1. Was the event or crisis anticipated in the National Security Strategy (NSS) or National Military Strategy (NMS)?
1. How accurately did the NSS/NMS anticipate the situation to include the area or region of the world, the actors involved, the cause(s), and anticipated US responses?

Iran: Although violence was feared and 45,000 Americans were evacuated, 75 stayed for diplomatic reasons. The Carter administration wanted to show faith with Prime Minister Bakhitiar and trusted his pledge to assure the safety of the Americans remaining in Iran. The mood in Tehran was becoming increasingly anti-American and the American Embassy was temporarily seized in February. Although Embassy officials predicted violence if the Shah was allowed to enter the US, still no recall of foreign service personnel or destruction of classified documents was ordered.

Haiti: From the readings, it is not clear whether the coup by BG Raoul Cedras was anticipated or not. Evaluation of the situation after the September 1991 coup began as a Peaceful Transition strategy with UN backing (e.g. UN Oil & Arms embargo) and the other regional powers (e.g. Governors Island Accord). However, these were increasingly felt to be "inherently unworkable" and the US policy began to shift more in favor of Forcible Entry.

2. What kind of planning was done for this military operation?
1. If the situation (or something resembling the situation) was anticipated and a deliberate plan existed, which type was it? Was the deliberate plan used, why or why not? If the deliberate plan was used, how and why was it changed or supplemented?

Iran: A readily available Joint Chiefs of Staff Contingency Plan and Crisis Action System (JCS CAS) for Iran was not used. Major General Vaught, the JTF Commander, chose to build a new, untried C2 system.

Haiti: There was an early decision by the Embassy to activate Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) before US citizens were threatened. Operation Uphold Democracy was a Crisis Action Plan which resulted in two different plans being developed: Maintain Democracy and Uphold Democracy.

2. How closely did the planning process match the six-step process.

Iran: Planning did not follow the six-step process of Situation Development, Crisis Assessment, COA Development, COA Selection, Execution Planning, and Execution.

Haiti: Planning was organized according to the six-step process. See the Uphold Democracy chart included in the JO504 dirty purple.

3. To what extent was the operation exercised or rehearsed prior to execution and what impact did this have on the plan or operation?

Iran: The entire operation was planned around maximum operational security (OPSEC). Regional experts were not consulted for fear of a security breech, unity of effort was sacrificed for security (very few people knew how the pieces of the puzzle fit together), there was no overall written plan for the entire operation, training was highly compartmentalized, planners reviewed and critiqued their own plan, joint briefings/debriefings were not done, Vaught decided not to have a full dress rehearsal.

Haiti: Although not stressed in the readings, one gets the feeling that joint exercises were conducted and critiqued and plans were altered and adapted accordingly. The Intell & Communications problems were solved (see Joint Intelligence and Uphold Democracy by Wilson).

4. If no plan existed prior to the execution of military operations, was one later produced?

I cannot find this addressed specifically in the readings.

3. Was a Joint Task Force (JTF) formed to carry out the military operation?
1. Who was the JTF commander and was he or she a member of the supported CINC's organic forces?

Iran: Vaught was the JTF Commander. He did not coordinate with regional authorities, but I cannot find a clear answer as to whether he was a member of the supported CINC's organic forces.

Haiti: More than one JTF was involved:

JTF-120 was under Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group Eight and had five commanders at different times. It provided protection and NEO support, and UN maritime embargo operations around Haiti.

JTF-160, formed in June 94, handled the flow of Haitian Migrants, commanded by a BG Marine Forces Atlantic.

JTF-180 Commander XVIII Airborne Corps ("kick-in the door")

JTF-190 Commander 10^th Mountain Division ("soft landing")

2. How did the JTF Commander organize his staff, why?

Iran: staff was organized for Secrecy.

Haiti: staffs were organized around interoperability and Joint principles, joint doctrine was followed.

3. Was there a clear chain of command delineating control and responsibility at all levels and for all tasks throughout the military operation?

Iran: conclusion of the Holloway Commission was that Command and control was excellent at the upper echelons (i.e. NCA thru JCS to COMJTF), but became more tenuous and fragile at the Intermediate levels. Command relationships were not well understood.

Haiti: a clear chain of command was evident throughout the operation.

4. Did the physical location of the JTF commander and his/her staff help or hinder accomplishment of the mission?

Iran: The overall joint training supervision function was retained at the JTF level in the Pentagon. It is believed that this hindered the mission.

Haiti: In all cases, the JTF commanders were "on the scene". A combination of JTF-180 and JTF-190 was finally used involving both commanders with headquarters afloat and ashore.

4. In what ways did leadership at the command levels influence the planning, organization, training, and execution of the mission?
1. Were there obvious leadership failures/breakdowns?

Iran: there was obvious leadership failure. The chain of command was ambiguous.

Haiti: there were no obvious leadership failures or breakdowns described in the readings.

2. Were major obstacles/difficulties overcome or minimized by flexible and effective leadership?

Iran: no; obstacles and difficulties more intensified by inflexible and ineffective leadership.

Haiti: apparently the answer is yes, although it wasn't really stressed in the readings.

5. What was the assessment of any military operations conducted in response to the situation?
1. Were there differing views between the American government and the American public on the success or failure of military operations? Between the US and any allies? Between the different services?

Iran: eroded taxpayer confidence in the military, world reaction: "has the US lost its touch?" CJCS appointed a review group; the Holloway Panel makes two major recommendations-est permanent counterterrorist task force and est an advisory panel of active & retired senior officers.

Haiti: embargoes proved ineffective (early strategy favored use of economic and political IOPs), but military operation was generally successful. The role of the Intelligence IOP resulted in a lot of popular support for our troops in Haiti, at home, and with our allies.

2. Did the US military repeat or correct any mistakes (C2 or C3I/leadership/ training/resources) of previous operations?

Iran: difficult to say whether we repeated or corrected any mistakes. Clearly mistakes were made, but an effort was made to not point fingers of blame. Positive lessons came out of the blotched rescue attempt (see the two main recommendations above).

Haiti: mistakes from the past were corrected. Interoperability of equipment and integrated training were stressed. The chain of command was clear at all levels. Existing plans were used early on (e.g. NEO).

3. What were the major lessons learned from this particular operation?

Iran: two fundamental concerns emerge which are related to most major issues:

1. the ad hoc nature of the organization and planning is related to most of the major issues and underlies most of the Holloway panel's conclusions. By not using an existing JTF organization, the JCS had to start from scratch.

2. many things which could have been done to enhance mission success were not done because of strict OPSEC considerations. Security is important, but cannot be the overriding factor if sound planning is degraded.

Haiti: initially send more than enough troops and then withdraw some gradually if not needed. Also, all JTFs had the same joint intelligence architecture, TTP, manual, and interoperable dissemination system and equipment.