AC504: TARGETING FOR EFFECT AND COMBAT ASSESSMENT
LESSON OUTLINE:
Thesis: Targeting for effect is much more than simply "putting bombs on target." Targeting can produce effects beyond the tactical level, but to be effective, it must advance the accomplishment of broader objectives--operational and strategic--and be measurable. This lesson focuses on the relationship between targeting, effects, and assessment. It is built upon historical examples found in WWII and Desert Storm of the problems experienced with targeting and assessment. This lesson also introduces objective based targeting--a synthesis of nodal analysis and the 3-D model--which predicts effects and links Centers of Gravity (COG) analysis to targeting to assessment. The lesson concludes with a discussion of methods to improve targeting for effect and combat assessment.
LESSON OBJECTIVES:
504.1 Comprehend that opportunities and vulnerabilities are created by increased reliance on technology throughout the range of military operations.
504.11 Infer implications of emerging concepts and technologies on the process of targeting for effect.
RTIC (Real-time Information into the Cockpit) is the concept of real-time targeting information being passed to the cockpits of a strike package to allow redirection of the package from a previously designated target to a new target. This is applicable when the previous target has a lower priority than the new one or when the strike package cannot make its original target but the need to hit an alternate target arises.
This RTIC capability has been developing and practiced since as early as 1995. The Air Force Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (AFTENCAP) Talon Shooter program is focusing on making this a reality.
The implication of this is the ability of the AOC to provide real-time updates to aircrews while in flight to redirect their attack efforts for the maximum effect possible. (Chapman Article) @ (concepts.doc)
Also not new is the quest for more rapid transmission of the sensed targeting information from the sensor to the shooter. Colonel John Boyd’s5 discussion of an observation-orientation-decision-action cycle or OODA loop in many ways reflects similar thoughts expressed by Carl von Clausewitz in his classic On War. These same thoughts were expressed by Lieutenant General Howell M. Estes III, Director for Operations, JCS J-3:
Seeing the enemy, taking action before the enemy can react is what it’s all about … that’s called getting inside the enemy’s decision loop.… Improving [our abilities on the battlefield] is going to be dependent on refining ways to get inside of this loop. An important way to do this is to gather the right imagery and to quickly get it to somebody that can do something with it. This is the challenge that we all face.
(Chapman Article) @ (concepts.doc)
From the Meilinger article. German defenses were so formidable before the arrival of American escort planes that it took extremely large formations to ensure low casualty rates for the bombers--Lancaster’s "law" seemingly proved in practice. Moreover, bombing accuracy was far less than expected, due partly to German defenses and deception and partly to abysmal weather. As a consequence, to destroy a target the size of a small house, a force of 4,500 heavy bombers carrying a total of nine thousand tons of bombs was required.
Unfortunately, this process took time to neutralize a major system within a country. Hundreds of bombers were required to take down a single oil refinery, but then the strike force would have to move to another target on the next mission. Because there were hundreds of targets to be struck, each requiring a massive strike, the Germans were able to rebuild their facilities between attacks. In other words, the absence of precision forced air power into a battle of attrition that relied on accumulative effects, essentially driving it down to the tactical level. An outstanding example of this in World War II concerns the German oil refinery at Leuna. This important facility had extremely powerful antiaircraft gun defenses as well as smoke generating machines to hide the refinery from Allied bombardiers. As a consequence, only 2.2 percent of all bombs dropped on Leuna actually impacted in the refinery's production area. Leuna therefore had to be struck twenty-two times during the last year of the war to put it out of commission. As the US Strategic Bombing Survey concluded, it would have been far more effective to drop a few bombs accurately than to "string 500-lb. bombs over the whole target."20 Exactly true.
