U.S.S. NAUTILUS - Report of Fifth War Patrol. Period from April 20,
1943, to May 25, 1943. Operation order Commander Task Force Seventeen
operation order 62-43, and commander Task Group Sixteen point five
operation order 17-43 of April 29, 1943.
PROLOGUE
Arrived Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor on April 15, 1943, for Fifth War
Patrol, which patrol consisted of training marines at ESPIRITU SANTO and
refueling and rearming of airplanes. Commenced refit on April 15, 1943
by Submarine Base personnel assisted by Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.
Completed refit on April 20, 1943. Dry-docking and renewal of pistons
and heads in main engines major job. Readiness for sea April 20, 1943.
Not depermed nor wiped; no training period.
1. NARRATIVE
April 20, 1943
0900(VW) Departed Pearl Harbor under escort for Dutch Harbor.
1300(VW) Made trim dive.
2000(VW) Escort departed.
April 21 to April 23, 1943
Made several dives on April 21, 1943 and ram into heavy seas, both boats
started to break up. Fired both day and night battle surface on April
22, 1943, for training.
April 24, 1943
We are behind schedule due to heavy head seas and necessity for renewal
of liners in number three engine. The engineers started work at 0100(W)
and by 1015(W) had renewed two liners and located one more.
1300(W) After renewal of three liners located one more needing renewal.
1930(W) Went ahead on all four main engines.
2015(W) Main lube oil line in number four main engine carried away.
Stopped engine and started repair. The engineers must be complimented on
their devotion to duty this date, they have been working continuously for
close to twenty four hours in mountainous seas with winds up to 60 knots.
April 25, 1943
0100(W) Repairs to number four main engine completed. Seas are still
mountainous but rising barometer indicates that storm should abate
shortly. Our speed has been cut down as much as four knots by this
storm.
1815 W Received message from Comtaskfor 16.5 giving us unit designation
16.5.20 and instructing us to use UNIMAK PASS.
April 26, 1943 to April 27, 1943
1530 W April 27, 1943 arrived Dutch Harbor and went alongside GUADELOUPE
and commenced fueling to capacity. Commander Task Group 16.5 (Commander
Gray) with Lt. Comdr. Schmidt, Commanding Officer U.S.S. S-32 came on
board outside of net and acted as pilots to our berth. We were most
cordially welcomed and Commander Gray offered all of his facilities to
us, including the issue of additional winter clothing. At 2100 W shifted
to assigned anchorage. In as much as no one from the Army had contacted
the Commanding Officer, the Nautilus sent for the Commanding Officer of
the Scout company with which company we were to operate. The Nautilus
detachment had just arrived on the FILLMORE April 26, 1943 and apparently
were not ready for training but after calling attention to the necessity
for early training we were promised that our detachment would arrive at
0800 W April 28, 1943.
April 20, 1943
By 0900 W the Army scouts had not arrived with their rubber boats hence
we sent working party to the FILLMORE to strip the rubber boats of
useless gear and attempt to obtain certain key men to come over to the
Nautilus for indoctrination. By 1500 W we had 30 Army Scouts and ten
rubber boats on board to work on. During the night while charging air
banks number two air compressor suffered a major casualty and the
services of the Submarine Base were called upon to attempt temporary
repairs. By working day and night until departure the compressor was put
in working condition.
April 29, 1943
0830 W 109 Army Scouts came on board and indoctrination training was
started immediately. After this training held several daylight drills in
actual disembarking which was witnessed by Commanding Officer NARWHAL who
then started similar training.
2130 W Held night landing drill in conjunction with NARWHAL with
excellent results.
April 30, 1943
0800 W Commenced drilling once more in inflation and disembarking
followed by two hours exercise on shore by Army. 2000 W NARWHAL departed.
May 1, 1943
Working all morning on checking and stowage of rubber boats. Sent Army
Scouts ashore for exercise in afternoon.
2000 W Underway for ATTU ISLAND, and immediately ran into heavy head seas
much to the discomfort of the Army Scouts.
