SE 531 THE POLICY PROCESS MODEL & US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

17 Dec 97 ACSC

PURPOSE: This lesson provides you one way of understanding the development of strategic policy as a rational outgrowth of the interests and objectives of actors. In the case of the United States, our strategic policy is expressed in the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.

LESSON OUTLINE:

Thesis: Providing security is a primary objective of state and nonstate actors. The Policy Process Model shows how rational actors derive policies from security interests and objectives and how internal and external actors and factors affect policy formation. The underpinnings of US governmental involvement in world affairs are expressed in the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. This document sets forth policy which guides planners and practitioners in responding to external events. It is imperative that a professional officer not only know what the national security strategy is, but also be able to articulate the rationale for that strategy.

Main Point I: The Policy Process Model

a. Actor Interests

b. Actor Objectives

c. Policy/"Grand Strategy"

d. Consider Internal/External Actors/Factors

e. Policy Application (Selection of IOP(s))

f. Feedback Loop

g. Model Limitations

Main Point II: Comprehend National Security Strategy as a cornerstone document. It provides strategic guidance to many agencies in the government. It communicates our nation's interests & objectives to friend &foe.

Main Point III: Comprehend the document's logic in support of its "Engagement and Enlargement" strategy. Recognize the perceived national security mission and identify the rationale for each of the three "central goals" of the 1996 National Security Strategy. Gain an understanding of the logic of strategy having differing "broad objectives" for each region of the world.

LESSON INTEGRATION & RATIONALE: This lesson introduces a conceptual framework for analyzing the relationship between interests, objectives, policies and the application of power by state and non-state actors in the strategic environment. It builds on the analysis concepts and dimensions introduced in lessons (SE501-508) and on instruments of power concepts which will be introduced in SE533. It articulates US strategy to preserve national security in the context of international dynamics and transnational factors discussed in previous lessons of the course. The lesson provides important contextual information for realistic discussions of the nations intended use of its instruments of power in both SE 533 and in future ACSC courses.

SE COURSE OBJECTIVES:

Comprehend the characteristics of the contemporary strategic environment.

Comprehend different conceptual frameworks which help us analyze the nature of the strategic environment.

Comprehend major regional issues and relationships shaping the strategic environment.

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

531.1 Comprehend how state and nonstate systems translate interests and objectives into policies and strategies.

531.11 Describe the Policy Process Model.

The Policy Process Model is a simple model to describe how actors in the strategic environment formulate their interactions with other actors. We know already that the strategic environment is complex and no simple model can fully capture all of the dynamics of how various actors make decisions. This model offers a framework for critical thinking about the process by which ends are translated into means. The policy process model is founded on a key assumption: rationality. In the context of international relations studies the notion of rationality has a very specific meaning. First, it assumes we are dealing with a unitary actor. Second, it assumes there is sufficient information for the actor to identify options and assess consequences. Finally, it assumes that the actor selects the optimal policy--i.e., the one which will maximize gains.

531.12 Describe the relationship between interests, objectives, policy and strategy.

INTERESTS: Broad motives or general ends sought; Can be defined in economic, military, ideological, moral, legal, cultural terms; Can have varying degrees of intensity

OBJECTIVES: Goals, aims, desired outcome

When an actor's security interests are expressed in terms of (or crystallized into) more specific goals, aims or desired outcomes we tend to refer to these as security objectives. Don't get hung up trying to make a clear-cut distinction between security interests and security objectives. Depending on the author, either term might be used to describe the ends being sought by an actor. Like interests, objectives can still be quite broad but can also be focused on a particular issue or situation. They frequently defy assignment to neatly partitioned categories but tend to overlap across political, economic, military or informational dimensions.

POLICIES: The generic term policy is to refer to the means by which an actor seeks to achieve its interests and objectives. Think of policy as a "fundamental choice of commitment or direction" (Hartmann :

POLICIES tend to be more focused along political, economic, military and informational lines.

Policy What it Affects

Political - behavior, organization, functioning

Military - armed forces

Economic - money, goods, raw mat'l, services

Information - knowledge, perceptions

There is a rational process flowing from the ends sought (which we have termed interests and objectives) to the means to achieve these ends (which we have termed policy and application of power. Although power application is an output of this process, the actor must consider its capability and will to use power early on during policy formulation. And, as you might expect, this process does not take place in isolation.

At some point our rational actor must decide on the means required to achieve its interests and objectives. In the language of diplomacy we commonly use the term "foreign policy" to describe the means employed to promote interests and achieve objectives. Drew and Snow point out that the terms foreign policy, Grand Strategy and Grand National Strategy are often used interchangeably to mean the same thing.

