A. PROLOGUE
Refitted at Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor from 17 October to 5
November 1943. Major work: renewal of secondary drain line in
officer's staterooms; renewal of conning tower blow manifold, and
repairs to the port air compressor. Engine did not require major
overhaul. The free wheeling clutch (Pcs. 26 to 38 inc. Plan K10113)
broke on engine 4. This is the third to fail and is considered a
design weakness.
The training period consisted of one week devoted to training for
special mission, and two days to submarine training. Three exercise
torpedoes were fired.
B. NARRATIVE
8 November 1943
1100 VW Embarked a Marine detachment; the Amphibious Reconnaissance
Company of the Fifth Amphibious corps consisting of 8 officers and 70
men under the command of Captain J.L. Jones, USMCR.
1300 VW Underway. Comsubpac Op.Ord.263-43. Port air compressor
still under repair. Our route passes north of JOHNSTON ISLAND, Made
two dives for trim and tightness after removal of the conning tower
air manifold. Received indoctrination depth charges. Escort vessel
PC 597, departed at nightfall.
9 November 1943
0745 W Received dispatch indicating enemy submarine in vicinity.
Commenced zigzagging.
0930 W Sighted a CORONADO type airplane (Contact 1). Plane
investigated us. Exchanged recognition signals.
1259 W sighted a LIBERATOR type airplane (Contact 2). The port air
compressor is still under repair. Requires lathe work beyond
capacity of ship to complete. The auxiliary gang has worked
constantly on this compressor since departure.
1815 W Made training dive. Stern plane operation erratic. Trouble
traced to faulty contactor in starting panel, and to probable thrust
bearing failure.
2344 W Sent dispatch Nautilus one to Comsubpac requesting permission
to stop at JOHNSTON.
10 November 1943
0200 W Received permission to stop at JOHNSTON, and changed course
for there.
0640 W Made training dive.
0740 W Sighted LIBERATOR (contact 3).
0743 W SD airplane contact (Contact 4).
0933 W Sent dispatch Nautilus two requesting rendezvous.
1033 W Radar contact on airplane (Contact 5).
1044 W Sighted a CORONADO type airplane (Contact 6).
1834 W Made training dive.
11 November 1943
0745 W Made rendezvous with air screen and proceeded to JOHNSTON
ISLAND entrance.
0856 W Boat came along side with Officer pilot to assist as
necessary in navigation and transferred liner to a crash boat which
took it to JOHNSTON. Spent day off JOHNSTON. Held battle surface
drills and held exercises for the Marine Detachment and later the
ship's company.
1630 WX Boat returned with liner and also two very large fish in a
box of ice, a gift from the Commanding Officer at JOHNSTON. Officer
pilot took dispatch Nautilus three ashore for further transmission.
1645 WX Took departure for corner of our area via rhomb line.
1830 WX Made training dive.
12 to 14 November 1943
Made dawn and twilight dives. At 1145 X 12 November sighted a
CORONADO type airplane (Contact 7).
15 November 1943
0525 Y Made training dive.
1617 Y Went to battle stations for SD radar contact (Contact 9).
2041 Y Went to battle stations on SJ radar contact at 7000 yards.
Blip was seen on screen only once and failed to reappear. (Contact
1). Maneuvered for 30 minutes to develop contact, but it failed to
reappear. Two experienced radar operators observed the blip and
believed it to be a ship. there was a rain squall in the direction
of the contact which might account for it.
16 November 1943
1050 Y Entered area.
0519 Y Dived. Went to test depth for test and bathythermograph
curve. Upon reaching this depth the main induction drain commenced
leaking. A full stream from a 1-1/2 inch line was running. The leak
continued at periscope depth but was diminished somewhat in amount.
Opened inboard valve and the Assistant First lieutenant crawled up
into the main induction and located the leak. A rubber gasket under
an induction plate had blown out partially. The gasket had no hole
in the center and a small leak between the gasket and the plate
finally blew the gasket in like a balloon. A Consaco gasket was
installed by the First Lieutenant and his Assistant after surfacing.
The bathythermograph indicated isothermal conditions, and 18,000
pounds ballast was dumped out in going deep. Expended one 15 pound
can of CO2 absorbent and surfaced with 2.1% CO2. The smoking lamp
was out except for 15 minutes during which time the CO2 rose from .5
to 1.0%.
17 November 1943
0529 Y Dived. On station for weather observation. Weather was
favorable all day for intended air strike hence made no reports.
After about two hours submergence the boat was getting lighter.
Checked the vents and located large bubble in the middle group port
side. 15,000 pounds was pumped out to restore the trim. Ran with
vent open. Cause determined to be a leaky blow valve which will be
ground in when operations permit.
1929 Y Surfaced and shifted to station for next day's assignment.
18 November 1943
0534 Y Made trim dive.
0600Y Surfaced and maneuvered to remain in assigned position as
rescue vessel for downed aviators.
