Copyright by Randy White
Ron, I just read a little of your memories on the web site. The team you were with just before Moss was KIA was team Japan 1, frag order 156-70. I remember the whole deal very well. The mission was to search for an enemy base camp, monitor movements and find any cache sites. The mission was in the Roung Roung Valley, far south west end. Our intended insertion LZ was 2-300 meters outside of the 101st DIV. a/o, so a request was made by the 2/17 for the LZ to be moved north to inside the DIV. a/o. Our insertion pilot was Mac Jones from C troop 2/17 Cav and I also have his story of that mission on a tape he sent home to his mother, that he gave me a copy of. It was to be an early morning insertion, and we went in just as the ground fog was lifting. Our insertion time was 07:05 at YC 793 813, and the LZ is just as you described it. A small clearing on a steep hillside going up to the left, with elephant grass below. It was a 5 man team and the TL was Don Robinson, Randy White was ATL, Ron Edwards, a little black guy named Davis was point, and one other person I can't recall. Coming into the LZ there was a cave facing us on a cliff to our left. This would have been behind us and to our left after we landed in the LZ. I was just waiting for a .51 to open as we were facing it. I recall the pilot taking his time, trying to get us lower into the LZ, but the blades were coming very close to the hill side. I don't remember who went out the door first, but after he jumped everyone had to go. It was a long way down through the elephant grass. Everyone rolled and tumbled down the hill side, till we came to a stop and gathered our wits. I don't remember who was knocked out when we hit the ground, but I remember waiting till he was revived. Robinson screwed up his back and ankle, and Davis hurt his back. While someone was out cold on the hill side, I pulled security and did a commo check with the C&C, while someone brought him back to consciousness. The team couldn't move far because of the injuries, so we went down hill from the LZ a short ways, laid dog and took stock of our situation. Robby didn't want to call for an extraction right away and thought we could move if he took a little time to get it together and heal. After a while it became apparent that the injured members couldn't travel, and he realized he'd need to call for an extraction. I remember hearing signal shots just after insertion and while we waited for a reply from the TOC. I think it was Davis who went a short ways from the LZ and found a trail 10-15 meters away, with fresh signs. We moved away from that location a short distance, as best we could, and set up security again. It was decided that there would be a ladder roll out with another team, back at the original LZ. There were no other LZs close by. We tried to explain that we thought our location had been compromised during insertion, and that it was not advisable. The cave was a perfect O.P. that looked out over the whole Roung Roung Valley, and some of the signal shots were coming from that direction. Regardless, the ladder roll out was decided upon by someone up the chain of command, and we waited, listening to the occasional signal shot change direction and grow closer. The Cav was busy while we waited with a downed chopper, and I remember the time for the roll out changing to later in the day. Finally at 14:38 hr the time came, and I got on the horn when they were about 5 min. out and told the XO that we were going to snap our rucks to the bottom rung of the ladder before making the climb. He said negative, to carry them aboard. The B troop bird got to the LZ and only the ladder on the up hill side of the bird would reach the ground. We'd have to wait for Japan 2 to come down before we could go up. I remember telling their team leader Wolfiel, and a couple others about the shots, then I turned back to the ladder. Our team was now going up the ladder while I was trying to hold it steady for them. Can you imagine trying to climb a rope ladder, under a hovering chopper, on a steep hillside, with elephant grass blowing around, and a full ruck sack and a bad back? I'll never forget the look of pain on Robinson's face as he slowly made his way up. I was the last team member on the ground and when I turned around looking for someone from the other team to help steady the ladder, they were gone. I knew the chopper had been hovering for a long time, so I sat on the bottom rung of the ladder and waved at them to leave. I wrapped my arms through the rungs and held on for dear life. We lifted out and the ground dropped away. I thought the pilot could find a place to set down in the Valley fairly quickly, but he didn't. My hands and arms started going numb and then the pain started to set in, but if I let go I was dead. I also remember having the fore-grip of my Car-15 in my mouth, because some how it had come off on the LZ and I didn't want to loose it. Parts for those were hard to get. Anyway the pilot got me out over the Roung Roung Valley and then Kiama started down the ladder. Kiama was flying belly and could see my shit was gettin' weak, but I chased him off as best I could with a mouth filled with a CAR-15 fore grip. The weight of my ruck and LBE had me hanging almost upside down, but I didn't want Kiama to knock us both off the ladder. The pilot finally came to a hover at what I thought to be about 1000 feet and started coming straight down very slowly. Kiama climbed out of the bird at some height above the ground, and down the ladder, grabbed me by my LBE and held on with one hand while we came down. At about 8-10 feet above the ground I saw we were close and said good enough. I let go and so did Kiama. After I crashed to the ground and the pilot sat the ship down, I couldn't even pull the quick release on my ruck, because my arms and hands were numb and asleep from being laced through the ladder rungs and hanging on. Someone helped get my ruck off as the ladders were rolled up and we piled into the choppper. We were on the floor of the Roung Roung Valley and wasted no time in getting out of there. Funny, I can remember seeing an old rusty bulldozer on the way down, near where we landed, and thinking how odd. Now on the maps I look at, I see there was an abandoned French airfield there. Anyway, Japan 2 was on the ground and we had made our exit. By the time we got back to the company area an NVA had walked into the position of Japan 2 and fired them up at 17:00 hr, killing Jack Moss Jr. and wounding Lt. Alexander. The team returned fire and received fire from approximately 3-4 NVA. The first medevac came in at 17:30 hr took fire and developed a fuel leak, so it had to leave the scene. The second medevac pulled out the wounded and KIA at 18:05 hr. The remainder of the team was lifted out with a B troop ship, that took a hit in the tail boom, by McGuire rig at 18:08. The INTSUM for this mission says the medevac and B troop ship were receiving fire from approximately 30-40 NVA at YC 792 815. I don't know what happened on the other team, and won't comment on their experience, but a bad decision was made somewhere higher up the chain of command to do the ladder roll out.
In Shelby Stanton's book "Rangers at War", he has the roll-out and the Moss killing as two separate missions. They weren't, they happened twenty two minutes apart at near the same location. This is all on pages 168 & 169 of his book. He says it was "part of the " shocking manifestation in the decline of expertise of the troops in the late war period". Bullshit. He never checked out what really went down. He uses this ORLL as a reference and misses all this. He also says the bird was hovering in the LZ for ten minutes during the roll out, when the ORLL that he supposedly quotes from, clearly says seven minutes. This is a small difference but more than a lifetime in combat and an example of his fabrications. I have the ORLLs for this mission and all this is left out. The ORLLs also go on to say that a ladder roll out is not recommended for Ranger missions. Stanton never mentioned that fact, but it's in the ORLLs he quoted from and listed in his bibliography at the back of the book. That's the true story of team Japan 1 &2 as I experienced it and know it. It's also the story of what can happen on a bad insertion, or not trusting the judgment of those on the ground. RW