FB5-42/A16-3 SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY TWO
Serial (060) In Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
November 8, 1942.
CONFIDENTIAL
From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY TWO.
To : The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
VIA : The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
Subject: U.S.S. NAUTILUS - Report of Third War Patrol.
1. The NAUTILUS's third war patrol was marked by the very large number of
contacts, the excessively bad weather which made patrolling at periscope
depth impossible and torpedo firing out of the question, increased enemy
anti-submarine patrol and intensity of attacks, a thorough covering of
the area assigned, utilization of the guns in conjunction with torpedoes,
and the large number of major defects in material experienced. Many of
these latter are probably natural developments in a ship of this age but
a lot of them were initiated, aggravated, or culminated by the severe
depth charging on October 12. It is worthy of note that they did not
make it necessary for the vessel to leave station although the commanding
officer felt considerable anxiety about air and oil leaks and the
increased noise level of the ship's hull and machinery resulting from
heavy seas and depth charging.
2. A refit period of four weeks by base repair force and relief crew
followed by two weeks navy yard overhaul appears necessary to
satisfactorily correct all the defective material.
3. It is considered the commanding officer took the correct action in not
delaying his departure from Midway in order to take on extra torpedoes
with consequent delay in "reaching the firing line". The operation order
should clear up the misunderstanding about zigzagging when under escort
(entry under 1500 VW, September 10). Likewise the Commanding Officer's
action in closing flood valves to improve speed and save fuel enroute to
area is considered correct. His checking with a submarine returning from
the area for which he was headed as to latest information of enemy
activity indicates his eagerness and determination to render a good
account on his coming patrol.
4. It may be well to issue instructions to commanding officers that if they
consider their vessels to have serious oil or air leaks they should so
report in which case arrangements could be made to have a plane check for
such deficiencies prior to entry to port the day of return. Likewise a
listening test on the day of return would be in order if conditions were
considered serious.
5. The report did not state what success was obtained with the stopped trim
on the run from Midway to Pearl. The information will be obtained
verbally. The suggested "positive tank" will be discussed and separate
correspondence initiated in the premises if considered feasible.
6. the commanding Officer's comment under subparagraph (a) under REMARKS
relative to combining areas ___ and ___ is a point well taken.
7. This is considered a well conducted patrol in spite of the adverse
conditions of weather and material. Action on the recommendations for
commendations will be taken in separate correspondence.
FC5-4/A16-3 SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR
Serial (0343) Care of Postmaster,
San Francisco, California,
9 November 1942.
CONFIDENTIAL
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To : The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. NAUTILUS (SS168) - Third War Patrol, Comments on.
1. Forwarded. The Squadron Commander strongly concurs in the remarks of
paragraph 4 of the comments of Commander Submarine Division Forty-Two.
It is recommended that this be a requirement of submarines returning
from patrol when oil and air leaks are suspected.
2. The NAUTILUS patrol covered a total of 58 days, of which 31 were spent
on station. The patrol was aggressively conducted and was successful
despite 16 days of stormy weather while on station and several major
defects in material. It is a pleasure to note the increasing use of
the 6" gun and their efficiency in coping with the enemy. The number
of torpedo tubes misfires prevented what might have been a more
successful patrol and the cause of the misfires will be investigated
and corrected.
3. The health and endurance of personnel was excellent and the morale was
high.
4. Considerable material damage was done to the NAUTILUS by severe depth
charging which will require docking. The regular three week refit
period will have to be extended. Full information of the work to be
done and the recommended completion date will be submitted later.
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