May 2, 1943
During the afternoon seas calmed and made practice dive. Exercised Army
Scouts on deck for one half hour.
May 3, 1943
Made trim dive and exercised scouts on deck for one half hour.
May 4, 1943
1305 W Sighted what appeared to be a patrol bomber bearing 245 T,
submerged to 100 feet. In as much as we have plenty of time decided to
remain submerged.
1624 w Surfaced, and commenced running on east and west courses about 75
miles north of ATTU ISLAND in order not to reveal our objective if
sighted by enemy plane.
1815 W Submerged on sight plane contact bearing 180 T, distant 8 miles.
He did not see us.
1907 W Surfaced.
2014 W Submerged on sight plane contact bearing north.
2110 W Surfaced. Probably all of these contacts were friendly planes but
we needed the training and we did not consider that the chance of
detection by the enemy was worth staying on the surface. All of the
planes were seen at least 8 miles away, flying low and we are certain
they did not see us. Received message during night changing HCW hour to
0740 W and telling us to use SCARLET BEACH.
May 5, 1943
0030 W Changed course to 180 T heading for ATTU ISLAND.
0532 W Submerged about nine miles north of SCARLET BEACH and started
periscope reconnaissance of that beach. Snow and general contour of the
island make it difficult to establish position, especially with so many
uncharted peaks. Aerial photographs would have helped.
0920 W Sighted friendly (P-38) fighter over HOLTZ BAY.
1700 W CO2 content had reached three percent starting using CO2 absorbent
which immediately brought percentage down to one and one half percent.
1930 W Started using oxygen.
2301 W Surfaced about 15 miles north of ATTU ISLAND. Received message
changing DOG day to May 8, 1943.
May 6, 1943
0557 W Submerged ten miles north of STELLER COVE and ran in to about 2
miles of SCARLET BEACH. Gave all Army officers several good periscope
looks at their beach.
0942 W Sighted a PBY in HOLTZ BAY, they seem to be able to fly anywhere
around here and at any altitude without opposition.
1635 W Started using CO2 absorbent.
1845 W Started using oxygen.
2302 W Surfaced.
May 7, 1943
0546 W Submerged about 5 miles north of ATTU ISLAND in fog. By 0700 W
fog had completely obscured the island.
1353 W Thinking that we had to make an accurate rendezvous at 2300 W
tonight came to 38 feet and obtained good radar fix, then headed for
rendezvous.
1913 W Sound operator heard fathometer on 050 relative 030 T. Started
calling NARWHAL on that bearing without success. The lack of oxygen and
high CO2 was more noticeable today due to fact that the Army Scouts were
continuously on the move making ready for their disembarkation. To climb
from control room to conning tower was worse than running a hundred hard
dash.
2230 W Surfaced at rendezvous and commenced circling.
2250 W Received message delaying DOG day until May 9, 1943.
2330 W Picked up indications on SJ radar of another SJ in the vicinity
apparently to the eastward. This indicated that NARWHAL had apparently
been set to eastward. We did not attempt to develop this indication.
May 8, 1943
0534 W Submerged ten miles north of ATTU ISLAND, weather clear. Many
white caps all day, but seas not as heavy as yesterday. White caps
gradually diminished as day progressed, and by 2300 W there was only a
gentle swell.
2243 W Surfaced.
2345 W Received message that weather conditions prevented landing tonight
and the night of the ninth. We could have made our landing on schedule
without undue hazard.
May 9, 1943
0030 W Received message to smash E.C.M. and throw overboard. With some
misgiving complied.
0534 W Submerged and ordered all hands to keep as quiet as possible in
order to conserve oxygen because we must be prepared to wait indefinitely
for favorable weather. We had good look into HOLTZ BAY during the day.
1500 W sighted a Liberator Bomber. By ordering no smoking and keeping
men quiet, no oxygen was used today.
2236 W Surfaced in heavy fog.
May 10, 1943
0445 w SJ radar contact bearing 034 relative 233 True range 4000 yards.
