Photos from the archives of Ben Brown, photographer unknown.
Photos from the archives of Ben Brown, photographer unknown.
Despite later abuses under POMO (the system presently in use in the AF), a WCS troop who hung in there long enough would eventually work in most, if not all, of these areas. In some cases, (notably ADC, where aircraft/mockup had seperate shredouts) strict specialization was the rule, and a new "jeep" could easily find himself consigned to the mockup or flightline for the rest of his career.
The Mockup - the "black box" fixers - who had the best working conditions.
The Flightline - usually the most abused, they had the worst working conditions.
Radar Cal - possibly the best of both of the above worlds - or a useless con job.
Sergeant Six-cart - the "CAT II" section, probably the most "thankless" job of all.
Debrief - a refuge for the "ROAD" ? (Retired on Active Duty)
Quality Control/Assurance - Knowledgeable misfits or a true source of help ?
Job Control - the "last man on the job".
Of course, WCS toads had some very "odd jobs", too - but these were rare !
In general
Though most of us didn't know it when we entered the field, WCS was hard to get into - just ask the guys who tried to crosstrain into it during the height of the Vietnam war, looking for a multiple-4 VRB. However, WCS was even harder to get out of !
WCS troops were highly trained - but so were PMEL weenies and ECM troops. The difference is that WCS toads didn't wear pocket protectors. Much of what the WCS troops learned didn't come from books, ATC school classes, or CDC courses; they had EXPERIENCE, doing it the hard way, often from trial-and error. Unlike many others, they HAD TO fix it, because failure meant combat mission failure - and the wrong people died.
Along the way, their career field separated out portions of the work they performed into entirely new career fields: Sensors, Avionics AGE, and the "illegitimate children" of the A, B, and C avionics shops supporting F-15/F-16 aircraft. (There isn't much of a "family resemblance" with WCS among these FNGs, though the aircraft use exactly the same priniciples as the older jets.)
One of the essential qualities of any WCS troop was the ability to troubleshoot a problem quickly. Here's how it was done !
The in-shop work on component parts was performed by swapping defective parts into the WCS mockup - a complete radar/gun/bombing system installed in multiple benches. Normally, the antenna "looked" out a wide picture window where it was safe to radiate. Thus, actual operation ( as would be seen in-flight ) could be tested. Mockup personnel normally troubleshot the component boards of Line-Replaceable Units ("black boxes") right down to the defective transistor, IC, or other component part - and replaced these small items to fix the unit. This led to a lot of wing "self-reliance" you won't find in more modern aircraft; for WCS, "NRTS" actions ( "Not Repairable This Station") were rare. Returning complete units to a depot or the manufacturer was pretty much unheard of, except for a very small number of assemblies where local repair wasn't authorized. (e.g. - the internal optics of gunsites, sealed gyros, etc.)
While there were many truly masterful technicians in different "mockups" around the world - troops who really would have wasted talent had they been assigned anywhere else - most of them got there via the "luck of the draw": they processed in and their name filled a mindless open "slot" in the CBPO manning documents. For experienced troops, their "reputation" often preceeded them, and lots of swaps and other deals were made to get these "good mockup types" into AMS, FMS or CRS (depending on the time period, and wing structure in use at the time).
A good mockup section was absolutely essential for any wing to be truly combat-ready - and it was the skill of the young guys - E-4s and Staff Sergeants, for the most part - that made the difference. Retaining the good ones was difficult, for the mockup was a great training ground for skillful electronic technicians. Under POMO, the insane demands of the AGS ( "Why should these guys enjoy a comfortable, air-conditioned shop") often reduced the quality of personnel in the mockup to nil. The "everyone is equal" mentality paid no attention to skills, experience, or disposition when it came to squadron assignments - and good mockup troops became bitter AGS "auxiliary crew chiefs", hanging wing tanks and changing tires instead of using their unique talents effectively.
Working WCS flightline could be as good - or as bad - as you made it...until POMO came along. There was nothing preventing WCS flightline troops from using the skills they possessed to speed the repair process. Repairs were NOT confined to replacement of "black box" components - and F/L personnel were fully authorized to replace component boards, etc. - possessing most of the same test equipment ( meters, scopes, etc. ) used in the mockup. "Line" alignments were very effective, harmonizing the units in any particular aircraft. Besides, unlike the mockup ( where the hard work of determining WHICH unit was bad had already been done ), F/L troops got to see wiring and other problems which the mockup folks would never experience.
