ATTACHMENT 1: DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

These questions are designed to be food for thought. They may or may not be representative of actual test questions, and are not all inclusive. The answers to all these questions may be found in one or more of the presented materials, so it is highly recommended that you review all the lesson material prior to answering the questions.

1. In one sentence, describe the reasoning why we have switched from requirements-based to capabilities-based plans.

One method of describing joint operation planning is from the view of resources. Requirements-based planning focuses on the combatant commander's analysis of the enemy threat and assigned task. The planned response determines the level of forces and the support needed to overcome the threat. These required forces and supplies may be more than the level of available resources. On the other hand, capabilities-based planning attempts to meet the threat based on the forces and support that have been funded by Congress in the current budget cycle. This level of forces, equipment, and supplies is available now or expected to be available in the planning cycle. (AFSC Pub 1, p 6-4)

2. Briefly explain how apportioned, assigned and allocated forces are used in the planning process and by whom or what are they designated?

Joint operation planning uses uniform categories to define the availability of forces and resources for planning and conducting joint operations. Availability categories are assigned, apportioned, and allocated.

Assigned. Assigned forces and resources are those in being that have been placed under the combatant command (command authority) of a unified commander by the Secretary of Defense in his "Forces For Unified Commands" memorandum. Forces and resources so assigned are available for normal peacetime operations of that command.

Apportioned. Apportioned forces and resources are those assumed to be available for deliberate planning as of a specified date. They may include those assigned, those expected through mobilization, and those programmed. They are apportioned by the JSCP for use in developing deliberate plans and may be more or less than the forces actually allocated for execution planning.

Allocated. Allocated forces and resources are those provided by the NCA for execution planning or actual implementation. The allocation of forces and resources is accomplished through procedures established for crisis action planning. In actual implementation, allocated augmenting forces become assigned or attached forces when they are transferred or attached to the receiving combatant commander. (Joint Pub 5-0, p I-13)

3. Briefly describe how adaptive planning provides a spectrum of options in a CinCs operation plans for regional contingencies.

Adaptive planning is a concept for contingency planning in the context of the post-cold-war world. It is the framework within which the deliberate planning process produces operation plans useful to high-level decision-makers should crises develop. It recognizes that without a single, well-understood, primary foe with global aspirations and capabilities to plan against, the world is a less predictable place. Adaptive planning also recognizes that key decision-makers are more likely to exploit available response time to deter further crisis development if a menu of response options, gauged to a range of crisis conditions, is available for them to implement rather than an all-or-nothing choice. The "all" would likely be too much and the "nothing" not enough to deter escalation of a crisis early in its development.

4. Describe FDOs and COAs and explain how they differ?

FDOs are deterrence-oriented and carefully tailored to avoid the response dilemma of too much too soon or too little too late. Military FDOs are intended to be used in concert with diplomatic, economic, and political options to give the NCA a wide array of deterrent options integrating all elements of national power. All regional operations plans have FDOs, and CinCs plan requests for appropriate diplomatic, economic, and political options as they develop their plans. (AFSC Pub 1, pp. 6-11 to 6-12)

A COA is the scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission. It is a product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. The supported commander will include a recommended course of action in the commander's estimate. The recommended course of action will include the concept of operations, evaluation of supportability estimates of supporting organizations, and an integrated time-phased data base of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and sustainment. Refinement of this data base will be contingent on the time available for course of action development. When approved, the course of action becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan or operation order. Also called COA. (Joint Pub 5-0, p GL-5)

5. How may campaign planning be viewed as a linkage both vertically and horizontally?

Campaign plans are the operational extension of a combatant commander's theater strategy. They translate strategic concepts into unified plans for military action by specifying how operations, logistics, and time will be used to attain theater strategic objectives. Campaign planning is a primary means by which combatant commanders arrange for strategic unity of effort and through which they guide the planning of joint operations within their theater. In addition, by means of a campaign plan, combatant commanders give the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information needed for intertheater coordination at the national level.

Campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of combat operations, but can also be used in situations other than war. Campaign plans guide the development of supporting OPLANs or OPORDs and facilitate national-level coordination of strategic priorities and resource allocations. Tasking for strategic requirements or major contingencies may require the preparation of several alternative plans for the same requirement using different sets of forces and resources to preserve flexibility. For these reasons, campaign plans are based on reasonable assumptions and are not normally completed until after the NCA selects the COA during CAP. Deliberate plans may include elements of campaign planning, however these elements will have to be updated as in any deliberate plan used at execution. (Joint Pub 5-0, p I-9 to I-10)

6. Joint doctrine implies strongly that campaign principles are generally expected to be embedded in the final product of any deliberate or crisis action planning process. What are these principles and how are they integrated?

