TH 507 INTERWAR LAND WARFARE THOUGHT:

TH 507 INTERWAR LAND WARFARE THOUGHT:
ARMOR/MECHANIZED AND BLITZKRIEG THEORIES

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

507.1 Comprehend how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war. [I.3 (b)]

507.11 Summarize the impact of contextual and operational art elements on the development and acceptance of Fullers and Liddell Harts armor/mechanized theories, and Guderians blitzkrieg theory.

Contextual and operational art factors influenced and constrained the development of British armor theory.

According to House (this material was not included in your readings), the following six factors affected all the worlds nations in the interwar period (1918-1939).

1. General revulsion against warfare and all things military.
2. Extremely tight defense budgets for the 15 years following W.W.I.
3. Rapidly changing technology, which made governments unwilling to invest in weapons that would become obsolete soon after development due to further technological developments.
4. Confusion regarding terminology used for this new technology.
5. Extremism and lack of consistency among advocates of new technology.
6. Opposition to new technology and tactics from the traditional arms of the military.

House goes on to give specific British obstacles to the development of armor theory. These included:

1. Traditionalism within the British Army, which discouraged radical changes to doctrine.
2. Lack of interest by the newly independent Royal Air Force in anything but strategic bombing and interdiction, resulting in a lack of ground support doctrine development.
3. Traditional defense needs of the British empire, which required large numbers of infantry soldiers for low intensity, police type actions instead of conventional warfare.

In discussing the Labor government that came to power in the early 1930s in Britain, Baucom states, "The "pacifist idealism" of this government, combined with the economic slump that began in 1929, ensured there would be no large-scale mechanization of the British army." (Baucoms comment was not included in your readings.)

The change in the art of war effected by the introduction of the petrol engine on the battlefield has been stupendous, for it has opened a new epoch in the history of war to which we can find no parallel in land fighting, the nearest approach being the replacement of sails by steam as the motive means in naval warfare. [Messenger. doc]

Contextual and operational art factors facing Germany in W.W.II that prevented Guderians ideas from being translated into practice

Economics: The House article reveals that the German economy, constrained by its raw materials base, was never able to provide the numbers of tanks and vehicles that Guderians totally mechanized army would require. He himself notes how few motor vehicles Germany produced compared to the US. As a result, the German army of World War II was essentially a World War I infantry army, with horse drawn transportation and logistics. It had only a few armored and mechanized formations (only about 13 percent of the army was motorized in 1939, and only 6 percent was armored). (The Change in the European Balance of Power)

Technology: Guderian gave specific characteristics for the various types of tanks Germany would require. In practice, German tank development lagged behind his requirements. Most of the tanks in the inventory in 1939 were Panzer I and IIs. The Pz I was never really intended to be a combat vehicle; it weighed only 6 tons and was designed for training and had only machine guns for armament. Guderian wanted capable medium tanks, with greater speed, armor protection, and firepower. Tanks fitting this description, the Panzer III and IV, did not appear until 1938-1939, and in small numbers at first. Many German divisions in Poland, France and the USSR were accordingly equipped with captured Czech Model 38 tanks. The awesome Panther and Tiger tanks did not appear until 1943, and then in quite small numbers (only 484 examples of the 68-ton King Tiger tank, one of the most formidable armored vehicles of the war, were built).

Hitler: was personally concerned with the question of armor technology. One of the major reasons for the failure of the Kursk offensive in July 1943 was Hitler's insistence upon waiting for further deliveries of the latest Panther and Tiger I tanks. This delayed the operation by at least two months, squandered the element of surprise, and allowed the Soviets to complete elaborate defensive preparations which thwarted the German breakthrough attempt. Moreover, the temperamental new tank designs broke down in large numbers, leaving the elderly Panzer IV to bear the brunt of the armored battle.

Interservice Rivalry: This was also brought out in the House article. With resources scarce, a fierce battle took place between the various services for allocations. The "ideologically reliable" Luftwaffe frequently won out, leaving scant resources for the panzer force.

Overall German Objectives: Hitler's national security agenda eventually overtaxed the resources of all branches of the German military. Even the successful panzer drives into the Soviet Union were just operational victories on a grand scale--they were swallowed up in the huge Russian spaces, in effect dispersing their combat power over too wide an area.

507.2 Comprehend the main elements of armor/mechanized warfare theory as developed in Britain during the interwar years by J.F.C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart.

