506.1 Comprehend the fundamental concepts of dominant battlespace knowledge (DBK), information operations (IO), and information warfare (IW). (answers from article Dominant Battlespace Knowledge by Owens, and Cornerstones of Information Warfare by DAF).

• DBK - emerging System of Systems - merger of knowledge, information, and force-assigning the right mission to the right force at both tactical and operational levels of warfare. (Owens)
• IO - Any action involving the acquisition, transmission, storage, or transformation of information that enhances the employment of military forces. (DAF)
• IW - Any action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy's information and its functions; protecting ourselves against those actions; and exploiting our own military information functions. Information warfare is a means to an end, not an end in itself. (DAF)

506.11 Identify C4ISR systems and precision force weapons that foster DBK. (answers from article Dominant Battlespace Knowledge by Owens).

506.12 Explain IO and IW (from the various Service perspectives), how they relate to each other, and the activities comprising each one. (answers from article Information Attack: Information Warfare in 2025 by Stein, pp 11-14).

Air and space power are a means to an end, not the end itself. Information is seen as analogous to air and space. Information is seen as a realm in which dominance will be contested and in which and from which military power can be employed. Like air and space power, information dominance is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the application or employment of all other military power and, likewise, is a global mission.

Information Dominance is defined as that "degree of superiority in information functions that permit friendly forces to operate at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from opposing forces."

IW is any action to "deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy an adversary's information, information systems, and information operations" while protecting "friendly forces from similar actions."

The Joint Staff, the Army, and Navy see part of IW as protecting our military systems and military information infrastructure, the USAF appears to envision part of IW as defending the armed forces against enemy information actions, as well as, defending the military information infrastructure.

• The Air Force's approach to IW is more aggressive than the other services or the Joint Staff.

U.S. Army -

Information Operations (not Information Warfare) is the capstone concept.

IO are "continuous military operations within the military information environment that enable, enhance, and protect the commander's decision cycle and mission execution to achieve an information advantage across the full range of military operations."

IO includes "interacting with the global information environment and, as required, exploiting or degrading an adversary's information and decision systems."

IW are actions "taken to preserve the integrity of one's own information system from exploitation, corruption, or destruction while at the same time exploiting, corrupting, or destroying an adversary's information system and in the process achieving an information advantage in the application of force."

• The Army's definition of IW is somewhat narrow in scope and doesn't seem to see IW as potentially having it's own role-rather it seems to be locked into a narrow supporting role of traditional missions.

The US Navy essentially shares the same view of information warfare as does the Air Force but, like the US Army, views information operations as a means through which to conduct traditional battle.

Operations Naval Instruction (OPNAVIST) 3430 defines IW as "action taken in support of national security strategy to seize and maintain a decisive advantage by attacking an adversary's information infrastructure through exploitation, denial, and influence, while protecting friendly information systems."

506.21 Explain how to employ sensors, C4I, and precision force to achieve DBK and the JV 2010 objectives of information superiority and full-dimensional protection. [SAE 1] (answers from article Dominant Battlespace Knowledge by Owens pp 2-4, and Information Attack: Information Warfare in 2025 by Stein pp 10-11).

By meshing inter-operable sensors, C4I, and precision force we have created a synergistic effect of DBK which gives us full battlefield information as well as the means to take advantage of the situation making our forces unstoppable by working together.

It provides our war-fighters with the information they need (but eliminates unneeded information) to have sufficient understanding of the scenario at hand as well as the tools necessary to achieve DBK.

506.31 Predict obstacles to achieving dominant battlespace knowledge. (answers from article Dominant Battlespace Knowledge by Owens).

Opponents Fight Back. Small opponents can "fight back" by channeling their aggression in ways that circumvent, undermine, or neutralize the technology Americans bring to the conflict. Vietnam is an example of this type of activity, the Vietnamese used very low-tech tactics to effectively beat our sophisticated weaponry.

Relying on Technology is An Achilles' Heel. Computer and communications technologies on which the system-of-systems are based are becoming less, not more, susceptible to the various forms of information warfare.

It Applies Only to the Last War. Every war is unique, we must be prepared for a wide variety of diverse situations. We can't rely on the last war to fight our next.

The System-of-Systems Ignores the Fog and Friction of War. War is inherently chaotic and ambiguous. The only things certain about it are that you will know less than you need to and your strategies and plans will not work out as well as you had hoped.

It's Not Broken; Don't Fix It. There is no significant obvious benefit from changing our current method of fighting wars. We must work to speed the wheels of bureaucracy so that we may a) take advantage of this new technological capability, and b) ensure that it is not used against us because we are unprepared.

506.32 Distinguish advantages and disadvantages of acquiring and implementing dominant battlespace knowledge. (answers from article Dominant Battlespace Knowledge by Owens).

The advantage of using DBK is that it provides a significant tool we can use to leverage our existing assets to win wars.

The disadvantages are listed in the previous section. Also Use Breeds Dependence (IW - JCS article)

506.41 Explain how the varying Service perspectives on IO and IW impact development of joint doctrine for IO and IW. (answers from article Dominant Battlespace Knowledge by Owens).

Joint doctrine is currently disjoint because the service don't agree on exactly what IO & IW is, it's significance or what we should be doing.

It is described by Stein as "unclear, confused, and contradictory". (Information Attack: Information Warfare in 2025 by Stein)

506.51 Explain how differences among the services in doctrine and organization impact incorporation of information warfare in campaign plans. (answers are a synthesis of all readings).

The different services tend to view IW parochially, and not in a joint manner.

See 506.12 for specifics.

506.52 Explain how the Services are integrating IO and IW into operational plans and exercises and using them to help accomplish strategic and military objectives. (answers from article Information Warfare: A Strategy for Peace... The Decisive Edge in War by JCS).

Efforts in six major areas are coming together to support the warfighter. They include:

1. Education, training, and exercises.
2. Policy.
3. Doctrine.
4. Assessments.
5. Organizational infrastructure.
6. Technology.

Multinational forces may have differences in C4 systems, language terminology, doctrine, and operating standards that can cause confusion.

• Increases demand for information and also raises level of uncertainty.
• JFC should exercise great care in structuring forces prior to operations to reduce confusion.

C4 Architectures and Interfaces - seeks to achieve interoperability and compatibility--provide the logical link between operational requirements and C4 systems development.

Common Global Vision. C4I for the Warrior - 21^st century vision of global information infrastructure--any mission--any time--any place. Responsive, reliable, secure, affordable.

Infosphere Architecture-Open systems architecture referred to as the global grid-virtual connectivity anywhere to anywhere. Supports both vertical and horizontal information flow.

Warrior Vision of the Infosphere-shared image of battlespace between joint decisionmakers and warfighters with instantaneous connectivity-yields coherent understanding to leadership.

Decision Support Systems (reporting, intelligence, logistics) -- Requirements must be incorporated in the planning and execution of military operations, shared, common information systems should do this through standard procedures.

Dominant Battlespace Knowledge (DBK) - Admiral William Owens

Three revolutions have brought about recent change for us:

1. End of the Cold War
2. Reduction in military budgets (caused by end of the Cold War)
3. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)--technology has improved our military capability dramatically-stresses "jointness"

The Emerging U.S. System of Systems-merger of knowledge, information, and force-assigning the right mission to the right force at both tactical and operational levels of warfare.

1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)--we know what both sides are doing
2. Command, Control, Communications, Computer Applications, and Intelligence Processing--Advanced C4I--where we translate awareness of what's going on to understanding of what's going on-and communicate that knowledge to combat forces-target ID & force allocation
3. Precision Force-includes precision-guided weaponry, but is broader-emphasizes speed, accuracy, precise use of all forces.

Five Criticisms of DBK / System-of-Systems:

1. Opponents Fight Back-"people's war", weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and other methods of non-traditional aggression may circumvent or neutralize DBK. OK, so what? We must be agile in our capabilities and robust in meeting new challenges, what else is new?
2. Relying on Technology is an Achilles' Heel-DBK is new center of gravity to be exploited by the enemy-we must be vigilant to ensure it's vulnerabilities are minimized.
3. It Applies Only to the Last War-It worked in Desert Storm, but in the next war it won't be in open desert, we won't get 8 months to build up, the enemy won't be a technological 3^rd world nation. By studying the past and contemplating future adversaries we can apply DBK across the spectrum of conflict to make best use of our capabilities at the lowest risk to ourselves.
4. The System-of-Systems Ignores the Fog and Friction of War-War is inherently chaotic and ambiguous. True. But, it does reduce the fog and friction of war for us, and that gives us a significant advantage.
5. It's Not Broken; Don't Fix It-Our current method of fighting war works, however, we have the potential for high dividend payback if we use our tools of war together to create synergism.

