The Persian Gulf Deception

Although on the surface the apparent, dramatic turn around in Kremlin thinking and the consequent collapse of Soviet communism may seem like positive developments for the West, there is reason to believe they may actually not be. Secular trends indicate there is a possibility that the Soviets have undermined their own political and economic power as part of a grand deception. There is reason to believe that Russia is currently misleading the world for the purpose of global military domination. An unprecedented campaign of large-scale deceptions may be underway which has totally misled the West such that the East can now successfully launch a surprise third world war. (2)

The problem with the Gulf Crisis and its positive outcome is that it all may have been literally too good to be true. Something which the West seemed to conveniently overlook throughout the Crisis was that Iraq had been a close ally of the Soviet Union for decades prior to the Invasion of Kuwait. Consequently, the humiliating defeat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the Gulf War, like the modern defeat of Soviet communism, may have been a deception- an inherently contradictory lie. There is reason to believe that Saddam intentionally provoked the Gulf War with the sole intention of handing the West a 'great victory'. He would have done this in cooperation with Moscow as an important part of an overall strategy to mislead America, its Western allies, and the world as a whole, so that the East can successfully launch a surprise attack against the West. In other words, when it comes right down to it, the Gulf Crisis and subsequent Allied victory over Iraq may have in actuality been nothing but a seductive lie.

In the following pages I will thoroughly examine how the Persian Gulf Crisis may have been a deception. There will be four major parts. In part I, numerous inconsistencies and contradictions associated with the behavior of Iraq and the Soviets throughout the Gulf Crisis will be brought to light. In the second part, a circumstantial case will be built for a Persian Gulf deception based upon the implications of the given inconsistencies and contradictions. This case will be confirmed by directly incriminating evidence in part III. In the final part, possible strategic aims of a Persian Gulf deception will be discussed.

Going into the Gulf Crisis Iraq had become a major military threat, and potential target, for the West. During the 1980's, Saddam Hussein built-up one of the largest militaries in the world. By 1990, he commanded a million-man army equipped with a vast arsenal of modern weaponry including over 4500 tanks, almost 5000 artillery pieces, and upwards of 800 combat aircraft (3). Saddam also controlled hundreds of anti-ship missiles and surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, as well as a stockpile of chemical and possibly biolological munitions. During the 1980's Iraq developed an extensive military infrastructure involving a comprehensive command, control, communications, and intelligence (Cµ3I) network. By the summer of 1990, throughout Iraq were radar stations, anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missile batteries, and weapons production plants which included facilities for the research and development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. (4)

As Iraqi military power grew, the West became increasingly concerned about its expanding regional influence. In early May of 1990- just prior to the Gulf Crisis- 'The New Republic' warned:

All in all, going into the Invasion of Kuwait, the West saw Iraq as a dangerous military threat and destabilizing force in the richest oil region of the world. Saddam's growing military power, coupled with his staunch anti-Israeli and anti-Western mindset, was becoming a major concern for the West. Iraq could someday unify the Arab world such that the West would be held hostage by its oil dependency. Even worse, Iraq could eventually unleash a major regional war involving weapons of mass destruction which could result in the destruction of Israel. By 1990, Saddam Hussein had come to embody many of "the serious security problems of the post-cold war era: aggression, terrorism, virulant tribalism, and missile, nuclear, and chemical weapons proliferation" (6).

In the weeks and months before Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, Saddam was putting out some not-so-subtle hints as to his belligerent intentions, giving the West an opportunity to consider the possibility of a future confrontation. In a speech made on April 3rd, 1990, Saddam threatened to "make fire eat up half of Israel", a comment which drew widespread Western consternation (7). In May, U.S. officials confirmed press rumors that Saddam told Kuwait: "Iraqi security may require him to occupy Kuwaiti territory in the future" (8). Such bellicose remarks likely led Western leaders to consider possible responses should Iraq become aggressive in the near-future.

As Iraq began to blatantly threaten Kuwait in late July of 1990, the United States made it clear that it would respond forcefully if need be. The prevailing sentiment of America's leaders at that time was reflected by Republican Senator Alfonse D'Amato who denounced Saddam as: "...a butcher, a killer, a bully. Some day we're going to have to stand up to him. Why not now?" (9). The State Department announced that the United States would "remain strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defence of our friends in the Gulf, with whom we have deep and long- standing ties" (10). To underscore America's willingness to use military force against Iraq should events warrant such action, a joint naval exercise with the United Arab Emirates was hastily arranged and initiated in the northern Gulf (11).