0845 Y Set course to close BITITU and look for downed plane just
reported by voice radio.
0908 Y Reversed course when it was evident that a CATALINA plane was
investigating.
1019 Y Voice radio indicated the reported plane was the wreck of a
ship. The two CATALINA planes assigned as life guard planes departed
area about noon. Did not see any return during the afternoon but
gathered from voice radio that they were back on station.
1400 Y Lost contact with any aircraft. The last air strike by our
forces was met by weak AA fire. From about dawn until now there has
been an almost continuous parade of aircraft from the southwest to
BITITU and return. Jap air appears to be non-existent and we have
been unmolested except for a curious photographer who evidently wants
one for his Brownie Album. The radar operators are hoarse from
reporting plane contacts. During one strike this afternoon we were
surprised to see a large 4 motor plane swim into view. At first view
we thought it was a Jap. It turned out to be a LIBERATOR which
passed over us rather high on a southerly course. Eventually we saw
about 4 more of these planes.
1625 Y No contact with any aircraft since 14oo Y. No more strikes
at BITITU. All fires on BITITU were out.
1630 Y Radar contact at 25 miles which quickly closed to 12. Dived.
Surfaced in a half an hour and got an immediate contact by radar
followed by a sight contact of a Jap model DAVE seaplane. Dived
again.
1930 Y Surfaced and set course to pass through area between TARAWA
and APAMAMA ISLANDS, twelve miles south of former, 6 miles north of
latter.
2015 Y Activity was noted around BITITU and planes were seen to be
coming in from the north and also the south. A searchlight on BITITU
pointing west at an elevation of 40d would make 4 long dashes which
were answered by the planes' landing lights. Two of the planes
heading for BITITU from the south passed low uncomfortably close
astern of us. Went ahead full until 2300 Y.
2252 Y Sent dispatch Nautilus four to Comsubpac regarding enemy air
activity at BITITU.
2355 Y Received rebroadcast of our Number four dispatch to other
interested parties.
19 November 1943
0500 Y In position for Day's assignment. Radar contact on airplane
(Contact # 10).
0502 Y Made trim dive. At dawn the air strike on BITITITU
commenced. Maneuvered to remain in position assigned to assist as
rescue vessel for downed aviators. One Catalina airplane was on
station in vicinity as life guard plane.
0800 Y Surfaced.
0900 Y Received Comsubpac dispatch indicating one plane down
northwest of BITITU. Will search for it after observation of surf
at BITITU.
1125 Y Bombardment of BITITU by surface force commenced. Could not
see ships but closely watched the fall of shot.
1130 Y Set course to close BITITU to be in position for surf
observation after the bombardment. Believed island defenders would
be too busy engaged to be concerned about a submarine. Had closed to
12,000 yards when we noticed guns on the southeast corner of BITITU
were spitting fire. Decided it would be wise to keep range open
until surface ships had done a little more damage. Turned to east
and as we finished turn at 1140 Y was fired on by shore batteries on
BITITU. Three projectiles whistled by and landed 150 yards over.
They were about 4" cal. They were exactly on in deflection and just
a trifle over. Dived.
1530 Y Worked in to a position 900 yards south of west end of reef
and with 15' of periscope observed the surf on west side of BITITU.
The surf was still. Since our observations a month ago the Japs had
built six to eight feet wall along the beaches. It looks formidable.
A few buildings appeared to be damaged; the majority were not
touched. Several guns of about 40 mm size were trained around and
suppressed at the periscope but did not open fire. The heavy caliber
guns appeared unengaged. Retired from BITITU to the southwest to
look for downed aviator.
1832 Y LIBERATOR planes made air strike on BITITU and started fires.
Our position was not too satisfactory as we were only 4000 yards
southwest of the island. Opened out from the island as best we could
be we were at the mercy of the current t which was running a strong
two knots. Search by periscope until dark revealed no trace of
missing plane. If it was the one which went down yesterday the
current must have carried him far to the west.
1910 Y Surfaced. Set course to pass north of MAIANA ISLAND.
Postponed battery charge to go through at full speed which, into the
current, was twelve knots over the ground.
1935 Y Send Nautilus five to Comsubpac giving results of
observation.
2047 Y Noted radar interference on 10 cm equipment. Believed to be
from Model SG of our own forces. If we could run east until 2200 Y
before radar's get closer we'd be able to turn south and perhaps
clear them. Interference was rapidly getting stronger.
2130 Y Radar contact at 10,900 yards bearing 094d T. (Contact # 2).
Went to battle stations submerged. Maneuvered to get clear as the
contact whip was obviously in our own forces. It appears there were
two small ships and one large one. Headed south toward MAIANA
ISLAND, now four miles away. Ships appeared not to notice us and
even turned away at 2148 Y.
2145 Y We were now about 4000 yards off the reef and had land from
340d to 120d relative. Changed course to 120d T to clear MAIAMA
ISLAND reef.