Maneuvered and placed him astern for a stern tube shot at 995 yards
range. At this range we could just make him out as the Narwhal. His SJ
radar was not in operation and his course between 060 and 090 True.
Decided to keep clear of him and not challenge because if we had made a
mistake and he was not the NARWHAL our position would be disclosed and
the enemy could then maneuver to avoid our torpedoes. We were in a
beautiful position for a stern tube shot. 0506 W He passed out of radar
range at 4800 yards. Fog continued to reduce our visibility to about
1000 yards so decided to remain on the surface until it lifted.
Apparently there is some attenuation of radar signal caused by fog,
because today it was not until 0638 W that we could establish our
position by radar at 12 miles north of ATTU. Other days we have gotten
pips as far as 18 miles north of ATTU. Visibility was, by now,
increasing rapidly so submerged, heading for SCARLET BEACH. Our idea
today is to check our position and soundings carefully as well as
landmarks in order to make an accurate rendezvous and assist us in the
subsequent landing operations.
1420 W Headed for rendezvous, obtaining fixes on ATTU ISLAND.
2218 W Called NARWHAL by QC without success.
2240 W Reached rendezvous, surfaced, and commenced circling.
2312 W Called NARWHAL several times all around the dial by QC without
success.
2334 W Decided NARWHAL may have been set to eastward and changed course
to 090 T.
2335 W Noticed splash of another radar on our screen. Determined source
was somewhere to the northward and east headed on 020 True.
2355 W Heard echo ranging centered about 341 relative and had radar
contact 5550 yards.
May 11, 1943
0001 W Radar range 4150 yards bearing 340 relative, changed course to 000
T. At this time commenced giving Army Scouts a big Steak Dinner.
0004 W Challenged in direction of radar bearing and exchanged signals
with NARWHAL. Immediately headed for SCARLET BEACH.
0012 W Notified NARWHAL by QC my course and speed and told her to
disembark at 0300 W.
0145 W Called Army Scouts to get ready in gun access hatches.
0202 W Opened hatches and started preparations for disembarking. At this
time the visibility was low and all that could be seen was in indistinct
outline of the beach at a range of 3 miles. Took radar fixes
continually.
0250 W Ready in all respects for disembarking, distance off beach at this
time 2500 yards and could just make out SCARLET BEACH. Had Army officers
on bridge to get magnetic compass course and obtain such landmarks as
were possible on this black night.
0258 W Noticed NARWHAL was lagging behind, order her to close up.
0300 W Disembarked scouts and told NARWHAL "We are disembarking". No
word was received from NARWHAL as to whether she had disembarked or not.
Judging from radar pips on rubber boats we believe she was late in
disembarking, which probably held up our detachment, because the
Commanding Officer of the Scout Company was on NARWHAL and his plans were
to send four lightly equipped boats from NARWHAL and NAUTILUS to beach in
first wave followed in ten minutes by the remaining heavier equipped
boats.
0345 W NARWHAL went out of radar range.
0350 W Could no longer see rubber boats on radar so turned infra red
light towards beach, maintaining position.
0435 W Sound heard pinging bearing 080 T.
0445 W Radar contact bearing 0234 T range 9300 yards. Undoubtedly this
was KANE coming in to make her landing. The decision had to be made as
to whether to remain in the vicinity of SCARLET BEACH and thereby
interfere with KANE causing both NAUTILUS and KANE to exchange visual
recognition signals or whether to proceed and retire to westward without
having contacted beach. It was decided to retire and not cause KANE the
added worry of recognition. Reconnaissance of SCARLET BEACH on previous
days failed to disclose any signs of enemy activity and no evidence of
opposition had been noticed tonight.
Due to dark, overcast night the Army Scouts probably had difficulty
locating exact landing beach with only their pocket compasses. In an
operation of this nature it would have been easy to have landed two or
three men the day before with beach markers and equipped with a "Walkie
Talkie", which would have facilitated the landing of the main body.