Apparently unintimidated by American posturing, on August 2nd, 1990, Saddam proved good on his word and Iraq invaded Kuwait. The West received the opportunity it needed to do something decisive about the growing Iraqi threat. Almost immediately, the United States and its Western Allies began preparing for a war against Iraq. Saddam's military empire could be forcefully checked before Iraqi regional influence grew too far or before Iraq's military might became too strong- eventually including nuclear weapons.

Saddam's provocation was ideal for a decisive Western military response. As the 1991-92 'American Defense Annual' later put it: "Saddam Hussein... proved to be a near perfect villian, and the coalition aligned against him had a compelling 'casus belli'" (12). A ruthless military dictator, infamous for gassing his own people, blitzkrieged the small, peaceful nation of Kuwait in blatant violation of international law. What's more, Saddam's Invasion resulted in Iraq's control of over a third of the world's available oil reserves and "put his forces within striking distance of one of the world's most critical resources, Saudi Arabia's oil fields, making it necessary for the United States and other nations to act to counter him, instead of just issuing protest statements" (13). As a whole, through the Kuwaiti Invasion, Saddam had come to threaten half the world's oil, a situation wholly intolerable to the oil-dependent West.

Between the Invasion and the beginning of the Gulf War, Iraq continued to behave in a seemingly irrational manner that was inconsistent with its own interests but favorable to Western interests.

In the wake of Saddam's overrun of Kuwait, international pressure, led by the West, began to build on Iraq to withdraw. Immediately, U.N. Resolution 660 was ratified which called for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait (14). Within days, U.S. military forces began flooding into Saudi Arabia. With Saddam remaining intransigent, the United Nations decided to impose international economic sanctions against Iraq. As Iraq failed to respond, military forces from across the globe began flowing into the Gulf along side the growing American build-up. On November 29th, with a sizable Coalition force already in place, the U.N. okayed a resolution for the forceful removal of Iraq from Kuwait by a U.S.-led international Coalition should Saddam's forces not unilaterally leave by January 15, 1991. (15)

Saddam's intransigence as international pressure began to build made little sense. It was apparent, given the scale of the American-led military build-up in Saudi Arabia, that, beyond freeing Kuwait, the West was preparing to use the Invasion of Kuwait as an excuse to destroy Iraq's military potential and, in turn, the threat Saddam posed to Western interests in the Middle East. Any sort of compromise or moderation on Saddam's part could have easily undone Western attempts to organize international support for a war and, in turn, resulted in substantial Iraqi gains. In John Bulloch's and Harvey Morris' 'Saddam's War', it is pointed out that:

Instead of moderation, however, Saddam remained almost completely intransigent and belligerent toward the West. He persistently made clear his unwillingness to be persuaded by Western intimidation. He declared Kuwait to have always been a part of Iraq and let the world know that all of Iraqi sovereignty- including Kuwait- would be militarily defended against any hostile actions. Furthermore, Saddam called on moslems around the world to rise up and launch a holy war, or 'jihad', against Western imperialism. (17)

Saddam sometimes, and usually at the wrong times, failed to behave according to the belligerent image he painted of himself. Iraqi forces never preempted the build-up of the American-led Coalition in Saudi Arabia. Saddam conveniently stood back as nations from all over the world, particularly in the West, mobilized and imported a massive military force. Yet, attacking while the Coalition was incomplete and disorganized may have undermined the Coalition's ability to successfully wage a war. Unfortunately, as is pointed out in the 1991-92 'American Defense Annual': "It seems unlikely that future enemies will graciously grant U.S. forces five months to prepare for battle" (18).

Even more inconsistent than failing to preempt was Saddam's release of Western hostages. There can be little doubt that: "One act of great good fortune was Saddam Hussein's decision to release his hostages, those human shields whose continued presence in Iraq would have vastly complicated the air war" (19). Specifically, Saddam made hostages out of the thousands of Western civilians (including over 3000 Americans) who had been living in Kuwait or Iraq when the Gulf Crisis broke out. He threatened to use them as 'human shields' by placing them in strategic targets in order to deter any approaching Coalition attack. These hostages became one of Saddam's only major trump cards against a U.S.-led attack. It was apparent a Coalition bombing campaign that would cost thousands of innocent Western lives would have exceptionally high political costs for our leaders. In an act of goodwill totally uncharacteristic of the 'Butcher of Baghdad', however, Saddam released the hostages. The only major concession he made before the Gulf War was profoundly self-contradictory in that it directly undermined his stated intention to inflict as much damage and pain as possible on the West. In fact, Saddam spared the lives of Westerners at the cost of Iraqi lives later lost in unhampered Coalition bombings.

