Supply support to the field was appalling. "Requisitions for supplies and spare parts were submitted by the group through Royce's headquarters at Townsville to an advanced air depot at Charters Towers, about sixty miles south of Townsville. Charters Towers, for some reason, sent the requisitions to Melbourne. Melbourne forwarded them to Tocumwal, the main Air Force depot about one hundred miles north of Melbourne. An average time of one month elapsed from the time the requisition started until it was returned, generally with the notation "Not available" or "Improperly filled out."

Previous regime was preparing for Japanese invasion of Australia instead of supporting the fight in New Guinea with all possible resources. He cleaned house of personnel who weren't able to do what he wanted. He made a list of requirements to support his plan for attack on Rabaul and directed the depot to support it or they "would be on the slowest boat back home he could find".

Kenney made use of local resources. He had drop tanks made by the Australian sheetmetal industry.

He also allowed crews to go out and salvage crashed aircraft for parts. He took advantage of the ingenuity of the maintenance technicians.

Kenney directed that all requisitions be supported regardless of paperwork requirements.

Kenney eventually moved the logistics depots in the south north where they could better support the combat units.

Kenney directed resources be provided to New Guinea to improve the living conditions of the combat forces. "Throughout the whole area the camps were poorly laid out and the food situation was extremely bad. There was no mosquito-control discipline and the malaria and dysentery rates were so high that two months' duty in New Guinea was about all that the units could stand before they had to be relieved and sent back to Australia."

Kenney directed the units with poor MC rates to stand down and to repair aircraft in order to mount a larger offensive than just a few planes.

Kenney utilized a gadget-whiz by the name of Pappy Gunn who was able to modify/install aircraft bomb racks, machine guns, etc. -- Air Forces first "tech rep"

Originally, the Allied Air Staff was ineffective. Too many people issuing orders in the commander's name. HQ had too many people assigned. Many senior ranking officers didn't want to live in harsh conditions at "the front". Kenney cut the overhead and dead wood.

The previous ACC was weak and spoke with MacArthur's exec, Sutherland, vice with MacArthur. In one year he had only spoke with MacArthur eight times. The Exec was issuing ATO from his office. Kenney had a showdown with exec and stopped his meddling in Air Force issues - one commander of air forces - centralized control, decentralized execution. Kenney assigned key personnel to complete his tasks.

"Only an advanced echelon of the American part of Brett's air organization was in Brisbane. The rear echelon was still back on the south coast of Australia, 800 miles away, at Melbourne, under Major General Rush B. Lincoln. It was just as if the headquarters were trying to function at Chicago with its rear echelon in New Orleans, except that we would have had much better telephone service. All personnel orders were issued through Melbourne, the personnel and supply records were all down there, and, as far as I could learn, the boys were really bedded down to stay. That would be another thing for me to look into." Kenney moved the organization north which resulted in unity of effort from the support forces

"The set-up was really chaotic. Missions were assigned by the Director of Bombardment at Brisbane, Royce at Townsville passed the word to the 19th Bombardment Group at Mareeba, which was a couple of hundred miles north of Townsville; and the 19th Group sent the number of airplanes it had in commission to Port Moresby, where they were refueled, given their final "briefing" on weather conditions along the route to the target and whatever data had been picked up by air reconnaissance. The fighter group at Port Moresby sat around waiting for the Japs to come over and tried to get off the ground in time to intercept them, which they seldom did, as the warning service rarely gave the fighters over five minutes' notice that the Nip planes were on the way. Scanlon had the authority to use any aircraft in New Guinea in an emergency, if targets of opportunity such as Jap shipping came within range, and this authority had to be exercised occasionally when the bombardment planes arrived without knowing exactly what they were supposed to do." By establishing primary, secondary, and tertiary targets, the bombers could concentrate on their targets - unity of effort.

***Compatibility - "I spent the rest of the afternoon working out a reorganization of the Air Force. I decided to separate the Americans and the Australians and form the Americans into a numbered Air Force of their own which I would command, in addition to commanding the Allied show. The Australians would be organized into a command of their own and I'd put Bostock at the head of it. My Allied Air Force headquarters would remain a mixed organization". Americans and Australians were "thoroughly mixed everywhere, not only in the staffs, but even in airplane crews. Kenney gained approval to form 5th Air Force and established bomber and fighter squadrons and groups and separating the Americans and the Australians. Kenney acted as a JFACC