2154 Y Ship speeded up to approximately 25 knots and headed for us.
Generally speaking, we were in a bad way. We believed the ships were
friendly but they were acting very belligerent. Our battery was low
as was our air supply. We were four or five thousand yards off a
reef on which the current was setting at about two knots. If we went
down we were in for a nasty time. If we didn't we would be detected
and have difficulty identifying ourselves. That they were Japs was
considered unlikely. Recognition signals were gotten in hand.
2159 Y Ship which was closing us was seen to open fire. Fired the
green recognition comet. The salvo landed. Perfect shooting. The
Executive Officer had the ship which was closing us under constant
observation since 2140 Y and absolutely no attempt was made to
challenge the vessel. We have no IFF. We were in our assigned area.
This was a clear case of shooting first and asking questions later.
The Executive Officer who was the last to leave the bridge saw
another salvo fired. One projectile hit and exploded in some fashion
just as he was closing the hatch. Our routine of diving was
disturbed and we forgot to close the outer voice tube valve. The
projectile hit the Conning Tower and the concussion damaged the
inboard voice tube valve so that it leaked. Sparks spurted from the
Conning Tower bilge but no fire started. Salvos could be heard
landing as we went deep. One close explosion near the motor room
ruptured a water line to the port main motor cooling and caused
considerable leak in the bilges.
2200 Y Dived to test depth and went to depth charge stations. It
required 6d up angle at full speed to hold her up. Water poured in
through the damaged voice tube valve which grounded out both
periscope motors, the air compressor motor, one turbo blower motor,
and two oil purifier motors. The gyro follow up went out, due it is
believed to shock. We were making every effort to slow up the voice
tube leak but at 310' we were just holding our own at full speed.
Water in torrents streamed down the conning tower hatch since we
could drain the conning Tower bilges only when we were not pumping
with the trim pump. Using what coverings we could provide we
shielded the IC, Gyro Compass, Voltage Regulator, and 1MC panels from
the deluge but they all got a thorough wetting. Fortunately, the
auxiliary gyro held up as we were steering by it. A leak in the
pressure hull was noticed over the trim pump controllers and we
managed to cover the latter before it developed trouble. The engine
room reported a steady stream from the main induction drain. The
main induction was flooded. The bathythermograph line showed no
density layer to hide under. The leaky master blow valve was leaking
air into #6 main ballast tank so the air manifold was secured at the
distribution stops.
We finally began to win on depth control and managed to get back to
300' and slow to 1/3 speed. There appeared to be three vessels on
the surface persistently tracking us alternately getting closer and
farther away but staying well forward of the port beam. Began to
reason that they were not friendly, but rather Japs, however, they
didn't deliver any depth charges which we were expecting momentarily.
By keeping track of the pounding of the surf on our starboard side be
decided we could work around slowly to south and get some current
component in our favor which is what we did.
We felt time was running out fast. We had an important date at
APAMAMA and we were going to keep it if we had to surface and fight
our way through the force that was molesting us. The 78 Marines we
had aboard were stoic but they were unanimous in the attitude that
they would much prefer a rubber boat on a very hostile beach to their
present predicament. Managed to assure them they would get their
boat ride and it was certain none of them would be hesitant about
leaving the ship when landing time came.
2355 Y Echo ranging distant. Started to periscope depth.
20 November 1943
0040 Y At periscope depth. The ship handled so well at periscope
depth we felt that she was not nearly so badly hurt as was first
indicated. The course to the south was evidently clearing the reef.
Everything was beginning to look rosy.
0048 Y Reached radar depth. The radar was slow to function normally
because of moisture in it but finally fired off and gave no contacts.
0053 Y Surfaced. The turbo blow would not blow the tanks. The bow
and stern were both under and blowing bow buoyancy didn't make her
respond. Fortunately radar said all clear of ships, land 3000 yards
away on our starboard quarter. Secured the turbo blow to investigate
the trouble. The ship started to roll over fast on her port side and
started under again. Closed the Conning Tower hatch. Evidently
there was something wrong with the vents. Closed the emergency
vents, corrected the list and surfaced again with high pressure air.
Opened the hatch and tested turbo blow lines individually finally
locating troubles in port middle and after groups which were
apparently ruptured. The main induction was flooded up fully. Took
engine air through the hatch and was able to make twelve knots. Set
course for APAMAMA, and started repairs and makeshift arrangements
for diving. The radar indicated further 10 cm disturbance to
eastward.
0157 Y Sent Nautilus six to Comsubpac reporting preliminary damage.
0255 Y Received Comsubpac dispatch directing us to report damage and
location of attack.
0240 Y Received dispatch telling other interested parties of our
damage and requesting an escort to cover us clear of area after
landing. Managed to get in a battery charge and an air charge.
0604 Y Dived to westward of APAMAMA. It appears that by late
afternoon we can reach the selected beach. The dive took over 4
minutes, but can be improved upon as the makeshift arrangements
worked all right.
