SE 533 INSTRUMENTS OF POWER
PURPOSE:
The purpose of this lesson is to introduce you to "instruments of power" which are available tools to use in the fulfillment of national policy objectives.
LESSON OUTLINE:
Thesis: Policy projection requires the application of national instruments of
power to achieve strategic objectives. The complexity and high degree of
interdependence that characterizes the strategic environment can make IOP selection a
difficult and potentially counterproductive endeavor. The situation, factors and
actors must be correctly analyzed to determine the most effective application of IOPs.
Main Point I: National Power can be categorized into four broad Instruments of Power (IOPs). The interplay between these instruments defines the extent of influence one actor has over another.
Main Point II: Each of the four instruments of power have potential strengths and weaknesses based upon the situation and the actor's willingness to use them.
LESSON OBJECTIVES:
533.1 Comprehend how each of the four Instruments of Power (IOPs) can potentially serve as
important means of policy projection.
533.11 Describe the means by which political, economic, information, and military
IOPs are exercised.
Nations use four instruments of power--diplomatic, economic, informational, and military--to project (fulfill) national security policy.
Usually, more than one IOP is used because most issues require a multifaceted approach and a combination of IOPs often achieves more powerful, synergistic effects. At the national level, the useof these IOPs is called "grand strategy."
Application of each IOP has certain constraints. Several other factors complicate the task of developing strategies for particular instruments.
Drew and Snow state that to implement policy, some combination of IOPs usually must be brought to bear, often in an ad hoc rather than a planned manner. Situations evolve over time--an appropriate strategy at one point may be forced to yield to another strategy at a different point. Different countries are predisposed by culture, history, and circumstances to prefer greater or lesser reliance on different IOPs. Relative emphasis placed on different IOPs fluctuates with time.
The use of the economic IOP has played an important role in foreign policy throughout history. The first recorded record of the use of economic sanctions occurred in 432 BC when the Athenian leader Pericles imposed trade sanctions on Megara. Megara appealed to Sparta for aid, resulting in the Peloponnesian War. In 1807, US President Jefferson embargoed all US trade with Europe to protest British attacks on US merchant ships. More recent examples of this "stick and carrot" approach include the US freeze on Iranian assets following the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran, and our granting of Most Favored Nation trading status to China.
"Today, information systems are part of larger information infrastructures. These infrastructures link individual information systems in a myriad of direct and indirect paths. A growing information infrastructure transcends industry, media, and the military and includes both government and non-government agencies." (Joint Pub 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare)
Information is becoming more and more important to the functioning of modern nations. Information drives modern, technologically-advanced economies. The world community is more closely connected, via the Internet, and satellite transmissions of images, voice, and text communications, than ever before. This trend is expected to continue in the future as the desire and need for greater communications connectivity increases, while the cost of transmission and equipment declines.
In his book Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway, Winn Schwartau discusses four generalized strategic goals of the information warrior:
All four of these activities can have serious consequences for individuals, corporations, communities and societies.
Modern militaries, like modern societies, depend more and more on computers and communication systems to process information and assist leaders in penetrating the "fog of war" to make the right decisions. As our dependence on sensors, networks and systems increases, so does their value as a target for our adversaries, because these systems become our Centers of Gravity. If an enemy can slow our operations tempo by attacking the information and the communications systems we depend on, then they may gain just enough of an edge to accomplish their goals.
The military IOP can also be used in "operations other than war:"
Arms control verification, counter-terrorism, nation assistance, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, peacekeeping, support to insurgencies, training, exchange visits, foreign military sales, combined exercises/operations, and military contact teams are all examples of how the military IOP can be employed.
You will notice that the military IOP may be used in conjunction with the other IOPs to influence friends and foes. Here are some examples:
Diplomatic: alliances, treaties, peacekeeping operations
Information: port visits, air shows, intelligence gathering, space assets
Economic: blockades, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief
(Some activities, such as counter-drug operations, may overlap all four areas.)
When discussing the IOPs employed by the US government, we distinguish between politics (domestic considerations/issues/factors affecting national decisions) and diplomacy (activities aimed at foreign governments).
As Barry Hughes discusses in his book, Continuity and Change in World Politics: The Clash of Perspectives, governments communicate their objectives and concerns to other governments through diplomatic representation. Sometimes diplomats do not communicate clearly just how important an issue is to their country (American Ambassador April Glaspie's meeting with Saddam Hussein on the eve of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait?) and sometimes a host government intentionally may try to deceive foreign representatives, such as Soviet denials to American leaders that it planned to invade Afghanistan in 1979.
Diplomats also report on the intentions and capabilities of host nations. This reporting can be based on local press articles, news reports, government briefings, conversations between political representatives, or clandestine means (espionage).
If countries differ on an issue, diplomats may negotiate a compromise, if possible, in
order to avoid an escalation of tensions. A compromise can lead to a "win-win"
agreement. An agreement may not be honored, however, as Hitler's invasion of the Soviet
Union, despite a non-aggression pact, demonstrates. In any case, negotiations may be used
for propaganda purposes, for diplomatic stalling, or strategic deception.
533.12 Describe the factors that complicate the task of developing
strategies for employing individual IOPs.
In the Instruments of National Power reading, the authors emphasize that democracies, in particular, have domestic constraints on the use of IOPs. For instance, there are Constitutional and statutory constraints on the use of military force. Our economic assistance is limited by the size of the budget apportioned for foreign aid. Our diplomatic leverage depends on the skill of our diplomats, while expanding information technologies make it easier for our adversaries to publicize anti-American propaganda. Let's look at the constraints on each IOP more closely.
The Constitution grants the authority to declare war to Congress, not the president, and the War Powers Act of 1973 limits the employment of US combat forces when war is not declared. Moreover, the 1996 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement document describes the categories of national interests that can merit the use of our armed forces:
Foreign economic assistance has no real domestic support, according to Drew and Snow, so there is little impetus to expand the federal budget in this area. As a result, economic assistance, and hence American influence abroad, is limited by the small (and declining) portion of the budget designated for foreign aid. Yet, the US government cannot order US firms to invest in certain countries to make up for this shortfall. On the other hand, punitive measures, such as the grain embargo on the USSR following its invasion of Afghanistan, affect certain domestic constituencies, and these "sticks" impact certain sectors of our economy as well as the target country. Lastly, America's economic strength relative to other countries affects its overall national power.
America's diplomatic success is closely tied to the military IOP, as the NATO airstrikes (Operation Deliberate Force) against the Bosnian Serbs in the late summer of 1995 demonstrated. Military attacks without diplomatic efforts to convince the Bosnian Serbs to stop shelling Sarajevo would have been purely punitive and, thus, unsustainable, while diplomacy without a credible military response to the shelling would have been powerless. Diplomacy also hinges on America's economic strength. As an example, because many countries desire Most Favored Nation trading status, the US can "play" this card during negotiations on a range of issues, from reciprocal trade agreements to human rights to democratic reforms, with other countries. As with any human interaction, our diplomatic success also depends on the skill and force of personality of our negotiators.
The information revolution provides societies access to a greater range of media than ever before. Many people believe that the mere publication or broadcast of information makes it truthful, but sometimes the information is not designed to inform listeners, viewers, or readers but to influence public opinion. The public may not "screen" the information for bias, special interests, hidden agendas, or outright fabrication. Moreover, due to laws against censorship, governments must combat this free speech with more free speech, a contest governments are finding hard to win as individuals and groups flood cyberspace with wild claims of governmental treachery.
The various actors and factors that determine a national policy and the means to achieve that policy. Internal actors and factors, such as the media, special interests, constituencies, lobbies, powerful individuals, public opinion, and national interests, influence the outcome of the policy process. Simultaneously, external actors, such as non-state actors like International Governmental Organizations (e.g., the UN), Non-Governmental Organizations (e.g., Greenpeace) and multi-national corporations (e.g., Exxon), and factors, such as world opinion and treaty commitments, also influence national-level decisions about policy and what IOPs are used to fulfill that policy.
State and non-state actors use IOPs to pursue their interests and influence other
actors. None of the IOPs are useful alone all of the time. Usually, IOPs work in
concert with others to pressure a target actor. This combination is more powerful than
IOPs used alone. Since circumstances will always vary as to whether national interests
are at stake, and what intensity and combination of IOPs can be used, crafting a grand
strategy to project policy will remain a very challenging task.
