Air Force core competency areas: Air and Space Superiority, Global Attack, Rapid Global Mobility, Precision Engagement, Information Superiority, and Agile Combat Support.

1. Air and Space Superiority control necessary to allow US forces operate
2. GlobalAttack - Ability to go anywhere - anytime
3. Rapid Global Mobility - timely positioning of forces through airlift, sealift and spacelift.
4. Precision Engagement - Employ forces min risk + collateral damage.
5. Information Superiority - collect, control, exploit and defend info - deny enemy .
6. Agile combat support - maintain ops w/ moderization, Test & Eval, Model & Sim, and Log

Strategy-to-Tasks (What is it) -Strategy into COA's

• Method for developing more effective PPBS inputs (Decide what we want to do and plan for it

These are the 12 joint warfighting operational capabilities identified in Perry's article

1. Dominant Battlespace Knowledge - interoperability between services - force multiplier
2. Combat Identification prevent fratricide and increase situational awareness
3. Information Warfare and Security secure ours and deny/destroy theirs
4. Precision Force destroy selected targets remotely w/ min collateral damage.
5. Joint Theater Missile Defense detect, acquire, track, and destroy enemy theater ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
6. Electronic Warfare degradation of enemy use of EM spectrum
7. Counterproliferation detect , destroy, neutralize enemy ability to use weapons of mass destruct
8. Chemical and Biological Warfare Detection rapidly detect and assess and provide adequate warning
9. Countermine rapid neutralization of land and sea mines
10. Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) fight in cities with minimal damage
11. Real-time Logistics Control real-time visibility into entire logistics support structure across the Services
12. Joint Readiness through exercise, simulation, and planning

Kenney (in Australia) improved logistics

1. He cleaned house of personnel who weren't able to support the plan
2. Use of local resources
3. Salvage crashed aircraft for parts.
4. Enforced support for requisitions regardless of paperwork requirements.
5. Moved the logistics depots closer to troops
6. Improve the living conditions
7. Worked on training stand downs to improve readiness

How did Kenney reorganized air forces to enhance compatibility/unity of effort.

1. Cut the overhead and dead wood
2. Initiated - one commander of air forces - centralized control, decentralized execution
3. Moved the organization closer to forces
4. Established primary, secondary, and tertiary targets - unity of effort
5. Separated Americans/Australians; created bomber/fighter squadrons & groups Kenney acted as a JFACC

Offensive:

• Supporting landing and Air Superiority Ops at same time
• Mass (18) bomber forces

Unity of Command

• Reorganized the air forces
• Listening to the troops
• Recognition program decorating combat achievement

Surprise

• Large offensive of bombers (largest thus far)
• Innovative attacks (Parachute Bomb)

Responsibilities:
JFC/ JFACC staff plans, monitors, and directs the execution of joint air operations

Designates - Joint Targeting Coord Board

Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB): reviews target info, dev target guidance & priorities; maintain a complete list of restricted targets

Phase 1 - Op Environment Research: gaining info about friendly/enemy capabilities & intentions, doctrine, and the environment in which the operations will take place.

Phase 2 - Objective Determination: clearly defined and quantifiable objectives that will contribute to the accomplishment of the JFC's operation or campaign objectives.

Phase 3 - Strategy Identification: A Statement that says how the JFACC plans to exploit joint air capabilities/ forces to support the JFC's objectives.

Phase 4 - Center(s) of Gravity (COG) Id: Those COGs that need to be defeated to satisfy the JFC's strategic, operational, and tactical objectives

Phase 5 - The Joint Air Operations Plan Development: Joint air operations plan that details how joint air operations will support the JFC's operation or campaign plan.

Air Force concerns where service and joint doctrine appear to be in conflict.
Key is that AF thinks that some "non-experts" might make doctrine

TACS are integrated to support the theater commander
They integrate all ground and air theater air control elements to plan, direct, & control theater air operations.

AOC integrates w/ army - with Fwd Air controllers, C2 specialists

Issues from different service about application of airpower
Marines want CAS - directed

Navy - Fleet Defense

AF - want control of all through JFACC

Changes to air request system to improve coordination
Target Prioritization into 3 levels: 1. Theater air interdiction, 2. Battlefield air interdiction, and 3. Offensive counter air.

Notional scenario
Crisis - Navy arriving first on the scene; JFACC at Sea

Come designate the Marine ACE commander as JFACC because of his proximity to a JFC.

The Air Force AOC stands up. - transfer JFACC responsibilities to the AFCC

Implications of new concepts/tech on the process of targeting for effect.
* Biggest is RTIC (Real-time Information into the Cockpit) allows new target designation on the fly (Flexibility)

Observation-orientation-decision-action cycle or OODA loop

Precision guided munitions (PGM) from carpet bombing to single bombing allowing parallel operations

Distinguish between effects and effectiveness
Effects is an assessment of the of the immediate impact of the attack.