In the early days, such things as 180-day radar calibration and calandar-scheduled missile checks were often performed right on the aircraft parking spot by F/L personnel. These lengthy processes were both an opportunity and a curse; a "flying good" aircraft could turn out to be a real pig when it came to the missile system, or a bent pin at a pylon attach point could doom the use of rarely-used TV-guided weapons. Since the AF appears to be ruled by Murphy's Law, the biggest pig on the flightline for engines or flight controls would usually zip right through WCS checks, with no problems whatsoever.
Eventually, dynamic checks of the missile and bombing systems became so important to combat operations that specialization became the rule; the "Radar Cal" section was born. At some wings, "rent-an-airman" programs were particularly effective for training F/L 3-levels, which would be assigned to the radar cal section for 90 days or so. There, they got intensive experience in valuable on-aircraft skills within their own AFSC, rather than spending most of their time as "wing walkers" for towed airplanes, or scrubbing jets on the washrack.
All along, the flightline personnel were the key to combat effectiveness. Without skillful troubleshooting techniques, the condition of wing aircraft quickly degenerated to the sorry state found in most TAC wings - especially so, after POMO. Of all the possible assignments for a WCS troop, the flightline was the hardest, and took a particularly rugged and knowledgeable individual to succeed at it. Properly replacing and potting a 55-pin ICU plug in 105-degree temperatures while upside-down in a black-painted cockpit took a lot - but so did the replacement of an overhead missile connector, kneeling in the snow beneath a jet, fighting off a biting, 10-degree wind.
As a "specialty" within WCS, this one was a relative newcomer, for it was "born" when the Air Force responded to deficiencies in AIM-7 missile system reliability during the Vietnam war. Project Constant Hit found serious problems in the test equipment used to calibrate the aircraft. With serious changes in test equipment - like the (in)famous APM-307 - came a requirement for specialized knowledge to use it effectively. As SSgt Ed Pollock would tell 3-levels: "The 307 is just like a dog - it can smell fear".
Initially, even the 307 had serious programming problems using the Multi-missile adapter. (A perfect aircraft would fail for sim dop at the missile station - but no one knew that. It quickly gained a reputation as the "yellow trash can" during this period, and the WCS troops spent more time getting around its false(?) failures than fixing jets.)
Without personnel skillful in both the aircraft and working with/maintaining the 307, a cal docks would turn out bad jets - and it sometimes degenerated to the point where skillful cheaters could play Pinochle for three days before turning out the jet in precisely the condition in which it arrived. Fortunately, such things were rare - and many radar cal shops became true experts in quickly troubleshooting/repairing all types of mission-critical sytems; in some locations, ECM and INS systems were "wrung out" in a coordinated fashion during rad cal, and the place became a center for "heavy maintenance" in avionics and weapons release systems.
Since most cal docks operation had two or more aircraft going at one time, the "other" jet sometimes became an expensive mockup for component troubleshooting or alignments, saving many hours. "Rent-an-airman" programs (temporarily assigning AGS 3-levels to CRS radar cal for intensive on-aircraft training) helped assure that the "tricks of the trade" were passed on, and fostered lots of cooperation between squadrons - something which became increasingly difficult under POMO. In time, many radar cal sections' most precious contribution to a wing was all-around expertise. Skilled in working on-aircraft problems, using many of the same techniques normally found only in the mockup, and highly knowledgeable of all mission systems, many radar cal troops became the "best of the best"; it showed most visibly in SKT scores. Radar Cal put troops on the "fast track" to promotion - not via any phony "political" process, but via the knowledge they gained there. It was no place for slackers; the workload in a good cal docks was heavy, and continuous.
Category II test equipment was not a choice assignment; it was never a "high-profile" job, and often included signing for many millions of dollars of test equipment, as the primary "Equipment Custodian". From torque wrenches to (in some places) APM-307s, they were responsible for ensuring the troops had the properly-calibrated tools required to do the job. This included some dirty deeds: chasing down AN/AWA-6 hydraulic pumps on the flightline, and repairing anything wrong with them or the counterpart pumps inside each mockup. It often was a paperwork nightmare, obtaining "justification" for equipment from the "difficult" folks in the supply squadron, or keeping a large file of "hand receipts" accurate and current.
Cat II required a conscientious, cooperative, and uncomplaining personality - along with significant "management" skills in scheduling. It helped if you didn't mind getting dirty - and good troubleshooting skills were necessary - at least in the early days, when AIM-4D launchers, AWM-20 testers, and -36 carts were part of the maintenance chore. "Sergeant Six-cart" even required some characteristics of MASH's Max Klinger: the ability to con the motor pool into borrowing their engine steam cleaner - and conning the supply weenies into accepting a missile umbilical as a "suitable sub" for a PSM-6 voltmeter when some sleazy NCO retired with one !