1600 Y Off the beach selected for landing. The Marine Officers
observed the beach. The Marines seem anxious to get off the
submarine. The had determined that the Torpedo Rooms were not
satisfactory sites for foxholes.
1920 Y Surfaced and retired southward to charge batteries. Touched
the equator, but the resident King Neptune was too tired to hold
court.
2330 Y Took stations for rubber boat landing. The sea was rough
with a 3 knot current setting across the beach. Put the ship about
2500 yards due south of the beach selected for landing and held her
thee against the current. Since middle and after vent systems were
damaged we were forced to use emergency vents for flooding down and
handling of the ship and this phase of the launching was not as
satisfactory as it had been in practice launchings.
The company was to go over carrying arms, special equipment such as
radio and visual fear, ammunition and food for forty-eight hours.
The rest of the food, ammunition and other supplies were to be landed
with our boat the next night. The Company hoped to be established in
the Hospital Area by that time so that trucking of stores would be
reduced to a minimum. The expected to make the Hospital Area by noon
and so indicate movement to that vicinity by banners not later than
mid-afternoon.
21 November 1943
0100 Y Received dispatch directing us to look out for enemy subs.
0045 Y Marine Reconnaissance Company left the ship.
0500 Y Marine detachment all safely ashore. Adverse seas, current,
and surf made progress slow. Ten centimeter radar interference noted
to northeast.
0527 Y dived to avoid showing submarine to possible enemy on beach
which would embarrass our Reconnaissance Company. We had developed
plans for maintaining contact with the Company ashore in case it were
not possible for the ship to remain on the surface. Two mattress
covers were sewn together to provide a banner two feet wide by
sixteen feet long. Four of these banners were given to the Company,
and a code for arrangement of them was developed. By suspending
these banners between trees so that they could be seen from sea they
would be used to convey information to the ship. Different
combinations of banners as to number and to arrangement would cover
all messages thought likely. The banner indicating ""situation
satisfactory"" was to be flown from dawn on unless contrary
conditions were encountered.
1840 Y Sighted arrangement signal on the beach indicating situation
satisfactory. Remained off beach all day. No change in the visual
signal.
1918 Y Surfaced and attempted to establish radio communication with
the party ashore. All efforts failed. As battery was low retired
south to charge and then planned to close beach to establish
communication and if situation permitted, launch boat and deliver
stores.
2022 Y Radar contact suddenly at 3900 yards (Contact #3). Went to
battle stations and started radar approach. Contact disappeared
about 2600 yards. Could not see anything from bridge. Believe it
was a submarine which dove at 2600 yards. Dove and tried to develop
contact. Nothing further was seen nor heard.
2133 Y Surfaced and continued retirement south to charge. Made
decision to move to Hospital Area to try to establish contact, and
set courses accordingly. Made further examination of the hull and
superstructure to better determine extent of our damage.
2320 Y Sent dispatch Nautilus seven giving information on Marine
landing, submarine contact, and additional information on our damage.
22 November 1943
0500 Y Received Comsubpac dispatch to Comcenpac about our damage.
0520 Y Made dawn dive off the Hospital Area. We did not know who
had control of the air nor how the fight on TARAWA was going.
Decided that since our diving time was slow it would be wise to
submerge until we could look the beach over. Saw some men in the
vicinity of hospital and at 0948 Y surfaced to attempt to raise the
Company by radio. All attempts failed.
1220 Y Sent dispatch Nautilus eight indicating or Reconnaissance
company had not reached the Hospital Area, and that stores and
ammunition had not been landed.
1232 Y Cruised on surface off Hospital Area trying to establish
either radio or visual touch with beach. Through the Hospital Area
slot in trees saw a vessel which looked like a tug either in the
lagoon or west of the atoll (Contact #4), distance about twelve
miles. Thought she might be bringing Jap reinforcements as we had no
information about her arrival. Set course to south to investigate
vessel. Dived when reaching southeast corner of atoll due to
previous submarine contact on south side. Stood west and searched
lagoon. Did not see tug any more. Decided to surface near landing
beach as the company must be in trouble in that they had failed to
reach Hospital Area.
1505 Y Sighted LIBERATOR type airplane (Contact #11) circling the
lagoon.
1920 Y surfaced. Made immediate contact with party on the beach.
They reported 25 Japs in cross island barrier which had halted their
progress. Our party controlled two islands including an excellent
beach. They needed stores and since they were stopped at this beach
position, would like delivery here. Decided that by putting ship
close to beach here we could accomplish delivery without too great a
risk. Immediately started work on getting out boat and stores.
2120 Y commenced lowering our boat and loading provisions and
ammunition. Three rubber boats came out from the beach to assist in
getting the stores over the reef. Obtained information on situation
from Captain Jones. Conferred with him on shelling beach. He
advised against it for three reasons, trajectories would be too flat
to do sufficient damage to entrenched Japs, his own force would be
put in jeopardy by strays and natives which were friendly might be
alienated by damage. Decided not to shoot. Marines had lost two of
their boats through damage on the reef. Gave them two of our seven
man type.