507.21 Explain Fullers and Liddell Harts theories of armored warfare

The main points of J. F. C. Fullers armored/mechanized theories

A British Officer in the British Tank Corps. Fuller devised the British plan for the first large scale (400) tank battle at Cambrai in Nov 1917. This summary of Fullers ideas is taken from the Baucom article (not part of your readings): "Fast moving tanks", working with aircraft, would attack the enemy's brain--his command structure--to create chaos and "strategic paralysis" prior to the main assault. The heart of the attack would be a force of heavy tanks, supported by artillery and accompanied by infantry to hold the ground the tanks captured. Once the main attack achieved a breakthrough or breakthroughs, a relentless pursuit by fast tanks, cavalry, and motorized infantry would follow until the enemy surrendered."

According to Messenger, Fuller asserted the tank would replace infantry and cavalry, and artillery would have to develop into a type of tank. The infantry would be used to occupy ground and protect lines of communication. Fuller added that infantry soldiers could become offensive weapons only if they traveled in armored personnel carriers, acting as "land marines". Fuller recommended creating a "new model division" centered on cooperation between infantry, artillery, cavalry and tanks. Tanks would be used to form an independent spearhead.

In the simplest terms Fuller envisaged armored mechanized armies which had the inherent capability, supported by aircraft and artillery, to breach a fortified line and then achieve deep penetration of enemy territory, mopping up the forward artillery zones, knocking out headquarters, capturing supply dumps, cutting communications, and generally causing such damage and confusion amid the least well-defended parts of the enemy hinterland that a total collapse of morale, command and control, and resistance can be expected. [Landry.doc]

The main points of Liddell Harts armored/mechanized theories

Liddell Hart participated in World War I and left the British Army due to wounds suffered during the war. He later became a military correspondent for The Daily Telegraph. B. H. Liddell Harts theory of mechanized warfare was essentially his strategy of the indirect approach applied at the operational level. The fundamental tenets of the strategy of the indirect approach are: (from Chaliand, ed., The Art of War in World History, From Antiquity To The Nuclear Age, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA 1994)

- The purpose of strategy is to diminish the possibility of resistance through dislocation of the enemy either physically or psychologically.
- Strategy produces such dislocation by exploiting movement and surprise.
- Physical movement should take the line of least resistance; psychological movement should take the line of least expectation.
- The perfection of strategy would be to produce a decision without any serious fighting. Battle is only one means to the end of strategy."

The following is taken from the Baucom article (not part of your reading): Liddell Hart "...believed that modern armies should be attacked at their weakest points and that instead of reinforcing an attack where it encountered the stiffest opposition, reinforcements should go to those points where the greatest success was being achieved. The idea was to push the attack to the greatest possible depth to create the greatest amount of chaos: the greater the depth of the penetration, "the greater the psychological effect on the enemy, the greater the confusion, and the more rapid his collapse." According to Baucom, Harts "...idea eventually became known as his "Expanding Torrent" concept."

According to Messenger, Liddell Hart advocated a combined arms approach using composite aircraft, tank, artillery and infantry formations. The Messenger article contains more detail on Harts theory and theory development.

507.22 Discuss their key similarities and differences.

How did they agree in their theories?

From Messengers article, both men believed armored forces could be used to strike a decisive blow against enemy communication and command centers. Again, from Baucom (not included in your readings), "Fuller and Liddell Hart, independent of each other, had come to the conclusion that the key to success on the modern battlefield was to paralyze ones opponent rather than bludgeon him to death with a series of costly attacks." Baucom continues to say "After being exposed to Fullers ideas on armor, Liddell Hart also came to see mechanized forces as the key to the new concept of "brain warfare."

According to Baucom, "Fuller and Liddell differed very little on the use of aircraft. Both men followed Douhet in seeing the plane as the key to destroying the enemy's will to fight and advocated simultaneous attacks on population centers to weaken resistance. They also considered close cooperation between armor and tactical air crucial."

How do they differ in their theories?

Fuller:
According to Baucom (not included in your readings): "Fuller seemed to favor mechanized attacks that would work closer to the enemy's line of defense, for he believed the enemy's brain was only about 20 miles to the rear of the front line. Although he envisioned deep thrusts in pursuit of a collapsing enemy army, the mechanized knives would turn parallel to the defensive lines to cut up the enemy army once a penetration of 20 miles had been achieved.