The deadline of January 15th eventually passed and the U.S.-Coalition attacked the very next day. The Gulf War was underway as well as continued inconsistencies and contradictions.

As General Powell correctly pointed out the following day, the Coalition somehow 'caught Iraq off guard' and achieved tactical surprise in its post-deadline air-attack (20). This, of course, is absurd. Going into the Gulf War, Iraq had one of the most experienced and hardened militaries in the world. It had just completed an almost decade-long, modern war with Iran. Furthermore, Iraq was equipped with a sophisticated Soviet Cµ3I network. To top it all off, Iraq had several months going into January 15th to prepare its defenses and a military response should war come. Yet, Saddam's war-machine was somehow surprised by a *deadline*-attack. Upon the initial wave of the air campaign there was little or no immediate Iraqi response: no defensive black-out of Baghdad (something they had been rehearsing), no immediate retaliatory SCUD missile strikes, and no Iraqi air- or ground-counteroffensive. Fortunately for the Coalition, all its planes ran into was well-lit targets, inept Iraqi air defenses, and some sporadic dog-fights. Tactical surprise allowed the Coalition to swiftly disable Saddam's war-machine with minimum associated costs.

During the air-campaign, the only significant counterattack from Iraq was random SCUD missile attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia. Fortunately, however, chemical weapons were never involved. Of course, why weren't they? It was not that Saddam lacked such weapons for in the War's aftermath U.N. inspectors have found dozens of Al-Hussein chemical SCUDs which survived Coalition bombings (21). Saddam decided not to use chemical SCUDs even though such restraint contradicted both the threats he was making and the image he was conveying prior to and during the Gulf War. If Saddam really wished to spread the conflict and set-off a holy war as he persistently claimed he would, hitting Israel with chemical SCUDs would have been an ideal provocation. It is doubtful that Saddam feared Israeli retaliation given that Iraq was already stomaching over two thousand Coalition sorties a day and Israeli involvement was the intended goal. All in all, it makes little sense that Saddam failed to use chemical SCUDs during the Gulf War against Israel or any of Iraq's enemies, whereas he gassed his own people only a couple of years before. (22)

In late February, the Coalition ground-offensive got underway, but again no chemical weapons were involved. Apparently, Saddam disallowed the use of any of the tens-of-thousands of chemical artillery shells and chemical mines in the Iraqi arsenal (23). This is surprising given how these weapons were employed with great success during the Iran-Iraq War (24). The fact that chemical munitions were not used by the Iraqis is but another inconsistency on the part of Saddam which was to the benefit of the U.S. and the Coalition forces.

By March, Kuwait was repatriated and Saddam had managed to suffer a defeat that seemed beyond human reasoning. With all said and done, the U.S.-Coalition had succeeded in a total military 'rout' of Iraq's war- hardened, well-equipped, million-man army and hardly got scratched in the process. After six-weeks of Allied aerial bombardment involving upwards of 100,000 sorties and 141,000 tons of bombs, Saddam's vast war-machine was left decimated at the cost of only a few dozen Coalition planes (25). Any of Saddam's forces in Kuwait that escaped destruction during the Coalition air-campaign proceeded to be encircled and destroyed in a 100-hour Allied ground offensive. When the War was over, more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers had been killed, 300,000 were injured, and around 150,000 had been taken prisoner (26). In causing this immense massacre, the Allies suffered only 468 casualties: 149 dead, 81 missing-in-action, and 238 wounded (27). Through the Gulf War Saddam lost some 4000 tanks, 2000 artillery pieces, 2000 armored personnel carriers (APCs), 100 aircraft, and 80 ships (28). Furthermore, Iraq's infrastructure suffered what the U.N. later described as 'near-apocalyptic' damage (29). The Allies, on the other hand, lost only 4 tanks, 1 artillery piece, 9 APCs, 44 aircraft, and 2 ships (30). All in all, Saddam's defeat at the hands of the West was so drastic and humiliating as to be utterly nonsensical.

With the Gulf War over, the West had reason to breathe a sigh of relief at home. Fortunately, there had been no major anti-Western terrorist attacks associated with the Crisis. Of course, why weren't there? The CIA "picked up all the tell-tale signs of Iraq's ability to wage chemical warfare and launch terrorist attacks around the Middle East and Europe... Intelligence analysts are still scratching their heads, wondering why these capabilities were not used (31)". In other words, Saddam refrained from launching terrorist attacks just as he failed to wage chemical attacks even though he was fully capable of and supposedly intending to do both. Thus, since there was no terrorism, Saddam acted in a contradictory manner which, once again, was favorable to the West.

