On 1 November, the Government of Vietnam announced the start of a country-wide "Accelerated Pacification Campaign," named "Le Loi" in Vietnamese. Scheduled to last three months, the campaign's objective was to extend the legitimate government's influence into many hamlets still afflicated by the three major Communist offensives launched during 1968 of the 1,000 hamlets targeted for the campaign throughout the country, 141 were in ICTZ
The 1st Marine Division planned Operation Meade River to support the Le Loi campaign. In a typical cordon and search operation under the Marines Corps like many which had been conducted previously, but on a much grander scale. Rather than surround and search single hamlets or villages, the division planned a cordon around 36 square kilometers in the Dodge City area, South of Da Nang.
Like Go Noi island to the south, Dodge City was heavily infested with Communists. At the center of the fertile Da Nang-Hoi An-Dai Loc Triangle, the area's terrain was almost completely flat, reaching only 4 to 5 meters above sea level. Many hamlets dotted the countryside, homes to the farming families who tended the vast tracts of rice paddies. Waterways of various sizes crossed Dodge City, as did the National Railroad and Route 4. The characteristics of the area gave it special potential as a source of food and recruits for the enemy. Its proximity to Da Nang, Hoi An, and the Dien Ban District headquarters gave it tactical significance as a possible enemy staging area for attacks on those key locations.
Col. Lauffer, the commander of the 1st Marines, recalled that the Korean Brigade had the tactical responsibility for the area, but had failed to keep the Communist forces out. Since its arrival at Da Nang, the 1st Marines TAOR included the area to the north of Dodge City, but in almost self-defense, the regiment had conducted several small-scale operations, "to familiarize units with the situation and to gain additional intelligence." According to Lauffer, "We were fully apprised of the fluid and rapidly changing situation concerning enemy troop strength in the Dodge City area." For Operation Meade River, Marine intelligence officers estimated that enemy forces in Dodge City numbered between 100 and 150 Viet Cong infrastructure personnel and could include up to 900 NVA or VC regular forces. The only indentified units in the sector, however, were two VC companies, the R-20 VC Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 36th NVA Regt., totalling an estimated 630 enemy troops.
Early on the morning of 20 November, seven Marine Battalions, under the control of the 1st Marines, began moving into prearranged positions to form a ring around part of Dodge City. Using 72 aricraft, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in one of its largest helicopter operations lifted four battalions (one of them from amphibious shipping lying offshore). Trucks moved another battalion, and two battalions marched in. By 0825, Dodge City lay within the 1st Marines cordon. Col. Lauffer observed that a helicopter was available to him throughout Meade River and that, "concerned commanders were given numerous ariborne views to enhance our tactical decisions."
In the initial hours of the operation, the Marines encountered light resistance. The Communist forces shot down two 1st Marine Aircraft Wing helicopters and damaged several others during the assault. On the ground, they used a command-detonated mine to destroy a truck, killing 1 Marine and wounding 23 Marines and 2 ARVN soldiers.
Along the Song La Tho, where the 1st Bn., 1st Marines manned the northern edge of the cordon, helicopters lifted in two towers. In the flat terrain, these towers provided imporved observation for Marines controlling artillery fire and airstrikes. Snipers also manned the towers and engaged enemy troops in Dodge City. Clockwise around the cordon from the 1st Bn., 1st Marines were: BLT 2/26; the 2nd and 3rd Bns., 5th Marines; the 3rd Bn., 26th Marines; BLT 2/7; and finally, the 1st Bn. 7th Marines.
Just before noon, Lt. Col. Neil A. Nelson's BLT 2/7 began the next phase of the operation by attacking from its positiion on the western side of the cordon toward the railroad berm. By 1600, Company H secured the southern end of the battalions's objective, after only minor contact with the enemy. At 1630, however, the battalion ran headlong into a strong Communist defensive complex located at a large bend in a stream which Marinces called the "Horseshoe." Company G, attacking in the center of the BLT 2/7 zone of action, made heavy contact with what proved to be North Vietnamese regulars. Under fierce fire from mutually supporting bunkers, Company G withdrew one kilometer, leaving behind six Marines, beleived dead.
When darkness fell over Dodge City, artillery and aircraft units illuminated the area with flares. Psychological operations (PsyOps) team used powerful loudspeakers to advise civilians of the cordon and to direct them to central collection points for the questioninng which was intended to winnow out the Communists among them. BLT 2/7 licked its wounds and prepared to resume the assault on the Horseshoe.
Col. Lauffer decided to reinforce BLT 2/7 for the attack. He ordered Company D, 1st Bn., 1st Marines and Company L, 3rd Bn., 26th Marines to report to Lt. Col. Nelson for duty. Nelson placed all four of his own companies on line for the assault, then used Company L as his new reserve. He ordered Company D to move south and to sweep the northern flank of Company F, which was on the battalion left.