Liddell Harts:
According to Baucom: Liddell Hart's contribution was to remove the limits imposed by Fullers thinking and turn armor penetrations into an "expanding torrent". Liddell Hart believed the fast tank that appeared in W.W.I would be "...the main force of the Expanding Torrent." Use the same chassis to carry infantry, artillery, and supplies.; link the air arm to the movements of these vehicles; use parachute drops, radio, every modern aid; and the Expanding Torrent, moving 20 miles per hour across country, diverging here, converging there, would be too much for any conventional army to stop. Its scope was illimitable."

While both theorists agreed that infantry could only be useful on the modern battlefield if they were motorized or mechanized, they differed in the role for infantry.

"For Fuller, the only real role for infantry was to follow up the success of armored forces by occupying the ground taken by tanks. [Baucom]

Liddell Hart, on the other hand, believed that motorized or mechanized infantry possessed offensive power in its own right and could be used to attack objectives independently of armored forces. [Baucom]

507.3 Comprehend the main elements of Guderian's Blitzkrieg theory.

507.31 Explain how blitzkrieg differed from the armor/mechanized theory advocated by Fuller and Liddell Hart.

What is the definition of "blitzkrieg"?

From the Muller article, "The term "blitzkrieg" refers to an operational combined-arms concept that emphasized aggressive use of independent armored and mechanized formations, trained in rapid exploitation, assisted by lavish use of tactical aviation, in effecting breakthroughs and encirclements. The term itself, however, was a creation of the foreign press; the Germans did not refer to blitzkrieg until the war was well underway. German armor theorists referred simply to mobile warfare, armored troops, or fast troops when discussing this type of armored warfare."

Literally, blitzkrieg means "lightning warfare." The actual term was coined by the foreign press (some sources say the Italian newspapers, others credit Time magazine). In many of its elements, the concept behind blitzkrieg is very similar to the US Army's Air-Land Battle doctrine.

What was Guderian's theory of mobile warfare?

According to Muller, "Guderian was actually more important as a refiner and perfector of German armored doctrine, rather than its creator." What's important here isn't to determine who actually developed blitzkrieg, but to study both the process of turning theory into practice and the circumstances (contextual and operational art elements) that allowed this to happen.

"The keys to Guderian's doctrine of armored warfare were, first, combined arms centered about the tank and, second, speed and audacity in the employment of this force. Recognizing that in modern war the brain of an army (its command and control centers) was more vulnerable than its body (the bulk of its troops), Guderian sought to paralyze the enemy's brain without having to destroy his body. As interpreted by J. F. C. Fuller, inadvertently one of Guderian's mentors, "the secret of Guderian's Blitzkrieg" was, after breaking through the enemy's front lines, to employ mobility as a psychological weapon; not to kill but to move,</E> to move [in order to terrify], to bewilder, to perplex, to cause consternation, doubt, and confusion in the rear of the enemy, which rumor would magnify until panic became monstrous. In short, its aim was to paralyze not only the enemy's command but also his government, and paralyzation would be in direct proportion to velocity. " [Baucom]

Note: The following information is not contained in the supporting essays. It is taken from, Achtung Panzer! written in 1937 by Major General Heinz Guderian.

Because of his personal experience with positional warfare along the Western Front during W.W.I, General Heinz Guderian sought to develop new methods of waging offensive warfare. Guderian believed that modern weaponry and positional warfare made unsupported infantry incapable of successfully functioning offensively in modern war. (p 35)

His historical analysis of World War I, especially the use of allied tanks, helped Guderian develop his mechanized warfare theory. He argued that World War I demonstrated the primacy of the defensive, but that two new weapons the aircraft and the tank, were primarily offensive, and together could represent revolutionary change. (p 200) Note: Clausewitz spoke of the relationship between the attack and the defense, but stated that their relative strengths were situation-specific. Guderian was prescient enough to realize that a shift in the relative strengths of the two was underway.