In the wake of the Gulf War, one of the greatest inconsistencies of all concerning Saddam's behavior has come to light. U.N. inspections following the Gulf War ceasefire have revealed that Iraq's program to develop nuclear weapons, code-named 'Project Babylon' (32), was far larger and more successful than had ever been suspected in the West. In fact, it is today believed that Iraq may have been less than a year away from having at least a few crude nuclear weapons when it invaded Kuwait (33). Of course, if Saddam was interested in taking on the West and fighting the "Mother of All Battles", why did he make his challenge when he did? Why didn't he wait a year until he had the Bomb? Why did Saddam invade Kuwait and fight a war with the West before developing the ultimate means by which to fulfill his grandiose ambitions?

For the Gulf Crisis, Soviet foreign policy did an about-face. Throughout most of the United Nation's history, Moscow had tried to undermine any Western efforts to bring about international cooperation, particularly if such cooperation was to somehow serve Western interests. Yet, for the Gulf Crisis, this was not so. For the first time since World War II the Soviets cooperated with the West in organizing an international effort.

The effort they finally chose to support was blatantly in the West's interest and against their own.

The oil-shock stemming from the Gulf Crisis was devastating to Western economic vitality. The West desperately needed a way to resecure its supply of cheap oil from the Persian Gulf by freeing Kuwait and eliminating the Iraqi threat. Without the okay of the Soviets and international support this may never have been possible and the West's economy may very well have been plunged into depression.

For the Soviets, on the other hand, higher oil-prices stemming from the Gulf Crisis was a blessing. At the time, Soviet Russia was the world's largest producer and second largest exporter of oil. Hence, the sharp rise in oil prices meant windfall profits of hard foreign currency- something the Soviets greatly needed. Given the price at which oil topped-out during the Crisis, the Soviets could have hoped to increase their hard-currency earnings by nearly $40 billion a year. (34)

Beyond oil interests, Saddam Hussein's Iraq was a valuable ally and military client which the Soviets should have wanted to keep.

By 1990, the Soviets had a long-standing and deeply-vested relationship with Iraq. In 1972, Moscow and Baghdad signed a 'Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation' (35). Over the next two decades the Soviets poured thousands of military 'advisers' and other specialists into Iraq who trained Baghdad's general staff and planning officers as well as organized its intelligence services (36). Soviet involvement in Iraq became particularly deep after Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979. Guided by a Stalinist philosophy, Saddam wanted to model Iraq after the Soviet military state (37). He affirmed his commitment to Moscow when he came to power by signing an agreement with Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov on military cooperation and strategic consultation (38). After making the agreement, the Soviets helped Saddam carry out a large-scale campaign to consolidate power within Iraq and become a regional military superpower. Reflecting Moscow's involvement, eight military facilities were constructed in Iraq for Soviet use including both air bases and naval ports (39). All in all, by the Kuwaiti Invasion, the Soviet Union had invested a great deal of time, energy, and resources in the construction of Saddam's totalitarian regime and modern war-machine- an investment they likely meant to make good on.

In developing its massive war-machine, Iraq became an ideal Soviet military clientele state. During the 1980's Iraq became the world's largest importer of arms. It is estimated that between 1980 and 1990 Saddam spent some $100 billion dollars on military equipment (that compares to just under $70 billion spent on arms by Britian or France during the same period) (40). Since 90 percent of Iraq's military was bought from the Soviets, it should be apparent just how valuable a customer Saddam was to Moscow.

Since Iraq purchased most of its arms from the Soviets on credit, it was in Moscow's interest to maintain Saddam's regime and Iraq's economic vitality. Going into the Gulf Crisis, Baghdad owed Moscow some $80 billion. For 1990 alone, the Soviets were expecting to receive $2 billion from Iraq (41). Given the seeming economic distress in Soviet Russia, preserving Iraq's economic potential should have been important to them. In a nutshell, the Soviets should not have wanted to turn their back on Iraq during the Gulf Crisis. As 'Times' columnist A.M. Rosenthal pointed out at the time, doing so meant that:

The principal reason Moscow forged a close relationship with Baghdad and made such a deep military commitment is because Iraq has tremendous geopolitical strategic value. Iraq is at the heart of the Persian Gulf and the richest oil-region in the world. Thus, it is a focal point not only of the Arab world, but also of vital Western energy interests. A foothold in Iraq enhanced Moscow's influence over other Arab nations and gave the Soviets access to the aquilles heel of the oil-dependent West.