Preparation of a campaign plan is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Campaign planning is conducted during both deliberate and crisis action planning. A campaign is a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. It orients on the enemy's centers of gravity; achieves proper phasing (or simultaneous and synchronized employment) of all available land, sea, air, space-based assets, and special operations forces; clearly defines an end state that constitutes success, failure, mission termination, or exit strategy; and serves as the basis for subordinate planning. These are the three campaign principles that are embedded into deliberate or crisis action plans.

7. Identify the necessary elements of a good mission statement - the who, what, when, where, why, and possibly how.

The mission statement is the product of the Mission Analysis step of the Concept Development Phase of Deliberate Planning. It carries through the planning process and is included in the planning guidance, the planning directive, staff estimates, the Commander's Estimate, the CinC's Strategic Concept, the concept of operations, and the completed OPLAN.

It is a clear, concise statement of the objective to be accomplished by the command (what) and the purpose to be achieved (why). Multiple tasks are normally described in the sequence in which they are to be done. Routine tasks or inherent responsibilities of the commander are not usually included in the mission statement. The elements of the mission statement are who, what, when, where, why, and possibly, how. Normally, how the operation will be conducted is developed later in the planning process as greater detail is added.

8. Briefly list some of the important guidelines in dealing with assumptions in the concept development phase of deliberate planning.

An assumption normally covers the issues over which the commander has no control and is used to fill a gap in knowledge. It is stated as if it were a fact. Subordinate commanders and supporting commanders treat the assumptions of the higher-echelon commander as facts and often do not plan for the possibility that they are not. Therefore, the statement of assumptions is a critical element in the development of the concept of operations.

If an assumption is later discovered to be incorrect, an alternate operation plan is generally needed. Because of their influence, the fewest possible assumptions are included in an operation plan. A valid assumption has three characteristics: it is logical, realistic, and essential for the planning to continue.

Assumptions are made for both friendly and enemy situations. Planners should use worst-case scenarios. Planners cannot assume a condition simply because of a lack of accurate knowledge of friendly forces or a lack of intelligence about the enemy. As the planning proceeds, additional assumptions my be needed, some early assumptions may prove to be faulty, and still others may be replaced with facts or new information. The use of assumptions is more prevalent for operations planned far into the future. (AFSC Pub 1, pp. 6-26)

9. Describe the 5 tests used in evaluating COAs in the commanders estimate as outlined in AFSC Pub

There are five tests for evaluating the COAs in the Commander's Estimate:

I. Suitability. Will the COA actually accomplish the mission when carried out successfully? In other words, is it aimed at the correct objective?

II. Feasibility. Do we have the required resources, i.e., the personnel, the transportation, the resupply, the facilities, etc.? Can the resources be made available in the time contemplated?

III. Acceptability. Even though the action will accomplish the mission and we have the necessary resources, is it worth the cost in terms of possible losses? Losses in time, materiel, and position are weighted in addition to purely military losses, and military and political supportability is also considered.

IV. Variety. There are military operations in which only one feasible COA exists. Generally, in joint operations this is not likely. The Commander's Estimate analyzes and compares substantially different COAs. Listing alternative, but only superficially different, COAs preempts the CinC's decision and eliminates an important and useful purpose of the Commander's Estimate.

V. Completeness. When the COAs have been reduced to manageable number, a last check is given to confirm that they are technically complete. Does each retained COA adequately answer:

A.Who (what forces) will execute it?
B. What type of action is contemplated?
C. When is it to begin?
D. Where will it take place?
E. How will it be accomplished? There is no inhibition to clearly explaining how the COA will be executed. The refined COAs are used by the CinC in his final decision; they must be explicit to allow sound judgments to be made. Care is shown not to usurp the initiative and prerogative of subordinate commanders by including too much of the "how." (AFSC Pub 1, pp. 6-32)

10. Describe the elements in the CinCs strategic concept.

The CinC's Strategic Concept is the proposed concept of operations for the plan, an expanded version of the COA selected in the Commander's Estimate. It is a narrative statement of how the CinC expects to conduct operations to accomplish the mission. It serves two purposes: (1) it clarifies the intent of the commander in the deployment, employment, and support of apportioned forces, and (2) it identifies major objectives and target dates for their attainment.

