TH 506 DISCUSSION.
The classical theorists we studied in TH 503 based their concepts almost exclusively
upon their study of and experience in ground combat. Jomini alone mentions the joint
employment of air or naval assets in very brief discussions of aerial observation via hot
air balloon and "ascents" (what we refer to as amphibious operations) in his Summary....
While their narrow perspective is unfortunate in hindsight, their concepts did, in fact,
provide a useful foundation upon which modern sea and air and space power theorists built
their respective theories. Foremost among the sea power theorists are Alfred Thayer Mahan
of the United States and Julian Corbett of Great Britain.
Prior to assessing Mahan's and Corbett's theories it is important to understand their
motivations for writing. The tone and content of their works are strongly influenced by
these motivations. Mahan was forced to be a sea power advocate. He addressed his theory of
sea power as reflected in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History.... to an America
which he believed was ignorant of the tremendous benefits which it could derive from the
development of its sea power potential. He therefore spent a great deal of energy
explaining the how sea power contributed to national power and buttressing his contentions
with historical examples. As a subject of the world's premier sea power, Julian Corbett
did not have to win over a skeptical country. He therefore was able to focus his sea power
theory (best recounted in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy) not on whether sea
power and a navy were critical to national power, but on how sea power (particularly naval
power) should be employed.
In discussing Mahan's and Corbett's ideas concerning the employment of sea and naval
power, it is important to the understand the conditions Mahan believed must exist if a
nation was to become a sea power. Those conditions are: geographic position, physical
conformation, extent of territory, population, national character, and the character of
government.
LOQ. In what ways did the United States not fully satisfy Mahan's six conditions at
the time of his writing (1889)?
DISCUSSION. Application of Mahan's own criteria to the US in the latter years of
the 19th century suggests that he would have to be an extremely persuasive advocate if the
US was to develop into a true sea power in the British mold. In Mahan's view, the geographic
position of the US was generally favorable, but was not ideal. While generally
isolated from foreign attack, the US had lengthy land borders which theoretically required
defense, and could therefore not focus exclusively on coastal defense and a navy as
England could. The US's extent of territory also presented some problems. Mahan
recognized that the length of a country's coastline could be either a strength or weakness
depending upon the density of the population living along it. The US coastline was
incredibly long and its population relatively sparse (particularly so when Alaska is
considered along with the continental US). This made adequate coastal defense virtually
impossible. The US was also lacking in population. Mahan used this term to
encompass both a nation's ability to defend itself from attack from the sea as well as its
ability to mobilize undeveloped sea power capabilities if required to reinforce its
existing merchant shipping and navy. The latter was primarily dependent upon shipping and
related industries, and Mahan recognized that the United States' vast natural resources
had allowed its citizens to largely disregard their development. The country's natural
wealth also made the US's character of government less receptive to the development
of sea power to broaden its trade base.
LOQ. How do Mahan's and Corbett's views on this subject differ?
DISCUSSION. Mahan defined command of the sea in strictly military terms. He
believed that to command the sea entailed total naval supremacy. It was only achieved when
hostile navies were decisively defeated or driven from the seas. Corbett defined command
of the sea in terms of access. He believed that command of the sea was simply the ability
to ensure unhindered use of the world's shipping lanes and deny that same freedom of
navigation to the enemy if necessary. In Corbett's view, there was no requirement to
engage in naval combat provided freedom of navigation was not threatened. Applying a
Clausewitzian term, Mahan believed the centers of gravity with respect to obtaining and
maintaining command of the sea were opposing fleets whereas Corbett identified sea lines
of communications as the sole center of gravity.
LOQ. Mahan (called by some "the Jomini of the Sea") spoke in terms
reminiscent of that classical theorist when he spoke of the importance of strategic points
and interior lines. How did Mahan define these terms and how were they important to his
theory of sea power?
DISCUSSION. There is no difference in the way Mahan and Jomini defined the
concept of interior lines. In both cases, it involved positioning a friendly military
force between possible opposing forces. Achieving this central position would allow the
friendly force to maneuver rapidly and securely to engage one or the other force along
shorter lines of communications than the divided forces would have to use to communicate
with one another.
Jominian decisive points and Mahanian strategic points are distinct but related
concepts. Jominian decisive points were those points against which force could be massed
to attain military objectives, whereas Mahanian strategic points were those areas on the
globe whose domination permitted control of the sea lanes. An example of a decisive point
would be an enemy flank or rear area. Gibralter would be an example of a strategic point.
It is possible, however, that a point could at once be strategic and decisive.
FUQ. How did Corbett and Mahan differ in their views on the proper roles for naval
forces?
DISCUSSION. Corbett generally took a more expansive view of the role of the navy
than did Mahan. Corbett believed that in addition to engaging in decisive battles at sea,
naval forces could be employed to good effect to blockade enemy coastlines, as convoy
security, to conduct limited operations against enemy shipping (guerre de course),
and to project power by transporting troops to the area of operations. Mahan's focus on
decisive battle at sea theoretically precluded dividing the fleet assets for those types
of missions. Similar differing views on roles will be apparent when we examine the ideas
of the air pioneers in TH 508.
FUQ. Is the navy an offensive or defensive tool?
DISCUSSION. Mahan believed in using the navy exclusively as an offensive tool to
gain command of the sea. Corbett agreed that the navy was best used offensively, but
recognized that it could also be used in limited defensive actions to dispute an enemy's
attempt to secure command of the sea. Critical to Corbett's theory was the idea of
maintaining a "fleet in being". Given that Corbett viewed the primary role of
the navy being to ensure sea lines of communications remain open, fleets must avoid
decisive battle except when both victory and fleet survival is assured.
FUQ. Could naval power be decisive?
DISCUSSION. Mahan was adamant that naval power alone could win a war involving
an enemy with significant sea trade by securing command of the sea and reducing the
enemy's country via economic blockade. Corbett believed that naval power made significant
contributions to military victory (thru exercising the roles mentioned above), but that
the joint efforts of naval and ground forces were also required. Again, the air pioneers
would differ on the same point.
LOQ. Some critics believe the world-wide popularity of Mahan's work contributed to
the surge in imperialism prior to World War I. What aspects of Mahan's theory of sea power
support this view?
DISCUSSION. Much of Mahan's argument in favor of developing sea power (naval
power, merchant shipping, and related industries) was based upon colonial trade. He
believed that truly great powers required colonies to serve as sources of cheap raw
materials and easily controlled markets for finished products. Mahan's work was popular in
countries heavily involved in colonial expansion at the outset of the 20th century such as
Germany and Japan, but establishing a direct cause-effect relationship would be difficult.
FUQ. What impact did Mahan's and Corbett's ideas have on naval operations in
subsequent wars?
DISCUSSION. Their ideas influenced both the compositions and employment of
navies at the dawn of the 20th century. Mahan's emphasis on winning the decisive battle
provided incentive for technological developments which produced the heavily armed and
heavily armored dreadnought class ship which dominated the seas during the First World
War. Readily adopting Mahan's belief in the decisive naval battle, admirals have since
sought to keep their fleets concentrated until they could engage in fully-pitched battles.
The naval battles at Tsushima Straights during the Russo-Japanese War, Jutland in W.W.I,
and Leyte Gulf in W.W.II. are examples of potentially decisive 20th century naval battles.
Corbett's influence is apparent in the use of naval blockades and commerce raiding. The most notable example of both is the German's use of submarines in attempts to blockade England during W.W.I and W.W.II, and their engage in guerre du course and limited naval engagements in both wars.
Mahan's and Corbett's sea power theories were heavily influenced by classical theory concepts. Applying these concepts to the sea medium, the two fundamentally altered the way sea power was subsequently developed and employed world-wide. Their influence also extended beyond their medium. J.F.C. Fuller incorporated some of Mahan's ideas as he developed his theory of armored warfare. His theory will be discussed in the next lesson. Air and space theorists have also benefited from sea power concepts. They have recognized that the sea, air, and space mediums are fundamentally similar and can be commanded or controlled in similar ways. Air and space power theories will be examined in TH 508 and TH 511.