Because of Iraq's strategic value, it was widely believed the Soviets would never let the West attack and defeat Saddam Hussein. Such a scenario entailed a shift in the regional balance of power that compromised Soviet interests and benefitted the West. Just prior to the Gulf War, 'Aviation Week and Space Technology' reported:

At the Hoover Institute, a national defense think-tank, experts believed that the Soviets would "do everything in their power to keep that man in there... They do not want that part of the world dominated by us" (44).

All in all, Moscow had vested interests in its relationship with Baghdad such that they should have stood behind, or at least sought to protect, Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the Gulf Crisis. Yet, they did not. In fact, they opened the way for the West to launch a war against their valuable Iraqi ally:

Although at least some contemplation would have been expected, the Soviets turned their back on Saddam and helped out the West immediately and without reservation. On the day of the Invasion, American Secretary of State James Baker was visiting his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, in Siberia. On news of the Invasion, the two got together, and within just a couple of hours they had worked out the draft wording for U.N. Resolution 660 which called for an immediate, unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. (46)

As Western forces began piling into the Gulf, Moscow failed to use its diplomatic leverage over Saddam to remove Iraq from Kuwait. This, of course, makes little sense given what the Soviets had to gain from preserving Iraq. Yet, while a diplomatic solution was still possible before Iraq was destroyed by Western military force, the Soviets sat on their hands. If they were interested in seeing a peaceful resolution to the Crisis they should have been able to produce one since the Soviet Union was Iraq's principal political- and military-supporter. It is apparent that: "The Soviet Union is the one power that could have brought Iraq to terms early on if Moscow had really clenched its fist" (47).

In fact, Saddam may have backed down if only the Soviets informed Baghdad of their willingness to let the U.S.-led Coalition attack. In 'Saddam's War', the authors revealed:

As war approached the Soviets actually helped prepare the U.S.-led effort to destroy Iraq. They fed the West important codes and intelligence on the Iraqi military which simplified the Coalition's offensive (49). Hence, the Soviets went extraordinarily out of their way to facilitate a Western-led attack against their valuable ally.

There was a prevailing and consistent theme to the contradictory behavior of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the Soviet Union during the Gulf Crisis. Both nations persistently acted in a way that facilitated a sensational Western Gulf War victory over Iraq. If, as part of a large- scale deception, Soviet Russia and Saddam's Iraq were working together to bring about the Gulf War and have Iraq decisively lose to the West, then the seemingly inconsistent and irrational behavior of Bagdhad and Moscow makes sense.

Saddam's Invasion of Kuwait was an ideal provocation to lure the West into launching a war against Iraq. By 1990, the increasing threat posed by Saddam's radical anti-Western policies, growing military power, and nuclear weapons development program, most likely had the West seeking an excuse to stop Iraq short. As Saddam began to make belligerent threats, increasingly directed at Kuwait, the West was given ample time to muse the possibility of fighting a needed war against Iraq. When Saddam actually invaded Kuwait, there was a blatant violation of international law and half of the world's known oil reserves came under an Iraqi threat- the West received both an ideal excuse and an unavoidable provocation to wage a mitigating war against Saddam's military empire.

Following the Invasion, the Soviets made it easy for the West to launch a war against Iraq. With the U.S. Secretary of State already in Russia, Moscow was able to immediately cooperate and the initial U.N. call for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait resulted. The reason the Soviets didn't take time to contemplate their response is because they had preplanned it. As the U.S. worked with the international community to set the stage for a full-scale war against Iraq, the Soviets continued to cooperate including their okay for the use of military force against their Iraqi ally. As the deadline for war approached, Moscow made sure not to use diplomatic pressure to get Saddam to back down because the intent was to make way for a Western attack.

Going into the January 15th deadline, Saddam made sure the West could go through with the War it desired by remaining intransigent and belligerent. Even as it became apparent that the Coalition force was more than large enough to overwhelm Iraq, Saddam failed to compromise on Kuwait. Saddam took steps prior to the Gulf War to open the way for a successful Coalition attack with minimum potential costs for the West. By failing to preempt the build-up of forces in Saudi Arabia, Iraq made it easy for the U.S.-led Coalition to achieve a military superiority and fully organize itself, thus facilitating Western success. On top of this, by releasing his Western 'human shield' hostages, Saddam removed a substantial mitigating factor to a Coalition air-attack and greatly reduced the potential costs the West would face in launching a war, both in terms of Western lives and consequent political costs.

For the initial Coalition air-attack, Saddam left his forces off-guard and unprepared, allowing the Allies the advantage of tactical surprise. Targets were left vulnerable, no initial military response was prepared or executed, and defensive responses were subdued, thus the door was left open for the the Allies to swiftly disable the potential of Saddam's war- machine. This gave the West an inflated sense of technical and strategic superiority, something which would be further fed throughout the War.