Guderian envisioned that the armored forces would be composed of three branches: armored and motorized reconnaissance, antitank, and tank units. Tanks would compose the bulk of the offensive striking power of the new army. Guderian envisioned three types of tanks: infantry support vehicles, tanks able to force a breakthrough of the enemy's defenses (the most important category), and very heavy "fortress-storming" tanks. (pp. 169-170)

Guderian felt the tank force must be a separate branch of the army for the revolutionary potential of the new weapon be fully exploited. Tanks "must be employed en masse in both breadth and depth. They strive to exploit tactical success into the operational dimension." (p 170)

Guderian believed that successful tank actions depend upon suitable terrain, surprise, and mass attack in depth. (181) He stated that tanks would have to deal with many threats and obstacles when assaulting a prepared enemy defensive line mines, antitank guns, and enemy tanks. The entire depth of the enemy defense must come under simultaneous attack by air and ground forces. (p 180) Each of the attacking elements would have a clearly defined "combat mission", (p 183) allowing the individual commanders to exercise Auftragstaktik.

What is Auftragstaktik?

A key component of blitzkrieg was the concept of Auftragstaktik, the decentralized, flexible command style known in the US military as commanders intent. This method of battlefield command has enabled smaller forces to defeat much larger ones through a timely ability to seize the initiative and act according to on the spot judgment. At the same time, too much latitude exercised by commanders will on occasion jeopardize strategic planning in favor of immediate battlefield success.

The literal translation of Auftragstaktik is, "Instruction, task or mission tactics" and here the German word Taktik is used very broadly. It does not refer solely to the tactical level of war. Common English renderings are: "mission- or goal-oriented tactics, or commanders intent." In A Genius For War: The German Army and General Staff 1807-1945, Col. T. N. Dupuy defined it as, "The responsibility of each German soldier and noncommissioned officer to do without question or doubt whatever the situation required, as he saw fit.

Guderian stated that aircraft could function as very useful direct and indirect support for mechanized forces. They could provide close fire support or attack targets well behind the front lines. (pp. 195-196) He saw tanks and aircraft as mutually supportive the tanks could drive for the enemys frontier airfields, and bomber and troop transport aircraft could seek out targets beyond the striking range of tanks. (p 207)

507.32 Discuss how blitzkrieg worked in practice during W.W.II.

World War I:
By the end of the World War I in November 1918 the essential ingredients of blitzkrieg were already present on the battlefield. The Germans had contributed the art of infiltration and shock action, although the latter at this stage was in the shape of artillery. The Allies had introduced the tank. Both appreciated the value of psychological dislocation, and each had used the aircraft in the ground support role to a greater or lesser extent. It now remained to be seen as to who would best interpret the experience gained from the war.

World War II: The Blitzkrieg Concept in Practice
The application of German armored doctrine during the German "years of victory" of 1939-1941 validated the hopes of its backers. It also converted many skeptics. Germany launched World War II on 1 September 1939. The Panzer spearheads, with massed air support, punched through the Polish linear defenses in two days and were operating in the clear by the third day effectively, the campaign was over at this point. As a result, many German officers including an infantryman named Erwin Rommel, later known as the Desert Fox became converts to the idea of armored warfare. Even Hitler was amazed at the results. On touring the shattered Polish defenses, Hitler asked Guderian, "Our dive bombers did that?" Guderian replied proudly, "No, our Panzers!".[Muller. doc]

Based on the great success of armor in the Polish campaign, German military planners were willing to give armored breakthrough and exploitation a more central role in the campaign against France, Operation YELLOW, launched on 10 May 1940. Once again, a daring, independent armored thrust through the thinly held Ardennes region this time carried out by independent Panzer Corps attached to army Group A routed the French within six weeks. A central feature of the successful breakout after Sedan was Guderian's refusal to wait for the supporting infantry his armor raced flat-out for the Channel coast without worrying about its flanks, just as he had foretold in his interwar articles. The speed of movement paralyzed the French defenders. Although the French army possessed more and (generally) better tanks than did the Germans, they were utterly unprepared for the speed and tempo of the German breakthrough. 19 As more than one commentator noted, the French were outthought as well as outfought. [Muller.doc]

Operation BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, saw the blitzkrieg concept accepted in full. The entire German plan depended on a swift victory over the USSR within four months. Four independent Panzer groups functioned as the spearheads of the attack they carried out massive encirclement battles that nearly destroyed the Red Army. Of course, the Germans were ultimately defeated in Russia, but the failures were strategic, not operational, and well-led German armored units, schooled in the blitzkrieg concept, remained formidable adversaries to the last weeks of the war, as American veterans of the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944 will attest. [Muller.doc]

The blitzkrieg concept has become the standard method of employing combined arms at the operational level of war. Armies worldwide have adopted the concept in whole and in part. The US Army's AirLand Battle as espoused in the various editions of FM 100-5 owes much to the blitzkrieg concept; Guderian's picture hangs at the Armor School at Fort Knox. For our purposes, the blitzkrieg story serves as an excellent example of theory being translated into workable and useful practice in spite of formidable obstacles. [Muller.doc]

Readings:

1. Excerpts from Towards Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization (House) [HOUSE.DOC]
Jonathan M. Houses 1984 USA CGSC paper addresses the political, economic, social, and technological factors that influenced the development of armored theory in Great Britain from the period before and up to World War II.

