Politics: Majority of disputes settled at regional level. US is only true military superpower. UN incapable of or unwilling to use appropriate force. US military relied upon for unilateral action. North Korea no longer poses a threat-reunified with South Korea in 2000 under auspices of UN. PRC continues to pose a regional military threat. Cuba falls in 2013 as Western Hemisphere’s last bastion of communism. Subsequent warming of relations with US, Iran & Iraq temporarily neutralized as regional threats. Continued Russia threat due to large WMD capability. Limited power projection capability.

Technology: US maintains technological lead in most areas. PRC, Japan and EU closing gap. PRC has replaced Japan as Pacific Rim technology leader. Alternative energy technologies drastically reduce US dependency on petroleum. Technology facilitates greatly enhanced participatory democracy.

Economic: Significantly increased role of regional trade and security alliances. US economy significantly enhanced by technology resulting in improved quality of life. US showing significant progress by actively paying down national debt. US economy strong. US leads world in information, aerospace, and military-unique technologies. Enhanced educational system results in retention of high tech/high skill jobs. NAFTA has resulted in continued loss of low tech/labor intensive jobs. Global economic difficulties have contributed to ongoing military downsizing and increased inward focus. US unique in maintaining strong military.

Socio/Environmental: Domestic issues pose significant threat to national security. Focus of US attention turning increasingly inward. Maintenance of strong US military perceived as "insurance" against continued global uncertainty. US military increasingly looked to a solution to domestic ills.

National Security Objectives: Enhance security, domestic and external. Promote prosperity, support democratic reform. Promote environmental protection. Pursue limited engagement.

National Military Objectives: Protect the US from external threats. Support preservation of the environment. Deter WMD proliferation and use. Deter/defeat terrorist threats. Combat domestic threats.

2025 Force Structure: Evolutionary not revolutionary from today. Highly organized, trained and equipped fighting force configured to deal with one MRC, and nontraditional missions (MOOTW).

2025 Force Enhancements: Air Force: F-22, JSF, BMD, smart weapons, laser weapons, strat lift, UAVs. Army: Super tank, fully integrated battlefield, advanced helicopters: Commanche and Apache. Navy: Advanced CVBG, Aegis plus, Son of Seawolf. Space: Enhanced and redundant C4I, Ballistic missile defense umbrella, High energy plasma weaponry, Enhanced navigation for precision targeting, Offensive kinetic or laser orbiting weapons. People/Training: Heavy recruitment or high tech capable warriors. Emphasis on engineering, SOF, and CA forces necessary for MOOTW operations. Reliance on simulators and virtual reality for most training. From Napoleon World 2025

The Navy plans to build new warships in the twenty-first century that will require significantly less personnel to operate. The Air Force and Army are looking at robotics and artificial intelligence to power platforms and keep personnel out of harm’s way. The negative effect will be the cost of this new technology. The F-18 E/F will cost twice as much as its predecessor, the F-18 C/D. The F-22 will cost eight times as much as the platform it will replace, the F-16. We must remember there is a trade-off between weapons that are dumb and cheap and those that are smart and expensive. New technology will likely drive us to a smaller force structure with fewer platforms and personnel. From on Future Force Structure Issues

Advancing Technology Trends: Long-range precision capability, combined with a wide range of delivery systems, is emerging as a key factor in future warfare. Technological advances will continue the trend toward improved precision. Global positioning systems, high-energy research, electromagnetic technology, and enhanced stand-off capabilities will provide increased accuracy and a wider range of delivery options.

Implications of Technological: Advances on Our Armed Forces: The combination of these technology trends will provide an order of magnitude improvement in lethality. Strategically, this improvement will enable more rapid power projection and reduced logistics tails. Operationally, within the theater, these capabilities will mean a more rapid transition from deployment to full operational capability. As a result, we will improve our capability for rapid, worldwide deployment while becoming even more tactically mobile and lethal. While these prospective improvements in lethality clearly offer promise of reducing the number of platforms and the amount of ordnance required to destroy targets, many military missions will require occupation of the ground, and intensive physical presence. For these missions the promises of technology are less certain, especially in environments such as cities or jungles.

Adaptations are likely to take the forms of increased stealth, mobility, dispersion and pursuit of a higher tempo of operations among elements within the battlespace. Increased stealth will reduce an enemy’s ability to target our forces. Increased dispersion and mobility are possible offensively because each platform or each individual warfighter carries higher lethality and has greater reach. Defensively, dispersion and higher tempo complicate enemy targeting and reduce the effectiveness of area attack and area denial weaponry such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Greater mobility and increased dispersion will, in turn, require additional communications and coordination capabilities since the synchronization of these dispersed elements will become even more important. Fortunately, the technology for this improved systems integration is at hand. New technologies will allow increased capability at lower echelons to control more lethal forces over larger areas, thus leveraging the skills and initiative of individuals and small units.

Real-time information will likely drive parallel, not sequential, planning and real-time, not prearranged, decision making. The optimal balance between centralized and decentralized command and control will have to be carefully developed as systems are brought into the inventories. Micro-miniaturization will also promote signature reduction and greatly increase the capabilities available for individuals and small units. Concurrently, multispectral sensing, automated target recognition, and other advances will enhance the detectability of targets across the battlespace, improving detection ranges, turning night into day for some classes of operations, reducing the risk of fratricide and further accelerating operational tempo.