As the War progressed and Saddam's empire was being decimated, Iraq refrained from using chemical weapons so that the West's Gulf victory would be clean-cut and total. Saddam made sure not to hit Israel with chemical SCUDs in that such a provocation would have surely elicited a potent Israeli military response. Israeli involvement in the Gulf War could have easily led to a breakup of the Coalition and possibly spawned a larger regional conflict. By keeping chemical weapons off the battlefield, Saddam minimized Coalition casualties and kept the conflict from escalating in a way which could have led to a breakdown in international support for the War and/or threatened the Coalition's cohesion. All in all, by not using chemical weapons, Saddam minimized Western losses- both in terms of lives and associated political costs, thus insuring that the victory handed to the West was total.

Throughout the whole affair there was no associated terrorism so that the deception would go smoothly and Soviet involvement would remain undiscovered. Extensive evidence has been uncovered which indicates that Moscow has been behind much of international terrorism (50). Thus, there is reason to believe that, prior to the Gulf Crisis, the Kremlin may have put out some sort of restraining order on both Saddam and international terrorist organizations in general. This would have been done for two reasons. First off, it was important to constrain hostilities as much as possible to the Persian Gulf region. Aggravating other tensions, such as between the Arabs and Israel, would have threatened both international support for the Gulf War and the exceptional nature of the West's victory. Secondly, terrorism could have opened up linkages to Moscow that Western intelligence might discover and trace, thus leading to an uncovering of the deception.

When the Gulf War ended and Iraq had been forced from Kuwait, Saddam had managed to achieve exactly what he intended from the start. He suffered a drastic, humiliating defeat while inflicting minimal damage on the U.S.-led Coalition. Thus, the West was handed a sensational, total victory in the Gulf.

As for the surprising extent of Iraq's nuclear program, Saddam challenged the West before he had the Bomb because 'Project Babylon' was most valuable as bait for a Western attack. Should Saddam have invaded Kuwait once Iraq had nuclear weapons, the odds are that there never would have been a Gulf War, and, if there was, it wouldn't have been a 'great victory' for the West.

If it seems difficult to believe that Saddam might have staged the Gulf Crisis under Kremlin order, simply consider the alternative: How could have Saddam invaded Kuwait without Moscow's knowledge and consent?

In a New Republic article, 'Virtual Ally: What's the Soviet Game in the Gulf', which came out just after the Crisis erupted, Edward Jay Epstein, an expert on Soviet intelligence, asked the provocative question:

As for consent, according to Claudia Wright of 'Foreign Affairs', in the 1980's the U.S. State Department thought of Saddam Hussein as "so beholden to the Soviet Union as to be incapable of autonomous foreign policy" (52). Given how dependent Iraq was on the Soviets- particularly in building up and maintaining its military strength, and given Saddam's Stalinist, pro-Soviet mind-set, it's unlikely Baghdad would have ever pulled-off a stunt as reckless and potentially costly as invading Kuwait without first seeking Moscow's approval. This is particularly true since it would have been nearly impossible to develop and carry out such plans without the Soviets noticing.

All in all, there is good reason to believe California Senator Bill Richardson who remarked, "there is little doubt that the Soviets were apprised of the invasion before it happened, helped plan it and approved it. There is no way communist puppet Saddam Hussein would have given the order to invade Kuwait if it were not sanctioned by Gorbachev (53)."

There was strong evidence that the Soviets were involved with Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait. First off, two weeks prior to the Invasion, Colonel General Albert Makashov, former commander of the Volga-Urals Command, went to Baghdad as a Soviet 'military counseler' (54). Since Iraq's military command would have had difficulty handling an operation as logistically complex as the Kuwaiti Invasion, there is reason to believe Makashov, and/or other Russian commanders, oversaw the Invasion. This is substantiated by the fact that there were Soviet military advisers attached to the Iraqi helicopter, tank, logistic, and radar units used for the Invasion of Kuwait (55). Also, 1200 Iraqi military personnel were being trained by Soviet specialists at Odessa, inside the Soviet Union, around the time of the Invasion (56). Further evidence of Moscow's complicity in the Invasion stems from the fact that the Soviets sold or transferred military spare parts to Saddam for at least five days following the August 2nd Invasion (57). What's more, when the U.S. began surveillance over Kuwait in the wake of the Invasion, there were indications that Soviet technicians helped the Iraqi air force jam intelligence and eavesdropping on flights by American aircraft (58).