The numbers regarding bomb accuracy changed over time. The Vietnam War saw the first extensive use of precision guided munitions (PGM) during the Linebacker campaigns of 1972, and this allowed American aircraft to demolish that proverbial "small house" with only 190 tons of bombs carried by 95 aircraft.21 Desert Storm introduced an improvement in accuracy, combined with stealth technology, that allowed a remarkably low loss rate per sortie (less than .05 percent). Aircraft could thus safely hit more targets in a given time period-parallel operations were possible. Few will forget the cockpit videos of laser-guided bombs flying down air vents and into bunker doorways. Only a small percentage of the total tonnage dropped was precision guided, and even they sometimes missed their targets; nonetheless, when using PGM and in suitable weather, our house now only needed one bomb and a single aircraft.22 This combination of accuracy and stealth meant that targets were struck and neutralized quickly and safely.
The result of the trend towards "airshaft accuracy" in air war is a denigration in the importance of mass. PGM provide density, mass per unit volume, which is a more efficient measurement of force. In short, targets are no longer massive, and neither are the aerial weapons used to neutralize them.23 One could argue that all targets are precision targets--even individual tanks, artillery pieces or infantrymen. There is no logical reason why bullets or bombs should be wasted on empty air or dirt. Ideally, every shot fired should find its mark.24 If this sort of accuracy and continued stealth protection are attainable on a routine basis, the political, economic and logistics implications are great. Objectives can be threatened, and if necessary attacked, with little collateral damage or civilian casualties, at low cost and low risk since few aircraft will be required. It will also require a vastly reduced supply tail: only a handful of cargo aircraft would have been necessary to supply all the PGM needed each day during the Gulf War. This may present air commanders with an unusual problem. (10 Propositions Regarding Airpower) @ (airpower.doc)
504.2 Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
Effects is an assessment of the of the immediate impact of the attack. Physical effects are easier to discern than psychological. Why? (Psychological effects are affected by time, culture, societal norms, enemy leadership -- many intangibles.)
Effectiveness is the measure of an attack's broader implications. Effectiveness is
tougher to predict than effects. Examples of effectiveness-assessment difficulties: Had
Hussein been killed in Desert Storm, would the attack have yielded a more
"Western-like" government in Iraq? Would he become a martyr and
"force" for continued violence? Would the Coalition have held together if
Hussein had been inadvertently killed during a bombing attack? (Power Point Word Doc) @ (
AC504LG.DOC)
504.21 Using a historical example, distinguish between effects and effectiveness.
The April 1942 raid on Japan led by Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle illustrates both virtual attrition and second-order strategic consequences. On the morning of 18 April 1942, 16 B-25s were launched from the carrier Hornet at a distance of around 700 nautical miles from Tokyo. The B-25s, each armed with 4,500-pound bombs and machine guns, attacked a variety of targets, including military barracks, docks, and factories, in Tokyo and other Japanese cities. Fifteen of the planes are believed to have dropped their demolition and incendiary bombs on Honshu, and some strafed targets as well. But the damage inflicted by these aircraft was neither extensive nor militarily significant. A school was "inadvertently struck, and a total of 12 people killed, 50 houses and shops demolished, and the bow of a warship [the carrier Ryuko] in drydock damaged." Judged by such criteria as directly destroying any appreciable amount of Japanese combat power or eliminating a vital element in Japan's war industry, the raid was ineffective. Indeed, balanced against the fact that the US Pacific Fleet had to sail 2 of its 4 remaining aircraft carriers into Japanese waters in order to bring Doolittle's B-25s within range, it is possible to argue that the raid, though daring, was "not commensurate" with the risk.
Nonetheless, in hindsight, the Doolittle raid proved remarkably effective in other, less obvious but far more important ways. Besides raising American morale in the dark days immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, it produced long-term effects on Japanese forces and strategy. As the official Japanese history of World War II has concluded, Doolittle's raid caused Japanese military leaders to lose face because they had promised that the home islands would never be bombed; led to diversions of Japanese forces; prompted the Japanese army to jump on the bandwagon for the planned Midway operation, at which the Japanese navy would suffer a major strategic defeat; and, aligned the Imperial General Headquarters unreservedly behind the Combined-Fleet's Midway-Aleutians plan, which later resulted in a further dilution of Japanese naval strength at the crucial battle of Midway. Thus, the second-order psychological and strategic consequences of the April attack on the Japanese home islands by Doolittle's 16 B-25s were far-reaching and profound. (Gulf War Air Power Survey) @ (effects.doc)
The distinction here is that the effect of the Doolittle raid was very limited. However, the effectiveness was great because it showed the Japanese that the homeland was reachable despite what the leadership stated. The psychological effectiveness surpassed the physical effect in this case.
