The GNA, passed in 1986, was key to fostering a level jointness not seen since World War II. The chain of command flowed directly from the NCA to the CINC and neither the Services nor the CJCS had command of any forces. However, important service doctrinal differences remained in the execution of both the air and ground campaigns. Also, the GNA eliminated any official channels for the services to provide planning expertise. Nonetheless, through ad hoc arrangements, service expertise was used extensively in the planning of both the air and ground campaigns. (Powerpoint Presentation pg32)

The Defense Reorganization ("Goldwater-Nichols") Act of 1986 had a fundamental impact on the institutions of the unified commands, the joint Chiefs of Staff, and the services. The act empowered the CINCs and the chairman of the JCS by giving them major new responsibilities in resource allocation as well as national security planning and operations. This empowerment came at the expense of the services, whose role was carefully limited to organizing, training, and equipping forces--not employing them. This deemphasis of the services' role was accomplished in large part by transferring power from the service representatives in the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the chairman of that organization. The services' operational role was limited to support of the unified combatant commands. Most of the senior officers we interviewed commented on the important role the 1986 Reorganization Act played in fostering a truly joint effort. (Reading #4 pg 4).

In many ways the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act was the godfather of the success of the Gulf war. However, its implementation has had a negative side effect as well: the gradual exclusion of the service staffs from operational matters during contingency operations. No CINC staff--not even the Joint Staff--possesses the operational expertise that exists in the aggregate of the service staffs in Washington. Moreover, much of that expertise is in joint operations, thanks in part to Goldwater-Nichols. The current planning structures place the Joint Staff (reporting to the chairman of the JCS) and the CINCs' staffs at the center of operational planning. While this reform has had many beneficial effects, it can easily lead to a planning process in which service staffs become bystanders as officers and officials from outside the services, jealous of their prerogatives, are reluctant to seek advice and assistance for fear that they will lose turf, clout, or accolades. (Reading #4 pg 35).

International Coalition: In an effort to placate Israel, planning was directed at SCUD hunting instead of the original plan. To placate the Arabs, a ground occupation of Baghdad was eliminated. To ensure Iraq's future, only short bombing impacts were planned. Finally, the UN would not authorize the ousting of Saddam by Coalition force. (PowerPoint pg11)

Inter-Service: The plan was initially put together and staffed by the Air Force. This bothered the Navy (they eventually adapted) and really bothered the Marines. The whole ATO idea was specifically Air Force and they were the only group with the electronic means to use it. The other services sent representatives, but these were mainly outsiders who had to join in. The idea was to get the most efficient use of assets and these were mostly AF. It was more costly for Navy A/C to drop bombs because of distances and other factors. The Navy also desired to keep its commander afloat instead of having him join the leadership in country. Other problems include: Carriers in the Persian Gulf, Inorganic tankers, lack of targeting devices, CONOPS vs gen war. These things all had to be overcome. The marines fought the idea that their A/C would be part of something other than MAGTF support. They held resources back from the JFACC and never really played the game or accepted the JFACC. (Reading #4 pg4-12)

Media impacts include: initial bombing video's which gave the war a bloodless feel and may have helped gather support for the fighting. The video of the bombing of a civilian filled bunker in Baghdad (Al Firdos) caused the NCA to limit bombing in Baghdad and force the approval of the target lists prior to execution. The video of the "Highway of Death" may have contributed to the early ending of the war. Careful review of the timing of media coverage of Coalition air attacks against Iraqi forces fleeing northward from Kuwait City along Highway 6 at the end of the war, for example, indicates that most of it appeared after President Bush had announced his decision to end hostilities on the evening of 27 February 1991 (Washington time). (Power Point pg 26, Reading #1 pg 13)

The trend toward "bloodlessness" as a desideratum in the conduct of war may have gained impetus from the growth in television reporting of combat operations via satellite. Cable News Network (CNN) reporting of the initial Coalition attacks on Baghdad while they were in progress remains one of the most vivid images from the Gulf War. Television coverage may have influenced political-military decision making during the Gulf War, although some senior participants in White House decision making discount this.

The Coalition's operational and tactical PSYOP sought to

• Encourage the defection, desertion, and surrender of the soldiers and leaders of specific Iraqi units
• Induce discord, alienation, malingering, and loss of confidence within Iraqi units
• Demonstrate to the Iraqi soldiers and unit leaders the overwhelming superiority of U.S. and other Coalition forces
• Intimidate Iraqi chemical and air defense units
• Convince Iraqi soldiers and unit leaders that the Coalition's quarrel was not with them but with Saddam Hussein and his regime
• Deter Iraqi soldiers and unit leaders from committing war crimes or engaging in wanton destruction.