There was also strong evidence of Soviet complicity with Iraq throughout the Gulf War. On numerous occasions allied forces heard Russian language communiques on Iraqi military radios. Following the War, returning U.S. soldiers said they saw evidence in the field that Soviet advisers were working along with Iraqi forces. According to F. Andy Messing, executive director of the National Defense Council Foundation, there were over two dozen documented cases that showed Soviet involvement in Iraq during the Gulf War. "The Soviets were all over the place", Messing reported, Soviet advisers "continued to tune radars, fix tanks and planes and advise (Iraqi) combat units down to the battalion level". In a Senate Foreign Relations briefing paper published February 21st, 1991, it was reported that: "For two days in February, Russian language and voices were communicating over Iraqi military networks". Furthermore, the Soviets repositioned satellites over the Gulf region and were "supplying targeting information to the Iraqis for mobile missile launchers". The report outlined how Soviet advisers were "helping Iraqis fire SCUD missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia". On February 25th, two days after the ground war began, former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said during a BBC interview that the Soviet Union was still supplying arms to Iraq. Despite the strong evidence of Soviet complicity, the Kremlin denied any involvement with Iraq and assured the West that its advisers and personnel were pulled out soon after Iraq invaded Kuwait. (59)

All in all, there appears to be sufficient indirect and direct evidence to believe that the Persian Gulf Crisis was a Soviet-engineered deception. The inconsistencies and contradictions in Iraqi and Soviet behavior throughout the Gulf Crisis build a strong circumstantial case for a deception in the Gulf. Based upon the direct evidence above, there seems little doubt that the Soviets were both aware of and involved in the Invasion of Kuwait. Furthermore, it is clear that the Soviets underhandedly backed the Iraqis throughout the Gulf War. The logical explanation for the directly incriminating evidence is that the circumstantial case is correct. Moscow and Baghdad worked together to create a large-scale deception in the Persian Gulf.

As a deception, the Gulf Crisis would have served important military and political strategic aims of Moscow and its Eastern counterparts.

In that it is not popularly perceived or expected, Russia, in concert with other military powers of the East, may be pursuing a grand strategy for world domination which involves launching a surprise third world war against the West (61). The central idea of any such strategy would be to instill a false sense of security in the West. Such a false sense of security will minimimize the West's military potential and maximize Western vulnerability. This is true for two main reasons. First off, with no sense of a threat, the West will reduce its military preparedness. Secondly, upon attack, the East would have the advantage of surprise- a key ingredient to success in a war involving rapid mass destruction.

The principal way in which Moscow may be trying to instill a false sense of security in the West is deceit. By intentionally creating and exaggerating the image of weakness and incapacitation, along with pursuing cooperative, peace-oriented policies favorable to the West, the perceived Soviet military threat has been virtually eliminated, America has come to trust its long-time Russian foe, and Western arrogance has been inflated to blinding proportions. Consequently, a tremendous, potentially false sense of security has developed in the West entailing a high degree of vulnerability.

If, indeed, the Gulf crisis was a deception, then it was tailor-made for a strategy as outlined above. First off, by creating a serious international crisis in which critical Western interests were at stake, Moscow gave itself the opportunity to cooperate with the West in a manner that seemed to reflect a progressive, peace-oriented change of heart. This significantly fostered Western trust. Secondly, since the West was allowed such a substantial victory over Iraq, and because Saddam's military state was of Soviet-design, the West's sense of superiority to the East was significantly inflated by the Gulf War, particularly with respect to military capabilities (62). Third, since Moscow turned its back on a valuable military ally during the Gulf Crisis, the image that Russia is incapacitated and increasingly interested in peaceful coexistence was reinforced and exagerrated. Lastly, on a broader level, the isolation and utter military defeat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq served as a symbolic end to the power of military totalitarian regimes.

A provocative example of how Western trust may have been directly exploited by the Soviets for successfully waging a surprise third world war can be seen in interrelated developments surrounding the Gulf Crisis and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. In November of 1990, during the middle of the Gulf Crisis, the United States signed the CFE treaty with the Soviet Union. The treaty entails major reductions in both sides' European theatre conventional forces into 1994.

The CFE treaty is highly favorable to the Soviets in the context of their initiating a third world war with a preemptive, nuclear surprise attack against the West. The reason this is so has to do with the fact that the United States is an ocean away from the European continent, whereas the Soviet Union is directly attached to it. Following a Soviet nuclear attack, America would be unable to reinforce its European allies because the necessary ports, airfields, men and equipment will have been destroyed. Consequently, it would be relatively easy for Russia to reorganize the Soviet army and march across Western Europe (63). Thus, the U.S. force withdrawals under the CFE treaty may be benefitting Russia if, indeed, a nuclear surprise attack is being planned.