The article detailed several vital industries that were targeted with good physical effect yet because of lack of allied resolve fell short of being truly effective. In each case the bombing campaign did not continue the fight and a vulnerable industry was left productive.
In the plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive, anti-friction bearings had been given high priority because it was believed the industry was vital and, because of its concentration, vulnerable. A little over half the total production came from Schweinfurt in Bavaria.
To the German Minister of Armaments and Production Albert Speer, the attacks on Schweinfurt were frightening. Speer was asked after the war what would have happened if there had been concerted and continuous attacks on the ball-bearing industry. He replied:
Armaments production would have been crucially weakened after two months and after four
months would have been brought completely to a standstill.
In those days, we anxiously asked ourselves how soon the enemy would realize that he could
paralyze the production of thousands of armaments plants merely by destroying five or six
relatively small targets.
This, of course, was the logic behind the entire air offensive. But the losses in August and October, followed by required support of the invasion, kept the campaign against ball bearings from attaining fulfillment (being truly effective). (The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler) @ (airplane.doc)
504.22 Explain why objective based targeting is more effective than input based targeting.
Input Based Targeting Focuses on inputs to the battle. It concentrates mechanically on the number of sorties and the ordnance delivered. The method looks at how should the enemy be attacked and how many targets should be selected. The planner surveys the available targets and selects some set to attack. If the result of the attack fulfills the commander's objectives, the campaign shifts to the next objective. If the results do not meet the objective, the planner can either continue the attacks on the initial target set or abandon it in favor of another set.
The problem with this method is it is primarily tactical as it starts with the how and how many questions rather addressing the larger question of what is accomplished by the attacks. It's a reactive rather than a proactive approach. A good example of this is the Army corp. commanders in DESERT STORM. They wanted a fix number of sorties (inputs) per day in their areas of responsibility. The important measure of merit became the number of sorties flown.
Output Based Targeting focuses on what the commander's objectives are. The objectives determine what results (outputs) must occur to meet the objectives. These results in turn determine the appropriate targets. This is the method used in designing the DESERT STORM strategic air campaign and is superior because it puts operational art at the forefront instead of tactics. Output based targeting is more in line with the five ring system of identifying centers of gravity (COG). After identifying the COGs, targets can be selected that will result in achieving the commander's objectives. If the objective is to cut off the leadership by a result of breaking the command and control system, the targets can selected as those links that if destroyed will break the C2 system. (Targeting Philosophies) @ (target.doc)
From the JFACC problems article out put based targeting would have been more effective. It seems that the measure of merit for determining the effectiveness of battlefield preparation should not have been based on the number of targets serviced on the corps commander’s target list. Rather, the measure should have been whether each corps could execute its planned scheme of maneuver with an acceptable number of friendly casualties. During VII Corps’s breaching of the enemy line on G-day, not one artillery round was fired into friendly troops. General Schwarzkopf thought that the scheme of maneuver or ground offensive could take up to 21 days.30 In fact, he asked General Glosson for assurance that the air intensity could be maintained for 21 days minimum. Not surprising, coalition ground forces completed operations in four versus 21 days. Casualty figures were expected to be as high as 10,000. Actual combat casualties were less than 100. (JFACC Problems) @ (problems.doc)
504.3 Comprehend joint principles and lessons learned from past operations and campaigns in employing unified and joint forces throughout the range of military operations.