Information technology will improve the ability to see, prioritize, assign, and assess information. The fusion of all-source intelligence with the fluid integration of sensors, platforms, command organizations, and logistic support centers will allow a greater number of operational tasks to be accomplished faster. Advances in computer processing, precise global positioning, and telecommunications will provide the capability to determine accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces, as well as to collect, process, and distribute relevant data to thousands of locations. Forces harnessing the capabilities potentially available from this system of systems will gain dominant battlespace awareness, an interactive "picture" which will yield much more accurate assessments of friendly and enemy operations within the area of interest. Although this will not eliminate the fog of war, dominant battlespace awareness will improve situational awareness, decrease response time, and make the battlespace considerably more transparent to those who achieve it. From Joint Vision 2010

Economics will have a major influence on force structure in the future. However, for the most part these will tend to push the military toward downsizing, becoming more efficient and economizing many tasks. Whether a balanced budget resolution is passed in Congress or not, future funding will likely be limited, not to exceed more than 3.5 percent of the GDP. This is significant because during most of the cold war, defense spending hovered around 10 percent of GDP. In the Reagan era, defense spending approximated 7 percent of GDP. If Congress is unsuccessful in balancing the budget, servicing the national debt will require money being siphoned off from other programs. Inability to balance the budget will increase interest rates, which will—in turn—make doing business, both governmental and private, more expensive. If Congress attempts to concentrate on balancing the budget, defense spending will probably remain at present levels or decline unless there are dramatic changes to the threat. From on Future Force Structure Issues

The government’s perceived need to balance the budget in the area of defense spending assumes spending to support regional allies where there is a probability of conglomeration support while overlooking the military’s gradual transition into the role of "world policemen" where regional allies may not be players. There’s been about a 26 percent cut in personnel and 30 percent cut in the defense budget but the bad news is that the military has proven it is too good. The military has proven that it can survive budget cuts and still operate, therefore it will be continuously vulnerable to gradual cuts ranging from 5 - 10 percent and still convince the American populace that it can still do well.

Defense spending in terms of tactical aircraft procurement will increase, although we have an aging fleet that needs modification. Nondefense discretionary cuts will suffer in the neighborhood of over one hundred billion dollars in 2002 alone. The two MRC scenario will be the basis of financial planning until some other threat prevails; primary emphasis is still the defense against Iraq and North Korea. The likelihood of warring with both Iraq and North Korea at the same time is viewed as being unrealistic, nevertheless about 50 billion a year will be spent in preparation for these 2 scenarios. More should be spent in strategic transport and pre-positioning, and PGMs, while maintaining the capability to arrive within 10 days (Desert Shield Like Capability). From on Future Force Structure Issues.

At the levels of procurement funding currently planned, there is not enough money to maintain a rate of replacement of the equipment in the planned force structure. Further, the military services have been explicitly instructed to focus on quality of life, training, and readiness of forces, and to look to the procurement accounts first if additional savings are needed. From Strategic Assessment 1995

Both international and domestic politics will have an influence on the force structure. Internationally, the lack of a tangible threat has led to downsizing in the United States and allied militaries. Historically, the United States people have been reluctant to support a large, expensive military without the perception of a tangible threat. Although peacekeeping seems to be a justification for a larger force structure, the American public and Congress have rarely coalesced around such an issue. Without this tangible threat, countries have a tendency to look inward and deal with domestic political considerations such as crime, the environment, and societal medical concerns. The combination of no tangible threat and a public view of deep societal problems will lead to a smaller force structure (in the future). From on Future Force Structure Issues.

Social issues will also influence future force structures. The following are just a few of the considerations, according to Dr. Peter Bishop and Mr. John Peterson. The graying of the American population will lead to smaller pools of recruits for the military services. In addition, as longevity increases, there may be a move to increase length of service. Indications are that the military society and society as a whole are diverging. During WWII, most families had loved ones serving in some capacity with the military. In addition, there were considerably more bases, forts, naval facilities, and camps within the continental United States. Today, with base closures and personnel cutbacks, less and less of the population at large has interaction with the military culture. Value conflicts within society will challenge the military leadership of the future. New recruits today have a significantly different set of values than those of twenty years ago. From on Future Force Structure Issues

a. The administration plans an active army of 10 full divisions; the alternative would have 8 (the indicated totals include contributions from independent brigades as well as full divisions).

b. Excluding those in Europe

From O’Hanlon, Michael, "How to be a Cheap Hawk"

The Quadrennial Defense Review is a soup-to-nuts review with the first task of looking at the future security environment out some 10 to 15 years. In our internal review, we concluded that for the U.S. armed forces, the world between now and the year 2010 will be at least as challenging as the present one. Moving to 2010, our forces in the field are likely to face a range of threats. Our forces in the future must remain able to prevent threats from arising by shaping the strategic environment; deter threats, if they emerge; and if conflict prevention and deterrence fail, use force to defeat these threats whenever and wherever our important interests are at stake. From "America’s Armed Forces: A Perspective

The Bottom-up Review suggested an overall force requirement based upon analysis of three types of military operations: fighting major regional conflicts, maintaining overseas presence, and peace enforcement and humanitarian interventions. If not engaged in two major regional conflicts simultaneously, the military force would be able to conduct the less demanding missions of forward presence, peace enforcement, and intervention operations of limited scope. Ensuring a reliable flow of oil from the Persian Gulf enjoys a broad consensus in the U.S. as an interest that must be defended with military force if necessary. Overt aggression against or threats to friendly oil-producing nations could occur with relatively little warning, as was the case in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991. A key element in deterring such threats and aggression is the capability of the U.S. to respond with adequate force to repel an aggressor. This requires that the U.S. military maintain the combat, support, and transport capabilities to deploy quickly and effectively a large force far from U.S. territory.