In addition, they wanted to deter the use of WMD or criminal acts. The measures used were numbers of line crossers and deserters and the fact that no WMD were used. The use of leaflets and radio/loudspeakers. The limit of the area covered was southern Iraq and Kuwait. The results appear to have been very successful due to the high numbers of soldiers that deserted or surrendered with respect to the numbers that were killed. The key appears to be that the Psyop effort was conducted in coordination with the bombing effort. Our leaflets said there would be devastating bombing the next day, and there was. It looked like we didn't lie. The Iraqi's own propaganda also worked in our favor when Saddam said that the West would not stand for casualties, but the Iraqi's could stand thousands. The soldiers realized that those thousand meant them. (PowerPoint pg 27-31, Reading #3)

The only really new technology used during Desert Storm was JSTARS. But the use of the other high tech (Stealth, Precision Munitions (LGBs), Tomahawk, etc.) weapons in more effective ways represent the MTR. During the twentieth century one can identify at least two dramatic changes in warfare that represents a RMA. The first culminated in the period 1939-1942 with the appearance of Blitzkrieg (lightning warfare), strategic bombardment, offensive carrier aviation, and amphibious warfare. These developments depended in various ways on the technologies involved in mechanization, aviation, and radio communication. The second, which centered on the marriage of atomic weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, covered the period from the late-1940s to the mid-1960s and culminated in the fielding of large arsenals of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads that were never used in anger. (Reading #1, Page 3)

• New Tech: JSTARS, Tomahawk (Not new, but saw their debut), F-117 (High state)
• New Tact: "tank plinking" - dropping LGBs on armored vehicles from high altitude.
• New Ops: "parallel Warfare" - combination of stealth and cruise missiles allowed the air campaign to target and destroy multiple target sets at the same time instead of one at a time.
• New Organizations: JFACC - provided unity of effort during the air campaign.

The war was not revolutionary in what it attacked. The same types of targets were attacked as during WWII, Korea and Vietnam, it is just that the effectiveness made a wider range of targets possible. We learned to use the high tech stuff we had been preparing to use against the USSR.

Desert Storm confirmed the decade-old Soviet prediction of an impending "military-technical revolution" driven by advances in microelectronics, automated decision-support systems, telecommunications, satellite and other advanced sensors, lasers, and, especially, non-nuclear munitions so accurate and lethal that they could wreak levels of military damage comparable to those attainable with tactical nuclear weapons. (Power Point pg38-40, Reading #1)

Advanced technologies allowed for more targets to be attacked because the targets were destroyed more effectively than ever before. In the six week air war in the gulf, there were more than double the number of laser guided bombs dropped than in the 9 months of the Linebacker II ops in Vietnam, with more effect and less losses. "A qualitative rather than quantitative change in weapons employment." Attacks on Baghdad were not perfect but they were pretty good in terms of not hitting everything except the actual targets. The idea of effective kill was used successfully as well. We had such good control of the battlefield that the mere presence of our forces caused the Iraqi's not to turn on their radar's or to abandon their equipment. Use of electronics, and air supremacy, allowed the engagement of targets beyond visual range. (Reading #1)

Wider access to advanced technology along with modern weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the requisite skills to maintain and employ it, will increase the number of actors with sufficient military potential to upset existing regional balances of power. Modern systems are sufficiently powerful that smaller numbers can dramatically alter the threats facing us. A number of potential adversaries may acquire the military hardware to make themselves distinctly more dangerous. Our most vexing future adversary may be one who can use technology to make rapid improvements in its military capabilities that provide asymmetrical counters to US military strengths, including information technologies. Alternatively, the high leverage associated with modern systems means that significant improvements in military capabilities can occur very rapidly, outrunning the pace of compensating political or military countermeasures. The application of these technologies against us may also prove surprising. Our adversaries will have an independent will, some knowledge of our capabilities, and the desire to avoid our strengths and exploit vulnerabilities. We anticipate the probability of facing technological or operational surprise will increase in the period ahead. In sum, the US must prepare to face a wider range of threats, emerging unpredictably, employing varying combinations of technology, and challenging us at varying levels of intensity. This era will be one of accelerating technological change. Critical advances will have enormous impact on all military forces. Successful adaptation of new and improved technologies may provide great increases in specific capabilities. Conversely, failure to understand and adapt could lead today's militaries into premature obsolescence and greatly increase the risks that such forces will be incapable of effective operations against forces with high technology. Long-range precision capability, combined with a wide range of delivery systems, is emerging as a key factor in future warfare. Technological advances will continue the trend toward improved precision. Global positioning systems, high-energy research, electromagnetic technology, and enhanced stand-off capabilities will provide increased accuracy and a wider range of delivery options. These capabilities will increase the combat power available for use against selected objectives, resulting in enhanced economy of force and a higher tempo of operations. (Reading #5, Pages 14-15)

Dominant Maneuver: Dominant maneuver will be the multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, and space forces to accomplish the assigned operational tasks. Dominant maneuver will allow our forces to gain a decisive advantage by controlling the breadth, depth, and height of the battlespace. Through a combination of asymmetric leverage, achieved by our positional advantages, as well as decisive speed and tempo, dominant maneuver allows us to apply decisive force to attack enemy centers of gravity at all levels and compels an adversary to either react from a position of disadvantage or quit. (Reading #5, Page 24)