Format. The CinC's Strategic Concept is written in sufficient detail to impart a clear understanding of the CinC's overall view of how the operation will be conducted, or concept of operations. The elements of information that clearly convey the CinC's concept of operations include the following:

I. Situation

A. probable preconditions for implementation of the plan
B. deterrent options included in the plan
C. enemy forces
D. general tasks of friendly forces
E. expected operations of other friendly commands that will influence the plan
F. assumptions, including level of mobilization
G. legal considerations

II. Mission

III. Execution

A. who will be employed
B. where forces will be employed
C. when forces are to be phased into theater
D. general description of how forces are to be employed
E. conventional, nuclear, deception, and other supporting operations
F. necessary deployment of forces
G. tasks of each subordinate and supporting commands
H. required supporting plans

IV. Administration and Logistics

A. transportation during deployment and employment
B. concept of logistics support

1. stockage levels, pre-positioned war reserve stocks consumption levels
2. mutual allies' support requirements and inter-Service support

V. Command and Control

A. command relationships
B. command and control requirements
C. succession to command (AFSC Pub 1, pp. 6-34)

11. Briefly describe the three areas of the time phased force and deployment data refinement process.

One of the most time-consuming and intensively managed aspects of plan development is constructing the OPLAN TPFDD. A TPFDD is the computer-supported data base portion of an OPLAN, necessary to complete Appendix 1 to Annex A of the OPLAN. The supported commander provides TPFDD development guidance and milestones to the JPEC through a TPFDD LOI. TPFDD development involves the sequential development and refinement of forces, logistics, and transportation data in a process collectively termed TPFDD refinement. A TPFDD normally contains assigned, augmentation, and supporting forces with accompanying supplies. As TPFDD refinement progresses, an estimate of resupply and personnel requirements to sustain the force based on consumption factors, computer modeling, and past experience is added. In addition, a fully refined TPFDD must be made transportation feasible. Therefore, USTRANSCOM plays a key role in the refinement process by hosting and coordinating refinement conferences and assessing transportation feasibility.

Forces refinement is conducted in coordination with supported and supporting commanders, Services, the Joint Staff and other supporting agencies to confirm that forces are sourced and tailored within JSCP guidance and to assess the adequacy of the combat support and combat service support sourced by the Services. USTRANSCOM provides sealift and airlift capability estimates based on lift apportionment throughout the process to ensure transportation feasibility.

Logistic refinement is conducted primarily by the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Service component commanders under the overall direction of the supported commander. Logistic refinement confirms the sourcing of logistic requirements in accordance with JSCP guidance and assesses the adequacy of resources provided through support planning. USTRANSCOM coordinates on logistic planning matters and hosts conferences dedicated to logistic planning and refinement.

Transportation refinement simulates the planned movement of resources to ensure that the plan is transportation feasible. USTRANSCOM uses computer simulation to determine transportation feasibility. In turn, the supported commander adjusts TPFDD requirements as necessary to remain within lift capability. (Joint Pub 5-0, p III-6 to III-8)

12. Describe the process commanders use to identify and resolve limiting factors and capability shortfalls in the deliberate planning process.

JOPES contains specific procedures for the supported command to identify shortfalls between the planned requirement and the identified capability at various points in the planning process. The supported command then attempts to resolve shortfalls, conducts risk analysis if the shortfalls are not resolved, and redefines the CINC's Strategic Concept if the resultant risk is too great.

The supported commander should continually identify shortfalls throughout the planning process and, where possible, resolve them by early coordination and conference with Service component commanders and supporting commanders. If the supported commander cannot resolve shortfalls, these and other limiting factors, along with an assessment of the associated risk, will be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution. Force and non-unit-related shortfalls will be submitted as a separate version of the TPFDD.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of the Services consider shortfalls and limiting factors reported by the supported commander and coordinate resolution. However, within the limitations imposed by projected capabilities in the JSCP timeframe, completion of an operation plan will not be delayed pending the resolution of a shortfall or limiting factor. Paragraph 10 of the Plan Summary will contain a consolidated list and impact assessment of the limiting factors and shortfalls that have not been resolved by options listed below. The impact assessment should specify the missions and/or tasks that cannot be accomplished because of the shortfalls. The supportability of the CINC's concept of operations should also be considered. (Joint Pub 5-03.1, p I-3, III-19, III-20)

13. Explain how the approval authority is determined for the different types of deliberate plans.

In the plan review phase of deliberate planning, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducts a final review of OPLANs submitted by the supported commander. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, and Defense agencies, assesses and validates joint OPLANs prepared by supported commanders using the criteria of adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and compliance with joint doctrine. It is a formal process that evaluates the entire plan, including TPFDD and other computer-supported data files, to determine whether taskings have been met and whether resources have been used effectively within the constraints of JSCP apportionment guidance. The review also identifies unresolved shortfalls in force and resource capabilities.