An alternative method of planning would be to drop specific scenarios and focus defense resources on the military capabilities the U.S. will need in the long term. A fair assessment of the types of capabilities--in terms of new technologies, information dominance, and new doctrinal concepts--that the military will have to bring to the next battlefield. The starting point is to recognize that the classical units of armed forces such as divisions, tactical fighter wings, and carrier battle groups are no longer the only way to bring firepower to a battlefield. Small numbers of specialized, highly capable systems can provide the edge over large classical forces in a conflict. From Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Force Structure

Find Ways of Operating That Are Less Manpower and Force Structure Intensive. The experience of Desert Storm has been influential in shaping analyses of U.S. force structure needs for the coming decades. A critical part of the advantage that the allied forces gained over Iraq came from their technological edge, which was on display in such highly-specialized systems such as stealth aircraft, precision guided munitions, and superior battlefield surveillance and intelligence. An approach to force planning that focused on the contributions made by such specialized systems on the modern battlefield might allow savings on traditional weapons platforms such as tanks, planes, and ships, and provide the resources to exploit the opportunities that advances in technology offer to U.S. armed forces. The risk of this option is that, because fielding such specialized, high-leverage, high-technology capabilities is preceded by years of expensive research, development, and procurement, finding the funds for an investment strategy that focused on such capabilities would require cutting force structure now. Once again, a measure of present capability would have to be sacrificed to make resources available to ensure strength in the future. From Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Force Structure

Barring substantial improvements of our delivery capability, we will soon find ourselves unable to use our precision weapons as effectively and cheaply as will be required. Should this happen, we will lose our offensive superiority and be unable to further our interests proactively. It is impossibly expensive only if we are stuck with cold war ideas on quantities. Example: we have just over sixty F-117s, but the world must react to those F-117s just as much as if we had many hundreds. In the new age, remember, mass comes from precision, not numbers, and it is mass that does the job. Our problem, though, is that F-117s operate in a fairly constrained, well-known altitude and speed block; it is only a matter of time until someone learns how to deal with this regime.

Our answer must be a F-118--maybe a little more stealthy but more importantly, something that operates in a significantly different speed and altitude regime--in a regime where the defenses developed against the F-117 are unlikely to be effective. Because the world must react more to a couple of these squadrons than it reacted to thousands of F-4s or F-16s--which depended on numbers for their success. How many of different types should we have in the inventory? A lot and all radically different--maybe ten to fifteen substantially different air/space/info war platforms each occupying a unique niche. Imagine trying to defend against this kind of force! We can call our new strategy a technological offensive.

We should plan to develop and field a squadron or so of a new weapon system every three to four years. Small numbers are relatively cheap--if we start out with the idea of producing only small numbers and then throwing the jigs away or converting them to something else. Think about how cheap was the very fast, low number F-117 program. Fast means huge savings in program costs. Small quantities mean we don't need the huge infrastructure requisite for long production runs that almost always demand the potential for unrealistic surge rates. Small and fast mean lower program costs which in turn mean less Congressional concern with excesses and profiteering.

And finally, a new system every three years or so means that lots of companies, somewhat leaner than today's perhaps, will have frequent opportunities to win a F-117 size contract. It means we will always have a system in operation which is near state of the art--not exactly the case with twenty year programs today. And finally, we can have an affordable program even in an era when defense budgets may revert to their historical levels in the US of 1.5 to 2% GDP. Very simply, high tech, done right, is cheap--far cheaper than the low tech attrition war equipment which is now such a large part of our inventory. Thus, we can have a very large standing Air Force--even today--if we measure size in output terms--effect on the enemy--rather than measure size on inputs like numbers of aircraft, tons of bombs, and so on. From Warden, John A., "A Strategy for the New Age"

If the trend toward reduced procurement is not reversed, DOD faces difficult choices. Each carries considerable risk either to the capability of U.S. forces in the near term or to the military's ability over the longer term to maintain the edge U.S. forces currently enjoy over present or emerging adversaries.

Stick With the Present Program: Deferring the Problem: The equipment introduced in the 1980s through the early 1990s still represents the most modern and capable military equipment in the world. There is no serious challenge to U.S. leadership in military hardware, and those nations currently developing technically advanced military hardware are traditional U.S. allies in any case. Since most capital military equipment enjoys a useful life of some 20 years, or even 30 years with adequate maintenance and refurbishment, the effects of deferring modernization will not be felt in most classes of equipment for another decade.

But there are a number of risks associated with allowing the military's equipment to age without plans to renew it on a steady basis. First, when block obsolescence does hit in 10 to 15 years, the procurement bill will be prohibitive, forcing the services to either shortchange other accounts or hold on to equipment beyond its useful lifetime. Second, if the Defense Department is not buying new equipment, the U.S. defense industry has no incentive to continue to develop new and better materiel and to keep skilled personnel in place. When the time arrives to begin a new round of procurement, the industrial infrastructure will be diminished. It will then be necessary to pay more to re-establish production lines, and to live with the consequences of years of inattention to designing and manufacturing new military equipment. Finally, if a serious adversary should arise, the dearth of operating production lines will make build-up of U.S. forces slower and more expensive.

Reduce the Planned Force Structure. Reducing the size of the force structure would help restore the balance between force size and modernization in two ways. First, less materiel would be needed to equip the force, so smaller buys would be required to maintain a steady pace of modernization. Second, the money saved on personnel and on operations and maintenance costs with a smaller force structure could be freed up to increase the procurement budget. The risk in this option is that the U.S. may sacrifice present capabilities in order to invest in the future. Further reductions in force structure would carry the risk that two major regional conflicts could not be fought simultaneously, at least not without considerable assistance from allies.

Success in fielding superior systems will depend on reducing excess infrastructure, implementing lasting acquisition reforms and maintaining sustainable increases in modernization accounts. That is the problem we have overall in our acquisition system. We have become so risk-averse that we end up spending billions to make sure we do not lose millions. A program manager in the past had to get a waiver in order to use commercial and performance standards. Now the reverse is true. If a program manager wants to use military specifications, then he has to get a waiver in order to justify the extra cost entailed in military specifications. From Kaminski, Paul G., "Building a Ready Force for the 21st Century"

Procurement has traditionally been the most volatile component of the budget in a drawdown because it is not necessary to purchase new equipment for a smaller force structure. By the year 2000, we plan for a modernization account to go up to $67 billion in current dollars -- almost twice what it was in the fiscal '96 budget submitted to Congress. And this modernization plan will focus on building a ready, flexible, responsive force for the changing security environment in which we live.

A big assumption in our defense planning is that we will get significant savings by overhauling our defense acquisition system. The idea here is to be more efficient in what we buy, how we buy it and how we oversee that buying process. We're implementing the provisions of the 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act to increase the department's access to commercial products. We've now completed just about one full year of implementation. The act contains multiple provisions that establish a preference for commercial items while exempting those items from government-unique contracting and accounting requirements. In the past, these requirements served as disincentives for commercial companies to participate in DoD procurements.

The first change we made was to stop required use of military specifications -- those reams of documents that spelled out in meticulous detail how contractors must design and produce a system of supplies and services. It was safe to specify conformance to military specifications and standards. Instead, we are going to be using commercial and performance standards which call for the highest quality standards available in the commercial market or if there is no commercial standard, describe how we want our equipment to perform and then challenge the supplier to meet that performance standard. From Kaminski, Paul G., "Building a Ready Force for the 21st Century"

Future World: DoD faces new national security challenges, a drastically reduced budget, reduced influence in the marketplace, and technology that is changing faster than the system can respond -- and that technology is available to the entire world.

We must have or design an acquisition system that can get out in front of these changes instead of reacting to them. The current acquisition process, although complex, is an integral part of the business of the Air Force and affects everyone. Thus, every officer must understand the acquisition process and be able to make inputs that help us continue to buy the right stuff for the pointy end of the sword.

DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2 are now being revised to define an acquisition environment that makes DoD a smarter, more responsive buyer of the best goods and services that meet our warfighters' needs at the best dollar value over the life of the product.

The rewrite will take us from a very detailed, centralized management approach that was widely perceived as inflexible and overly bureaucratic, to a set of more flexible policies and procedures that emphasize the use of professional judgment and common sense to streamline the acquisition process. The major themes in the new 5000 series documents are:

• Teamwork among program managers, and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and service staffs;
• Tailoring acquisition process and procedures to fit individual programs;
• Empowerment of managers and staff to reach agreements at lowest possible levels;
• Cost as an independent variable to ensure lower-cost systems to meet mission needs and life-cycle cost goals;
• Commercial products utilized when possible to reduce cost and time to field;
• Best practices modeled on sound commercial/business experience.

To make a cultural change, we are putting the appropriate incentives in place to adjust the behavior of our acquisition work force. The use of integrated product and process development and integrated product teams in DoD acquisition.

The intent of the department's IPPD-IPT initiative is to replace after-the-fact oversight with early and continuous insight. The goal is to institutionalize a management approach that encourages partnership by stakeholders vs. sequential, adversarial relationships between and among organizations. We want to build in quality rather than inspect in quality. From Kaminski, Paul G., "Building a Ready Force for the 21st Century"

We are in the midst of the information revolution and in a world dominated by the superiority of the offense. In this world, relying on a policy of reacting only to an identified threat as the basis for our force structure may be disastrous. We no longer have the luxury of depending on a rather sluggish Soviet Union to give us a measured threat. Instead, we have to consider any of a variety of almost 200 nations and perhaps an equal number of powerful non-state groups. How could we conceivably be ready either offensively or defensively if we rely on reaction in this kind of environment? This to me suggests that the US must abandon its old threat-driven force structuring system. The US is the dominant militarily in the world today--and the primary reason it is dominant is because it has precision weapons with the ability to find targets for them, and the wherewithal to deliver them cheaply and rapidly. Without these attributes, the US has no decisive advantage over most opponents. Although we need to improve precision in a variety of ways including all weather and precision of effect, the improvements we make are likely to be modest as opposed to the four order of magnitude change since World War II B-17s. In the area of weapons delivery, we are likewise far ahead of the rest of the world, largely because of our stealth capability. Clearly, though, we cannot assume continued ability to penetrate defenses with impunity. From Warden, John A., "A Strategy for the New Age"

One of the great strategic benefits from the end of the Cold War is that we have been able to safely cut our forces. Since 1989, we have reduced our active all-volunteer forces by 700,000 people -- about a third of the active force. How big is a cut of 700,000 people? The force we cut is more than the number of troops in the British, the German, the Dutch and the Danish armed forces combined. Or put another way, the force we cut is 200,000 people more than all of the auto workers in the United States. Today, our armed forces are smaller than they were since before the Korean War. In terms of combat structure, the Navy went from 566 ships to 354, a reduction of 38 percent. The Air Force went from 36 to 20 fighter wings, a reduction of 45 percent. And the Army went from 18 active divisions to 10, a reduction of 45 percent as well.

Meanwhile, the defense budget has been reduced by 40 percent in real terms. And we now spend less of a percentage of our national wealth, only 3.2 percent, on defense than at any time since before the Second World War. All these are dramatic reductions -- reductions which in the past have always resulted in a nose dive in our capability and readiness. That's what happened after the First World War, the Second, the Korean and the Vietnam War. But not this time, not after the Cold War. With hard work, sound leadership in the field and a high degree of support from two administrations and the Congress, we have, for the first time in our history, been able to manage a huge postwar drawdown, creating a much smaller but pound-for-pound an even more capable and more ready force. That in itself is a remarkable success story yet to be told.

And it's a good thing that we stayed ready because in the wake of the Cold War came not peace and stability, but ethnic conflicts, failed states, the disorders of democratization and that old reliable, naked aggression. Today's force has successfully engaged in over 40 contingency operations since Operation Desert Storm. This week, some 55,000 servicemen and women are participating in 14 separate operations around the globe. That makes it about an average week for the three years that I've been chairman. From America’s Armed Forces: A Perspective

The 2025 project team reviewed a number of different future forecasting methodologies. The approach used by the 2025 study creates alternative futures by examining trends, studying the work of respected futurists, considering surprises and "wild cards," and conducting analyses to identify the factors, or "drivers," that will be the major contributors to the process of change in the future.
The seminar took the perspective that we were serving on the staff of a three-star general at the Pentagon, tasked to make major decisions dealing with future force structure of the US military. This narrowed our focus to major issues driving force structure specifically as outlined in AFM 1-1 : organizing, equipping, and training. Key factors and driving forces developed in Steps 2 and 3 drive decisions in each of these major areas, specifically:

Step 2: Having identified these decisions, the seminar identified the following key forces:

• National Security Strategy
• Military Strategy
• Threat - Conventional/WMD/Ballistic Missile
• Money and Congress - what the military actually gets
• US public opinion
• World opinion
• Alliances - building or deteriorating
• Operational efficiency: Gov’t vs civilian
• Quality of US Intelligence
• Potential for drastic change in US government
• US industrial base
• Criterion for success: Force structure meets requirements of broadest slice of possible futures

Step 3: The following are the macrotrends that affect the forces identified above. They consist of both predetermined trends and critical uncertainties and revolve around four major categories (political, economic, technology, and social). Several of these trends are extracted from Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, "Force XXI Operations," p 2.1-2.3:

• Uncertainties (eye-opening surprises, unreliable factors)
• One or two actual MRCs
• WMD terrorist act
• National Bankruptcy (like Russia, but due to US deficit)
• Discovery of new resources
• Ability to form an alliance for a particular conflict
• Potential for one unified national military system
• Stability of US 2-party system
• Major technological leaps
• Counter stealth on the cheap

Napoleon World: Economic characteristics of Napoleon World relevant to Force Structure: The economy is strong, averaging 4-5% growth. Social Security is a welfare system for needy elders over 80 years of age. A highly interconnected, world-wide military-industrial complex plays a large role in world economy. Several multinational firms control the flow of most advanced military hardware, but are selling to any country with the funds. Military contracts were once nearly monopolized by the large multinational corporations, but Congress viewed this as a threat and ordered the dispersal of contracts. Many new, small, domestic high-tech companies emerged to compete for the contracts.
Technology in the military continues to increase, while the educational base in America continues to decrease. Advanced information collection and distribution systems rapidly connect sensor and shooter and enable decentralized and remote command and control. With vectored thrust, all services can fly from short fields, aircraft carriers, and some surface ships. The navy incorporates stealth ships and submarines into its missions of power projection and sea lane control. Smart weapons have drastically leveraged the combat power of a smaller, faster-moving, easier-to-deploy forces. China emerges as the technological development leader in the Pacific, although Japan and India are close behind.
Political: The world is characterized by regional instability and high threats to US interests resulting in a robust military structure and capability that centers around global reach and naval forward presence. Several regional powers are military dictatorships with large, capable, and technologically advanced equipment, ballistic missiles, and WMDs acquired through economic growth. These regional powers have formed alliances and coalitions to counter US international political and military power and handle own security interests. The US is much less the world’s political leader and moral conscience.
Social: Inner-directed people are leading a transition in a long term paradigm shift from "scientific/industrial’’ to "social/consciousness." This agrees with the generational model below in role of individual and intolerance of those unwilling to accept personal responsibility for actions. Dependency is unacceptable. Capitalism reigns over socialism economically and socially. There is a sense of urgency to fix what is wrong with the world and growing teamwork to bring resources and talent to accomplish this. Personal violence and substance abuse decline. War is more likely.
Generation X country leadership with an urgent, uncompromising, and relatively intolerant viewpoint and a "we must fix the world" attitude which will produce high-rise behavior and a higher likelihood to employ the military. Neither recruitment nor retention among the civic-minded millennial generation are a problem, despite worsening demographics. In fact, the number of applicants to the military will greatly exceed requirements, permitting selectivity and an increase in the quality of recruits.

UN World: America finds itself stagnated economically and trailing China as the world’s largest economic power. Regional trading blocs are the norm as countries attempt to form around common US interests to preserve their markets and access to critical raw materials. World is an interdependent global economy. Trade wars take over as the dominant form of warfare. Regional trade blocs such as APEC, EU, CIS, etc. are the norm. Many countries are on brink of bankruptcy because of budget deficits. US trade deficit is larger with China than any other county. MNCs control a huge share of many US industries. US standard of living decreases as middle-class incomes stagnate and taxes increase. Deficit continues to increase, but economy and government adapt.
UN maintains a standing military forces as "world policeman." Nations augment with specialized forces. UN role has shifted away from US lead nation state. UN Security council has grown to 7 permanent voting members. Members are the US - UK - China - Russia - Japanese Coalition (Far East countries) - European Coalition (European continent) and Muslim Coalition (Arab states in Middle East). General Assembly power has grown. UN allocates raw materials to ensure economic stability. US must rely on coalition support in UN to acquire materials for production.
US political system has split to a 6 party system - Republican, Democratic, Black, Right wing, Left wing, and Minority parties. Parties must form coalitions to form a majority party. Decentralized government control - Federal aid to states has stopped, states must pay for all programs for residents (secular society).
Social/Environmental: Society characterized into distinct groups, basically Boomers and Bloomers. Low education level compared to other industrialized/technical nations. Shortage of high-tech skilled labor. Low social and ethical values. Science and medicine contribute to longer life spans and larger populations. More threats occur simultaneously (natural and man-created). Natural disasters call for increased need for military and support systems.
The primary driver for technology has become Multi National Corporations (MNCs). Nation-States have become extremely reliant on MNCs and are extremely sensitive to their interests. Computing power has improved, but at a less than exponential rate. The major break through is in light-based computing. Fundamental shift from individual processors to centralized servers. Internet II incorporates communications (phone), entertainment (television/radio/movies) and commerce (business over the net). Agriculture: Expansion has continued and the US is a leading provider of food and technology. Desalinization technology has made the farming of marginal land possible. Aquafarming has become a booming industry worldwide. Space will remain the preeminent domain of the US. Intelligence gathering has become our forte (we become the world’s tattletale). Military satellites are increasingly becoming modified "off-the-shelf" commercially available systems. The military has perfected "shooter-to-sensor" technology. Gene sequencing (not splicing) has been accomplished for small invertebrates and plants
Aviation: Advances in size, maneuverability, and engine efficiency has increased. Micro Electric Motor (MEM) advances enable wings that reshape during flight. Single fuselage transports with over a million pound carrying capacity are on the drawing board. Extremely maneuverable UAVs replace nearly all the manned fighter force. Engine efficiency permits trans-Atlantic flights and return trips without refueling.

Wally World: There exist simultaneously weak military and external threat environments. There have been no major conflicts since 1996. This has been brought about by a series of military downsizings in response to federal budgetary constraints resulting from a correct Congressional perception that no external threat to national security warrants the maintenance of a large standing force. This is a politically correct world, where social trends originating in the 1980s and 90s have come to fruition. The role of the military has been redefined in domestic terms. The speed of technological change has slowed down. Water and food become "gold" commodities.
World power measured by economic not military power. Regional trade blocs such as APEC, EU, CIS, etc. are the norm. Oil demand increases in the face of diminishing reserves. This slowly intensifies the switch to alternate energy forms such as solar. Many countries are on brink of bankruptcy because of budget deficits. China is world’s most significant economic force. Foreign investors control a huge share of many US industries. Deficit continues to increase, but without significant effects on US economy. Spending for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid increase. Military share of budget continues to decrease. Trade deficit increases because of US inability to compete with cheaper overseas wages. US exports agriculture goods and information technology. Military equipment is increasingly being procured from foreign sources.
Due to the disinterest of the US people in military matters and the reduced threat, the pace of acquisition of new technology is reduced and research and development funds are reduced to a minimum. No breakthroughs in military technology (including new propulsion systems, non-lethal weapons, Stealth, radar technology that could detect stealthy A/C, Jamproof communication and information systems) in the US and in the rest of the world. Basically the same military technology as today is available. As a result, instead of developing and deploying new equipment, it is decided to upgrade existing equipment and keep these operational as long as possible.
Political: No major threats. Lack of international support (alliance/coalition) in case of possible US involvement in a conflict. The number of Congresspersons without previous military experience continues to rise until no representative now has prior military experience. 2025 sees a democratic Congress and Presidency.
The military is seen as a proving ground for experiments in social engineering. Service academy faculty is civilian in an attempt to make academies "less aggressive". Military training exercises for 2025 have been entirely devoted to drug interdiction, urban population control and border fortification. Recent disarmament treaties with China, North Korea, and Russia have required the US to cut the wings off all the B-1 , B-2 and F-15 aircraft. Only the Chinese continue to maintain a large standing Army. They are however, perceived as low-threat because of their lack of global reach, and because they have become our most important trade partner.
Social: Increased alienation between small military and general population unfamiliar with military. More emphasis on social issues and less on military issues. All barracks are now unisex. 90% of active duty pediatricians have been replaced by epidemiologists, as the emphasis in health care has shifted from well baby clinics to drug treatment trials for AIDS cases. The percentage of individuals on active duty who are HIV positive now reflects the population at large. All standard antibiotics including the sulfanilamide’s, penicillin and tetracycline are no longer effective against organisms that proliferate in battlefield wounds. Because of the exhaustion of world petroleum reserves and the de-emphasis of high-tech weaponry by Congress, military advantage will revert to the art of maneuver. Clausewitz and Jomini replace aerodynamics as courses of study at the Air Force Academy.

Paranoid Policeman World: Budget deficit growth rate has slowed. Interest rate manipulation has been effective in controlling inflation. US has started paying down the debt. Economy is strong, and although service industry has grown, US leads the world in information, aerospace and military-unique technologies. Education is better so US is keeping more high-tech, high-skilled jobs. Although interdependency of world leads to strong alliances, stresses on world economies, coupled with diminishing threat, resulted in most countries downsizing military to homeland defense and putting their money back into infrastructure. Significantly increased role of regional trade and security alliances (e.g. ASEAN, EC, NATO, OAS, etc.).
US maintains its technological lead in most areas. US uses its technological lead to supply its numerically inferior fighting force with leading edge technology weapons, i.e. non-lethal weapons, sub-lethal weapons, directed energy weapons, stealth. US led research leads to development of cost effective alternative energy sources, drastically reducing the US’s dependency on oil. China emerges as the technological development leader in the Pacific, replacing Japan. The information technology age has matured allowing US citizens to actively engage in a new form of participatory democracy.
US remains the only true military superpower. United Nations incapable of and unwilling to use force which US deems appropriate. As such, the US military frequently enforces UN security mandates, as well as other US prerogatives. Because of a slowdown in economic growth, PRC downsizes military and decides to put money into infrastructure instead of conducting significant modernization of military. North Korea agrees to terms of UN sanctioned reunification of Korean peninsula under single democratic government.
US military forces are regularly used to build and rebuild the US infrastructure, combat illegal drugs and participate in environmental clean-up initiatives. In 2020, despite years of US financial support, Russia declares bankruptcy. Slowly rebuilding under auspices of UN. No longer possesses a viable military. Majority of disputes settled at regional level.