0450 W Commenced retirement to westward in accordance with instructions
keeping the beach under constant scrutiny for signals.
0510 W Sent message to C.T.F. 51 giving him the above information.
0612 W Submerged after making certain that our message came through the
Fox schedule satisfactorily.
2222 W Visibility low due to fog, surfaced.
May 12, 1943
Received message during night ordering us to Dutch Harbor and also to
look for enemy shipping approaching ATTU from southwest which was
heartily complied with.
0612 W Submerged as visibility increased somewhat.
1917 W Seas became so rough that periscope depth could not be maintained,
increased depth to 90 feet.
2156 W Came to periscope depth, found sky completely overcast, low
visibility, heavy seas.
2202 W surfaced.
May 13, 1943
0841 W Early morning low visibility lifted and submerges. Could not
maintain periscope due to high seas, rant at 100 feet.
2059 W Visibility reduced by fog, surfaces.
May 14 to May 16, 1943
Surface running. 1921 W May 14, 11943, crossed 180th meridian. 0544 W
submerged on sight plane contact and at 0624 W surfaces. 0315 W May 16,
1943, received message altering routing and canceling speed restriction,
immediately went ahead full speed. 15.5 knots in order to arrive DUTCH
HARBOR before dark the 16th. At 1900 W May 16, 1943, arrived DUTCH
HARBOR. The entire trip from the north coast of ATTU was made by dead
reckoning except for one hazy sun fix obtained May 14, 1943.
May 17 1943
1600 W Departed DUTCH HARBOR for PEARL HARBOR.
May 18, 1943
1530 W Received message from Comsubpac to change course had head for MARE
ISLAND immediately. Upon hearing this the morale of the crew increased
one hundred percent.
May 19, 1943
Received message ordering us to go through a point through which we had
already passed. So informed comsubpac giving my position, course and
speed. In afternoon received message giving us a definite routing.
Slowed to seven knots. This will cause us one day's delay in arrival in
port and commencement of overhaul. Made trim and training dive.
May 20 to May 21, 1943
Burned out bearing on turbo blower. On May 21, 1943 shifted to HPG and
sent message requesting escort rendezvous at Point NAN at 0600 Zebra
twenty fifth. This is four hours ahead of schedule but will assure our
arrival MARE ISLAND prior darkness.
May 22, 1943
0545 V Heavy fog set in, started SJ radar.
0645 V SJ radar contact bearing dead ahead, range 8,900 yards. Started
TDC and got him on course 304 T. Speed 9. We were only 100 yards off
track so changed course to open.
0654 V Sighted merchantman in fog range 800 yards; exchanged recognition
signals.
0656 V In latitude 44-21N, longitude 139-45W passed him 350 yards abeam.
May 23 to May 25, 1943
On May 23 received message from Cominseafrom to Cominshore patrol, San
Francisco, requesting destroyer rendezvous at 0600 Z May 25, 1943. At
0600 May 25, 1943, made rendezvous with escort and proceeded to MARE
ISLAND. 1200 T May 25, 1943, arrived MARE ISLAND.
2. WEATHER
North of 34d N the weather became erratic. On April 23rd and 24th a
hurricane was near our track. Green water came down the main induction
into the engine room in such quantities at one time that the throttleman
on the port side stopped the engine thinking we were diving and he had
failed to hear the signal. The after lookout was lashed to the radar
mast with an airplane safety belt. He was spun completely around by one
wave. Our boats were again destroyed. Subsequent days were rough and
overcast with abnormal and sudden changes in the barometer readings.
Winds would shift quickly from one direction to another. One star fix
was obtained in 3 days after the hurricane, and sun sights were few.
The weather in the ATTU area was generally poor. "D" day was postponed a
total of 4 days. The day finally selected was the worst; visibility
1,000 to 2,000 yards in a heavy mist and light rain. All previously
selected "D" days were better from a submarine standpoint.
