What W.W.I conditions caused Germany and Britain to develop new weapons like the tank?

TH-507

INTERWAR LAND WARFARE THOUGHT: ARMOUR/MECHANIZED AND BLITZKRIEG THEORIES

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS and Suggested Responses

Note: some of the information contained in these answers is not included in your assigned readings. This extra material is to help clarify the main points of the lessons.

1. What W.W.I conditions caused Germany and Britain to develop new weapons of mobility like the tank?

Recall from the House article, Toward Combined Arms Warfare, that mobility across No Man's Land had become a major obstacle for attacking forces during W.W.I. New weapons like the machine gun and improved artillery virtually eliminated the use of cavalry on the battlefield and gave tremendous advantages to the defender. According to House, "Like all major wars, W.W.I accelerated the development of new technology. Besides changes in artillery and communications, a number of new weapons appeared as the result of efforts to solve the penetration problem. None of these efforts was entirely successful, but they all represented additional weapons or tools to be combined with the traditional arms."

In discussing the tank specifically, House adds: "The tank was originally designed as a special weapon to solve an unusual tactical situation, the stalemate of the trenches. Basically, the tank was intended to bring the firepower of artillery and machine guns across the morass of No Man's Land while providing more protection than a purely infantry unit could carry. The sole purpose of this weapon was to assist the infantry in creating a penetration so that the cavalry, which had been waiting for the opportunity since 1914, could exploit into the German rear."

In the Baucom article, he states (this information was not included in your readings): "By 1917 military leaders began to realize that horse cavalry could not exploit breakthroughs on the Western Front. A mechanical cavalry was needed with the range and speed to perform the traditional function of the man on horseback."

For these reasons, both sides attempted to develop new weapons of mobility during and after W.W.I.

2. How did the Allies use armor in W.W.I?

The House article, Toward Combined Arms Warfare, and the Messenger article, "The Blitzkrieg Story", both give good summaries of the use of tanks during W.W.I. Other information presented here is from the Baucom article (this portion of the article was not included in your readings.)

Tanks first appeared during the Battle of the Somme on 15 September 1916. Although the British achieved complete tactical surprise and some local success using only 49 tanks, mechanical failures, crew fatigue and German artillery prevented the British from achieving significant results. According to Baucom, "Still, the tank had shown great potential for use against entrenched infantry and machine guns."

On 17 November 1917, over 500 British tanks attacked the Germans through the fog at Cambrai. The first day brought some initial success, but the end results were disappointing. Only ten days after the attack at Cambrai, German counterattacks had restored the original front lines, eliminating all gains the British offensive had won. According to Baucom, "Tank losses and crew fatigue only partially explain the failure of the Cambrai offensive. Perhaps the major cause of failure was the doctrine that governed the use of the tank. That doctrine embodied the traditional military view that infantry was queen of battle. Tanks should support the infantry in its efforts to breach the enemy's line." The Battle of Cambrai is also discussed in the Messenger and House articles.

An important point to be learned here is that changes in doctrine may be necessary to fully exploit new technological advances on the battlefield.

During the spring of 1918, British tanks were used defensively to try to stop the German Ludendorff offensives. Villers-Brettoneux became the sight of the first tank-versus-tank battle. "It was a minor affair, but foretold the shape of things to come." (This quote from Messenger's The Blitzkrieg Story was not included in your readings.)

3. What are the main points of J.F.C. Fuller's armored/mechanized theories?

This summary of Fuller's ideas is taken from the Baucom article (not part of your readings): "Fast moving tanks, working with aircraft, would attack the enemy's brain--his command structure--to create chaos and "strategic paralysis" prior to the main assault. The heart of the attack would be a force of heavy tanks, supported by artillery and accompanied by infantry to hold the ground the tanks captured. Once the main attack achieved a breakthrough or breakthroughs, a relentless pursuit by fast tanks, cavalry, and motorized infantry would follow until the enemy surrendered."

According to Messenger, Fuller asserted the tank would replace infantry and cavalry, and artillery would have to develop into a type of tank. The infantry would be used to occupy ground and protect lines of communication. Fuller added that infantry soldiers could become offensive weapons only if they traveled in armored personnel carriers, acting as "land marines". Fuller recommended creating a "new model division" centered on cooperation between infantry, artillery, cavalry and tanks. Tanks would be used to form an independent spearhead.