2. Excerpts from The Blitzkrieg Story (Messenger) [MESSENGER.DOC]
Messengers 1976 book The Blitzkrieg Story provide an excellent overview of the use of armor in W.W.I to attempt to reintroduce movement into the trench warfare which predominated along the Western Front. It also recaps the key points of Fuller and Liddell Harts theories.

3. "Theory into Practice: The Evolution of Blitzkrieg" (Muller) [MULLER.DOC]
Dr. Richard R. Muller is the Director of the War Theory and Campaign Studies Department at the US Air Force Command and Staff College. His recent article discusses the major contextual factors and historical influences on the development of blitzkrieg "lightning warfare" theory associated with Germany in pre-World War II, and mainly during the war.

4. "Armored Forces" (Guderian) [GUDERIAN.DOC]
The 1947 article is an excellent (but long) first-hand account of the theory of mechanized warfare. Written by Colonel General Heinz Guderian (one of Hitler's principle German Generals), and reprinted from the Infantry Journal Reader of 1947.

5. Excerpts from The Mechanization of Land Warfare: Ideas, Technology, and Weapons (Baucom) [BAUCOM.DOC]
LtCol Donald R. Baucom's 1978 USAFA paper, provides additional information on elements affecting both Germany and Great Britain during the interwar years.

6. Excerpts from Blitzkrieg Masters: Guderian and Patton (Landry) [LANDRY.DOC]
Excerpts from J. Vincent Landry's, US Air Force Command and Staff paper, provide additional information on elements affecting both Germany and Great Britain during the interwar years.

Lesson Outline:

Thesis: At the end of W.W.I, Great Britain was poised to dominate the fields of armored warfare. Britain's use of armor in the Battle of Cambrai, while ultimately only a mixed success, demonstrated how armor could be used to "punch a hole" in fixed defenses. During the interwar years, visionaries such as J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart recognized the inherent capability of armored forces to rupture an enemys battle line, bypass his strong points, and disrupt his leadership and communications. Yet Great Britain never fully embraced these ideas. A variety of contextual factors caused Great Britain to relinquish a potentially decisive military edge in the organization and employment of armored and mechanized forces at the start of World War II.

The Germans, led by Heinz Guderian, modified the idea they so admired and borrowed from their British counterparts to more fully integrate and better synchronize operations of ground and air forces. Their unique product was the operational concept we know as blitzkrieg or "lightning warfare."

Overview: This lesson lets you examine the origins and developments of the blitzkrieg concept. First, you'll look at some basic definitions for our lesson, to include the concept of auftragstaktik. Next, you will examine the various factors that influenced the development of the "armored idea." You will then study Guderian's concepts concerning armored and combined warfare before concluding the lesson by evaluating how well his ideas were translated into practice.

Main Point 1: Based on experiences from the latter stages of W.W.I, J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart pioneered mechanized warfare theory development in Great Britain during the interwar years. While key tenets of their respective theories are quite similar, the debates over their differences precluded the advancement of a unified armor/mechanized theory in Great Britain. In the absence of a single agreed upon theory, the advocates of mechanization could not garner popular support and were effectively suppressed by conservative members of the British military establishment.

Main Point 2: Guderian's blitzkrieg theory was similar to the armor/mechanized theory advanced by Fuller and Liddell Hart, but goes into greater detail with regard to organization and equipment requirements. It also emphasizes centralized control and decentralized execution in keeping with the German army's concept of auftragstaktik.

Main Point 3: Despite very similar experiences during WW I, the interplay of contextual and operational art elements in Britain and Germany following W.W.I resulted in environments which were extremely resistant to change and very receptive to change, respectively.

LESSON INTEGRATION AND RATIONALE:
This lesson provides a complete look at the theory-to-practice process, as well as serves to underscore the importance of contextual elements in the formulation of military theory. It concentrates on the operational art, and provides a means for understanding modern combined arms doctrine.