Effectiveness is the measure of an attack's broader implications.

Doolittle's Raid - Almost zero effect (Nothing destroyed); 100% effectiveness (Japanese military leaders to lose face, force redeployment)

Combined Bomber Offensive, Great effect (destroyed lots of stuff) 0% effectiveness (Aircraft production went up)

Objective based targeting is more effective than input based targeting.
Input Based Targeting is find target - get sorties + ord and see if your kill it

Objective (Output Based Targeting) determine results you want, bomb targets to achieve, (in line with the 5 rings, allows COG's to be bombed)

Difficulties of assessing psychological effects.
Hard to measure people; shock effect of application of mass; can be long term (Romans destroyed Carthage) or quick (destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki)

Problems with the BDA process in Desert Storm could be overcome
Desert Storm used old iteration of BDA - Target had to be destroyed to count. PGM's often were completely successful, but rated an not due to this.

Development of BDA that looks beyond damage to effect is important

Core competencies of air and space superiority/info superiority can be used to improve feedback and enhance combat assessment.
This allows for unimpeded access to target to find out if the target was neutralized

Superiority is the enabler.

Info Superiority tells you if your attack impacted their abilities

US space forces are organized. (Kelly)
Unified, Functional command. SECDEF assigned space forces--Prob --other actors control parts:National Intel, Civil gov, Commercial

Confronting a space capable adversary will impact campaign planning.
We are there, must rely on space superiority,

Means of space support, enhancement, application, and control.
Space Support: real or near real-time info, to support campaigns

Space Force Enhancement: better surveillance, intel, comm

Space Force Application: improving existing terrestrial capabilities

Space Planning Support Teams, Forward Space Support in Theater- help the theater JFACC understand and use resources

Functions and capabilities of various types of space assets
Civilian Satellites:

• Weather: NOAA/TIROS, GOES
• Communications: INMARSAT, INTELSAT
• Imagery: Landsat, SPOT

Major Military Satellite Systems

• Weather:DMSP
• Navigation: GPS
• Communications: DSCS, Milstar, FLTSATCOM, UFO,
• Intelligence/Warning: DSP, SBIR, (replace DSP), Classified

Space assets to accomplish C4 capabilities outlined in Joint Pub 6-0.
Use of all assets to have Space Superiority

C4 elements used by NCA, to CINCs to, subordinates

• Super High Frequency (SHF) Satcom
• Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Satcom:
• Ground Mobile Force/Defense Satellite Communications System (GMF/DSCS)
• Commercial satellite terminals (SPOT, INMARSAT, INTELLSAT, etc.)
• GPS
• DSP

Dominant battlespace knowledge (DBK) - merger of knowledge, info, and force - to right mission and right force at both tactical and operational levels of warfare. (Owens)

IO - acquisition, transmission, storage, or transform info to enhance our forces. (DAF)

IW - deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy's info and its functions; while protecting ourselves

IO and IW from the various Service perspectives
U.S. Air Force - Information Dominance - degree of superiority which allows AF to operate when they want. IW defending Armed Forces . IW is capstone.."

U.S. Army - Information Operations is the capstone . IO is enhancing our abilities.

IW protecting us while destroying an adversary's information system

U.S. Navy - Information Operations is the capstone but views IW like the AF. IW is aggressive.

How to employ sensors, C4I, to achieve DBK
Meshing sensors, C4I, and precision force we have created a synergistic effect of DBK

C4I for The Warrior will help to achieve DBK.
Provides needed info, eliminates unneeded info to understand the scenario - achieve DBK.

Obstacles to achieving DBK
Opponents fight back; relying on tech is an achilles' heel; it applies only to the last war; ignores the fog and friction of war

Advantages/disadvantages of acquiring/implementing DBK
Advantages - tool to leverage our existing assets to win wars.

Disadvantages can become a crutch and breed dependence

Making IO and IW joint by doctrine
Joint doctrine is currently disjoint because the service don't agree on roles of IO & IW

How Services integrate IO and IW to achieve objectives

1. Education, training, and exercises.
2. Policy.
3. Doctrine.
4. Assessments.
5. Organizational infrastructure.
6. Technology.

Two broad categories of Information Warfare:
1. Attack and defend information. 2. Exploit Information.