Socio/Environmental: Major threats to national security are domestic problems. Peripheral interests such as global environmental concerns, exploding populations, declining resources (oil, food, water) driving massive immigration and human rights abuses are secondary. US society turning inward to address rising crime, terrorism, aged population stressing medical system, failing infrastructure system, and fractured family trend. Strong military seen as insurance against international chaos driven by soaring populations, decreasing resources, have/have-not gap, religious fundamentalism. Military also seen as answer to domestic programs: crime prevention, drug war, environmental clean-up, anti-terrorism, low-cost housing, etc.

Joint Vision 2010 is the conceptual template for how America’s Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting. Focused on achieving dominance across the range of military operations through the application of new operational concepts, this template provides a common direction for our Services in developing their unique capabilities within a joint framework of doctrine and programs as they prepare to meet an uncertain and challenging future. This vision of future warfighting embodies the improved intelligence and command and control available in the information age and goes on to develop four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics.

Each of the operational concepts incorporates America’s core strengths of high quality people and information-age technological advances, builds on proven competencies, and focuses the development of future joint capabilities. Full Spectrum Dominance will be the key characteristic we seek for our Armed Forces in the 21st century. Joint Vision 2010 then examines the six critical elements required to transform the operational concepts into joint capabilities: people, leadership, doctrine, education and training, organizational structure, and materiel. Channeling our strengths with this vision, we will move toward a common goal: a joint force—persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict. From Joint Vision 2010

In planning future force structure and allocating resources, we established forces levels and support which should enable us to win one MRC across a wide range of likely conflicts. Our detailed analyses of future MRCs, coupled with military judgment of the outcomes, suggest that the following forces will be adequate to execute the strategy for a single MRC: 4 - 5 Army divisions, 4 - 5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades, 10 Air Force fighter wings, 100 Air Force heavy bombers, 4 - 5 Navy aircraft carrier battle groups

Force Enhancements to Support Our Strategy: These enhancements include improving: (1) strategic mobility through more prepositioning and enhancements to airlift and sealift; (2) the strike capabilities of aircraft carriers; (3) the lethality of Army firepower; and (4) the ability of long-range bombers to deliver conventional smart munitions.

Strategic Mobility: Purchase and deploy the C-17 airlifter or purchase other airlifters to replace our aging C-141 transport aircraft, keep an Army brigade set of heavy armor afloat on ships deployed abroad that could be sent either to the Persian Gulf or to Northeast Asia on short notice, increase the capacity of our surge sealift fleet to transport forces and equipment rapidly from the United States to distant regions by purchasing additional roll-on/ roll-off ships, improve the readiness and responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) through a variety of enhancements, and fund various efforts that improve the "fort-to-port" flow of personnel, equipment, and supplies in the US.

Naval Strike Aircraft: The Navy will provide a precision ground-attack capability to many of its F-14 aircraft, acquire stocks of new "brilliant" antiarmor weapons for delivery by attack aircraft, and develop the capability to fly additional squadrons of F/A-18s to forward-deployed aircraft carriers that would be the first to arrive in response to a regional contingency.

Army Firepower: The Army is developing new, smart submunitions that can be delivered by TACMS, the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS), the Tri- Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) now under development, and by standard tube artillery. And the Longbow fire control radar system will increase the effectiveness and survivability of the AH64 Apache attack helicopter. More prepositioning of ATACMS and MLRS and having Apaches self-deploy from their overseas bases.

Air Force Long-Range Bombers and Munitions: Modify the Air Force's B-l and B-2 long-range, heavy bombers to improve their ability to deliver "smart" conventional munitions, and develop all-weather munitions. For example, the Air Force is developing a guidance package for a tactical munitions dispenser filled with anti-armor submunitions that can be used in all types of weather.

Reserve Component Forces: If mobilized early during a conflict, brigade-sized units could provide extra security and flexibility if a second conflict arose while the first was still going on. The Navy plans to increase the capability and effectiveness of its Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Air Wing through the introduction of a reserve training aircraft carrier.

Allied Military Capabilities: Assisting South Korea in its efforts to modernize its armed forces and take on greater responsibility for its own defense—including conclusion of an agreement to produce F-16 aircraft.