2215 Y Party left the ship with all gear.
2217 Y Retired southward to charge.
2335 Y Received Comsubpac dispatch indicating U.S.S. CLAMP had been
sent to repair our damage. Evidently ship we saw about noon today
was the CLAMP.
23 November 1943
0041 Y Sent dispatch Nautilus nine to Comsubpac giving
reconnaissance information. Maneuvered during night to be off the
east coast of APAMAMA at dawn.
0525 Y Made running dive. We are now able to dive in about two and
a half minutes which is time from clear the bridge to fifty three
feet. Because middle and after groups are, in effect, double banked
the ship as a tendency to go down by stern first until forward group
floods, the go down by the bow until main induction floods. At
daylight observed the east beach for any sign of progress of our
Reconnaissance Company. No sign of them by noon. Felt that we must
get best estimate of our damage reported at earliest possible date.
At 1120 Y surfaced and examined damage closely in daylight. Sent
Nautilus ten to Comsubpac.
1152 Y Made running dive and proceeded to initial beach.
1923 Y Surfaced off initial beach and made immediate radio contact
with the Reconnaissance Company. The had two wounded men in the
group to be sent out and some more blood plasma was needed.
2008 Y The two wounded men were brought out in the rubber surf
boats. One was dying. The other's injuries were not serious.
Captain Jones himself came out and brought a ma showing the exact
LOCATION OF THE Jap positions. The decision was made to shoot, and a
position was selected from which the bombardment would be make. We
were to receive spots by radio if practicable, and a white banner
would be displayed at the northern extremity of the Marines
positions. Shooting would commence about eight if possible and if
all was clear on the other side of the lagoon.
2014 Y The party from the beach left the ship. Stood south to
charge batteries.
2204 Y Sent dispatch Nautilus eleven requesting rendezvous with
doctor. Our ECM evidently went out of commission at the time of the
noon dispatch. The Marines had delivered MAREK, Harry J., PFC
(486263), USMCR and KING, John F., Corp., (271672), USMCR to us. The
former had been shot through the right chest by an automatic rifle.
He was in a very serious condition and already in a coma. The latter
was in a less serious condition suffering from a suspected ruptured
hernia. Did all in our power to save him but at 2215 Y Private MAREK
died.
24 November 1943
0024 Y Sent dispatch Nautilus thirteen canceling request for
rendezvous with a doctor.
0050 Y Sent dispatch Nautilus ten again. It was garbled by the ECM
at the first transmission.
0116 Y Sent dispatch Nautilus twelve giving reconnaissance
information.
0330 Y Received Comsubpac dispatch directing us to transfer other
injured man to CLAMP.
0450 Y Held funeral services for MAREK, Harry J., PFC, (486263),
USMCR.
0455 Y Committed the body to the sea.
0505 Y Received Comsubpac dispatch indicating friendly transports
and escorts would arrive APAMAMA today.
0512 Y Made running dive and maneuvered for position to start
bombardment.
0715 Y Read Cincpac's dispatch to the crew.
0718 Y Sighted CORONADO type airplane.
0748 Y Surfaced. Made contact with Captain Jones on the beach.
Received information about opening fire. As we surfaced sighted a
hospital ship (Contact #5).
0810 Y Opened fire at 5000 yards. Radio spots from the beach.
0811 Y Hospital ship asked whether she could proceed south of atoll
with safety to which we replied "Affirmative".
0820 Y Hospital ship asked whether we had a case to transfer to her.
Told her we would close her later and deliver the man.
0853 Y Checked fire to close range. Marines reported we had knocked
out a gun position on the lagoon side. They were spotting us in on
the one on the seaward side.
0904 Y Resumed fire.
0909 Y Ceased firing on request of Marines. Assume they had
situation in hand. 75 rounds high capacity projectiles expended.
Set course to rendezvous with the hospital ship to transfer injured
man.
0916 Y SD radar contact followed by sight contact of a single wing
seaplane (Contact #13).
0921 Y Dived when the range closed to 6 miles as we could not
positively identify him and was in the clouds working around to the
sun. Set course west toward the location of the hospital ship.
1118 Y Sighted a ship which appeared to be a tug (Contact #6). Also
saw the tops of some ships off the west passage. As we were
expecting to rendezvous with the CLAMP decided she must be this
vessel.
1146 Y Fired recognition signal and 1203 Y surfaced and closed. She
signaled by searchlight an inquiry about our wounded man.
1147 Y Sighted a transport and escort group off West Passage.
Assumed that the occupation of APAMAMA was underway. Managed to get
in voice radio communication with one officer of our Reconnaissance
Party. He indicated that the other officers of the group were in
trouble and that there was one casualty and that they needed medical
aid.
