Regarding the mine incident re: USS Warrington in July of 1972 while assuming blockade duty off a (mined) North Vietnamese harbor. Many of the USS Hull's (DD 945) crew observed the USS Warrington on the day she "got the mine." We also responded to provide "Rescue and Assistance" following the mine detonations that afternoon.

USS Hull was one of three ships on blockade and interdiction duty, along with a [unnamed] DD and the guided missile destroyer USS Robison. On the day it happened the Warrington had reported to the task group sometime overnight. She arrived to relieve the other Destroyer in normal rotation, and I believe that the DD had left station by the time the explosions occurred, but may have been recalled to station after the explosion. Hull had been on this station for a week or so (the days ran together on that cruise) and a routine had developed. Mid July daytime at this duty was mostly - hold station and watch the harbor entrance. We would run out to catch an oiler or ammo ship every day or two to keep everything topped off.

My recollection was that daytime station was 10,000 to 15,000 yards off shore, far enough to preclude threat from shore battery but close enough to "discourage" any ships from entering or leaving. Nobody did during the daytime. Nobody in there right mind would challenge the mid-day sun in that part of Vietnam in mid July. Let alone would Charlie provide a line-of-sight visual target for eight or ten 5"38's and 5"54's waiting for the opportunity. All we needed was something to shoot at.

Several hours before the hits at 0745 M&B Division not on watch, were assembled on Hull's starboard side for Quarters. Officers Call ran long and the Chiefs and LPO's, and eventually both divisions watched the "show" being put on by the just-arrived destroyer. The Warrington was making white-water several thousand yards closer to the coastline than our normal station. Although she was at least a mile distant (?) the bow wake and rooster tail were clearly visible - doing better than 20 knots I would guess. We watched her steam in front of the harbor mouth for some 15-20 minutes including at least one significant turn. There was no apparent enemy activity and Hull was at "normal" modified condition III watches (standard in enemy waters with no imminent threat).

While waiting for the officers to call quarters I wondered aloud to the Chief, "I wonder what the f... they're up to?" Ben Chisolm MMC wagged, "They're testing the mines!" The harbor had been mined by our forces some weeks earlier (or at least that was the general belief of the crew) ... and the charts on the bridge had areas of "something" clearly marked on them. We all had a good laugh at Chiefs joke and stood to quarters.

At quarters it was announced that the USS Warrington had relieved the USS ______ (the other Fram II can) and joined our three-ship task unit. After quarters we queried the MPA as to what they were doing? To my recollection, his response indicated that it was as big a mystery in the wardroom as it was to us. I did not witness anything stated below first hand, but I have good confidence in what was relayed to me while I manned #2 engineroom during the pursuit of the damaged destroyer and the Rescue and Assistance alongside. The Chief Engineer and DCA went aboard her as well as a repair crew. I believe that our DCA, Ens. Mike Riley, stayed aboard because of the injury suffered by the Warrington's DCA (I think that he rode her back to Subic...?). John Lee MM3 was our Captain's 1JV Talker and my counterpart in aft engineroom. He was on the bridge for the entire evolution and was the primary source of the eye-witness account and bridge gossip.

Hull was on tropical hours because of the afternoon heat and the nighttime intensive operations. When Warrington reported the hit and turned east, most of Hull's crew was either racked out or on watch. I suspect Robison's crew was doing about the same. During the day, when we weren't chasing oilers or ammo ships, was when we got our sleep. All of the action here was at night so when Battle Stations and then Rescue and Assistance Detail were called early in the afternoon ... something was up. We went to General Quarters only for a short time and then manned Rescue and Assistance Detail. Whatever happened to Warrington, it was it wasn't perceived as a threat to us - and ANY aircraft in that area would have been a major threat.

However ignominious the ultimate loss of the USS Warrington to "friendly" mines, and for whatever reason she was in harms way, make no mistake that she served her crew well that day. We turned and accelerated to intercept her (I don't know our distance or relative position. I was a snipe), but the Warrington wasn't waiting for anybody - she was heading east and considering the damage, at great speed. We badly underestimated her cap acity to get out of the mine field and eventually had to overtake her from the stern. John later told me that we didn't start to overtake her until we were doing well over 20 knots - even though she was crabbing badly to port and obviously making speed on only the starboard shaft!