504.31 Summarize the difficulties of assessing psychological effects.
Air power can produce both physical and psychological effects. Physical effects are easier to measure since they can be quantified. Psychological effects on the other hand are more difficult to assess. A key aspect of creating psychological shock is the application of mass. In the past, mass tended to be a large force focused on a single target. For instance, the Romans destroyed Carthage totally, razing its buildings, killing its inhabitants and sowing its soil with salt so nothing would grow. This destruction took over two decades to accomplish. Physically it was very effective but psychologically probably had little impact.
On the other hand the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki took a single B-29 only two seconds to accomplish the same level of physical destruction with atomic bombs. What was even more devastating was the psychological effect on both the Japanese and the world. The applicable of mass was in a different format of precision but overall greater than the Roman legions at Carthage.
The overall difficulty in assessing psychological effects is the effect is not quantifiable. You can measure how many power stations are destroyed but you cannot measure the psychological effect this has on the population. (Meilinger Article) @ (airpower.doc)
504.32 Generalize how the problems identified with the BDA process in Desert Storm could be overcome in future conflicts.
Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) is the use of post attack reconnaissance to asses the amount of damage resulting from an attack. The problem in Desert Storm resulted from the use of precision guided munitions (PGM) which rendered BDA often inadequate. An example from the reading is an intelligence headquarters building was struck by coalition aircraft; BDA reported the sortie was 25 percent effective because on-quarter of the building was destroyed. Yet, the wing of the building hit was precisely where the target was located, so in reality the sortie was totally effective. The BDA process was using a measurement technique appropriate to the past when precision was unobtainable so obliteration was necessary. In short, BDA is as much an art as a science, an it is often difficult to determine the effects of a precision air strike. (Meilinger Article) @ (airpower.doc)
No one will know for sure what percentage of Iraqi troops were really attrited by airpower prior to G-day, nor was it critical for making the decision to launch the ground offensive. However, having both ARCENT and MARCENT responsible for assessing BDA in their own sectors was a mistake. To start the next war with only two aircraft—such as A-10s and AV-8s—as the designated tank killers would be unworkable. Rules for defining a tank kill must be standardized and published at the theater level before G-day. This would have averted problems associated with BDA rules that got increasingly more rigid as G-day approached. In addition, it is critical that aircraft video be exploited daily by the intelligence communities, not just the JFACC staff. We need to purchase equipment that will allow each wing to transmit its aircraft video to both the JFACC and DIA. (JFACC Problems) @ (problems.doc)
The challenge for airmen is to devise methods of analyzing the relationships between complex systems within a country, determining how best to disrupt them, and then measuring the cascading effect of a system's failure throughout an economy. The author is basically describing output based targeting. (10 Propositions Regarding Airpower) @ (airpower.doc)
504.4 Comprehend the complexities of integrating battlespace systems supporting joint and multinational forces.
504.41 Illustrate how implementation of the core competencies of air and space superiority and information superiority can be used to improve feedback and enhance combat assessment.
The core competencies improve feedback by providing additional assets for conducting BDA. Air and space superiority and information superiority ensure reconnaissance assets can provide both the physical aspect of how much physical destruction occurred (i.e. damage to buildings) and provide the intelligence information related to the effects an attack has had on such things as the communication system. The second feedback is related to having the objective being to destroy the command and control capabilities. ELINT, SIGNIT and some of the intelligence methods can provide feedback to how well this was accomplished. Information such as enemy efforts to reconstitute the system or a dramatic drop in communications related to the attack can be analyzed to assess damage inflicted. (Powerpoint presentation) @ (ac504dl.ppt)
These USAF core competencies support the entire process. Superiority is the enabler. Without it, one cannot properly execute nor assess. It supports both facets of the process and enables the JFACC to conduct strategic warfare over the enemy and protect operations conducted in friendly territory. Timely information and intelligence is key to effective targeting and assessment. We must know where to target and be able to assess results (and re-attack if required) faster than an enemy can react, re-supply or rebuild. Information superiority applied through targeting and assessment induces strategic paralysis, the goal of Boyd's OODA loop theory. Directly quoted from the powerpoint note pages) @ (ac504lg.doc)
AC COURSE OBJECTIVES:
READINGS: