The manner in which these weapons are used should be driven by the military objective. Such military objectives always come from the political imperatives of the government. Accordingly, when commanders and their planning staff are considering how to achieve these political ends, the number of options they can offer should be maximized wherever possible so the amount of force necessary can be matched as closely as possible to the overall aim of the operation. These aims can range from monitoring activities with unarmed observers to engaging in aggressive counter offensives in the face of a serious threat to national survival. Non-lethal weapons can assist commanders in this matching.

One major lesson the Air Force learned from its experience in the Gulf was that the US needs a diverse family of UAVs, not one all-purpose model. Smaller, target spotting, tactical UAVs would be easier to operate near the front lines, under the control of corps or division commanders. Larger, long-endurance unmanned vehicles could take off far from the battlefield yet patrol broad swaths of strategic area. In service to joint task force or theater chiefs, small numbers of low observable UAVs could fulfill the hard-target reconnaissance mission just as stealth filters are used to attack high-value targets.

Such a range of capabilities would mesh perfectly with the Pentagon’s emerging "information dominance" doctrine. It could help provide the detailed location data necessary for the best use of many types of precision-guided munitions.

JV 2010 provides a common direction for our services in developing their unique capabilities. JV 2010dilineates four operational tasks: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics enabled by information superiority. UAV’s exploit elevation to provide theater-wide surveillance, reconnaissance, and C3 advantages. Any non-lethal technology such as combustion alteration technology, electrical power disruption technology, high power microwaves, or superadhesives could destroy, neutralize, or disable an enemy’s means of gaining information or controlling forces. Precision engagement would be enhanced by technologies such as acoustic weapons, which enable us to not only precisely destroy the target but also identify the particular target we want to destroy. Additionally, UAV’s and ABL’s would allow us to identify and precisely mark and target enemy centers of gravity and TBM’s. Full dimensional protection would be enhanced by the ABL. This platform would enable us to accomplish counter air and defense of high value assets against air to air and SAM missles. Once again the UAV would give us a real-time picture of enemy movements against us without jeopardizing other airborne reconnaissance assets. Information superiority could be enhanced through the use of the UAV, the development of our global TV network to control and disseminate information that so often influences public opinion or our perceptions

All the readings in this block point to the huge inadequacies in US global television doctrine. By looking at what we don’t have, you should be able to infer what we should have in order to use global TV as a weapon. So with that in mind, here we go. Global real-time television, has opened the line between diplomacy and war and left a sizable gray zone where the wills of nations can be bent and major changes in international politics can be effected without the necessity to resort to all-out lethal means. This type of conflict is here defined as "SOFTWAR": The hostile use of global television to shape another nation’s will by changing its vision of reality. To date, the US’s use of global TV is pitiful.

US Special Operations Command continues to update the PSYOP doctrine, to include use of the television medium, with little true understanding of the current state-of-the-art or the day-to-day realities of the global television business. There is no one at the command or Joint Staff level in a decision-making position with career credentials in global or even network broadcasting. How can the US expect to produce effective TV counter-propaganda with video illiterates leading video neophytes?

In current doctrine, there are no provisions for carrying a C-band and/or K-band commercial satellite uplink or for integrating an uplink into the system. An uplink would provide access to commercial capacity during operations, as well as provide the capacity to soft-jam or spoof enemy use of satellite transponders in a given footprint. There also are no current provisions for dealing with Direct Broadcast Satellite transmissions which can cover entire regions of continents. This makes COMMANDO SOLO-II TV functions obsolete. A DBS footprint is about 2,000 miles in diameter, while vehicle COMMANDO SOLO-II is about 100 miles. DBS also operates in a completely different frequency range from COMMANDO SOLO-II, and advanced DBS models will most likely use a HDTV format. There are no provisions or plans for HDTV broadcasts from COMMANDO SOLO-II. Now emerging from development, American HDTV may well provide a single world broadcast format, rendering most COMMANDO SOLO-II TV functions obsolete. Similarly, there are no provisions or plans for completely digitizing what is a mostly analog COMMANDO SOLO-II system. Using digitally based machines provides a tremendous amount of flexibility in reception, processing, and dissemination of the video. Nor are there plans for using existing Digital Audio Tape (DAT) and off-the-shelf computer capacity for real-time video or audio deception mimicry, which would be extraordinarily useful in both conventional and special operations.

There are no provisions for either ground or air launching of organic UAVs to transmit TV pictures to an enemy population. Such cheap, off-the-shelf, semi-expendable drones are not only force multipliers, but also preclude the loss of a COMMANDO SOLO-II (of which there are only four, with two follow-on aircraft) and its highly skilled, hard-to-replace crew of 12 or more.

An early indication of the effect of Information Age or Third-Wave institution of global television is that it gives developing nations the equivalent of a multi-billion dollar indications and warning intelligence system for under $100.00 a month. CNN Headlines, for instance, delivers half-hourly reports on the status of the US government, from which US action is easily predicted. For example, it the President is calling for immediate military action and the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader both vociferously disagree, the probability of action is less likely than if all three are in agreement on the policy.

Recall that during the Desert Shield phase of the Gulf War, the news media covered, broadly but anecdotally, US military preparations and mobilization. This coverage aired American popular and Congressional reactions to the crisis, mobilization procedures, and the prospects of armed conflict, including disaffected reservists and families of military personnel. The fact that this coverage might have provided the Iraqi leadership with an inaccurate portrait of ultimate American resolve does not lessen the validity of the point.

Global television also provides an instrument for Command and Control Warfare (C2W). While DoD uses direct methods such as jamming, spoofing, or attacking enemy military command and control organizations to render them ineffectual, some Third-Wave-oriented foreign powers use an indirect method against the political side of the NCA. An adversary has only to generate very strong video that is designed to negatively stimulate the US body politic. By instantly creating domestic political pressure, an opponent often can preclude our political leadership from acting, thus freezing the US military and by default rendering US policy and military capabilities ineffectual.

ADVANTAGES:

AC COURSE OBJECTIVES:

• Know the capabilities and limitations of US military forces across the range of military operations. (OPMEP Learning Area 1)
• Know of the systems and understand the processes supporting the 21st century battlespace and how these are integrated to achieve operational-level joint force missions. (OPMEP Learning Area 5)
• Analyze the impact of contextual and operational art elements on campaign planning.

CONTACT HOURS: This lesson can be completed in 6 hours.

1. Casagrande, "Non-lethal Weapons: Implications for the RAAF"
2. Grier, "DarkStar and Its Friends"
3. de Caro, "SOFTWAR"
4. Coulombe, "The Airborne Laser: Pie in the Sky or Vision of Future Theater Missile Defense?"
5. Metcalf, "Acoustics on the 21st Century Battlefield"

21^st Century Armed forces-Joint Vision 2010 is in the blue book and doesn’t really have anything to do with the SOB’s. I wouldn’t read it.

Casagrande’s paper provides a good overview of nonlethal technologies and suggests how the Australian Defence Force could use them. Coulombe and Metcalf discuss the implications of airborne laser and advanced acoustics technologies. Grier talks about the missions that UAVs will perform in the coming century. De Caro explains how global television can be used to shape another nation’s will by changing its vision of reality.

Thesis: Future technology is limited only by the imaginations of its developers. Military planners must remain aware of technological advances and carefully consider them during the campaign planning process. Moreover, in this era of budget cutbacks and force drawdowns, the weapon systems most likely to be funded are those whose worth has been "proven" in wargames like Global, Ulchi Focus Lens, and Blue Flag.

Main Point I: New technologies like UAVs and the airborne laser can be used to enhance JV 2010’s operational concepts of dominant maneuver and precision engagement.

Main Point II: Nonlethal technology can improve the capability of US military forces.

Main Point III: Television may be used as a weapon in the joint campaign.

This lesson most closely ties to TH 502, RMA/MTR. There are also some links to AC 506, Information Operations and Information Warfare, and AC 509, The Role of the Media in Campaign Planning.

LESSON OPR: War Theory and Campaign Studies Department