TH 502- CRITICAL ANALYSIS TOOLS 22 Sep 97

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

502.1 COMPREHEND CRITICAL ANALYSIS.

502.11 Explain the 3-step Clauswitzian analysis process.

Clausewitz recognized that successful military leaders possessed a thorough understanding of warfare obtained through a combination of personal experience and the study of historical campaigns. In order to provide some structure to the latter, he developed a 3-step critical analysis process which provides a useful format for assessing and discussing military theory and operations.

According to Clausewitz, when conducting an analysis, one must first identify pertinent facts. One must then determine the root causes surrounding those facts. and, finally, suggest other, better alternatives. In other words, the three step process is:

STEP 1. Discover and establish the facts (the "what happened")

• heavily relies upon history
• a thorough understanding of the context in which the event occurred is critical (key contextual and operational art elements are discussed later) -
  

STEP 2. Trace effects (the facts) back to their root causes (the "why")

• be aware of multiple "causes" for a single effect
• thorough analysis will usually dictate that one progress through more than a single cause-effect "level".

STEP 3. Propose alternatives (the "how better").

• critics must recognize that in hindsight they will have a more thorough understanding of some aspects of events than the commander at the time(especially their outcomes), while having less understanding of others
• any alternatives must be feasible
  • must be realistic for the times (e.g. technological capabilities)
  • must consider the contextual elements and operational elements of the period
• it is possible that better alternatives may not exist
  

502.12 Distinguish between contextual elements and operational art elements citing examples of each. (Weaver/pollock reading)

To aid the military planner in deriving military objectives from the strategic objectives provided to them, our model identifies six "contextual elements.

Determining the military objective is the focus of a campaign plan. Surprisingly, this is difficult for several reasons. First, strategic objectives are defined by political leadership and may often appear vague and unclear. Second, political considerations may result in strategic objectives that are not based upon clearly defined endstates. Third, military objectives must align with these strategic objectives or the entire campaign process breaks down or becomes irrelevant. Such problems with "congruency" may disrupt the planning process by creating confusion, and potentially cause military operations to fail.

Definitions: Contextual elements are those elements that affect military operations--but are usually outside the influence of the military commander In essence, contextual elements are what the commander is stuck with, or what's above his paygrade.

Operational Art Elements are those elements which can be influenced by the commander to varying degrees.

Contextual Elements:

Politics:

• The form of government (i.e. dictatorship) & its stability:
  • can be de facto or de jure
  • may or may not be influenced by the will of the people
  • may or may not be based upon a balance of power

EXAMPLE

The most graphic demonstration of the influence of politics on military planning can be seen in former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger's six major tests for employing US forces abroad. His tests focused on questions of vital interests, clear objectives, and domestic support as important criteria for US military interventions.

International Relationships

• Political and economic linkages to other nations
  • who relies upon whom and for what?
  • alliance structures and the strength of these alliances
  • world outlook (e.g. inward, outward, expansionistic) --world opinion

EXAMPLE

General Norman Schwartzkopf had to overcome while preparing for DESERT STORM. The delicacy of maintaining an Arab coalition against fellow Arabs required political and military leaders to exercise caution and recognize constraints which do not exist when acting unilaterally.

Sociocutural Norms

• Societal norms, influences, religions, cultural biases .
  • accepted behaviors and standards of conduct
  • persuasiveness within the government and population --technological advancement
  • cultural proclivities with other nation/states & cultural bonds
  • "military culture" vs. "civilian culture"
  • nationalism
  • demographics

EXAMPLE

In the 1980s President Reagan similarly invoked images from the popular movie "Star Wars" when he labeled the USSR "the Evil Empire."

Military leaders must guard against "mirror-imaging" when developing and executing operations. People tend to view the world through the lens of their own history and culture. To deal with sociocultural issues, the military planner should consider the behavioral norms of a country.

Physical Environment

• Weather patterns, geography, distances, location,
  • extreme climate
    • effects on personnel and equipment
  • ability to control the "battlespace"
    • ability to/speed of maneuver
    • ability to fully employ weapons systems

EXAMPLE

US attempts to cut Viet Cong supply lines on the Ho Chi Minh Trail failed in part because the jungle, slash burning, and fickle weather conditions reduced on-station times for US aircraft.

Leadership

• Personalities, Formal and Informal leaders & decision- makers
  • form of leadership (e.g. totalitarian, democratic)
  • leadership style: autocratic, laissez faire, consensus builder
  • informal bonds and influences
  • other governmental institutions
  • established chain of succession or hierarchy of command
  • personal biases and beliefs of the leaders

EXAMPLE

During the Napoleonic Wars, leadership was a comparatively simple concern since monarch and general were often the same person.

Economics

• Market forces, manufacturing capabilities, trade deficit/surplus
  • price of waging war / maintaining a standing fielded force
  • price free trade blocks & cartels
  • economic reliance on others; ability to blockade or be blockaded
  • standard of living
  • trade deficit
  • natural resources

EXAMPLE

DESERT STORM. American politicians circled the globe soliciting military support and financial contributions for the war effort. Planning requires an understanding of both our economy and that of our adversary.