In general this weather was expected in the ALEUTIAN area, although April
and May are considered the best months of the year for weather.
3. TIDAL INFORMATION
Track from PEARL to DUTCH HARBOR was through areas about which tidal data
is known and tabulated.
Off the north coast of ATTU the current set 105d T at 1 knot during
flood; moon just past new. Ebb current set along 285d T at .4 knots.
4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
Weather was bad. Navigation enroute to DUTCH HARBOR when north of
latitude 33d N was by sun line only. One sight of a planet was obtained
on the 800 mile run to ATTU from DUTCH HARBOR. While patrolling area and
conducting reconnaissance, fixes were obtained from the island of ATTU's
various landmarks. The area had been previously sounded by one or two
vessels and was not sufficiently comprehensive to be of much value. The
water north of ATTU is, however, deep. One pinnacle was located at a
depth of 43 fathoms while a few yards from it the depths were 600
fathoms. An overlay for H.O. Misc. Chart No. 10,253-1 is prepared. It
was determined that the north coast is not correctly located on this
chart. USC & GS Chart No. 9102 of July, 1942, shows a more accurate
placement of the island, but is of no value for close piloting. The
beach selected for landing was peculiarly adapted to radar navigation.
This is fortunate as the landing was made in a fog. In general the
entire ALEUTIAN area is adapted to radar navigation.
Celestial observations will be rare. Aleutian view chart No. 1 (ATTU)
shows some topography. A series of 17 charts prepared by the U.S. Army
Engineers from photographs was used to locate peaks. A set of these
should be obtained if operations around ATTU are to be undertaken.
(N5254-EM252/6x8). These have the same coastline error as Aleutian View
Chart No. 1, and H.O. Misc. No. 10-253-1. Current floods 1 knot along
105d T; ebbs .4 knots along 285d T.
5. DESCRIPTION OF WARSHIPS
At 0445 W on May by radar, sound , and sight, a submarine in Lat. 53-15N
Long. 172-55E which the officer of the deck called the U.S.S. NARWHAL.
At 0445 on May 11, by radar and sound a vessel in Lat. 53-05.5 Long. 173-
06.4E which was believed to be the U.S.S. KANE.
6. TABULATION OF AIRCRAFT SIGHTED
Not transcribed.
7. SUMMARY OF SUBMARINE ATTACKS
None
8. ENEMY ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES
None
9. ENEMY MINING ACTIVITIES
None
10. MAJOR DEFECTS
a. Main Engines: Four cracked liners replaced on engine No. 3 on
April 24. One of these had completely separated at the base of
the top ring. One more cracked loner was located and replaced on
May 7. Lubricating oil supply line to cooler on No. 4 engine
cracked and spilled 200 gallons of oil into the bilge's.
b. Generator Engines: On May 8 and 12, cylinder head gaskets were
blown out upon starting engine. Leaky exhaust valves had
partially flooded the engine which was then insufficiently
drained. A lead developed in the circulating water line elbow
attached to the port auxiliary engine. Repaired by silver
soldering when on surface.
c. Air compressors: Connecting rod bearing cap holding bolts failed
on first stage of port compressor. Connecting rod came loose and
considerable damage was done including breaking a hole in the
crankcase casing. A new compressor will probably be required.
d. Boats: both boats were again destroyed by heavy seas. If the
decking over the Narwhal's boats proved satisfactory similar
covers should be installed on this vessel.
e. Steam heat: As operations in cold weather have been completed it
can not authoritatively be stated that the steam heating plant is
of no value and should be removed at the first opportunity.
f. Boat inflation: The arrangement can be much improved by using
two 6-lead spiders.
g. Sound: The JK heading training unit developed a short circuit to
ground in a junction box. Decommissioned that unit for 3.2
hours.
h. Radio antenna: Resistance has been 20,000 ohms or lower.
i. Torpedoes tubes: the gyro spindle retraction switch on the #2
became inoperative. Access to affect repairs is impossible at
sea.