From Drew and Snow

The term strategy is military in derivation and the clearest applications of strategy are in the military realm, but other groups and individuals have appropriated the term as part of their lexicons as well. In particular, the term is associated with the broad set of goals and policies a nation adopts toward the world (akin to the broadest definition and sense of national foreign policy).

In this adaptation, strategy also remains a process relating means to ends, but the means and ends are somewhat different. Grand national strategy is the process by which the nation's basic goals are realized in a world of conflicting goals and values. The ends of grand strategy are usually expressed in terms of national interests. The role of the strategy process is to translate those national interests into means for achieving those ends. Those means, in turn, are traditionally described in terms of the instruments of national power. They are usually categorized as the political (or diplomatic), economic, and military instruments of power.

Grand national strategy thus emerges as the process by which the appropriate instruments of power are arrayed and employed to accomplish the national interest. Thus, the building blocks of grand national strategy are the goals or national interests that are to be served and the instruments that may be used to serve those ends.

Nuechterlein depicts level of intensity in the following with the left being the highest level:

Intensity of interest

531.13 Describe the impact of internal an external actors and factors on the policy process.

The policy process is affected by the external environment and internal environment. Both environments can be analyzed in terms of the relevant actors and influencing factors. They can cause conflict and friction changing perceptions.

Factors: At least six characteristics influence the grand strategy process in the United States: security policy is potentially fundamental in its effects; its objectives are external rather than domestic; its objectives are generally negative rather than positive; it has a basically conservative bias; its problems and solutions are often highly technical; and it is more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the budgetary process than other areas of public policy. Each of these factors affect the design of strategy and its content; collectively, these factors help define the milieu for strategymaking.

Actors in the US

Internal Actors

The executive branch of government has the major responsibility for the formulation and execution of foreign and national security policy. The institutions represented on the National Security Council are the core actors within the executive branch who examine national security policy. They bring to bear different institutional perspectives on foreign and defense concerns and thus, when the system operates properly, guarantee that the range of institutional concerns are addressed before policy is made. The National Security Act of 1947, in addition to creating an independent Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense, provided a structure within which to fashion national security policy, the National Security Council. The statutory members of the council are the president (who convenes it and serves as chair), the vice president, the secretary of state, and the secretary of defense. In addition, the president may appoint additional members, and the act specifies that the director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as advisers to NSC. Finally, the act contains provision for a professional staff to coordinate the council's activities. The position of national security adviser (NSA) evolved from this provision.

Despite its historically preeminent role as the foreign policy agency, the State Department's influence has been in gradual decline. The department is still responsible for US embassies and consulates and their personnel up to and including the ambassadors. Most American business with foreign governments is still conducted through the embassy system, but, particularly in high-profile situations with national security overtones, other actors have infringed on traditional State Department "territory."

Congress is the other major institutional actor. Within the checks and balances system that undergirds the US Constitution, there is planned tension between the executive and legislative branches. A major role of Congress is to oversee and restrain the actions of the executive, and this is accomplished constitutionally and politically. The constitutional restraints given to Congress are largely reactive and seek to review presidential actions to ensure they are in the national interest. These restraints operate in shared areas of responsibilities, or what are otherwise known as concurrent powers exercised by both branches. These include raising and maintaining armed forces, declaring war, advising and consenting on treaties, and confirming officials.

The political powers of Congress in the national security area consist of two related powers. The first is the power of the purse. All appropriations bills, by constitutional provision, must originate in the House of Representatives, and the executive branch of government cannot spend any money in the national defense (or for any other purpose) that has not been appropriated by Congress. Since virtually everything the executive does costs money, this is not an insignificant power.The power of the purse can be exercised both directly and indirectly. In a direct sense, Congress can refuse to fund all or part of the monies requested by the president for national security projects. Prime examples of this direct application in the 1980s include the MX (Peacekeeper) missile system and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), both of which were funded at levels considerably lower than those sought by the administration. There are some things that Congress cannot directly control, such as supporting military personnel in a combat zone, and in these instances Congress can voice its displeasure indirectly by such means as threatening to deny funding for other presidentially backed programs.

The other political tool of Congress is known as "watchdogging." A primary purpose of the Congress is to monitor executive policies and programs, both in terms of their wisdom and the degree to which they are exercised. The primary tool for this is the web of standing committees in the two houses of Congress. Most of the interaction between Congress and the executive branch in matters of national security occur in these committees, and the most powerful members of Congress in the area of national security policy are the chairs and ranking minority members of relevant oversight committees. In the area of national security, the relevant Senate committees (with their House equivalents in parentheses where the title is different) are: Foreign Relations (Foreign Affairs), Armed Services, Finance (Ways and Means), Select Committee on Intelligence, and Appropriations.

