Since the advent of warfare, military leaders have recognized the importance of its
study. They realized that the commander who has the most thorough understanding of all
aspects of war has a decided advantage in battle. There has been less consensus, however,
in the form that the study of warfare should assume. There are those who subscribe to the
pre-Napoleonic idea that the tremendous number of variables associated with warfare permit
one to learn only through personal experience - a trial and error method of study largely
limited to battle tactics. Others adhere to the more modern position that warfare includes
certain constants (principles, patterns, or norms), the understanding and application of
which will improve one's chances of achieving battlefield success at the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels.
This lesson will focus on the concept of war theory. The readings for this lesson
addressed the definition of war theory; why is it needed and how it is developed; how it
evolves; its functions, applications, and limitations; and associated risks. These ideas
provide a useful foundation upon which to trace the evolution of selected military thought
which influenced the development current air and space power theories and assess its
validity.
In order to properly discuss the concept of war theory, we must first attempt to define
it.
LOQ. Using the Athens and Winton articles as a guide, define "war theory".
DISCUSSION: The readings suggest a number of possible definitions, all of which are
closely related.
Athens stresses the Greek root - theoros - meaning viewing or observation.
--War theory is therefore a set of beliefs based upon the observation of war (military experience).
--War theory is a framework which permits the accurate assessment of military situations and enhances decision-making.
--Athens emphasizes Clausewitz's warning that theory is descriptive not prescriptive. Commanders must not attempt to apply it dogmatically to battlefield situations.
Winton emphasizes that war theory is a systematic statement of principles or
propositions related to military study.
LOQ: The readings suggest that while war theory may contain some timeless principles or
maxims, it is a dynamic, continually evolving body of thought. If this is the case, what
are some factors which drive its evolution?
DISCUSSION: Howard believes that changes in war theory result from "paradigm
shifts", many of which are not fully appreciated until battlefield catastrophes
occur. Howard cites two primary causes of such shifts - technological development and
socio-political or economic change. Today, Howard's paradigm shifts are sometimes referred
to as "Military Technical Revolutions" or "Revolutions in Military
Affairs." These concepts will be addressed in the next lesson (TH 502 - Critical
Analysis Tools).
FOQ: What are some examples of "paradigm shifts"?
DISCUSSION: Howard cites the magazine-fed rifle as an example of technologically-based
paradigm shift, and the Napoleonic "nation in arms" as a socio-political
paradigm shift. Other more recent examples may include the development of nuclear weapons,
stealth technology, and precision-guided munitions.
FOQ: Howard suggests that military institutions are extremely resistant to change,
particularly revolutionary change. How does he support this contention?
DISCUSSION: Howard advances a number of reasons for this, some of which include the
following.
Change is normally the result of teamwork and consensus-building. This method of
decision-making is time consuming.
Military institutions are huge beauracracies; like most beauracracies they tend to
discourage original thought.
Military institutions are hierarchical and emphasize conformity. The attributes
required to succeed in such an environment often run counter to those possessed by
original thinkers.
Change disrupts the status quo; someone's ox is always gored.
FOQ: Can you think of any examples of "original thinkers" in the military
whose ideas, though ultimately accepted, were resisted or suppressed when initially
proposed?
DISCUSSION: Some modern military figures who might fit this category may include the
following:
Billy Mitchell (the father of US airpower theory)
George Patton (early armor advocate)
T.E. Lawrence (W.W.I practitioner of guerrilla warfare)
ADM Grace Hopper (automation advocate)
Col John Warden (strategic bombing thru systems analysis)
FOQ: Howard also suggests that the development of war theory suffers during "ages
of peace". How does he distinguish between "peacetime" and "ages of
peace"? What are the two greatest obstacles which must be overcome if war theory is
to evolve during the latter?
DISCUSSION: Howard defines "peacetime" as an interval between wars when
another war is anticipated and actively prepared for. Conversely, an "age of
peace" is a period when people believe that there will be no more major wars. Howard
allows that during "ages of peace" the military is not necessarily idle. It is
often quite busy with military operations other than war (MOOTW) - a concept which was
introduced in the War & Conflict course. Some might argue that the US is currently in
an "age of peace".
The two primary challenges which must be overcome if military theory is to advance
during "ages of peace" are public indifference and an environment unsuited for
validating new military ideas. Society tends to place military concerns on the back burner
during "ages of peace". Impetus for change (and the resources necessary to
affect change) is generally absent as the population focuses on other concerns.