4. What are the main points of Liddell Hart's armored/mechanized theories?

B.H. Liddell Hart's theory of mechanized warfare was essentially his strategy of the indirect approach applied at the operational level. The fundamental tenets of the strategy of the indirect approach are: (from Chaliand, ed., The Art of War in World History, From Antiquity To The Nuclear Age, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA 1994)

- The purpose of strategy is to diminish the possibility of resistance through dislocation of the enemy either physically or psychologically.

- Strategy produces such dislocation by exploiting movement and surprise.

- Physical movement should take the line of least resistance; psychological movement should take the line of least expectation.

- The perfection of strategy would be to produce a decision without any serious fighting. Battle is only one means to the end of strategy."

The following is taken from the Baucom article (not part of your reading): Liddell Hart "...believed that modern armies should be attacked at their weakest points and that instead of reinforcing an attack where it encountered the stiffest opposition, reinforcements should go to those points where the greatest success was being achieved. The idea was to push the attack to the greatest possible depth to create the greatest amount of chaos: the greater the depth of the penetration, "the greater the psychological effect on the enemy, the greater the confusion, and the more rapid his collapse." According to Baucom, Hart's "...idea eventually became known as his "Expanding Torrent" concept."

According to Messenger, Liddell Hart advocated a combined arms approach using composite aircraft, tank, artillery and infantry formations. The Messenger article contains more detail on Hart's theory and theory development.

5. How did Fuller and Liddell Hart differ in their theories?

According to Baucom (not included in your readings): "Fuller seemed to favor mechanized attacks that would work closer to the enemy's line of defense, for he believed the enemy's brain was only about 20 miles to the rear of the front line. Although he envisioned deep thrusts in pursuit of a collapsing enemy army, the mechanized knives would turn parallel to the defensive lines to cut up the enemy army once a penetration of 20 miles had been achieved. Liddell Hart's contribution was to remove the limit's imposed by Fuller's thinking and turn armor penetrations into an "expanding torrent"..." Liddell Hart believed the fast tank that appeared in W.W.I would be "...the main force of the Expanding Torrent". Use the same chassis to carry infantry, artillery, and supplies.; link the air arm to the movements of these vehicles; use parachute drops, radio, every modern aid; and the Expanding Torrent, moving 20 miles per hour across country, diverging here, converging there, would be too much for any conventional army to stop. Its scope was illimitable."

While both theorists agreed that infantry could only be useful on the modern battlefield if they were motorized or mechanized, they differed in the role for infantry. According to Baucom, "For Fuller, the only real role for infantry was to follow up the success of armored forces by occupying the ground taken by tanks. Liddell Hart, on the other hand, believed that motorized or mechanized infantry possessed offensive power in its own right and could be used to attack objectives independently of armored forces."

6. How did they agree?

From Messenger's article, both men believed armored forces could be used to strike a decisive blow against enemy communication and command centers. Again, from Baucom (not included in your readings), "Fuller and Liddell Hart, independent of each other, had come to the conclusion that the key to success on the modern battlefield was to paralyze one's opponent rather than bludgeon him to death with a series of costly attacks." Baucom continues to say "After being exposed to Fuller's ideas on armor, Liddell Hart also came to see mechanized forces as the key to the new concept of "brain warfare."

According to Baucom, "Fuller and Liddell differed very little on the use of aircraft. Both men followed Douhet in seeing the plane as the key to destroying the enemy's will to fight and advocated simultaneous attacks on population centers to weaken resistance. They also considered close cooperation between armor and tactical air crucial."

7. What is the definition of "blitzkrieg"?

From the Muller article, "The term "blitzkrieg" refers to an operational combined-arms concept that emphasized aggressive use of independent armored and mechanized formations, trained in rapid exploitation, assisted by lavish use of tactical aviation, in effecting breakthroughs and encirclements. The term itself, however, was a creation of the foreign press; the Germans did not refer to blitzkrieg until the war was well underway. German armor theorists referred simply to mobile warfare, armored troops, or fast troops when discussing this type of armored warfare."

Literally, blitzkrieg means "lightning warfare." The actual term was coined by the foreign press (some sources say the Italian newspapers, others credit Time magazine). In many of its elements, the concept behind blitzkrieg is very similar to the US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine.

