TH 503 DISCUSSION.
TH 501 emphasized the value of a comprehensive, dynamic body of military thought as a
tool improve one's decision-making ability and as a foundation for employing the critical
analysis process which is critical to the evolution of the way we think about war. It
remains logical, however, to question the relevance of studying three seemingly antiquated
approaches to war, one of which was formulated over 2000 years ago, when our primary
concern is understanding, planning, and executing warfare in the 21st century.
LOQ. In the previous lesson, the importance of understanding the influence of
contextual elements on military campaigns or the development of theoretical concepts was
stressed. What were the main factors influencing the classical theorists' views of war?
DISCUSSION. All three theorists wrote during periods of revolutionary change.
(Howard would perhaps call them "paradigm shifts"; Krepinevich might note the
presence of RMAs or MTRs.) In Sun Tzu's day, China was slowly transforming itself from an
area composed of numerous feudal fiefdoms to one consisting of a handful of more powerful
"states". The size and resources of these new states permitted them to raise,
train, and equip standing armies led not by feudal lords, but by professional military men
with similar concerns and strategies. Sun Tzu attempted to address their common concerns
in his writings.
Clausewitz and Jomini were presented with a similar situation in early 19th century
Europe. Political revolutions spurred a rise in nationalism which changed the character of
war. Up to that time, war had traditionally been a limited enterprise only affecting the
rulers or aristocracy and their relatively small forces of retainers and mercenaries. The
Napoleonic Era began the transformation towards near total wars in which the emotions and
resources of the entire nation were involved. This political revolution, combined with a
concurrent industrial revolution which permitted the mass production of goods, resulted in
a military revolutionary as well. A primary characteristic of this military revolution was
the formation of huge, conscript armies (the "nation in arms" or levee en
masse) fueled by nationalist spirit and supported by an industrial base which
permitted it to conduct sustained operations over greater distances than ever before.
Large armies were only one aspect of the military revolution. The sheer size of these
armies dictated a larger, more professional, merit-based officer corps be formed to train
and lead them in battle. Napoleon was the first to recognize and properly harness the
force generated by these three simultaneous revolutions. Clausewitz and Jomini sought to
analyze his success, and develop new ways of thinking about the proper conduct of war and
its relationship to policy.
LOQ. What is it about the theories of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini that makes
them relevant today?
DISCUSSION. Collectively, the ideas of the classical theorists provide a comprehensive study of warfare. They address critical issues such as the relationship between politics and warfare, the intricacy of strategy, the levels of war, its psychological and physical dimensions, and operational concepts. No less importantly they provide students of warfare with a basic taxonomy with which to discuss its complexities. Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini were all concerned about reducing the chaos and complexity surrounding the study of war. In comparing the essence of their theories we can, perhaps, identify those aspects of war which are of timeless and constitute the core of subsequent theories of war.
LOQ. How did Sun Tzu, Jomini, and Clausewitz treat the relationship between
political policy and war?
DISCUSSION. They all recognized that politics and war were inextricably linked. But each recognized that while political concerns drove the decision to engage in war and in a large measure dictated its objectives, the planning and execution of combat operations had to be accomplished by military professionals unfettered by rulers or politicians untrained in the military arts.
In his five fundamental factors affecting warfare, Sun Tzu included the moral influence
that a just, righteous ruler has on his people and his troops. In doing so, he recognized
that when the sovereign exerts a positive moral influence on his people, a unity of
purpose is achieved which is essential to the successful prosecution of wars. He was
adamant, though, that this unity of purpose would be of little use if a ruler was
unschooled in the art of war yet insisted on controlling military operations. Sun Tzu also
recognized that warfare was often conducted by alliances and coalitions whose moral unity
might be vulnerable to disruption.
Like Sun Tzu, Jomini also recognized the role of statesmen in deciding to go to war, establishing national objectives, and marshaling popular support for the effort. Jomini, too, cautioned against rulers or politicians meddling in military operations, saying that "a general whose genius and hands are tied by an Aulic council five hundred miles distant cannot be a match for one who has liberty of action, other things being equal." He also understood that political and moral factors could influence military results, though he devoted relatively little time to their discussion because their influence could not be analyzed scientifically.
Clausewitz is best known for positing that war is an extension of political policy. War
is but one means to achieve (or contribute to the achievement of) the desired political
endstate. Similar to the other two theorists, Clausewitz believed that the political
leadership was responsible for determining national objectives and deciding whether the
military was an appropriate tool (means) to accomplish those objectives (ends). Clausewitz
believed that politicians shared responsibility (with the military leadership) for
ensuring that military operations remained consistent with national objectives. Clausewitz
echoed Sun Tzu and Jomini in his belief that the planning and conduct of military
operations was best left to professional soldiers..
FUQ. Recent conflicts suggest that wars in the 21st century may fail to conform to
the nation-on-nation model which was typical of the warfare observed by the classical
theorists. Will their views concerning war's relationship to policy continue to have
relevance in such non-traditional wars?
DISCUSSION. Some may argue that in situations involving tribal or ethnic hatred,
war is a socio-cultural phenomenon totally dissociated from politics. Yet, the survival of
one's culture is inherently a political objective. Colonel John Warden has argued that no
matter what "system" are involved in warfare, every bomb is a political bomb. In
other words, it is impossible to employ military force without political consequences.
Col. Warden's "systems approach" will be discussed in TH 511.
FUQ. Although Sun Tzu and Jomini did not actually use the term "center of
gravity," they recognized, along with Clausewitz, the existence of certain
"hub[s] of power and movement upon which everything depends". What did these
three theorists consider to be important centers of gravity?
DISCUSSION. Sun Tzu's centers of gravity were the enemy's strategy, his allies,
his army, and-as a last resort-his cities. He recognized that the key was to dominate the
center of gravity by maneuvering in such a way as to place the enemy at a decisive
disadvantage. This would either preclude the need to fight, or ensure decisive, relatively
low cost victory if combat occurred. For Sun Tzu, an enemy's weakest point, not his
strongest, was his center of gravity.
Jomini's fundamental principle of throwing the mass of his forces against the decisive
points in the theater of operations is related to the concept of center of gravity. From a
strictly military standpoint, points were judged to be potentially decisive if they
dominated key terrain (e.g. a river, a valley, a fortress, a capital) or were key to the
scheme of maneuver (e.g. flanks for armies on the offensive; the object being defended for
armies on the defensive). However, in the Mendell translation of The Summary....,
Jomini stated that "another class of decisive points … are determined more from
political than from strategic considerations: They play a great part in most coalitions,
and influence the operations and plans of cabinets. They may be called political objective
points." He goes on to say "in most campaigns some military enterprises are
undertaken to carry out a political end, sometimes quite important, but often very
irrational. They frequently lead to the commission of great errors in strategy."
Jomini concludes that "either the political objective points should be selected
according to the principles of strategy, or their consideration should be postponed till
after the decisive events of the campaign."
For the most part, Clausewitz allowed the context of the war to determine the center of
gravity. In keeping with his 19th century perspective, he believed that the center of
gravity was most likely to be the enemy's army, capital, or leaders, depending on the
nature of the conflict. The difference between a Jominian decisive point and a
Clausewitzian center of gravity can be illustrated in this way: It might be possible to
gain access to a Clausewitzian center of gravity through a successfully attacking a
Jominian decisive point.
Although all three theorists had definite views concerning the focus of military
operations, the important thing is not what they would attack, but why. Sun Tzu's
hierarchy of offensive strategies, Jomini's decisive points, and Clauswitz's centers of
gravity are important in that in their own ways they focus on achieving specific effects
which contribute to attainment of previously determined political objectives.
FUQ. What do Sun Tzu's hierarchy of strategy, Clausewitz's concept of center of
gravity, and Jomini's "fundamental principle" suggest about their views
concerning defensive and offensive warfare?
DISCUSSION. While Sun Tzu's hierarchy and Clausewitz's concept of center of
gravity can address all levels of warfare (e.g. strategic, operational, and tactical) and
Jomini's fundamental principle has an operational or tactical focus, all recognize the
importance of initiative. Exercise of initiative is inherent only to the offensive (or
Jomini's "active defensive").
FUQ. How do these three theories account for the role of psychological forces in
warfare?
DISCUSSION. Sun Tzu's whole approach to war focused on creating a psychological
imbalance within the enemy by attacking his strategy using deception and surprise. The
effects achieved through this psychological imbalance will disrupt the psychological
stability provided by a righteous ruler with a moral purpose.
Like Jomini and Clausewitz, Sun Tzu offered a psychological profiles of the good and
bad commander. He contrasted the five virtues of a commander (wisdom, sincerity, humanity,
courage, strictness) with five dangerous qualities (recklessness, cowardice,
hot-headedness, pride, compassion).
In describing war as a great drama, Jomini acknowledged the role that moral forces and
natural genius play in it. He also recognized that some types of conflict release
psychological forces which defy the principles of warfare he sought to establish. Jomini
believed that "Peoples' wars" (civil wars) and "wars of opinion" (e.g.
religious or ethnic wars) were so passion-filled that otherwise useful principles of war
did not apply. Jomini believed that such wars could only be resolved through exhaustion
over time.
Like Sun Tzu, Jomini discussed the psychological make-up of a good commander. Jomini
believed that great captains could dominate the outcome of warfare through intellect and
force of will (his example, after all, was Napoleon Bonaparte). He also emphasized the
importance of such qualities as high moral and physical courage, firmness, and the ability
to properly judge character. This latter skill permitted the commander to recognize and
exploit superior capabilities in subordinates while compensating for their weaknesses.