The New World of Information Warfare - John Tirpak

In the future, logic bombs may replace AMRAAM missiles and F-15's.

Information Warfare is not a mission in itself, but rather a part of every mission. IW must be mainstreamed into Air Force thinking. We're all information warriors. (all statements by MGen Linhard)

Two broad categories of Information Warfare:

1. Attack and defend information.

• Includes psychological operations, military deception, security measures, physical destruction, information attack, and electronic warfare.

1. Exploit Information.

• Gathering all that is knowable and turning it into military decisions faster than the adversary can.
• MGen Linhard calls this acting within your opponent's decision loop.
• Includes command and control, combat id, intelligence, weather, and surveillance.

Computer processing power is doubling every 18 months (or faster).

Low-cost, high-power systems available to "bad actors" at minimal cost.

"Secure" computer systems can be broken into and exploited at minimal cost and risk.

Potential terrorist targets include the power grid, the public telephone system, the stock market, the Federal Reserve, the IRS, the air traffic control system, strategic corporations, etc.

-- Since these high profile targets are so vulnerable, one must assume everything is vulnerable. We must work hard to increase security measures and reduce the terrorist threat.

To counter these threats we've set up the Air Force Information Warfare Center at Kelly AFB, TX; created IW exercises such as Blue Flag; and integrated IW into other exercises. We're also developing the concept of an "air operations center" to collate and disperse battlefield information, as well as setting up information warfare squadrons (Shaw AFB).

Everything is vulnerable to terrorist attacks - even the hardware / software which control our aircraft in flight - this could be devastating in combat, any critical system could be made to malfunction causing loss of aircraft and crew.

We are currently 2 - 4 years ahead of the rest of the world in IW - but we must stay ahead, because of our emphasis in high-tech weaponry we have the most to loose.

Cornerstones of Information Warfare - Department of the Air Force

The competition for information is as old as human conflict. Nations, corporations, and individuals each seek to increase their own information while simultaneously reducing their adversary's. Since about 1970 information technology has skyrocketed. The Information Age transforms all military operations by increasing the quantity and quality of information. Quality information is the counter to the fog of war.

There are two ways to influence the enemy's information functions: direct and indirect.

Direct attacks information, but not collection, analysis, or decision functions. May short circuit OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop.

• COMPUSEC is the defense.

Indirect uses military deception to present false image of reality.

• OPSEC and COMSEC are the defenses.

Three objectives of information warfare:

1. Control the information realm so we can exploit it while protecting our own military information functions from enemy action (Counterinformation).
2. Exploit control of information to employ information warfare against the enemy (C² Attack).
3. Enhance overall force effectiveness by fully developing military information functions (Information Operations).

C2 Attack-Any action against any element of the enemy's command and control system.

Command and Control-The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

Counterinformation-Actions dedicated to controlling the information realm.

Defensive Counterinformation-Actions protecting our military information functions from the adversary.

Direct Information Warfare-Changing the adversary's information without involving the intervening perceptive and analytical functions (e.g. changing data in a computer).

Indirect Information Warfare-Changing the adversary's information by creating phenomena that the adversary must then observe and analyze (deception based on physical evidence).

Information-Data and instructions. Derives from phenomena (observable facts or events), then is analyzed to become information (perceptions and interpretations-regardless of the means).

Information Attack-Directly corrupting information without visibly changing the physical entity within which it resides (e.g. computer viruses, or hacker attack).

Information Function-Any activity involving the acquisition, transmission, storage, or transformation of information.

Information Operations-Any action involving the acquisition, transmission, storage, or transformation of information that enhances the employment of military forces.

Information Age Warfare-Tool to impart combat operations with unprecedented economies of time and force. Affects all combat operations. Distinct from Information Warfare.

Information Warfare-Any action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy's information and its functions; protecting ourselves against those actions; and exploiting our own military information functions. Information warfare is a means to an end, not an end in itself.

