OS-511 -- Challenges in Intelligence

LESSON OBJECTIVES

511.1 Comprehend how national intelligence organizations support Joint Force Commanders [I.4(d)].

511.11 Explain the critical importance of intelligence in the decision-making process.

Military history shows that intelligence is a key player in command and control. The commander privy to good intelligence has had a distinct advantage over the one who was not. The thoughts of a few military theorists and leaders illustrate this point.

How can one man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant of what his adversary is about?" - Jomini

" An army without secret agents is exactly like a man without eyes and EARS." Sun Tsu

Everything in a manner, depends upon obtaining intelligence. A single man in the night will be more likely to ascertain facts than the best glasses in the day. Secrecy and dispatch may prove the soul of success to an enterprise." -- George Washington

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Poor intelligence or failure to use intelligence blinds the commander and adversely effects decision-making. It slows or expands the commander's OODA loop. Poor intelligence does not adhere to the tenets of intelligence.

What is intelligence?

• It is information (yeah but it is more)
• It is information on an enemy/adversary (better)
• It is superior understanding of an enemy (getting warmer)
• According to Shulsky, "intelligence refers to information relevant to a governments formulating and implementing policy to further its national security interest and to deal with threats to that security from actual or potential adversaries."
  

511.12 Explain the different types of intelligence and how they may best be used to support the commander.
There are seven primary source types:

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

human intelligence. A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

imagery intelligence. Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Also called IMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

measurement and signature intelligence. Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter, or sender and to facilitate subsequent identification and/or measurement of the same. Also called MASINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

open source intelligence. Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. Also called OSINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

signals intelligence. 1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called SIGINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

technical intelligence. Intelligence derived from exploitation of foreign material, produced for strategic, operational, and tactical level commanders. Technical intelligence begins when an individual service member finds something new on the battlefield and takes the proper steps to report it. The item is then exploited at succeedingly higher levels until a countermeasure is produced to neutralize the adversary's technological advantage. Also called TECHINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

511.13 Summarize the major historical reasons for intelligence failures.

The Shulsky reading provides historical reasons for intelligence failures.

• Lack Of "All-Source" Intelligence Analysis. One source of information is depended on to make a decision.-
• Lack Of Useful Information. A lot of information may be available but it may not be relevant-
• Bureaucratic And Political Bias. Policy drives analysis-
• The Tyranny Of Conventional Wisdom. Everyone is coloring inside the lines.-
• Mirror Imaging. Assuming an adversary sees things the way we do.

One could also make a good argument that failures are usually the result of bad decision-making and not a failure of the intelligence organization it self.

The key intelligence failure is a misunderstanding of the situation, which leads a government or its military to take actions that are inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interests. Whether it is subjectively surprised by what happens is less important than the fact that the government or the military is doing or continues to do the wrong thing.(Shulsky)

By understanding the reasons for intelligence failure the commander and staff can take action to mitigate their impact on intelligence support.

1. Timeliness: for intelligence to be good it has to be on time. Intelligence must be available in time for commanders to assess what needs to be done and to take appropriate action. Just getting it there before the event happens doesn't cut it!!

2. Objectivity: intelligence must avoid bias. For intelligence to be objective, it must be truthful devoid of bias, distortion, and free from political constraints.

3. Usability: intelligence must be in a form suitable for application when it is received.

4. Readiness: intelligence must be prepared for contingencies and responsive to the operational commander.

5. Completeness: intelligence should provide as much of the total picture as possible.

6. Accuracy: intelligence should be verified truthful.

7. Relevance: it must be of a nature that is usable to the receiver and contributes to decision-maker's understanding of the enemy.

511.14 Explain how a commander and staff can lessen the impact of factors detrimental to good intelligence.

Ask questions-- understand the basis for the intelligence. Don't blindly accept intelligence as fact. Don't be lulled by past performance.

Encourage countervailing analysis. Allowing competing positions will often alleviate the reasons for past intelligence failures.

Jomini's four point summary on intelligence;

• Use all possible sources of information
• Multiple sources are essential
• Reliance should never be placed on just one source
• Intelligence is rarely perfect

511.2 Comprehend the role of intelligence in information warfare [SAE 2].

511.21 Explain what is meant by the term information warfare.

Because of the strategies of deception, maneuver and speed employed by coalition forces in Desert Storm, knowledge came to rival weapons and tactics in importance, giving credence to the notion that an enemy might be brought to its knees principally through destruction and disruption of the means for command and control.

Some military analysts have sifted the desert sands and concluded the time has come for the military to anoint command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) as a formal "warfare area," a change in course already adopted, in part, by the U.S. Navy.

Superior knowledge has always been an important-often decisive-factor in combat, but battles were seldom delayed and almost never halted because of severed communications. Indeed, an astute commander assumed that his communications would be disrupted, because they almost always were.

As airman and author James P. Coyne notes in his book on airpower in the Gulf: "Before the age of electronics and aerospace technology, command and control-in the modern sense of the term-was a comparatively minor element in warfare."7

Battles were fought, albeit inefficiently and often ineffectively, independent of the health of supporting communications. Commanders no longer can afford to be cavalier about the state of their information systems.