Clausewitz was also keenly aware of the psychological forces present in war. He
recognized that success in warfare depended upon the commander's ability to overcome fog,
friction, and chance as well as the fear borne of extreme violence. He emphasized that
warfare involved a continuous, complex interaction of opposing forces driven by diverse
and sometimes irrational motivations. While like Jomini he recognized that psychological
forces are not easily measured or predictable, Clausewitz made a convincing case that if a
commander ignores such forces, he dismisses a dominant factor which shapes the outcome of
battle.
FUQ. In our modern conception of warfare, do we tend to emphasize psychological or
material forces? Where should the emphasis be?
DISCUSSION. Some may argue, as Russell Weigley does in The American Way of
War, that the US military is most comfortable using its overwhelming material force to
achieve victory through the annihilation of the enemy. However, considering the increasing
role our armed forces are assuming in military operations other than war (MOOTW), and the
likelihood that our involvement in hostilities will be of a more limited nature than that
for which we prepared prior to the dissolution of Soviet Union, we may well find ourselves
depending more on psychological measures. In a certain sense, overwhelming material force
has a psychological force all its own, but it is unlikely that the ongoing drawdown of our
force structure and the limited nature of future wars will allow us to rely on the
physical (and psychological) effects created by sheer numbers.
LOQ. Based on your interpretation of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and Clausewitz, what
inferences can you draw about the role of information in warfare?
DISCUSSION. The importance of intelligence is thoroughly woven into every
aspect of Sun Tzu's theory of war. Successful implementation of any of his hierarchy of
strategies depends upon a thorough understanding of one's opponent. One can posses such an
understanding only if thoroughly informed. The importance Sun Tzu attached to information
gathering at the what we now refer to as the strategic, operational, and tactical levels
is reflected in his lengthy discussion on the advantages gained through the proper
employment of spies. No less important to Sun Tzu was a comprehensive knowledge of one's
own capabilities and limitations. Sun Tzu's feelings on the importance of information and
the intelligence that it produces was concisely illustrated in his observation that if one
knows both himself and his enemy he will always be victorious; if one lacks
knowledge of either himself or his enemy he may be defeated; if one has
insufficient understanding of both himself and his enemy he will be defeated.
Jomini attached similar importance to the role of information, though his focus again
is more at the operational and tactical levels. He stated that "nothing should be
neglected to acquire a knowledge of the geography and the military statistics of other
states, so as to know their material and moral capacity for attack and defense as well as
the strategic advantages of the two parties." It is easy to see how intelligence
borne of detailed information is necessary if one is to be able to employ Jomini's
fundamental principle of warfare and mass force at the decisive point at the proper time.
Clausewitz's views regarding the importance of information and intelligence were so
ambiguous that some critics assert that he did not recognize their importance. Clausewitz
did not dismiss intelligence out of hand. He did, however, recognize that information and
intelligence are always imperfect and can therefore just as easily contribute to fog and
friction as alleviate it. Clausewitz stressed that a critical feature of military
"genius" was the ability of the commander to not allow himself to be swayed from
his course or paralyzed to the point inaction by the inevitable tidal wave of
often-conflicting information.
FUQ. How does modern technology affect how we view these theorists' conclusions
regarding the role of information?
DISCUSSION. When Sun Tzu, Jomini, and Clausewitz wrote their theories, information and intelligence gathering was essentially limited to forms of human observation. Occupying the high ground, sending out reconnaissance patrols, and using espionage were the primary means of gathering information and intelligence. Despite these limitations, Clausewitz was concerned that the volume of possibly conflicting information would adversely affect a commander's decision making ability.
We have entered an age where information technology dominates war planning and
execution. The "information overload" which Clausewitz recognized nearly two
hundred years ago remains a major obstacle to decision making at every level. The
challenge is to properly tailor our intelligence gathering and dissemination techniques to
provide the commanders with timely, useful, intelligence.
Thorough study of the ideas contained in The Art of War, On War, and The Summary of the Art of War reveals inconsistencies in the way the three classical theorists view certain aspects of warfare. Because Clausewitz and Jomini both developed their theories based upon their experiences in the Napoleonic Wars, their differences of opinion are particularly noted by critics. Many of the inconsistencies between the three theorists can be explained by differing contexts in which they wrote, others still by the levels of warfare (strategic, operational, or tactical) which they emphasized in their analyses. The remarkable thing about these theorists is not that they sometimes appear to disagree on particulars, but that they tend to agree on the larger concepts concerning war which must be explored, and so often reach similar conclusions with respect to those concepts. These areas of agreement constitute the foundation upon which all our subsequent theories of war are based. The influence of the ideas of the classical theorists will be apparent in subsequently developed air, sea, and ground warfare theories which will be studied in later lessons.