Precision Engagement: Precision engagement will consist of a system of systems that enables our forces to locate the objective or target, provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess our level of success, and retain the flexibility to reengage with precision when required. Even from extended ranges, precision engagement will allow us to shape the battlespace, enhancing the protection of our forces. Information operations will tie together high fidelity target acquisition, prioritized requirements, and command and control of joint forces within the battlespace. This combination will provide a greater assurance of delivering the desired effect, lessen the risk to our forces, and minimize collateral damage. Precision engagement will build on current US advantages in delivery accuracy and low observable technologies. It will use a wide variety of means, including very accurate aerial deliveries or air drops, discriminate weapon strikes, and precise, all-weather stand-off capability. Enhanced jointness will ensure greater commonality between Service precision engagement capabilities and provide future joint force commanders with a wider array of responsive, accurate, and flexible options. (Reading #5, Pages 25-26)

The Gulf war did exemplify this vision. It really helped that our enemy was scared, cowed, inept, and not very well trained. We also had a battlefield that was devoid of trees, mountains and jungles. It would have been a little different had we been doing this in Northern Europe against a well trained and motivated Former Soviet Union. As the readings stated: In Iraq, Ineptness started at the top and worked its way down.

510.6 Apply joint principles and lessons learned from past operations and campaigns in employing unified and joint forces throughout the range of military operations. [II.b]

The various elements are covered in the Power Point presentation:

CONTEXTUAL:

• Political: Needed public and congressional support, limit war, casualties
• Coalition: Convinced Russia/China not to support Iraq and spread costs, Arab-Israeli sensitivities, Must placate Arab fears of Western colonialism
• Economic: Oil, costs, material supplies
• Socio-cultural: No more Vietnam's, Build strategic air campaign to avoid ground invasion, embargo
• Leadership: President, SECDEF, CJCS, Saddam forced their agendas
• Environment: Iraq surrounded, desert, little population

OPERATIONAL:

• Logistics: Airlift - fast - small capacity, Sealift - Slow, huge capacity
• Technology: F-117, JSTARS, Precision guided munitions
• Information: Space, We decapitated their abilities
• Targeting Science: Ability to get specific targets (destroy or make ineffective)
• Deception: Amphib ops, false radio calls.
• Measuring Success: BDA (problems, etc)

(This was all a function of the Power Point Presentation pg10-25)

(1) Gulf War Airpower Survey Summary Report, "Was Desert Storm a Revolution in Warfare?" The GWAPS Summary Report begins the examination of the revolutionary nature of the conduct of the Persian Gulf War. (Gwaps.doc/16 Pages)

(2) The General's War (Gordon and Trainor) Gordon and Trainor discuss contextual elements that shaped campaign planning, highlight problems in application of operational art, and detail the conflict that occurred between the Air Force and the Army regarding airpower employment. (Genwar.doc/125 Pages)

(3) Psychological Effects of US Air Operations in Four Wars, 1941-1991 (Hosmer). Hosmer outlines the use and effects of PSYOP. The Gulf War toolbook provides an overarching view of the campaign. (Psyop.doc/17 Pages)

(4) Joint Air Operations (Winnefeld and Johnson). Winnefeld and Johnson focus on command and control structures and examine the role of Naval and Marine air. (Jao.doc/40 Pages)

(5) Joint Vision 2010 pp. 13-18 (review) - also in coursebook (JV2010.pdf/6 Pages)

(6) GulfWar.tbk. Has seven chapters covering the entire time period from 02 August 1990 - 03 March 1991. Not a bad refresher, but not really relevant to the SOB's.

(7) ac510dl.ppt (for scripted version use ds1.doc) This was key.

Thesis: The coalition's lopsided victory in Operation Desert Storm was heavily dependent on airpower. Despite this obvious conclusion, controversy rages about the role airpower played in the ultimate outcome. Some herald the use of precision, stealth, and information systems as a Revolution in Warfare. Others point to the incompetence of the Iraqi forces as the major reason for success. This case study begins the process of placing the coalition victory in Operation Desert Storm in perspective by viewing this conflict from a strategic and operational viewpoint. This final Airpower and Campaign Planning case study will conclude with a look to the future. What lessons from the 1991 conflict can we use to improve our ability to employ airpower in the future?

Main Point I: Overview of Desert Storm joint doctrine and planning.

a. Contextual elements and their effects on US strategy and objectives.

b. How military / political objectives affected operational art.

c. Other operational art issues - media coverage, intel limits, & measuring success

d. Relationships between NCA, JCS, JFC, and Service Chiefs.

Main Point II: Analysis of Desert Storm joint doctrine, planning, and execution.

a. Advantages and vulnerabilities created by reliance on advanced technology in Desert Storm.

b. Planning and measuring effects of psychological operations.

c. Analysis of Desert Storm in terms of RMA / MTR.

d. Strengths / weaknesses of the Gulf War JFACC organization.

Main Point III: Improving joint planning and doctrine to deal with potential future scenarios.

a. Refining the JFACC concept and applying it in the future.

b. Making joint doctrine more joint.