1155 Y Tug began to dash madly about, going to general quarters.
Asked him by visual what the situation was. He informed us Jap air
attack warning had been received by his voice set and that a Jap sub
had been contacted between APAMAMA and TARAWA. Escorts were working
it over. Followed him about on the surface until "alert" subsided.
1230 Y Sighted a hospital ship standing toward us.
1340 Y Small boat from the tug came alongside to get our wounded
man. We learned that the vessel was not the CLAMP but the MATACO.
An officer and a repair man looked over our damage and said it could
not be repaired at sea. Meanwhile the MATACO arranged with the
hospital ship, now close by, to receive the patient.
1400 Y Patient transferred to the (hospital ship). Requested the
MATACO to inform the Task Force Commander on the TENNESSEE that the
Reconnaissance Company needed help and also medical aid. Now
believed our mission complete at APAMAMA. Our present orders require
that we wait in the vicinity of APAMAMA for a rendezvous with a
repair vessel. MATACO has no orders.
1421 Y Sent Nautilus fourteen to Comsubpac giving information about
damage. The MATACO closed the TENNESSEE to deliver by visual the
message concerning assistance for the Reconnaissance Company, then
believed to need it.
1450 Y Sighted a LIBERATOR type airplane (Contact #14). After the
MATACO delivered this message we asked her whether she could give us
escort to the south to avoid embarrassing the surface task force in
any of its movements. She originated a message indicating that the
repairs were a base job and escorted us during the remainder of the
day and night. Apparently as a result of this the rendezvous with
the (???) was cancelled.
1750 Y Received Comsubpac dispatch directing us to remain in the
vicinity of APAMAMA until an escort was designated to take us clear
of the area so that we might proceed to JOHNSTON. Spent night
fifteen to twenty miles south of APAMAMA.
25 November 1943
0600 Y Received dispatch indicating Comtaskforce 53 would designate
escort. Spent this day waiting for orders.
0954, 1058, 1505 Y sighted LIBERATOR type airplanes (Contact #15,
#16, #17).
1500 Y Didn't know whether large task force we saw yesterday landed
at APAMAMA or not.
1850 Y Closed initial beach to check up on our Reconnaissance
Company. They were in need of nothing, and gave us the latest
information to relay to higher authority. Apparently the information
which we had received from one of the officers of the group regarding
medical aid was in error. We wished them a Happy Thanksgiving on
their K rations and retired to the southward.
1916 Y Sighted a lighted hospital ship (Contact #8).
26 November 1943
0048 Y Sent Nautilus fifteen to Comsubpac and Comfifthphib giving
reconnaissance information. Maneuvered to remain south of APAMAMA.
0231 Y Radar contact (Contact #9). Went to battle stations and
tracked the target for an hour. We were a little apprehensive about
the escort as she had no warning of the other ship. When the target
was sighted she was noted to be very small; about the size of a tug.
At 0345 Y received a message indicating that friendly ships would
arrive APAMAMA today. Secured from battle stations and stood away to
east to open the range and avoid embarrassment.
0400 Y Received Comsubpac dispatch telling us to remain with MATACO
until escorted clear as we are to go straight to JOHNSTON.
0712 Y Began getting radar disturbances and occasional airplane
contact which indicated that the task forces had arrived. At 0815 Y
sighted the masts of three cruisers. The escort vessel identified us
and ComCruFive answered the challenge. At 0830 Y the MARYLAND and
her group were sighted.
0950 Y Sent visual message to Comtaskforce 53 in MARYLAND reporting
our presence in locality and asking whether he had any instructions
for us. Maneuvered to remain 15 miles south of APAMAMA out of way of
the task force.
1715 Y Received orders to direct the MATACO to escort us to JOHNSTON
ISLAND. Set rhumb line for there. Made best sustained speed.
Several engine liners were cracked. MATACO gave us probable location
of a friendly force along track to JOHNSTON.
2102 Y Made radar contact with a group on our port hand. Changed
course to avoid and in so doing made radar contact at 2339 Y on our
starboard hand. Changed course to avoid and at 0025 Y lost all
contact. Radar interference of 10 cms was very strong on both these
groups and their location was in position MATACO told us to expect
them. The MATACO has no radar so we lead at night.
27 November 1943
Steering rhumb line for JOHNSTON zig-zagging during daylight.
0825 Y Strong radar contact at 40 miles on a group of planes.
(Contact #18)
0844 Y Eight LIBERATORS passed overhead headed northwest.
1316 Y Strong radar contact at 24 miles. Sighted LIBERATOR
formation passing ahead on a south easterly course. (Contact #19)
1820 Y Decided to work east to leave MILLE and MALOELAP air circles
as soon as possible.
2151 Y #3 main engine failed, liner carried away. Put auxiliary
engine on to help with load.
28 November 1943
Steering rhumb line for JOHNSTON, zig-zagging during daylight.
0144 Y #3 engine back in commission.
1520 Y Received Comsubpac dispatch directing us to proceed to Pearl
if able to make it by morning of 4 December.