It was an important, but thankless job - and it could cripple a wing if done poorly. In almost every case, though, Sergeant Six-cart excelled at it, even though it sometimes seemed that only "Igor-type" hunchbacks ended up there.
There's no question that a good aircrew debrief was absolutely necessary to properly diagnose aircraft problems... and in most places, whoever was available at the time could do the job just fine. However, the automated techniques ( used by the "maintenance analysts" ) for identifying repeat or recurring write-ups were worthless to WCS; work-unit codes from AFTO 349s just didn't cut it.
Most major commands had developed almost-worthless "WCS debriefing" documents for the aircrews to fill in; they drew pictures on them, or, understandably upest at being forced to complete yet another debrief form for every sortie, used the cryptic "radar inop". Thus, many outfits supplied a full-time WCS body to debriefing, hoping to straighten the mess out.
Usually located within an air-conditioned Ops building, it attracted those desiring relief from the flightline. In most places, the debriefer's duty schedule tracked the flying schedule - with little weekend duty, details, or TDY.
It was the perfect place for the "Retired On Active Duty" NCO, who could "kick back", get in some golf some days, yet still provide a very useful function, coaching the "stick actuators" and "flight-suit inserts" into making some sense in their AFTO 781A write-ups. In some cases, good WCS debriefers found the obscure key to some difficult, recurring problems; these never would have been found without critical, knowledgeable tracking of the symptoms, and face-to-face followups with the aircrews. No hero medals were ever presented to debriefers, but it was a very important job that was open to everyone.
Crew Chiefs and Engine weenies would kill to be assigned to this Wing Staff position - yet WCS 7-levels had to somehow p*ss off the boss before they were "banished" to QC. Manning documents always required a filled WCS slot in QC, even if no other avionics techs were "on staff".
There, among the load toads, AGE men, and 431s, they could reflect on their "sins", on the "injustice" of it all, and a small number became bitter foes of their former co-workers.
Officially, there could be a somewhat "adversarial" relationship between QC and the troops doing the work - despite the old joke, "We're here to help you !". Young troops were taught to fear the inspector looking over their shoulders, ever on the alert for a slight slip-up, a missing torque wrench, or a checklist turned to the wrong page for the job being accomplished.
However, while most WCS toads knew at least one QC inspector with a grudge, those assigned there who managed to maintain their composure could be a definite asset to the rest of the WCS troops in a wing. It all came down to knowing when to "look the other way" - and when NOT to do so. This became even more important under POMO, where serious training deficiencies - primarily in AGS - could be reported in such a way that supervision "bought" the write-up, instead of the lowly airman deprived of an opportunity to properly learn his job. During annual "activity" inspections, "recommended corrective actions" could go a long way toward correcting real problems - while the almost-compulsory BS write-up ("hydraulic/pneumatic fittings uncapped", "PSM-6 stored with switches in the wrong position") could be noted, once, without further comment.
Quality Assurance was an important job; there has to be someone "watching the watchers", after all - but in WCS, there was all too much bitterness, revenge, and "political influence" in making the assignments to the job. It is the one thing the crew chiefs do right: their most motivated troops are assigned to QC; WCS sent the guys they didn't like. An assignment to QC couldn't be turned down; you don't tell a Colonel you don't want a job that *he* considers a real honor.
There usually were at least a couple of WCS troops assigned to job control, every shop's voice in the DCM's ear. Many of those assigned there had no direct experience with the weapons system in use - but they had experience in maintenance operations, and did a good job there. ( e.g. - what do you do with a Tsgt F-111 troop assigned to an F-4 base ? Ans: send him to job control.)
Sometimes, intense radio/telephone "friendships" and trust came about between unseen voices at either end of the "hotline"; they grew to know what was really important to the other, and made every attempt to comply. A WCS troop in Control needed one attribute above all else: an air of "authority", which worked both ways..."down" to the troops, and "up" to the DCM. He was, after all, IN CONTROL of the maintenance operations, on a plane-by-plane basis. A young SSgt could indeed tell an old E-8 what to do, though this took some diplomacy skills that not everyone possessed.
Without knowledgeable and reputable WCS troops in Job Control, a wing's mission would be seriously degraded in a very short period of time. Most people forget: when the last WCS troop on duty on a Saturday night finally completed the day's paperwork and locked up the building, he "checked in" with the WCS controller before leaving. All the crew chiefs and other specialists had long since gone home...but JC was on the job - one of the most important jobs in the field.
Since WCS shops were normally sizeable in personnel, and almost always the "last ones out of dodge" (three fully-manned shifts, sometimes seven days per week), orderly rooms and wing staffs often hungrily eyed the numbers to supply bodies in unusual circumstances. Among them:
