SE 534 STRATEGIC CENTERS OF GRAVITY

SE 534 STRATEGIC CENTERS OF GRAVITY

OVERVIEW:

The purpose of this lesson is to explore the concept of strategic centers of gravity. The lesson will demonstrate how the concept provides a framework which allows one to analyze an actor and make sound decisions on how to most appropriately employ the "instruments of power" that are available for use.

LESSON OUTLINE:

Thesis: The concept of center of gravity originated in early military thought and remains applicable across all levels of modern conflict. Unfortunately, the concept of center of gravity has often been molded to suit the purpose of the definer, serve a new capability, or otherwise respond to the predominant contextual factors of the time. The difficulty in identifying centers of gravity at the strategic level lies in the many dimensions, conflicting interests, and issues that define the environment. Nonetheless, IOPs must be directed in such a manner as to have the greatest chance for success with the least possible risk.

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

534.1 Comprehend the concept of center of gravity.

534.11 Describe the origin of the concept of center of gravity.

Carl von Clausewitz was the first theorist to specifically use the words "center of gravity." His teachings reveal a certain perspective which we must keep in mind as we discuss this topic. Therefore, let's provide a definition to account for this focus. A center of gravity is a characteristic or set of characteristics of an actor that will, if affected appropriately and adquately, lead to a desired change in the behavior of the actor.

At the national level, a center of gravity is much broader. A country's leader may be its center of gravity. The ability to generate economic wealth through its industrial base may be. Then again, the ability to propagate information and educate its population may be. Thus, our definition must adjust to account for the strategic nature of the actor.

534.12 Identify the characteristics of center of gravity.

. First, we see that Clausewitz believed a center of gravity was a relative concept, and that only when one examined the strategic environment in which the two "belligerents" operated could one determine the center of gravity for either side. For example, the COG for a nation at war thousands of miles from home could be its logistics support tail, while the same might not be true for that nation in a regional conflict. Thus, we learn that a center of gravity is situation specific, and can change depending on the environment.

Second, we can see that Clausewitz believed a center of gravity could be tangible or philosophical. Many have debated whether Clausewitz intended his concept to be strategic or tactical in nature. Because of the limited technology available in his time, much war-fighting theory and writings revolved around battlefield tactics and how to defeat the enemy at the lowest level of engagement. The fact that Clausewitz mentions intangibles as potential centers of gravity may provide some insight that he believed the concept could apply at higher levels as well.

534.2 Comprehend that the concept of center of gravity provides a potential framework from which we can analyze an actor and make decisions on how best to employ instruments of power

534.21 Describe the relevance of center of gravity at the strategic level.

. The ability to see strategic issues from a systems perspective allows us to look at the key actors, processes, and sub-systems involved; the relationships between those actors, processes, and sub-systems; and how changes in one end of the "system" will have impact elsewhere. This ability to predict and interpret cause and effect relationships from a systems perspective works hand-in-glove with our ability to identify potential centers of gravity.

Additionally, we learned in SE-533 that there are other ways to influence a nation's actions besides military might. Diplomacy, economics, information, and military power can all be used as needed to bring about desired effects in support of our objectives.

Likewise, an understanding of the tools available to influence actors at the national level is critical to bringing about the desired changes in behavior we wish to see occur. The information we presented in SE-533 illustrates that at the strategic level, a center of gravity can be influenced through economic, political/diplomatic, informational, or military means. Key to the entire process is understanding your own objective! Without an understanding of your objective, you can neither select a strategy, center of gravity, nor instrument of power

READINGS:

Clausewitz, Carl Von, "Closer Definition of the Military Objective: The Defeat of the Enemy"

The aim of war should be what its very concept implies--to defeat the enemy.

These events are proof that success is not due simply to general causes. Particular factors can be decisive--details only known to those who were on the spot. There can also be moral factors which never come to light; while issues can be decided by chances and incidents so minute as to figure in histories simply as anecdotes. What the theorist has to say here is this: one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed. Small things always depend on great ones, unimportant on important, accidentals on essentials. This must guide our approach.

For Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII, and Frederick the Great, the center of gravity was their army. If the army had been destroyed, they would all have gone down in history as failures. In countries subject to domestic strife, the center of gravity is generally the capital. In small countries that rely on large ones, it is usually the army of their protector. Among alliances, it lies in the community of interest, and in popular uprisings it is the personalities of the leaders and public opinion. It is against these that our energies should be directed.. Still, no matter what the central feature of the enemy's power may be--the point on which your efforts must converge--the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin, and in every case will be a significant feature of the campaign.

Basing our comments on general experience, the acts we consider most important for the defeat of the enemy are the following:

Destruction of his army, if it is at all significant
Seizure of his capital if it is not only the center of administration but also that of social, professional, and political activity
Delivery of an effective blow against his principal ally if that ally is more powerful than he.

If two or more states combine against another, the result is still politically speaking a single war. But this political unity is a matter of degree. The question is then whether each state is pursuing an independent interest and has its own independent means of doing so, or whether the interests and forces of most of the allies are subordinate to those of the leader. I would, therefore, state it as a principle that if you can vanquish all your enemies by defeating one of them, that defeat must be the main objective in the war. In this one enemy we strike at the center of gravity of the entire conflict.

There are very few cases where this conception is not applicable--where it would not be realistic to reduce several centers of gravity to one. Where this is not so, there is admittedly no alternative but to act as if there were two wars or even more, each with its own object. This assumes the existence of several independent opponents, and consequently great superiority on their part. when this is the case, to defeat the enemy is out of the question.

We must now address ourselves more closely to the question: when is this objective both feasible and sound?

To begin with, our forces must be adequate:

To score a decisive victory over the enemy's
To make the effort necessary to pursue our victory to the point where the balance is beyond all possible redress.

Next, we must be certain our political position is so secure that this success will not bring further enemies against us who could force us immediately to abandon our efforts against our first opponent.

Both belligerents need time; the question is only which of the two can expect to derive special advantages from it in the light of his own situation. If the position on each side is carefully considered, the answer will be obvious: it is the weaker side--but thanks to the laws of psychology rather than those of dynamics. Envy, jealousy, anxiety, and sometimes perhaps even generosity are the natural advocates of the unsuccessful. They will win new friends for him as well as weaken and divide his enemies. Time, then, is less likely to bring favor to the victor than to the vanquished.

But if the conquered areas are important enough, and if there are places in them vital to the areas still in enemy hands, the rot will spread, like a cancer, by itself; and if only that and nothing else happens, the conqueror may well enjoy the net advantage. Time alone will then complete the work, provided that no help comes from outside, and the area that is still unconquered may well fall without more ado. thus time can become a factor in the conqueror's strength as well; but only on condition that a counterattack on him is no longer possible, that no reversal is conceivable--when indeed this factor is no longer of value since his main objective has been achieved, the culminating crisis is past, and the enemy, in short, laid low.

That chain of argument was designed to show that no conquest can be carried out too quickly, and that to spread it over a longer period than the minimum needed to complete it makes it not less difficult, but more. If that assertion is correct, it follows equally that if one's strength in general is great enough to make a certain conquest one must also have the strength to do so in a single operation, not by stages. By "stages" naturally, we do not mean to exclude the minor halts that are needed for reassembling one's forces or for administrative reasons.

We hope to have made it clear that in our view an offensive war requires above all a quick, irresistible decision. If so, we shall have cut the ground from under the alternative idea that a slow, allegedly systematic occupation is safer and wiser than conquest by continuous advance.