Upon completion of the review, the supported commander is informed that the plan is approved or disapproved for reasons stated. Plans that contain critical shortfalls that are beyond the supported commander's ability to resolve will be approved with these short-falls identified. In such cases, the supported commander will be provided with guidance regarding specific actions planned or programmed to redress the shortfalls. Approved plans remain so until superseded or canceled. (Joint Pub 5-0, p III-8) Results of the review will be forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum (or message) stating that the plan is either:

• Approved (effective for execution, when directed). Any critical shortfalls within plans that cannot be resolved by the supported commander will be outlined within the review comments and the approval memorandum.
• Disapproved. (Joint Pub 5-03.1, p IV-5)

Upon notification that a plan has been approved, the supported commander incorporates CJCS-directed changes and directs the completion of supporting plans by supporting and subordinate commanders. (Joint Pub 5-0, p III-8)

14. Discuss 4 criteria used by the JPEC to assess and validate a supported commanders OPLAN.

Review Criteria. The Joint Staff will ensure that all elements of the plan are properly evaluated. The general criteria for CJCS review of an OPLAN are adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and consistency with joint doctrine.

• The review for adequacy determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations are capable of satisfying the JSCP taskings. The review assesses the validity of the assumptions and compliance with CJCS guidance and joint doctrine.
• The review for feasibility determines whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished using available resources. The primary factors considered are whether the resources made available for planning by the JSCP and Service planning documents are being used effectively or whether they are being exceeded.
• The review for acceptability ensures the plans are proportional and worth the expected costs. It joins with the criteria of feasibility in ensuring that the mission can be accomplished with available resources and adds the dimension that the plan can be accomplished without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position. Additionally, using this criteria, the plans are reviewed to ensure they are consistent with domestic and international law, including the Law of War, and are militarily and politically supportable.
• Operation plans will be reviewed for compliance with approved joint doctrine as stated in approved and test publications contained in the Joint Publication System. Incorporation of appropriate joint doctrine when preparing operation plans will ease crisis action planning and the execution of operations. (Joint Pub 5-03.1, p IV-4)

15. How did conflicting national goals affect the planning and employment of coalition forces in Operation DESERT STORM?

16. How did Gen Schwartzkoph and Gen Khaled achieve Unity of Effort for the coalition forces in Operation DESERT STORM?

17. How did Gen Schwartzkoph and Gen Khaled resolve cultural differences Operation DESERT SHIELD?

18. What problems with doctrine, training, and equipment did Gen Schwartzkoph and Gen Khaled overcome while planning for employment of coalition forces in Operation DESERT STORM?

19. What problems did Gen Schwartzkoph experience with national communications while planning for employment of coalition forces in Operation DESERT STORM?

20. What were the special considerations that influenced Gen Schwartzkoph's proposed command and control structure during planning for Operation DESERT SHIELD?

21. Were there any differences of opinion concerning command and control of coalition forces during planning for Operation DESERT STORM?

Questions 15-21:

Gen Khaled's article:

• Formed C3IC (Coalition, Coordination, Communications, and Integration Cell) dealt with US & Saudi problems in nation war planning. Very effective in resolving conflicts
  • Cell was eventually split into ground, naval, air, logistics, special ops, & intelligence
• Saudi forces would only serve under their own command.
• Saudi Commander named as "Commander of Joint Forces and Theater of Operations"
  • prevented Schwarzkopf from being named Supreme Commander
  • parallel command established for Saudi's dignity/independence
  • US was not going to be viewed as an occupying power and run the war like Korea/Vietnam
  • Gen Khaled was the "glue" that held the coalition together
  • All Arab and coalition forces put under Khaled's control (not US forces)
• Saudi Commander target selection priorities. 1 ballistic missiles 2. Iraqi AF 3. Airfields 4. C3 sites
• 5. Jamming/surveillance sites 6. Air defense systems 7. Field artillery 8. Ammo dumps/fuel supply

• Most controversial point in his memo: Gen Khaled wanted a contingency plan to attack from Turkey by air. The northern attack would make Iraq think the ground invasion was coming from the north also.

Schwarzkopf's article:

Most pressing concern was the cultural crisis of US personnel flooding into Saudi Arabia

Religious, cultural concerns occupied the majority of his time in the beginning. Spent hours talking with Prince Khalid on cultural issues. Frustrating because he wanted to express the urgency of the situation to the Saudi govt. The Saudi bureaucracy was very slow and contained too much inertia.

Definitely wanted Arab participation to add validity to the coalition. Believed the Egyptians were key to Arab participation in DESERT STORM.

French: Had difficulty deciding what role they wanted to play. Had commercial interests in Iraq (military sales) Used them as protection of flank

Syria: Least trusted, concerned with their ties to Iraq and terrorism. Only major coalition partner Schwarzkopf did not consult with personnally in planning DS. Syria almost backed out at the last minute. Coalition saved by having them fight support behind the Egyptians for their invasion into Kuwait City.

Saudi army: Needed help badly. In disarray, not adapted to field conditions, poor logistics, nor were they self-supporting (food, maintenance, etc..)