External Actors

In addition to the governmental actors with formal responsibility in the policy process, other actors directly affect the substance of strategy. Two major sources of influence outside formal governmental channels are readily identifiable interest groups and public opinion.

At the most general level, an interest group is a collection of individuals who share common interests different from other groups' interests. In the political sphere, a large number of such groups represent the gamut of interest on general issues of grand strategy and more specific policy issues. Each group attempts to influence public policy in directions compatible with its beliefs. Through such techniques as lobbying and education, interest groups transmit policy options and positions from the private sector to governmental actors who make policy decisions.

Classifying the different kinds of interest groups in any neat, precise way is difficult, but there are at least four criteria for dividing groups. Certain groups can be distinguished by the breadth of the issues in which they take an interest. At one extreme are the broad interest groups, such as the League of Women Voters or AFL-CIO, who take positions on virtually all issues. These generalist groups differ from more specific groups who may take positions only on foreign policy problems (e.g., the Council on Foreign Relations) or some subset of foreign policy. Generalist groups are larger and have higher public visibility, but, quite often, the more specialized groups possess greater expertise in their particular areas of interest and, hence, are more effective in influencing decisions.

A second perspective on interest groups relates to their organizational permanence. Most organized groups persist over time and attempt to promote enduring interests, but the last two decades have seen the rise of so-called single-interest groups. These groups usually begin as loose, ad hoc coalitions responding to a discrete interest, and they have mixed records in terms of permanence. The various anti-Vietnam groups represented a single-interest group that dissolved after their issues disappeared. The antidraft registration movement of the early 1980s is a more recent example. The groups organized by Ralph Nader are examples of single-interest groups that have shown more permanence by widening their purviews.

A third way to view interest-group activity is the degree to which they focus on strategic issues. Such organizations as the Foreign Policy Association or the Veterans of Foreign Wars have foreign policy/strategic interests as primary concerns, and they generally develop elaborate positions encompassing the broad range of strategic policies. Others become directly interested in specific issues when their interest areas become relevant to foreign policy (e.g., the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Association of Manufacturers).

Fourth, interest groups may be distinguished in terms of whether they represent "public" or "private interests." An important phenomenon paralleling the rise of single-issue groups has been the emergence of groups purporting to protect broad public interest (e.g., the public at large) rather than more parochial interests. Such groups as Common Cause or Moral Majority are controversial because their views of what constitutes the public "good" are often based on ideological precepts (liberal or conservative) and because many suspect that their apparent piety in professing the interests of all masks more parochial concerns.

The most controversial interest groups represent private interests that may profit directly from policy outcomes. These "vested" interests exist across the whole range of policy areas (e.g., pharmaceutical firms in relation to food and drug laws), but they have gained particular prominence in the security area because of the large amounts of money traditionally allocated to defense spending.

In any open society, public opinion provides the final and ultimate restraint on governmental decisionmaking. Principles of responsibility and accountability mean that decisions must be justified as being in the public interest, and the public must be willing to bear the burdens that policy decisions create. The perception of public willingness to support policy is a particularly important consideration in the defense and security area because of the potentially extraordinary burdens that decisions may impose (e.g., policies may result in war). In less extreme cases, however, public opinion as a public determinant is more constrained.

The point to be made in the national security area is that there is no single public opinion, but there are the opinions of several publics. For better or worse, the vast majority of US citizenry has no developed or sustained interest in foreign policy issues. This uninformed public does not regularly seek information about foreign affairs, and it does not form opinions consistently unless its own interests are directly affected by events (e.g., war), an event receives wide publicity (e.g., the Iran-Contra affair), or efforts are made to. mobilize it (e.g., the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics). Participation by the uninformed public tends to be sporadic and malleable; rather than shape foreign policy, its opinions are shaped by it.

The second largest public sector is the informed public, which is defined as citizens who regularly keep up with, and form opinions about, foreign affairs. Its opinions tend to be generalized rather than specific (e.g., prodefense or antidefense spending as opposed to being for or against specific weapons deployment). Access to information for this group is generally limited to the electronic and popular print media, and most of its members are professionals whose work does not directly involve them in foreign affairs. This group generally contains local opinion leaders (e.g., clergy and journalists) who perform the important task of transmitting information to the uninformed public. With its limited information and greater focus on other areas, however, the informed public's role in the policy process is more reactive than formative.