Military Information Function-Any information function supporting and enhancing the employment of military forces.

Offensive Counterinformation-Actions against the adversary's information functions.

Information Warfare - George Stein

There is no official, open-source US government definition of information warfare. DoD calls it command and control warfare (C²W). All of the services disagree about C²W, but agree it's important. Information warfare is simply the use of information to achieve national objectives.

IW is about the way humans think and make decisions. It's not about computers, radios, or satellites - It's about the human mind. It's about the paralysis of the enemy's OODA loop.

Cyberspace may be the new battlespace-but the battle remains the battle for the mind.

The news media today creates a fictive depiction of reality-what we see is true, but it's not the complete story, not everything relevant has been said, it may be out of context. This fictive universe can change public opinion or NCA decisions based on bad information.

The media can create fiction also by using special effects to portray things which never occurred (e.g. scenes from Forest Gump or the premise of the movie Wag the Dog). Imagine what would happen if we created news for an enemy we were physically fighting-we could get them to surrender based on a fictitious event.

Developing Information Warfare Strategy - We must creatively use our existing tools and make new ones to provide information dominance on the battlefield. Just like Billy Mitchell thought out new ways to use air power, we must discover new ways of using today's technology to gain a decisive advantage for the mind. We must also think of and build new tools (e.g. electromagnetic pulse generators on unmanned aerial vehicles designed to destroy enemy radar) to give us a decisive advantage. Develop the strategy and the technology will be built.

Developing Information Warfare Doctrine - We must view Information Warfare broadly and not just view it as C²W.

Conclusions: If we do not develop an effective strategy for Information Warfare we could be on the receiving end of an electronic Pearl Harbor. We have a small lead in information technology but we must work hard to keep it. We do not yet have a strategy for Information Warfare. Whoever develops and deploys one will discover it's a significant force multiplier. Let's not be on the receiving end. Remember, it's better to give than to receive.

Information Attack: Information Warfare in 2025 - George Stein

The true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous so that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this -- B.H. Liddell Hart

Information Warfare is "Actions taken to achieve relatively greater understanding of the strengths, weaknesses, and centers of gravity of an adversary's military, political, social, and economic infrastructure in order to deny, exploit, influence, corrupt, or destroy those adversary information-based activities thorough command and control warfare and information attack."

Targets, not method of combat, define what is information warfare. A bomb taking out a telephone switching system, or a computer virus doing the same, are both Information Warfare.

The Future Environment - we must be able to do more by doing it differently. Information warfare may provide capability for asymmetric response. Information Dominance is the core competency which will strongly come into play (goal is greater understanding, not total understanding). The term warfare in information warfare "should not be construed as limiting IW to a military conflict, declared or otherwise."

Netwar - national conflict through use of intel & comm assets, attacks decision-making process.

Cyberwar - operational level of netwar. Attacks the mind of the enemy commander by getting inside his OODA loop and forcing him to make bad decisions.

Joint Vision 2010 has 4 technological trends assumed to shape future war fighting environment (which require information supremacy):

1. Increasing precision of weapons and their means of delivery.
2. Increasing menu of weapons' effects-from lethal to nonlethal technologies
3. Increased stealth for both offensive platforms and invisibility of friendly forces
4. Improvements in information systems integration, from sensors to shooters, which may permit a "dominant battlespace awareness" to include the ability to "see, prioritize, assign, and assess"

Information supremacy is the capability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.

Dominant Maneuver (US Army operational concept) proposes to bring together widely dispersed joint forces to attack the enemy throughout the height, breadth, and depth of the battlespace by attacking all levels of the enemy's centers of gravity simultaneously.

Precision engagement depends on a system of systems that permits our forces to locate the target, provide responsive command and control, have the desired effect, assess the effect, and reengage if required. That is, we can shape the battlespace and conduct a dominant maneuver.

Full-dimension protection, built on information supremacy (actually, supremacy of information-in-war), will provide multidimensional awareness and assessment, as well as identification of all forces within the battlespace. Defensive information warfare will be required to protect our information systems and processes.