READINGS:
1. Drew, Dennis and Snow, Donald, "Instruments of National Power"
Each instrument is applied for the same purpose: to achieve outcomes that serve the
national interest. The economic instrument is more explicitly amenable to the
"carrot-and-stick" approach than other instruments. Hence, economic
assistance or preferential trade relationships can be used as positive inducements
(carrot) to produce desired behavior, and the threat of withholding aid or using quotas or
tariffs to disadvantage trade can be a sanction (stick) if another country does not take
desired actions. The diplomatic/political instrument is somewhat more derivative and
amorphous. What is clear is that diplomatic skill can help turn events in a nation's favor.
The ability to mediate successfully and to produce unique and mutually acceptable
solutions to complex issues without application of military or economic power is the
essence of the diplomatic instrument.
CONSTRAINTS:
First, the instruments are highly interrelated and thus cannot be viewed in isolation. In other words, treating the various instruments of power in isolation oversimplifies reality.
Second, each of the instruments of power is, in fact, a combination of multiple factors, and any one factor can be crucial in a given situation. It is difficult, for example, to identify any single index of military power that allows prediction of a clash between two reasonably equal, or even not so equal foes, because so many factors comprise military prowess . To a great extent, military history is a chronicle of calculation and miscalculation in comparing military instruments and their capacities to serve national ends.
In application, some combination of instruments usually must be brought to bear, often in an ad hoc rather than a planned manner. This complex intertwining occurs for two related reasons. On one hand, any given situation may involve multiple objectives with political, economic, and military/security dimensions and different strategies may be necessary for the various aspects. On the other hand, situations evolve over time; thus, an appropriate strategy at one point may be forced to yield to another strategy at a different point. The situation in the Persian Gulf illustrates the first factor and the Iranian hostage crisis is a good example of the second factor.
The fourth factor that complicates strategymaking for particular instruments of power is the fact that different countries are predisposed by culture, history, and circumstance to prefer greater or lesser reliance on different instruments of power. The Soviet Union relies heavily on the military instrument partly because of its experience with foreign invaders and a weak Soviet economy that restricts its economic leverage. The United States has historically emphasized the economic instrument, reflecting a preeminent economic system and an aversion dating back to the American Revolution to maintaining a large peacetime military force.
Fifth and finally, the relative emphasis placed on different instruments of power
fluctuates with time.. The argument for interdependence suggests the relative rise of
the economic instrument among the tools of power, and its champions optimistically suggest
that once cooperative patterns become widespread, they may become the norm. Such an
outcome would, of course, diminish the role of military force considerably. There is
evidence, however, of a growing awareness that interdependence has a darker, more
Machiavellian side in which the military instrument plays a potentially greater role.
This construct suggests that mutual dependence does not necessarily lead to cooperation
because one nation can withhold or threaten to withhold vital resources to put another
nation at its mercy. Under such conditions, the only way to ensure access to vital
materials may be the resort to force. The "Carter Doctrine" regarding the
Persian Gulf is testimony of this concern
2. National Security Strategy of Engagment and Enlargment, "Deciding When and How to deploy US forces"
The decision on whether and when to use force is therefor dictated first and foremost by our national interests. In those specific areas where our vital or survival interests are at stake, our use of force will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral. Second, in all cases, the costs and risks of U.S. military involvement must be judged to be commensurate with the stakes involved. We will be more inclined to act where there is reason to believe that our action will bring lasting improvement. On the other hand, our involvement will be more circumscribed when other regional or multilateral actors are better positioned to act than we are. Even in theses cases, however, the United States will be actively engaged at the diplomatic level. But in every case, we will consider several critical questions before committing military force: The decision on how we use force has a similar set of derived guidelines:
First, when we send American troops abroad, we will send them with a clear mission and, for those operations that are likely to involve combat, the means to achieve their objectives decisively. Second, as much as possible, we will seek the help of our allies and friends or of relevant international institutions. If our most important national interests are at stake, we are prepared to act alone. But especially on those maters touching directly the interests of our allies, there should be a proportionate commitment from them. Working together increases the effectiveness of each nation's actions, and sharing the responsibilities lessens everyone's load.
These, then, are the calculations of interest and cost that have influenced our past
uses of military power and guide us in the future. Every time this Administration has used
force, it has balanced interests against costs. One final consideration regards the
central role the American people rightfully play in how the United States wields its power
abroad: the United States cannot long sustain a fight without the support of the
public, and close consultations with Congress are important to this effort.
3. Kinner, Jan, "A Sample Glossary of Economic Weapons"
There are five different "types" of sanctions, as described below.
Often in the literature these are divided up into two broad categories: trade sanctions
and capital sanctions.