Two ways to influence the enemy's information functions: direct and indirect.
Direct attacks information; Indirect uses military deception

Three objectives of information warfare:

1. Control protecting our own military
2. Exploit against the enemy
3. Enhance fully developing Information Operations

Joint Vision 2010 has 4 technological

1. More precision weapons.
2. More effects-from lethal to non-lethal technologies
3. Increased stealth
4. Improvements in information systems integration

Ways of achieving and exercising air superiority using Warden's air superiority cases 1-5.
Case I: Both sides have the capability (WWII Pacific)

Case II: One side overwhelming (WWII post 1943)

Case III: One side is vulnerable but is unable to reach the enemy. (Battle of Britian)

Case IV: Neither side can strike, air action is confined to the front. (Korea)

Case V: Agreed political constraints or because neither side had any air power.

What enemy forces may do to counter US airpower
Blocking access Deny basing , Interdict airlift and Blocking littorals

Active resistance - Attacking centers of gravity to disrupt

Passive resistance - Avoiding and deflecting the fury of American air campaign

Ideas to counter denial of air superiority/information dominance by a low-tech adversary.
Principles to counter denial

1. Centralized Control and Command
2. Detailed Preparation
3. Logical Deception Ploy
4. Corroboration of Sources
5. Timing.
6. Appearance and Maintenance of Security

Techniques to counter denial:

1. Encouraging the Obvious.
2. The Lure
3. The Repetitive Process
4. The Double Bluff.
5. The Unintentional Mistake
6. Bad Luck
7. Substitution

Russian application of airpower in Afghanistan.
Total air superiority, and ineffective.

Airpower not effective - even though it had great effect

1985 - move successful when Airpower combined with Airborne troops - Crushed base of suport - Don't allow retreat - use of night

Discuss the Mujahideen countermeasures taken in response to the Russians.
Man-portable SAMs (Russians eventually figured it out)

The Russians bogged down in Afghanistan

US/British gave Stinger and British Blowpipe missiles to the Mujahideen. (effective weapon)

Impact of the Russian failure to define conflict termination.
Soviets had no means to gauge success or failure and determine it was time to end the conflict.

Applicability of lessons learned from the Soviet use of Airpower in Afghanistan to US Airpower
Air Base Security, Limited Value of Bombing, Secure Logistics Infrastructure, Problems of Sustaining Air Ops, Stingers are Effective

Media role in the formulation of national security strategy
Influences public opinion - media must be respected commentators and experts

President is the "recognized expert" by default

Greatest impact is that of RAW video - mislead cam cause a public outcry

Characteristics of a mutually positive military-media relationship
Help media understand the military’s role - taking care of the reporters and teaching and being honest with them;The Pool system

Importance of accurate coverage of the US military
US military needs to be covered by the media simply to survive in its present form.

The media can help with troop morale.

Media-related logistical and operational considerations
Media is needed, must be taken care of - lots of media required - Pools - support to the extent possible but don't compromise Ops - Remember other countries have their own media problems

Explain Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) impact civ/mil relationship in Desert Shield/Storm.
The chain of command flowed directly from the NCA(civ) to the CINC (mil) empowered the CINCs and CJCS

Explain failure to coordinate hampered coalition/services campaign planning.
International Coalition: many compromises: planning impacted

• Israel, forced SCUD hunting
• Arabs - Forced more kimited attack
  

Inter-Service: Navy/Marines felt AF was hogging the glory

All planning was initially put together and staffed by the Air Force

Impact of media coverage on the planning and execution of the air campaign.
Initial bombing videos gave the war a bloodless feel - gave public and game feel

Collateral damage (bunker in Baghdad) caused the NCA to limit bombing in Baghdad

Video of the "Highway of Death" may have contributed to the early ending of the war

Measures of success for assessing psychological effect.
Encourage the defection, desertion, and surrender deter the use of WMD or criminal acts.

Measures were numbers of line crossers and deserters and the fact that no WMD were used

Defend as MTR and not an RMA
MTR = New tech – Mil Appl – New Tactics/Ops – New Organizations

RMA = New Concept – New Tactics/Ops Concept – New Organizational Arr – Tech for Mil

DS was not new stuff, new tactics - it was more effective use of what we had - same stuff only more

Contributions and limitations of advanced technologies in Desert Storm.
Effectiveness allowed more targets to be attacked (Parallel warfare)

Air supremacy worked - effective kill was used successfully as well.

Air campaign in Desert Storm/JV 2010’s dominant maneuver + precision engagement.
JV2010 validated - laser guided munitions were used extensively.

Contextual elements and operational art impacted the outcome of Desert Storm.
CONTEXTUAL

• Political
• Coalition
• Economic
• Socio-cultural
• Leadership
• Environment

OPERATIONAL

• Logistics
• Technology
• Information
• Targeting Science
• Deception
• Measuring Success