Focused logistics illustrates the thinking that the ability to project power with the most capable forces is the central problem. "The ability to fuse information, logistics, and transportation technologies; provide rapid crisis response; track and shift assets even while enroute; and deliver the logistics and sustainment to the level of operations" assumes that getting stuff there for the forces is the essence of projecting power.

The US Air Force - Information is seen as a realm in which dominance will be contested and in which and from which military power can be employed. IW is any action to "deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy an adversary's information, information systems, and information operations" while protecting "friendly forces from similar actions." Current USAF thinking is confused in the area of IW and has not yet reached a coherence in the words that will define and guide doctrine.

Air Force Doctrine Document-1 (AFDD-1) - The information role is defined to include command, control, communications, and computers; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation and positioning; and the weather service.

Air Force Doctrine Document-5 (AFDD-5) - "Information Warfare" defines information attack as "activities taken to manipulate or destroy an adversary's information without visibly changing the physical entity within which it resides" and information functions as any activity involving the acquisition, transmission, or storage or information.

Cornerstones of Information Warfare - roles and missions of air and space power are: aerospace control, force application, force enhancement, and force support. Information attack is directly corrupting information without visibly changing the physical entity within which it resides. The USAF is the first to recognize that IW is about information itself and not just information-in-war.

Global Awareness in the view of New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century, is that the USAF can use "affordable means to derive appropriate information about one or more places of interest after a delay which is short enough to satisfy operational needs."

Global Reach is usually thought of as the ability of deploying aircraft from the Continental United States or out-of-theater bases into the area of interest in a rapid and timely fashion.

Global Power is increasingly characterized by the ability to engage with precise and discriminating effect, permits the asymmetric strategic response which leverages the differential information-in-war advantage provided by global awareness and the information-based planning and execution control provided by global reach.

The future potential in information warfare to substitute precise and discriminate credible information-whether by the methods of C²W (deception, PSYOP, or other means) or information attack-to a precise and discriminate target decision maker is the essence of decisive maneuver as it may position the adversary in space and time, by his own decision, in that strategic situation so disadvantageous "that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this."

Information Warfare: A Strategy for Peace... The Decisive Edge in War - Joint Chiefs of Staff

Information Warfare (IW) has emerged as a key joint warfighting mission area. The explosive proliferation of information-based technology significantly impacts warfighting across all phases, the range of military operations, and all levels of war.

Some potential adversaries are rapidly exploiting information and information system technologies such as telecommunications, automated data processing, sophisticated decision aids, remote sensors, and other related systems. Timely, accurate, and relevant information is absolutely essential to warfighting as large force structures give way to smaller, highly trained, and technically equipped forces. Although the nature of war remains unchanged, its character is now in constant transition.

Information itself is becoming a strategic resource vital to national security. The continuing growth of information systems and technologies offers nearly unlimited potential for exploiting the power of information in joint warfighting.

The successful conduct of warfare in the information age requires access in information available outside the theater of operations. Mobility and sustainment of forces are highly dependent on commercial "reach-back" infrastructures that include international telecommunication, the public switched network, transportation systems, and commercial electric power grids.

IW applies across all phases, the range of military operations, and at every level of warfare.

It may have its greatest impact in peace and the initial stages of crisis. IW can make an important contribution to defusing crises. There are both offensive and defensive aspects of IW.

Information Warfare-Defense (IW-D) implementation is designed with an objective of information assurance to protect access to timely, accurate, and relevant information wherever and whenever needed.

IW-D Components:

1. Authentication - verification of originator
2. Integrity - protection from unauthorized change
3. Non-repudiation - undeniable proof of participation
4. Confidentiality - protection from unauthorized disclosure
5. Availability - assured access by authorized users

Attack Detection - A critical element of the detection process is identifying indicators or adversary activity, analysis of those indicators, and dissemination of warnings. These capabilities must automatically detect system intrusions or aberrations and instantly generate alerts.

Restoration - relies on a pre-established understanding of the desired levels and conditions of system performance and functionality.

Attack detection mechanisms serve to trigger the response process. Timely response is essential to influence adversary perceptions, establish user confidence, and maintain public support.

Offensive IW (IW-O) - As with the IW-D system, IW-O capabilities are employed at every level of warfare and across the range of military operations.