j. Six inch guns: the gas ejection air valve on gun #2 failed to
function during training firing. valve was replaced.
k. Oil leaks: An oil slick was noticed upon each surfacing which
appeared to rise from the region at gun one, and also from safety
tanks.
l. air leaks: The gas ejection air spider connections to both deck
guns leak air. Closing the root valve will not stop a stream of
bubbles because there is a volume tank which ultimately fills
with water expelling the air.
m. Periscopes: Upper limit switches are not satisfactory. The new
type should be installed. The horizontal stadimeter of No. 2
periscope is not on zero which gives a double image.
n. Flood valves: Flood valve 4C forward does not operate
hydraulically. (Navy Yard did not repair properly)
o. Superstructure: Plates welded over holes in superstructure came
off allowing the seas to strike the boats as before. One part of
superstructure bracing was torn loose by heavy seas on port side
abreast of fwd. Gun access trunk.
p. Loud squealing noise, location undetermined by heard in coming
tower while ship is diving or making full speed.
q. One 20 mm gun barrel burst on initial firing round, presumably
due to defective cartridge.
11. RADIO
At 1445 Z May 16, while 190 miles from Dutch Harbor an attempt was made
on 8470 kcs to transmit a message to NPR. No answer was heard. Radio
Auckland, New Zealand, however contacted this message with a strong clear
signal to tell us NPR was trying to reach us. At the same time NPG could
be heard very faintly and the message was finally transmitted direct to
NPG. NPG estimated our signal strength as moderately strong and the
amount of interference also as moderately strong. Auckland however
continued to come in strength five and assisted in the transmission of
the message by relaying "Z" signals to this ship. This is mentioned to
illustrate the unusual radio reception conditions found in this area.
All three shore stations could hear this ship and each other, but we were
unable to hear NPR and could hear NPG only faintly. Auckland on the
other hand could be heard clearly.
Except for short periods of fading in which it was necessary to shift the
receiver frequency, reception of NPG Fox schedule was good. Much static
was observed, usually occurring between 1400 and 1700 Z while patrolling
off ATTU and while enroute here. Japanese interference on 7065 kcs was
frequent during the night hours. One night a continuous oscillation was
heard on 7065 kcs interfering with reception.
No success was had in listening to NPM or NPG low frequency Fox schedules
while at periscope depth. This is believed to be due to a poorly
designed coupling unit and perhaps faulty loop antenna.
The first CTG 16.5 submarine serial letter to be received in
Cryptochannel 105 was letter "S". Serial letters missed are "Y" and "Z".
The last to be received was letter "E" at which time our ECM was
destroyed.
The first CTG 16.5 submarine serial letter to be received in
Cryptochannel 108 was letter "K". Serial letters missed are "M" and "W".
The serial letter "U" was received in two different messages in this
channel.
Last serial letter received was "L".
Last serial letter sent was "C".
Since no station serial numbers were missed while on the surface it is
assumed that the missing serial letters of both crypto channels were sent
while this ship was submerged and not repeated later on the schedule.
Last station serial number to be received was 449.
Enroute to Dutch Harbor from Pearl Harbor difficulty was experienced in
raising NPG to transmit a message. NPG was not heard to answer our call
but NPR called immediately saying they would relay any messaged to NPG.
On another occasion in the vicinity of ATTU, NPR answered immediately
when called only once.
RADAR
The SJ radar continues to be an invaluable aid to this ship. The
performance of this particular radar has been excellent. Range of 5500
yds. Was obtained on a friendly submarine. After disembarking soldiers
in rubber boats their progress to the beach could be followed for as far
as 1800 yards with the ability of distinguishing between boats that were
not too close together. Radar was also used for navigation purposes
during this same operation to great advantage.
The SD radar was unable to pick up planes sighted at a range of eight or
nine miles when their altitude was low. No other contacts were made with
planes so that the test range of the SD could not be measured.