The most important influence on decisionmakers comes from the effective (or elite) public. This segment comprises that part of the public that actively puts forward and advocates various policy alternatives. It includes interest group representatives, national opinion leaders (e.g., the national media), and individuals whose lives and livelihoods are directly affected by foreign affairs (e.g., executives of corporations doing business overseas). In the area of grand strategy and military strategy, the expert community of defense intellectuals-scholars, "think tanks," and retired military officers are particularly influential. These individuals seek to influence policy by advocating positions in scholarly and professional journals, testifying before Congress, and the like. This group has been especially prominent in nuclear strategy formulation.

Actors can define interests in a variety of ways; expressed in terms of economic criteria, ideological criteria, military security, morality or legality, cultural affinity and ethnicity.

531.2 Comprehend US national security objectives and strategy.

531.21 Explain why the United States publishes a national security strategy.

Publication Purpose: Explain national values and objectives to obtain broad bipartisan support of American people and Congress IAW Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 President elaborates national security strategy to:

- Give Strategic guidance to federal agencies

- Communicate national interests

- Communicate national objectives

531.22 Identify each of the three central goals of the current National Security Strategy.

1) To enhance our security with military forces that are ready to fight and with effective representation broad. 2)To bolster America's economic revitalization 3)To promote democracy abroad.

(Believe to be mutually supportive)

531.3 Comprehend US interests in different regions of the world.

531.31 Describe the logic of the National Security Strategy having differing "broad objectives" for each region of the world.

The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of strategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper. Examples:

Europe and Eurasia: In Europe an important element of our strategy is military strength and cooperation. Second is economic. The third is to support growth of democracy for better security.

East Asia & the Pacific: Security is also the first pillar of the new Pacific Community for the United States. The US combats the proliferation of WMD in this area.

Western Hemisphere: The growth of democracies offers an unparalleled opportunity to secure the benefits of peace and stability and to promote economic growth and trade.

Middle East, SW and South Asia: The security of Israel and our Arab friends as well as maintaining the free flow of oil at reasonable prices are part of our interests in the Middle East.

Africa is a great challenge. We need to identify and address the root causes of conflicts and disasters before they erupt.

531.4 Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces. Only nation capable of conducting large scale and effective military operations far beyond its borders.

531.41 Describe the US policy for use/non-use of US military forces. "Will only send our interests and our values are sufficiently at stake."

First: Determine level of national interest involved

Vital
Important
Humanitarian

Second: Balance expected costs and risks against interest

Third: If decision made to use military IOP:

Ensure clear mission
Ensure means to achieve objective decisively
Attempt to engage allied support

3 basic categories of national interests that can merit use of our armed forces.

1. America's vital interests - interests that are broad overriding importance to the survival, security and vitality of our national entity-the defense of US territory, citizens, allies and our economic well being. We do whatever it takes- including unilateral and decisive use of military power. Example: DESERT STORM, Vigilant Warrior (1994 Iraq near Kuwait)

2. Important but not vital US interests- do not affect our survival but do affect importantly our national well being and the character of the world in which we live. Should only be used if advance US interests, are likely to accomplish objectives, the costs and risks of their employment are commensurate with the interests at stake and other means have been tried and failed. Force should be selective and limited.
Example: Haiti and Bosnia

3. Humanitarian Interests- based on unique capabilities of our military rather than combat power. Military is generally not the best tool. Used when catastrophe overwhelms ability of civilian relief agencies, when urgent relief is required, when can use unique military resources, and risk to troops is minimal. Example: Rwanda

READINGS: Most of the objectives came from the powerpoint presentation, not the readings.

Drew, Dennis and Snow, Donald, "Making Strategy-An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems"
A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Feb 1996 (located in coursebook)

This is a very long reading from the White House. Some info is outdated. A new one I believe has been published and can be found through defenselink search.

READING RATIONALE: The Grand National Strategy reading introduces the concepts of national interests, objectives and policy, relates these to the application of power and describes several important influences on the U.S. policy process. The National Security Strategy, as its name implies, provides current national security strategy of the US.

Actors can define interests in a variety of ways. Papp (pp. 44-46) offers examples of interests expressed in terms of economic criteria, ideological criteria, military security, morality or legality, cultural affinity and ethnicity. Interests can also have differing levels of importance or intensity. Recall Dr. Magyar's article in your War and Conflict Coursebook (p. 3) which described levels of interest as being either core, intermediate or peripheral. Drew and Snow (pp. 28-29) describe a four-level taxonomy originally defined by Donald Nuechterlein: Survival, Vital, Major, Peripheral. In that scheme, a vital interest is one for which a nation is unwilling to compromise and one over which a nation would go to war.