The Gulf Crisis sped-up and augmented the U.S. pullout from Europe. A substantial portion of the half-million soldiers and military equipment that poured into Saudi Arabia for the Gulf War was pulled out of Western Europe (64). For instance, half of America's mechanized divisions in Europe were drawn into the Gulf. From Germany alone, more than 70,000 soldiers and 40,000 tanks, artillery pieces, and other equipment were moved to Saudi Arabia (65). Following the Gulf War, with superpower trust elevated, many of the forces pulled from Western Europe returned to the U.S. rather than the European theatre because it was to be removed by 1994 under the terms of the CFE treaty anyways (66).

The Gulf Crisis, along with technicalities in the CFE treaty, was used by the Soviets to stockpile military equipment behind the Ural mountains- an important preparatory measure prior to waging a surprise attack- without alarming the West. Just before signing the CFE agreement during the middle of the Gulf Crisis, the Soviets scurried over 70,000 pieces of military equipment east of the Ural mountains (according to Moscow's count) (67). On top of a large number of planes, helicopters, and armoured combat vehicles, 20,000 tanks and over 34,000 artillery pieces were moved. This accounts for half the tanks and two-thirds of the artillery the Soviets had prepositioned against Western Europe up to that time. Placing the equipment behind the Urals protects it from being counted under the CFE treaty limits. It also protects it from Western missile and/or air attacks and puts the equipment in a strategic position for later use in a re- conquest of Eastern Europe and offensive on Western Europe. In a Februaury opposing-editorial to the Wall Street Journal, the Deputy Director of the Arms Control Association, Jack Mendelsohn, commented that: "...placing these weapons in storage behind the Urals says something important about Soviet intentions regarding a surprise attack or general war in Europe" (68). NATO's supreme commander (retired: 6/92), General John Galvin, had this to say about the stockpile: "My concern is that this equipment is there for future use. It's big, big numbers. But I know it's just sitting there in the snow- tanks and airplanes side by side, sometimes for kilometers at a time" (69). For the most part, however, the West disregarded the provocative Soviet move. Western suspicions were minimized due to growing superpower trust, the distracting events in the Gulf, and the idea that the Soviets may have simply been seeking to circumvent the CFE treaty.

As can be readily surmised, the general idea of the Gulf Crisis and Moscow's strategy in general may involve seducing the West with lies in order to successfully wage a surprise third world war. It may be that Gorbachev and Saddam are seeking to achieve long-run victory by allowing their own short-run defeats. The West seems to have been easily seduced by what may prove to be the staged death of Eastern military totalitarianism and an illusory global victory of Western society. Such a lie is simply too tempting for indulgent, proud Westerners to refuse. As a consequence of this, Western vulnerability is at a post-war extreme and its military potential has been significantly compromised. Thus, the path may have been opened for an all-out surprise attack from the East.

A logical explanation for the pervasive inconsistencies and contradictions in Iraqi and Soviet behavior throughout the Gulf Crisis and Gulf War is that the whole affair may have been some sort of staged deception. It is possible that Saddam invaded Kuwait under Kremlin order with the sole intention of provoking a war with the West. By cooperating with the West in an unprecedented manner, the Soviets opened the way for the Gulf War. Once war came, Saddam did what it took to decisively lose. The upshot is that Moscow and Baghdad underhandedly worked together to hand the West an illusory Gulf victory.

The purpose behind such a deception would likely involve an overall Eastern strategy to dominate the world by fighting and winning a third world war. Saddam stomached a humiliating defeat in order to augment a false sense of security in the West and help Soviet Russia completely win over Western trust. This, in turn, has opened the way for Moscow to dupe the West into lowering its guard, thus creating an opportunity for the East to launch a successful surprise attack.

Due in large part to the Gulf Crisis, the world may today be on the brink of what would undoubtedly be the the Mother of All Wars. It is rather apparent that an attack from the East would today be a total surprise. Furthermore, in the wake of its Gulf 'victory', America has increasingly let down its military guard, particularly against a Russian nuclear attack. {For instance, America's strategic command has been disbanded, a sizable part of the U.S. ICBM arsenal has been deactivated, many attack-warning satellites and radar installations have been shutdown, and almost all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons abroad have been pulled home- including those which were on naval vessels (70).} All in all, the proper conditions have developed for the East to launch a successful surprise attack against the West. The Persian Gulf Crisis may have been a seductive lie which was created toward this ultimate End.