1900 Y Set course for Pearl.
2015 Y Sent Nautilus sixteen to Comsubpac reporting position, speed
of advance and or change of course for Pearl.
29 November 1943
Steering rhumb line for Pearl.
0802 Y #3 main engine failed, liner carried away. Put generator
engines on to help with the load.
1245 Y #3 main engine back in commission.
30 November 1943
Steering rhumb line for Pearl
0631 Y #2 main engine failed, liner carried away. Put auxiliary
engine on to assist with load.
0856 Y Sent Nautilus seventeen reporting entering JOHNSTON five
hundred mile circle and giving positions along route to Pearl.
1523 Y #2 main engine back in commission. It still had a cracked
liner which could not be located. Plan to run it until it fails and
this show its location.
1 to 3 December 1943
Steering rhumb line for Pearl. Adjusted speed to arrive on the 45
mile circle at dawn the fourth.
4 December 1943
0010 VW Noted 10 cm radar interference.
0208 VW Radar contact bearing 125d T, range 13,000 yards (Contact
#10). Escort identified us.
0910 VW Entered Pearl Harbor and moored at the Submarine Base at
1000 VW.
C. WEATHER
The passage from Pearl to Johnston was made during 8-11 November
1943. "Kone" weather prevailed on the eighth and ninth. The
passage from Johnston to TARAWA was made in heavy seas from the east.
The wind velocity was about 20 knots. Arrived off TARAWA 16
November. The wind and sea were from 120d T and the sky was much
overcast. The weather on the morning of the seventeenth was fine and
continued so through 27 November at which time we left the area from
a point south of APAMAMA.
The passage from the Northern Gilberts to Pearl was made in very
large swells which changed into normal trade winds in Latitude 7d
north. Frequent rains were encountered from the Gilberts north.
D. TIDAL DATA
In the areas visited tidal conditions prevailed as set forth in the
Pacific tide tabled, "Sailing Directions for the Gilbert Islands" by
Master Mariner Hoyen, and Secret Sailing Directions for United
Nations Bases.
E. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
This patrol was conducted in the same waters as the sixth patrol.
There are no facts in addition to those previously given in the
report of the sixth war patrol.
F. SHIP CONTACTS
Not transcribed
G. AIRCRAFT CONTACTS
Not transcribed
H. ATTACK DATA
The gun attack was a shore bombardment of the Japanese emplacements
on APAMAMA. 76 6" H.C. projectiles were fired with ?? reported hits.
Spotting was done by our Marine Reconnaissance Party ashore using
portable radio sets (SCR 511). Fuses were set on 3000 yards. One
gun emplacement was reported destroyed. Others damaged. Exact
details are lacking but by nightfall the following day the Marines
reported all Japs dead.
I. MINES
No mining activities were observed in the Northern Gilberts from 16
November to 27 November 1943.
J. ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS
We were pursued by echo ranging, but no depth charges were heard.
K. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE
The main engine cylinder liners continue to crack and from a military
standpoint, these failures remain outstanding weakness in the vessel.
A cracked liner has serious affect on our water supply. It requires
a period of five to six hours to repair during which time the maximum
speed of the ship is reduced to eleven knots. Two engines with
moderately cracked liners will consume 500 gallons of fresh water per
day. Usually all four have at least one cracked liner. During the
period of the patrol ?? liners were cracked badly enough to force
shutdown of an engine, ?? of these on the return from station. The
ship reached port with ?? engines showing cracked liners which will
be in need of replacement during refit.
The combination of water loss through engine failures and the large
number of passengers carried made the water situation acute at times.
The stills were started shortly after leaving port. Our available
supply dropped to 8000 gallons by the time the Marines left. One
tank of 3500 gallons was salted by a valve failure. This water was
re-distilled to battery water without loss, but at the end of the
time spent making battery ware our available supply of potable water
was 2900 gallons. Following this the main engines had three
breakdowns of liners in two days; each costly on fresh water. We
entered port with just enough fresh water to make it and with the
stills very much in need of overhaul.
The failure of cylinder head studs on the main engines continues.
Two failures were experienced and in each case it was necessary to
spend a period of two hours with the engine shutdown while the faulty
stud was drilled out and replaced.
All damage was a result of two shells. One close miss aft caused a
salt water line to the port main motor cooler to rupture and leak a
considerable amount of water into the motor room. Two other
projectiles struck the superstructure piercing several vital pipes
and came to rest on the tank tops where it was retrieved and brought
back.
(Transcription note - microfiche of the following paragraph is
extremely poor and some words are not readable. Best effort was
made to interpret the missing words.)
The exact path of the 5" cannon projectile follows: Entered through
superstructure plating leaving a clean hole; thence through the HP
blow lines to the after and middle groups cutting most of their
diameter; thence through a part of the auxiliary engine air induction
opening a ragged hole about one by two feet; thence through a
superstructure frame to the Conning Tower itself where it made a foot
long gouge 3/4" deep; thence in ricochet through a main strength
frame tearing it away from the pressure hull; thence to the periscope
well bending it and tearing loose a few rivets; thence to the
pressure hull, and finally was absorbed by another main strength
frame.