For the record, the USS Warrington did the most you can ask of any ship - it got her crew out of immediate danger in the mine field and reached an area where the other 'cans' could provide help. In the 30 minutes between the mines and going DIW (dead in the water) ... she did what every greyhound is designed to do - run!

We spent a couple of hours maneuvering alongside. We transferred some DC stuff, shoring mostly, as well as a repair crew and the DCA. Talk among the crew about the damage and injuries was, for the most part, consistent with the other responses. Our Chief engineer told us that there were no fatalities, for or five injuries, none life threatening. The irony of the Damage Control Assistant being the only one incapacitated was noted by everyone. Also at that time, USS Robison rigged the tow and I believe we pumped feedwater to Warrington to assist in an attempt to light-off the forward plant. We returned to blockade duty as the Robison and Warrington headed east to meet the tug at 2-3 knots. We had plenty to think about once it was over. They were on the way back to Subic, be it ever so slowly, and we had to contend with the fact that there were probably more mines out there - nobody was about to admit that we weren't exactly sure where.

As to what they were doing or why? The word never came out. Speculation from the wardroom came to a very abrupt and somewhat uncharacteristic silence within 24 hours. A theory that she was trying to draw fire from shore batteries circulated briefly; some rumors about "hot-dogging" - although I can't imagine for whose benefit. It was widely accepted by the crew on the Hull, that the mines that Warrington activated were mines that we had placed as part of the escalation of hostilities in 1972 and that Warrington had just strayed a little too close. The fact that the Warrington had just arrived on station (and recently arrived in theatre?) may have been a factor.

As to the speculation that the mines came from above, I can state that no air action Battle Station occurred on Hull. This was not a picket point or ordinance drop point during the period that we were on station - that's a fact. The USS Robison was there to launch missiles at anything that flew over the mountains from the west - no questions asked, they would be right on top of us when they cleared the ridgeline. The April attack on the USS Higbee, which was two 500 lb. bombs from a Mig, was still fresh in everyone's mind - hostile air contacts did not go unnoticed or unknown to the crew.

It seems unlikely that someone on Warrington's bridge simply went on a joy ride - the Warrington's CO could have requested independent operation, but Robison and Hull would have pointed out to Warrington that she was in a "bad place" if the area where she was steaming was off limits (even if Warrington didn't have the latest charts). Hull certainly tracked and (usually) plotted the other ships on station. Warrington certainly knew where she was and so did everyone else. I assume that the skipper had checked in and gotten the "plan of the day" from the group commander (Robison was either carrying a Flag, or Robison's CO was SOPA).

All the ships of the task group were in site of one another, in broad daylight, on a clear day. There is no doubt that she was operating with a lesser margin (relative to the "known" position of the mine fields) than the other ships did either before or after the Warrington took the hits. My guess is that the submarine or aircraft that laid the mines in the first place just got a few outside the box and Warrington got unlucky and/or imprudent.

One last twist. In October of 1972 the USS Hull returned to Subic ... oddly enough we were moored way out in the boondocks outboard of the USS Warrington and a WW2 LST that was serving as the staging area for her decommissioning. I have no idea why we were put here, unless some of Hull's crew was debriefed nearby? There was some talk of an inquiry, but I can't confirm that. By then her crew was gone save for a Master at Arms and a few sounding and security watches. The word was that her crew had been "dispersed" and the few sailors still on board didn't know or say much. Several of our snipes made a salvage tour one night while we were moored alongside but there wasn't much to salvage or to see as I understand it - she had already been in and out of dry-dock and was largely decommissioned, on an even keel, etc. I can confirm that there is no way she was sold to anybody ... it was obvious by the way they hacked her up that she would become a target.

I still wonder what the she was doing that day? What I do know is that she protected her crew and got them out of harms way and remained afloat - not a bad epitaph for a warship.

Doug Hisey MM3
USS Hull DD945
12/71-11/74

Ranks and Rates above are those at the time in question.