Kenney went on the offensive by supporting the landing in the Solomon islands as well as operations against Rabaul. He said "I then discussed the air situation and told him (MacArthur) that I wanted to carry out one primary mission, which was to take out the Jap air strength until we owned the air over New Guinea. That there was no use talking about playing across the street until we got the Nips off of our front lawn. In the meantime, our reconnaissance aircraft would be constantly looking for Jap shipping that should be hit at every feasible opportunity, but we were not going to get anywhere until we had won the air battle. I told him I had called off flying all bombers, B-17s, B-25s, and B-26s. until we could get enough of them in shape to put on a real show; that about August 6, just prior to the coming South Pacific operation to capture Guadalcanal and Tulagi, I would send the maximum number of B-17s against the main Japanese airdrome at Vunakanau, just southeast of Rabaul. The Jap aircraft there would raise the devil with the Navy landing operations if they were not taken out. At the same time, the B-25s and B-26s with fighter escort should be given a mission to clean up the Jap airdromes at Buna, Salamaua, and Lae The effort against the New Guinea airdromes should be continuous until the Jap airpower in New Guinea was destroyed and the runways so badly damaged that they even stopped filling up the holes. In the meantime, I would put everything else in support of the Australian drive along the Kokoda trail. General MacArthur approved this program and said to go ahead, that I had carte blanche to do anything that I wanted to. He said he didn't care how my gang was handled, how they looked, how they dressed, how they behaved, or what they did do, as long as they would fight, shoot down Japs, and put bombs on the targets. When I told him that I hoped to put between sixteen and eighteen B-17s on Vunalcanau, he remarked that it would be the heaviest single attack in the Pacific war up to that time.

(see 502.21) Kenney reorganized the air forces which resulted in a more effective unity of command. This reorganization also simplified the command structure.

By listening to the troops, Kenney met their needs and fostered a cohesive unit thereby achieving unity of command. Separating the Americans and the Australians also resulted in more effective operations and achieved unity of command within their respective units

Kenney allowed the 3^rd Light Bombardment (Dive) Group to resume its name as the 3^rd Attack Group for which the unit was proud of which again fostered unity of command.

Kenney initiated a recognition program decorating combat achievement which fostered unity of command

The large offensive of 18 B17 against Rabaul was the largest thus far in the Pacific campaign. The Japanese were caught by surprise with over 150 aircraft on the ground. Until then attacks on the Japanese were not significant.

Kenney's use of Parachute Bombs suprise the Japanese when they thought that para troopers were attacking and came out of cover to shoot at them as they landed.

AC COURSE OBJECTIVES:

• Know the capabilities and limitations of US military forces across the range of military operations. (OPMEP Learning Area 1)
• Comprehend the linkage of campaign plans to attainment of national objectives. (OPMEP Learning Area 3)

CONTACT HOURS: This lesson can be completed in 7 hours.

Southwest Pacific Campaign Toolbook.

Shannon, Donald H., US Air Strategy and Doctrine as Employed in the Strategic Bombing of Japan.

Exerpts from SAF and CSAF speeches on Air Force Core Competencies.

READING RATIONALE:
The Toolbook application covers the geography of the campaign, the strategic context in which the campaign was conducted (including the campaign objectives), and the sequence of events (battles) that comprised the campaign. The US Air Strategy and Doctrine reading is a concise source of information about the overall strategic air war in the Pacific. The Kenney reading provides an eyewitness account of how the US Army Air Force's air campaign fit into the joint Pacific theater campaign, as well as the leadership and ability to use technical innovation demonstrated by General Kenney. Finally the CSAF reading provides descriptions of the six AF core competencies.

Thesis: One of the most significant deviations from the years of deliberate planning for a war in the Pacific was the crisis-action response to establish the southwest Pacific theater of operations. This case is used to illustrate course objectives and themes and to show the impact of the campaign process's contextual and operational art elements on campaign planing. The case represents one of the earliest examples of joint air operations and is a testimony to Kenney's leadership and to the importance of air superiority. The readings demonstrate how Kenney overcame difficulties in organization and command deficiencies in resources to achieve unity of effort. These campaigns also highlight key military-political issues affecting the campaign process and illustrate innovative applications of technology and ideas to overcome severe environmental and geographical conditions.

MAIN POINT I: The SW Pacific campaign itself

1. Objectives
2. COGs
3. COAs

MAIN POINT II: Factors affecting the SW Pacific Campaign

1. Contextual Elements and of the Southwest Pacific
2. Operational Art Elements of the Southwest Pacific
   

MAIN POINT III: Comparing the SW Pacific Campaign and Core Competencies

1. Similarities
2. Core Competencies that were developed as a result of the campaign
   

LESSON INTEGRATION AND RATIONALE: AC 501: Introduction to Airpower and Campaign Planning; AC 503: Joint Air Strategy and Operations; AC 504: Targeting for Effect and Combat Operations; AC 506: Fundamentals of Information Warfare.

LESSON OPR: War Theory and Campaign Studies Department