Desert Storm was different: knowledge-and its denial to an enemy-became an indispensable factor. Air Force official Martin Faga succinctly put it: "We could see, hear and talk all through the war. After a few hours, he could not." Using advanced technologies, coalition forces concentrated firepower to create what Joint Warfare Publication 1 calls an "information differential." Then, with devastating effectiveness, they exploited that differential, first to fix and then, in a matter of days, to flatten a formidable and battle-tested military power.

It was a war where an ounce of silicon in a computer may have had more effect than a ton of depleted uranium: a provoking notion that, if true, should factor heavily in debates about how to downsize U.S. military forces and the priority to be given the role of information systems.

The strategies and tactics used with such sensational effectiveness in Desert Storm worked well because they were conducted in what Robert Hermann once called a "free-signaling environment." What the outcome might have been had the ether been less than benign, should be a matter for serious inquiry; certainly before new doctrine that rests upon the assumption of bountiful communications is hammered into place

511.22 Describe how lessons learned from DESERT STORM have driven changes in the intelligence community.

What other lessons learned were derived from Desert Storm?

• Command unique communications equipment makes the task of disseminating information more difficult. During Desert Storm, it was difficult to pass intelligence information because all the services had different communication devices.
• Stove pipe systems hinder the lateral flow of information. Often there was no cross flow of information between intelligence units in the same area because of dissimilar communication devices. Often a unit would go to its parent command in search of information when a nearby unit might have already had the needed information.
• Timeliness of information is key. As we get into conflicts in the information age, the need to move intelligence information quicker will increase.
• Analysis is more than just counting craters. There was a tendency to count destruction when the commander really needed an assessment of a enemy units viability.
• Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA)...
  • General Schwarzkopf told Congress that:

BDA … was one of the major areas of confusion.… It led to some disagreements. As a matter of fact, it led to some distancing on the part of some agencies from the position of CENTCOM at the time, as to what the bomb damage assessment really was.47

Theater planners and intelligence staffs disagreed among themselves and with the Washington intelligence agencies over the levels of damage being achieved by the bombing in Iraq proper and within the Kuwait theater. At the same time, reports from Air Force, Navy, and Marine flight crew members and those of other Coalition air forces agreed that they received little or no bomb damage assessment on the targets they attacked during the entire war.

511.23 Give examples of how intelligence resources contribute to the AF core competency of information superiority.

Air Force intelligence will head into the future with five concepts.

1. Customers will have "one button to press" to get the information they need.
2. All-source intelligence organizations will provide tailored organic support to the force level and below.
3. Intelligence units will have a demand or "pull" system that will filter data.
4. Air Force intelligence will operate standard and deployable systems.
5. Air Force intelligence will be able to deliver near real-time intelligence to mission planners as well as directly into the cockpit.

These strategies mean that Air Force intelligence must be flexible and have the capability to provide more timely and effective support to the operators as they organize and plan to execute the Air Force's concept of "global reach, global power."

COURSE OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces across the range of military operations, to include command relationships, force development and organization, and the concepts of deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment (OPMEP Learning Area 1).

2. Comprehend the systems and understand the processes supporting 21st century battlespace and how they are integrated to achieve operational-level joint force missions (OPMEP Learning Area 5).

READINGS

1. Intelligence Toolbook (intel6.tbk)
2. Excerpt from Silent Warfare, Understanding the World of Intelligence, Shulsky (os511r2.doc)
3. Joint Pub 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations", Executive Summary and Chapters 4 and 5 (jp2_0.pdf).
4. Introduction from The First Information War, Campen (os511r4.doc)
5. Gulf War Air Power Survey, "What was the Role of Intelligence?" (os511r5.doc)
6. "Desert War: Crucible for Intelligence Systems", Clapper (os511r6.doc)
   

READING RATIONALE

The Intelligence toolbook provides the baseline, knowledge-level data concerning intelligence. It provides an explanation of each of the Intelligence disciplines, products, and systems. The Shulsky reading provides an introduction of the conflicts and barriers that lead to intelligence failures. Joint doctrine's view of intelligence is presented in JP 2-0. The last three articles discuss the performance of Intelligence during the Gulf War.

LESSON OUTLINE

Thesis: Intelligence is an integral part of the commander's decision-making process. For maximum and effective intelligence support, different types of intelligence-gathering capabilities must be understood and properly integrated.

Main Point I: Information and intelligence, while similar, are not the same. Intelligence comes in various forms, including human intelligence, imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, measurement and scientific intelligence, open source intelligence, and medical intelligence. The capabilities and limitations of each should be understood by military planners.

Main Point II: To use intelligence, the commander must understand intelligence problems and challenges. By understanding the reasons for intelligence failure, the commander and staff can take action to mitigate their impact on intelligence support.

Main Point III: Major changes have occurred in the Intelligence community as a result of DESERT STORM.

LESSON INTEGRATION AND RATIONALE

This lesson links to the command and control lesson of Operational Structures and explains the purposes and pitfalls of intelligence at the operational level. Often, the structure and attributes of the intelligence system are taught without discussing the environment and values impacting that system.

LESSON OPR: War/Theater Level Studies Department