In Southwest Asia defense cooperation agreements, more frequent joint and combined exercises, equipment prepositioning, frequent force deployments, and security assistance. Modern weapons, such as the M1A2 tank to Kuwait and the Patriot system to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, to improve the self-defense.
In Europe, retain about 100,000 troops, including two and one-third wings of Air Force fighters and substantial elements of two Army divisions, along with a corps headquarters and other supporting elements. Equipment will remain prepositioned, along with the equipment of one additional division that would deploy to the region in the event of conflict.
A brigade-sized set of equipment in Kuwait to be used by rotating deployments of US forces that will train and exercise there with their Kuwaiti counterparts. In some circumstances, we may find it possible to center naval expeditionary forces around large-deck amphibious assault ships carrying AV-8B attack jets and Cobra attack helicopters, as well as a 2,000-man Marine Expeditionary Unit. Another force might consist of a Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile-equipped Aegis cruiser, a guided missile destroyer, attack submarines, and P-3 land-based maritime patrol aircraft.
A new concept is being developed that envisions using tailored joint forces to conduct overseas presence operations. These "Adaptive Joint Force Packages" could contain a mix of air, land, special operations, and maritime forces tailored to meet a theater commander's needs. For planning purposes, we are evolving toward a future strategic nuclear force that by 2003 will include:

• 18 Trident submarines equipped with C-4 and D-5 missiles.
• 500 Minuteman missiles, each carrying a single warhead.
• Up to 94 B-52H bombers equipped with airlaunched cruise missiles and 20 B-2 bombers. Future Force Structure Issues

The Army of Tomorrow:- The Army’s vision for the future, to tackle the above stated challenges, is Force XXI. Force XXI will be the transformed Army of the 21st Century. The central and essential feature of this new Army will be its ability to exploit information.

- Quicker and more reliable information will be realized through technological advances.

-- Electronic connectivity between and among all echelons in the Army will become a reality. This will result in such speed and precision in communications that the entire organization’s situational awareness and agility will far exceed that of today’s force.

-- This greatly enhanced connectivity, speed, precision, and agility will result in significantly improved lethality, survivability, tempo, versatility, sustainability, and deployability in the force—in short, a better Army.

-- Force XXI will be ideally suited for joint operations and will be fully compatible (connectivity) with the operational systems of the other services.

-- The structure of Force XXI will be modular in nature; organization(s) will be easily tailored with the necessary force package to meet the mission needs of a joint commander.

-- Force XXI Army will be based primarily in the continental United States, with minimal forward presence. The Force XXI Army will continue to depend on a combination of airlift and sealift to project their land combat power.

-- Soldiers will be the most important element of Force XXI, for it’s in quality soldiers that the full power of technology will be realized.

-- Force XXI objectives are to:

--- Dominate land maneuver

--- Project and sustain

--- Conduct precision strikes

--- Win the information war

--- Protect the force.

- The means by which the Army achieves Force XXI is the Force XXI Campaign Plan. This plan incorporates three complementary and interactive efforts:

-- Joint Venture. Joint Venture is the first and most important element in the Force XXI Campaign Plan. It focuses on the redesign of the future Army operational forces. Its name "Joint" requires the participation of every major Army Command and the Army staff in order to be successful. The Commander, Training and Doctrine Command, supervises and coordinates the Joint Venture effort.

--- Joint Venture will consist of a series of Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE), Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATD), Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD), and Advanced Concepts and Technology II (ACT II) programs. These experiments/demonstrations will test future force structure organizational designs, equipment, training, and doctrine.

--- The first phase of Joint Venture will concentrate on the design of the brigade; the second phase, on the division; and the third phase, on the corps.

--- The 2nd Armored Division, located at Ft. Hood, Texas is the Army’s experimental force (EXFOR) for Force XXI. The EXFOR provides Joint Venture with the primary means to experiment with information age concepts and technologies.

-- Institutional Army. Institutional Army is the second and supporting effort of Force XXI Campaign Plan. It constitutes that part of the Army generating and sustaining the operating forces. Like Joint Venture, this effort also cuts across all the major commands and the Army Staff. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army supervises this portion of the plan.

-- Army Digitization. Army digitization is the third part of the Force XXI Campaign Plan. It constitutes that part of the Army concentrating on the development and acquisition of information-age technologies, particularly the digital communications hardware and related software needed for information-age battle command. This effort is led by the Director of the Army Digitization Office (ADO).

- Secure Data Transmission Using Paging Systems - Automated Target Recognition

- Pencil Camera Technology - Long-Range Video Transmission

- Advance Medical Technologies - GPS Fuses for Artillery Munitions

In contrast to the large, concentrated operations and forces of the past, the new Marine Corps warfighting strategy will comprise dispersed and independent small forces capable of highly versatile, coordinated and effective operations against a wide range of enemy targets, facilities, and infrastructure over a much larger area of action (AOA). These small forces will provide and have access to real-time wide area reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting and will be supported by remote, sea-based fire, and logistics. Stealth and deception will be fully exploited to minimize detection and risk while compounding and confusing the tactical picture to the adversary. The underlying premise is that such small distributed forces can more readily and effectively overwhelm an adversary by critical and timely attacks against all aspects of its warfighting ability, including military forces, command and control centers, and supporting resources. Key technology areas include: advanced sensors; lightweight, portable real-time command and control; all-source real-time situational awareness; covert and precision target localization and tracking; stealth; mobility; and sustainability.

Force Structure Composition:

• Force structure includes not only airborne platforms but also ground based support systems and the personnel needed to fulfill the Air Force plan.
• The AF through 1999 has been sized to meet our current national security requirements as defined in the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), the Mobility Requirements Study, and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
• The AF structure today had been significantly reduced. Active manpower is down from 535,000 to 400,000 by late 1995. Fixed airborne platforms for 1996 and projected systems for 2025 are as follows:

- The AF has programmed for 13 active and 7 reserve component FWEs and 100 deployable bombers to fight and win two nearly-simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs). Of the 13 active duty FWEs, 5 2/3 are permanently assigned

Key to preserving the future security of the US are the integration of information technologies with air and space capabilities and the connectivity for distributed, demand-driven systems. Having these capabilities helps produce what we call the "Vigilant Edge." That is a condition of advantage, of watchful superiority, in using air and space power to help preserve the nation and protect our interests.