12. SOUND CONDITIONS AND DENSITY LAYERS
Sound conditions were very good. The propellers of a friendly submarine
on the surface were heard at a range of 5500 yards with the sea in a
smooth to moderate condition. Unusual sounds were heard in the vicinity
of ATTU. Some were similar to a pile driver noise. These sounds were
loud and varying in frequency. Usually they were heard continuously over
the4 entire day. Other noises were not identified, and others were the
familiar sounds made by fish.
No density layers were observed in this area.
13. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY
HEALTH: Ninety percent of the crew had chest colds at one time or
another during this cruise. The more or less sudden change from tropic
to arctic area is obviously the cause. There was one case if illness
resulting in six sick days. Diagnosis: Lymphangitis, ring finger, left
hand. There was the usual number of minor cuts and bruises. One officer
was incapacitated for a few days as a result of accidental injury to the
right foot while lowering the periscope. Two men received small wounds
when a projectile exploded in and burst a 20 mm gun barrel.
HABITABILITY: The additional one hundred and nine men aboard from
April 28 to May 11 presented several problems: (1) Air purification for
periods of 18 hours submerged. (2) Berthing. (3) Messing. (4) Sanitary
tanks. (5) Sweating of hull and hull fittings.
AIR PURIFICATION: On each day 4 cans of CO2 absorbent were used.
Oxygen was used except on two days. On those days all hands were
requested to sleep if possible and the smoking lamp was put out at 1400.
The ships allowance of CO2 absorbent and oxygen should be augmented for
any other similar operations which must await certain weather conditions.
On the day preparations were made for the landing the CO2 content rose to
4% and there was much panting. On all other days four cans of absorbent
were sufficient. It is evident that CO2 absorbent is to be used, it
should be opened early in the dive to insure getting the most absorption.
Because of the irritation to throat and nose of the particles it must be
handled with the greatest care. With no CO2 absorbent used, the CO2
content rose to 3% in 12 / hours, (50,000 cubic feet of air, 205 persons,
unlimited smoking, and moderate activity)
BERTHING: This was done with no additional bunks. Each torpedo
storage skid was rigged to hold 3 persons (36). Hot bunks of watch squad
(29). Remainder of soldiers off watch slept on mattresses on the torpedo
room decks. On the Makin raid this vessel had additional bunks
installed. The method used this time is definitely better in that there
is improved circulation of air, and allows space for recreation on a
large floor space in torpedo rooms. From a military standpoint the ship
can be used for a raid with only sufficient warning to remove the reload
torpedoes. On this mission the entire crew was taken. 20 men were left
in on the Makin raid. In event of a raid in tropic waters, more air
conditioning units would have to be installed.
MESSING: One extra cook and one extra baker were in the crew. The
problems were solved to everyone's satisfaction, and credit is due the
members of the Commissary department for their extra work and skillful
handling of the mess. The food was up to submarine standard, and many
compliments were received for the Army personnel.
SANITARY TANKS: The small after sanitary tank, now also used as a
sludge tank for the after head, would fill after 4 hours submergence
which decommissioned half of the head facilities. Men walking forward
and aft caused much trim pump operation to keep this trim.
SWEATING OF HULL AND HULL FITTINGS: Condensation on cold parts of
the hull had a high nuisance value. In addition many minor electrical
and radio grounds were noticed. Exercise on deck was give twice before
reaching enemy waters.
The winter clothing was a good design. The rain-proof parka fills the
need for a foul weather garment which will not impede progress down the
hatch when clearing the bridge.
14. MILES STEAMED
From Pearl to Dutch Harbor 2080 miles. From Dutch Harbor to area and
return 1917 miles.
15. FUEL EXPENDED
62,441 gallons.
16. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE
FUEL PROVISIONS TORPEDOES WATER PERSONNEL
92,970 gal. 25 days 6 12,000 gal. 45 days
17. FACTORS WHICH ENDED PATROL
Completion of mission caused ending of this patrol.
18. REMARKS
The following points were brought out incident to the landing operations
conducted during this patrol.