Additionally, it is extremely difficult to fully validate new military concepts
(particularly those dealing with combat) short of employing them in actual operations. Our
increased emphasis on war gaming and simulations is one way we are attempting to address
this problem.
The United States may well be in the midst of an "age of peace". The impact
this will have on our future war theory and resulting force structures and doctrines has
yet to be determined.
LOQ: Given occasional paradigm shifts and the tremendous number of variables which make
every war, campaign, and battle distinct, what relevant functions does war theory perform?
DISCUSSION: Perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of war theory's functions is
provided by Dr. Winton. He believes that war theory ideally:
Defines the field, providing the necessary focus to the study of war.
Categorizes warfare into subordinate parts, thereby distinguishing between ideas that at first appear fused.
Explains the relationship between the subordinate parts.
Connects warfare with other phenomena (war does not occur in a vacuum).
Anticipates new relationships.
FOQ: What does Winton mean when he states that war theory should anticipate new
relationships?
DISCUSSION: Winton's inclusion of an anticipatory (predictive) function for war theory is consistent with its evolutionary nature discussed earlier in the lesson. It is critical that war theory be able to anticipate future trends if, in Howard's words, the military is to spot "essential currents" (paradigm shifts?) on which it can negotiate "a disturbed and by no means friendly" sea of change.
The military can gain tremendous, perhaps decisive, advantages by identifying and
leveraging future trends, the most significant of which we will refer to in the next
lesson (TH 502) as Military Technical Revolutions (MTR) or Revolutions in Military Affairs
(RMA).
FOQ: Athens discussed Clausewitz's insistence that war theory can not be prescriptive.
How then does a commander benefit from his knowledge of war theory on the battlefield?
DISCUSSION: A knowledge of theory provides the battlefield commander with a guide to
action. It gives him with a broader, studied perspective (Athens refers to an
"intellectual foundation") and understanding of the "normal" patterns
of war. This enhanced understanding of war will allow him to rapidly exercise sound
judgment under stressful, uncertain combat conditions.
FOQ: Who does Athens cite as examples of leaders who properly applied their knowledge
of war theory?
DISCUSSION: Athens cites T.E. Lawrence and Mao Tse Tung as two leaders who were
well-versed in war theory, and who applied their theoretical knowledge properly to meet
unique combat requirements.
FOQ: What is the relationship between "theory" and "doctrine?"
DISCUSSION: Doctrine puts theory into practice.
Athens explains the distinction between the terms (which are sometimes used interchangeably) using a computer analogy. Theory is the computer's operating system and doctrine is the application software.
Howard points out that no one will get doctrine right in peacetime. Victory will go to
the side whose theoretical foundation is sound enough that his doctrine is least wrong,
and can be readily adapted.
LOQ: What are some of the limitations of war theory that can be discerned from the
readings? Are they valid?
DISCUSSION: Some limitations raised in the readings include:
Warfare is too complex and varied for theory to have any relevance.
War theory often discounts contextual elements which play a critical role in the battle outcomes. (Note: These elements will be discussed in the next lesson, TH 502 - Critical Analysis Tools.)
War theory does not take a thinking, reacting opponent into consideration.
Elements of war theory are not equally applicable at all levels of war (e.g. the
strategic, operational, tactical).
FOQ: How does one assess the validity of war theory?
DISCUSSION: Our current theory of war and, more specifically, the way we think about
air and space power is a composite of concepts and ideas drawn over the years from a
number of theorists. Many of these theorists will be discussed in upcoming lessons. The
best way to determine the validity of our theories of war is by evaluating the success of
our doctrine (which flows from them) in the conduct of operations.
LOQ: What is the primary risk associated with war theory?
DISCUSSION: Perhaps the greatest risk associated with war theory is that it's concepts
will be applied inappropriately (e.g. prescriptively or dogmatically). This is always a
concern given the military's institutional resistance to change in the absence of
catastrophe on the battlefield.
Despite the impractical connotations of the word "theory," the development of a war theory rooted in practical historical experience will, as Clausewitz suggests, provide a foundation for historical study which supplements battle experience. It therefore will play an increasingly critical role in our development of combat-ready leaders during extended "ages of peace". A sound military theory will also help the military better anticipate and accommodate the proliferation of 21st century technologies. Leveraging such technologies will allow us to maintain battlefield dominance at a reasonable human and material cost.