The inboard voice tube valve was made to leak by the shock of the hit
against the Conning Tower which caused flooding or wetting of the
following electrical equipment: One air compressor motor, both
periscope motors, one LP blower motor, two lube oil purifier motors,
the 1MC, IC frequency control, the gyro follow up system, and the IC
distribution board.
L. RADIO
All Radio equipment functioned satisfactorily. Each night
interference was encountered on the Haiku Fox Schedules. On
frequencies of 4525 and 9090 kcs more than one station was always
sending. 14390 kcs could be copied best. (Our mean position
Latitude 1k North Longitude 174d East.) NPM's note was always poor.
On the night of 25-26 November 1943 interference was encountered on
the 4235 series. It required three hours to finally deliver messages
to NPM.
The special radio equipment used with the Reconnaissance Company was
the model TBX and the model 511 SCR. The model TBX was successfully
used on voice at a distance of eight miles over water. The equipment
was not tried at a greater range, but would be effective at
considerable greater distance. The TBX has a hand generator. The
small 511 SCR set was used when close to the beach with clear
reception. This set was heard clearly at five miles over water.
Spotting for the bombardment was done by the 511 SCR with excellent
results.
On trip back a 511 SCR was mounted on the bridge to give instant
warning to our escort, the MATACO, of any radar contacts. The MATACO
rigged a receiver and a loudspeaker on her bridge to receive the
messages. She receipted by visual.
First Comsubpac serial received was 53-U-090834
Last Comsubpac serial received was serial 87-040933
First Nautilus transmission 100750 "Nautilus One"
Last Nautilus transmission 301930 "Nautilus seventeen"
M. RADAR
The radar equipment functioned to our complete satisfaction. The SD
picked up a group of bombers at 40 miles, and gave good warning on
low flying planes.
N. SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS
The sound gear performed will. Sound conditions in the Northern
Gilbert Islands are excellent. Surf could be heard on both the JK
and JP gear at 8000 yards. These waters have many fish noises, and
also a pounding noise similar to the volcanic disturbances heard in
the Aleutian area, but not as loud nor as frequent.
O. DENSITY LAYERS
No density layers were encountered in the Northern Gilbert Islands.
P. HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY
The health of the crew and marines was excellent.
The food was excellent and well prepared. Variety of diet was wide
and thoroughly enjoyed by all hands. Thanksgiving was moved up to D
day so that the Marines could have the traditional feast before
leaving the ship. Cafeteria style service was used until after the
Marines left the ship. It proved highly satisfactory.
Habitability was fair to good. During the all day dives, smoking was
prohibited except for a 15 minute period at noon. CO2 absorbent was
spread in the morning and content rose to 2.1% by the time of
surfacing at night. During the time the Marines were aboard there
were one hundred eighty one persons in the ship.
To avoid large weight shifts in the ship the Marines were kept in the
end compartments except during meal hours. We carried five movies
along and showed them in alternate torpedo rooms each night.
Wardroom berthing and messing arrangements were a trifle crowded but
satisfactory. Seventeen officers sere taken care of here.
The air conditioning for all the ship except for the Conning Tower is
now adequate.
Q. PERSONNEL
The state of training of the crew was good and improved steadily.
Their performance of duty under combat conditions was exemplary.
Difficult and dangerous jobs were done in launching the rubber boats,
launching our won boat and in transferring the Marines stores and
ammunition. All hands worked with a will, speedily and skillfully,
in the dark, without lights. They are very proud that their ship
stopped a five inch shell. The bombardment of the shore positions
was the high spot for the crew from a morale standpoint. They always
like to shoot the six inch guns, and their performance was excellent.
R. MILES STEAMED; FUEL USED
Pearl to Area 1975 miles: 38,770 gallons
In area 1758 miles: 41,110 gallons
Area to Pearl 2055 miles: 42,195 gallons
S. DURATION
Days enroute to area: 8
Days in area: 12
Days enroute to Pearl: 7
Days submerged: 7
T. FACTORS AFFECTING ENDURANCE REMAINING
Torpedoes: 15
Fuel: 24,800 gallons
Provisions: 60 days
Personnel factor: 30 days
Limiting factor this patrol: Damage caused by shell hit.
U. REMARKS
At night while operating in areas in which friendly forces were known
to be and enemy forces likely to be present the Commanding Officer
was hard put to determine the proper action in handling contacts.
Where the contact was accompanied by ten centimeter radar
disturbance, it was assumed to be friendly. It was hoped that the
radar's on the other ships must have noted disturbance from our
radar, and at least give some consideration to the chance that we
were friendly.
We learned bitterly the truth of the maxim: "The submarine has no
friends"
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