(a) The senior Army or Marine officer should be on board the senior
submarine.
(b) Experience gained at Makin and Espiritu Santo indicated the need
for landmarks in addition to compass courses. Especially was this
brought out in the ATTU operations where visibility was so low
that no landmarks could be given. It would appear that two or
three men could have been put ashore in small four man rubber
boats equipped with the infra red beach marker with instructions
to turn it on at a specified time. Necessary delays in the
landing operations incident to unfavorable weather could be worked
out easily by one work signals by radio which would be so short
that the enemy could not possibility "listen in". Under
conditions found at SCARLET BEACH a flashlight or blinder tube
could be used intermittently as the marker in place of the infra
red.
(c) The portable radio type BC 745A with five frequencies furnished
this vessel has proved very satisfactory during training and
reception is so certain that the necessity for a preliminary call
up could be eliminated. Naturally radio conversation would have
to be cut to a minimum.
(d) There is no necessity for installing extra bunks in a submarine
of this type, this operation was conducted with no extra bunks and
Nautilus full complement of 88 men. Plus eight officers and one
hundred mine Army Scouts including officers. On the Makin Mission
this vessel carried 101 Marines and only 78 men and 7 officers of
Nautilus complement. Extra bunks were installed for the Makin
Mission, no extra bunks for the ATTU Mission. This vessel can,
therefore, by decreasing her complement temporarily and
elimination of extra bunks carry a total of 120 Army Scouts or
Marines.
(e) the delay from day to day had a marked effect on most of the Army
Scouts. This was probably due to the fact that this was their
first enemy action.
(f) The difficulty of navigation close to the beach without soundings
in low visibility would have been eliminated if we had the beach
markers mentioned above to guide us. However, the SJ radar proved
invaluable in this instance and we are certain our position was
accurate.
(g) Under the conditions encountered, underwater sound was used for
communication between submarines, this may not always be possible,
hence infra red signaling apparatus should be furnished for
signaling between submarines.
(h) A rubber boat stowage similar to the one installed on Nautilus
should be installed on Narwhal.
(i) The spider manufactured by the submarine base, Pearl Harbor was
used satisfactorily, however, the manifold was so small that the
air was wire drawn by the time it reached the eight outlets coming
from this manifold. A system using two spiders with six outlets
is recommended.
(j) The cafeteria system was used to serve the 106 rations for the
Army Scouts and 88 rations for the ship's force (total 194).
Total time required while on the surface was about one hour. For
all day dives, the troops were messed by taking about 15 men from
each of their living quarters at the same time to avoid any
radical change of trim. The time for messing was increased to
about 2 hours. The ship's force of 3 cooks and one baker put in
about 12 hours daily assisted by 2 cooks from the Army Scouts. On
operations of a similar nature, additional metal trays and mess
gear are recommended which will facilitate messing.
(k) These Army Scouts responded to our training better than any group
we have ever had on board and after one day's intensive training
were considered proficient. However, three full days training is
recommended with the third day underway.
(l) Once again our boats were smashed by the sea. The plates welded
over the holes in the superstructure carried away first. Narwhal
has steal decking over her boat stowage's and no holes in
superstructure, if after this trip her boats are still intact it
is recommended Nautilus deck be modified accordingly. This will
necessitated moving deck torpedo tubes forward it they are to be
kept in operation.
(m) It is strongly recommended that the steam heating system
installed in this vessel be removed at the first opportunity.
Under no conditions during wartime will it ever be used. The
space in the engine room vacated by this equipment could be
utilized for stowage of spare parts. This recommendation is made
after this vessel has been in northern waters for three weeks.
(n) It was a pleasure to have the Army Scouts on board. The
cooperated in every way with Nautilus personnel. This was one
time when Army and Navy coordination could not have been better.
The Commanding Officer is likewise proud of his officers and crew.
The went out of their way to make the Army feel at home. Men gave
their bunks to the Army as well as some of their clothes.
Likewise, the Army gave our men some of their clothes.
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