Operational Art Elements

Logistics

• The ability to supply and sustain forces in the field
  • includes national infrastructure, personnel, and factories
  • includes the manpower of the nation
    • factory workers, farmers, scientists & armed forces
  • ability to train and equip the forces
  • transportation
  • communications

EXAMPLE

In Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the World War II, John Ellis argues the United States won the war because it overwhelmed its enemies with its ability to generate war materiel.

Technology

• Incorporation of advanced technologies in existing systems, appropriate doctrine to permit its leveraged usage on the battlefield
  • R&D capability
  • production capability

EXAMPLE

Technology is not limited to technological advancement, but also includes identifying military applications for new technologies and making necessary changes to military doctrine and organizational structures. Computer systems provide new abilities to collect and exploit data which are impacting on the conduct of war from senior command levels down to the individual ship, aircraft, or tank.

Information

• Knowledge of enemy
  • existing knowledge of enemy capabilities, limitations, and intentions
  • intelligence gathering capability

EXAMPLE

Public access to worldwide news networks is forcing planners to reduce casualties of all types in order to sustain popular support for military operations.

Targeting Science

• Selection of target & optimum method of affecting it
  • the heart of the operational art
  • effects-based
    • strategic, operational, or tactical?
    • psychological or physical?
    • required duration, level of destruction, size of area

EXAMPLE

DESERT STORM. Stealth applications and precision targeting and munitions are becoming more important because they tend to reduce casualties and collateral damage.

Deception

• Keeping your intentions from your opponents while exploiting their intentions
  • used at strategic, operational, and tactical levels --employs active or passive means

EXAMPLE

Allied deception activities planned and executed in support of the Normandy invasion.

Measures of Merit

• Knowing when you have succeeded or failed.
  • based upon objectives
  • need to identify concrete indicators upon which to base your measurements
    

EXAMPLE

One of the first goals of the DESERT STORM air war was to knock out the Iraqi capital's electrical power. The lights going out in Baghdad on live television served as a good measure that we had achieved our desired effect.

502.13 Understand the relationship between the concepts of Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA) and Military Technical Revolutions(MTR) (Krepinevich reading)

While Krepinevich only uses the term "Military Technical Revolution" to describe his concept, it is useful to distinguish between the "instigating forces" which drive the incorporation of new technologies into military systems. We will therefore add the term "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) to our lexicon. While numerous references will only refer to MTRs, we use that term only in discussing REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY RESULTING FROM THE DIRECT APPLICATION OR MODIFICATION OF TECHNOLOGY ORIGINALLY DESIGNED FOR NON-MILITARY PURPOSES. The term RMA, on the other hand, will be used to refer to REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY RESULTING FROM THE APPLICATION OF TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPED IN RESPONSE TO A PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED MILITARY NEED. A simple way to think of this distinction is as follows: In MTRs, technology inspires military application; in RMAs military requirements inspire technological development.

Typically, four elements comprise both MTR and RMA. These are:

1. New science / technology
2. Application of that technology in a device of military utility
3. Tactics and or operational concepts that best exploit that device
4. Organizations that facilitate that exploitation
   

An Example of a MTR/RMA is provided below:

1. Science/Technology -- Wright Brothers' "Flyer"

The combination of the internal combustion engine , advanced aerodynamics, and external catapults resulted in a properly designed, manned, heavier than air machine which flew under its own power.

2. Application -- Reconnaissance and Air Interdiction

The Wright brothers toured Europe in 1909 and licensed manufacture of their aircraft to an Italian company, which in turn sold aircraft to the Italian Army. These aircraft were employed in the Italo-Turkish War of 1912 where they supported the Army by providing aerial reconnaissance. On their forth mission, they dropped grenades on Turkish positions in the first air interdiction mission. European nations looked on and recognized the military potential of the airpower.

3. New tactics/operational concept - Counter Air, Interdiction, Strategic Bombing

By 1916, the concepts of air superiority and interdiction were developed along with the tactics to execute them. By 1918, the concepts and tactics associated with close air support, and massed aerial operations had also matured. At the close of W.W.I, most of the major roles currently executed by the USAF had been developed along with their associated tactics. During the interwar years many people developed predictive theories on the use of Air Forces. Building on these predictive theories, the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) specifically developed the "industrial web" concept in support of strategic bombardment. The ideas of three highly influential "air pioneers" and the ACTS will be studied in TH 508.

4. Organizational impacts - Establishment of Independent Air Forces

The USAAF was given partial autonomy over the employment of US Army Air Forces in 1935 with the establishment of GHQ AF and full operational autonomy in 1942 after the Operation TORCH debacle in North Africa. After 1942, independent air operations resulted in significant improvements in the employment of airpower at the strategic and operational levels. Strategic bombardment took the war to the enemy's heartland, and while continuing to provide support to major ground operations.