IW-O in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) - Offensive IW related plans with their associated capabilities may be employed in peacetime to deter a crisis, control crisis escalation, project power, or promote peace. The employment of offensive IW capabilities in these circumstances may require NCA approval with support, coordination, deconfliction, cooperation, and/or participation by other USG departments and agencies.

Wartime Employment of IW-O - employment of IW-O capabilities can affect every aspect of an adversary's decision cycle by impacting its information centers of gravity.

The deterrent effect IW-O capabilities can have on a potential adversary during peace and crisis.

IW-O also provides deterrence of an information-based attack against the United States. The IW vision does not demonstrate a nation that is invulnerable, but rather one that is vigilant, decisive, and prepared to respond to any threat, foreign or domestic.

The three principles of the Joint Staff's implementation vision are:

1. Reduce the opportunities presented to potential adversaries by educating, training, and increasing the awareness of warriors to vulnerabilities and protective measures.
2. Improve information attack capabilities and measures to protect against and detect attack on information and information systems by pursuing emerging technological capabilities and the synergy created by integrated defense-in-depth solutions.
3. Build the necessary relationships, within government and throughout the Nation, to secure the information needs of all constituencies. Seal those arrangements in law and policy, resulting in reconstituted national deterrence to preserve peace, security, and stability.

Efforts in six major areas are coming together to support the warfighter. They include:

(1) Education, training, and exercises, (2) Policy, (3) Doctrine, (4), Assessments, (5) Organizational infrastructure, (6) Technology.

Education, training, and exercises offer the greatest return on investment. Training for system and network administrators to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities is another investment yielding high dividends. Lessons learned from incorporating IW into joint exercises also will help accelerate and shape policy and doctrine.

The Joint Staff is the lead agent for developing joint doctrine for information warfare. This doctrine will include both offensive and defensive IW principles.

The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment process, under the guidance of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and with CINC participation, serves as the primary analytic tool to support the Chairman in articulating joint warfighting requirements. Critical to the continued success of IW-D efforts will be the availability of intelligence to support a comprehensive threat awareness. Maintaining ties to academic and scientific organizations provide a glimpse at the leading edge thinking that may influence future warfighting strategy and doctrine.

Information Warfare-a strategy for peace ... the decisive edge in war.

Information Warfare: Applying the Lessons Today - LtCol James Rodgers

History is a valuable teacher, but only if we learn from her and apply her lessons.

• The first step in successful information warfare is understanding your opponent's language, culture, and values.

• We frequently do not understand our enemy on a multitude of plains. We don't speak their language. We don't comprehend their culture. We need to spend more time understanding our enemy's weaknesses. Specifically, in Information Warfare, what works in one country may not work in another due to differences in infrastructure and culture.

• The second step in successful information warfare is understanding your opponent's operational doctrine and practice.

• It's very difficult to understand the enemy's operational doctrine and practice. Then, sometimes even if we understand it, they may not use it. An example being U.S. doctrine during the cold war, we worked hard to develop doctrine-then seldom followed it. This drove the Soviets mad trying to figure us out (this wasn't out strategy-this was luck).
• Our own biases and assumptions (mirror-imaging) add difficulty.

• Information Warriors must be able to keep their secrets.

• We must ensure that IW systems and capabilities are designed and operated with security commensurate with their value. Security is not cheap... it's invaluable. If we can't afford to protect sensitive IW capabilities it's better not to have them.
• One should not keep a secret so well that it causes undue allied casualties or costs a battle. Yet one must also be prepared to accept certain, predetermined losses to protect a critical capability for a larger, future need.

• Information warfare targets, like frogs, should be boiled slowly.

• Long-term strategies require time to be developed and implemented. We Americans expect everything in a hurry. Patience is critical.

• IW is not like playing solitaire ... there is an opponent in this two-sided game. Expect the normal measure/countermeasure cycle of warfare to limit your effectiveness over time.

• It's possible to beat IW using very low tech weapons / procedures. Be alert to your weaknesses and be prepared for the enemies counter-attacks.

• Make sure someone out there is listening. Never allow an operation to hinge solely upon information warfare techniques.

• Some opponents are immune to IW methods because they use low-tech procedures and weapons. We must be able to use other diversified weapons and have solid strategy in order to defeat every foe. IW is good, but we must make sure it's not the only card we have to play.