It was a very grim lesson that was learned. Unit leaders at every level must pay more
attention; especially after an intensive fight there is a tendency for people to let down
because they feel they have given their all. This is not the time to let down. You must
even intensify your efforts in order to spread people out and dig people in, especially
when the enemy seems to have had some advantage over you. These enemy forces
will press the advantage.
Later that evening, the battalion received another mission. Once all casualties were retreived and evacuated, Lugger's Marines were to push forward 2,000 meters, link up with 4th Bn., 31st infantry, and act as a rallying point for its scattered companies.
At first light on the morning of the 26th, as Companies G and H secured the high ground on the right, Companies E and F moved forward and immediately came under heavy small arms and mortar fire. By afternoon, both companies had advanced only 600 meters, and once again had come under heavy enemy fire. Digging in, the companies requested air and artillery support, but it had little effect. Under constant orders to push forward, no matter the cost, Company G. was brought down to reinforce the beleaguered companies, but it too took intense mortar fire, suffering numerous casualties. With all forward movement blocked, Col. Codispoti ordered Lugger's battalion to hold its positions, retrieve all casualties, and assist the 3rd Bn., which would be moved up in relief. In the interim, Lt. Col.Joseph E. Hopkins, transferred from the 3rd Marine Division, had assumed command of 2nd Bn., 7th Marines. (Keith Nolan, in his book "Death Valley" said that Lt. Col. Lugger was releived of his command because Col. Codispoti felt that Lugger was not agressive enough. I don't see what more he could have done. The fact was that everywhere we went we met very stiff opposition from a very determined foe who had had maybe years to prepare this area. They were very well dug in and about a prepared as they could be.) Hopkins, with Col. Codispoti's approval, issued revised orders for the battalion to "move forwrd to certain selected objectives...and recover all casualties lying in front of their positions." Second Bn. Marines accomplished the mission as ordered, noted Hopkins, "albeit reluctantly in at least two instances."
Following its arrival in the Que Son Valley on the 17th, the 3rd Bn., 7th Marines, under Lt. Col. Ray G. Kummerow, who had relieved Lt. Col. Allison on the 16th, was assigned by Col. Codispoti the tasks of securing LZ Baldy and the 9th Engineer rock crusher to the west, and patrolling Barrier Island to the east. On the 26th, following several days of sweeping the island and encountering nothing but enemy snipers, Kummerow's Marines helilifted to LZ West, atop nui Liet Kiem, overlooking the upper Que Son Valley,, and ordered to relieve the 2nd Bn., heavily engaged below. After coordinating with Lt. Col. Lugger by radio on the relief, the batalion moved off the hill, guided by an Army reconnaissance unit. Lt. Col. Kummerow described the relief:
The going was very slow, with numerous halts and very little progress. It turned out
that the Army had never been off the hill on foot before, and had become helplessly lost.
I instructed mypoint of the mile-long battalion column to use a compass heading to the
rendezvous point. Approaching dusk, we finally emerged on the stream bed where I
expected to pick up 2/7 guides and found to my surprise 2/7 on the march, heading
back to FSB Ross. I deployed the point company to establish security for a bivouac area
just short of the 2/7 furthest point of advance and closed in the battalion
as darkness fell.
The next morning, following a passage through the 2nd Bns. lines, Kummerow's Marines headed west toward a planned linkup with the 4th Bn., 31st Infantry.
Straddling a small stream with two rifle companies abreast followed by the remaining two in trace, the 3rd Bn. began sweeping the valley floor. Almost immediately, Co. L, on the right flank (It sounds to me like this would be in the same area Golf got bogged down on the 25th.) became engaged and eventually unable to maneuver, all the while suffering heavy casualties from an entrenched enemy automatic weapons position. Kummerow ordered Co. K to pass through Co. L's lines and continue the attack. Surmounting a series of rice paddy dikes, the marines of Co. K, in a number of violent assaults, overran the NVA platoon, killing 13 and capturing two 12.7mm heavy and on 7.62mm light machine guns.
This was about the end of Golf's contribution to the fighting at this time. When we left the valley we went back to Ross and resupplied. The next day we left and went back toward Hill 441 but stayed on the east side. On August 29th we had our last firefight associated with the above. We were going to the aid of Hotel Co. and was ambushed. We had two killed and 5-6 wounded.