8. What is the definition and concept behind Auftragstaktik?

(Note: The following information is not located in the supporting essays.)

A key component of blitzkrieg was the concept of Auftragstaktik, the decentralized, flexible command style known in the US military as commander's intent. This method of battlefield command has enabled smaller forces to defeat much larger ones through a timely ability to seize the initiative and act according to on the spot judgment. At the same time, too much latitude exercised by commanders will on occasion jeopardize strategic planning in favor of immediate battlefield success.

The literal translation of Auftragstaktik is, "Instruction, task or mission tactics"-and here the German word Taktik is used very broadly. It does not refer solely to the tactical level of war. Common English renderings are: "mission- or goal-oriented tactics, or commander's intent." In A Genius For War: The German Army and General Staff 1807-1945, Col. T. N. Dupuy defined it as, "The responsibility of each German soldier and noncommissioned officer … to do without question or doubt whatever the situation required, as he saw fit. This meant that he should act without orders, if action seemed necessary." (116) Robert A. Doughty, author of The Breaking Point, which detailed the German victory over the French in 1949, further clarified this by stating, "The success of Auftragstaktik rested on subordinate commanders understanding the intent of their commander even if that action violated other guidance or orders they had received." (32) Essentially, under Auftragstaktik, operational orders would provide the commander with an understanding of what the operation was supposed to accomplish (the objective). The how was left entirely to the commander on the scene.

Doughty believed that Auftragstaktik was basically a philosophy of command because it was such an integral part of the German officer corps. Therefore, commanders were given a wide range of latitude to deal with situations as they felt best accomplished the mission even if that meant ignoring certain orders or directives. "Though an officer did this at his own risk, the results could be astounding, for the concept of Auftragstaktik permitted, if not encouraged, an officer to use his initiative to solve a tactical problem." (Breaking Point, 32)

The Germans, during the 1940 campaign in France, displayed how Auftragstaktik works at its best. The German operational plan was extremely hazardous and risky, demanding swift exploitation of fluid battle situations and fleeting opportunities as they presented themselves. As a result, the German campaign plan depended upon commanders such as General Heinz Guderian of XIX Panzer Corps who were conditioned to advance and exploit without awaiting orders from higher headquarters. The German reliance upon this factor was not incidental to the plan; the entire operation (Plan Yellow) was built upon the assumption that most commanders could be expected to perform in this fashion. The success of this campaign, due in no small part to Auftragstaktik, led to the fall of France in only six weeks.

This command style differs sharply from that used by the French during the same campaign. The French relied upon an unwieldy system of centralized command and control, a legacy of the firepower-intensive experience of the First World War. The French squandered valuable hours and days awaiting direction from higher headquarters; they were out-thought as well as outfought. "French and German doctrine thus differed sharply on several key points. When one emphasized methodical battles, firepower, centralization, and obedience, the other emphasized continuous battles, mobility, decentralization, and initiative." (Breaking Point, 32) Since the two sides were about evenly matched in numbers and technology, Doughty believes the different philosophies of command may well have been the principal reason for the German success.

Not every aspect of Auftragstaktik was positive. For example, Doughty said it allowed some commanders, "particularly headstrong ones, to act independently and for personal reasons to ignore directives from higher headquarters … such individuals could disrupt carefully planned, complex operations and could place an entire operation in jeopardy." (Breaking Point, 32) The military needs to develop leaders who can be counted on to understand and execute their commanders' intent. Years of training and socialization may be necessary before higher commanders can realistically count on field commanders to exercise initiative.

Although House doesn't specifically mention Auftragstaktik, he does discuss decentralized execution, which is basically the same thing. Decentralized execution allowed German commanders in the field to make decisions necessary to comply with directives. This led to a reduction in detailed instructions required from higher headquarters. "This decentralization and rapidity of decision making were ideally suited to any form of fluid combat, including mechanized operations." (House, 53) House states that this command style, combined with, "the German experience of the psychological effects of tanks during W.W.I, the German infiltration tactics, and belief in massing on a narrow front … would lead to blitzkrieg." (House, 53)

9. According to House, what World War I changes in German tactical doctrine might be seen as precursors to blitzkrieg?

Both Muller and House mentioned the "Elastic Defense." Although Guderian makes slight mention of this idea in his book, many others (including House) see it as one of the ancestors of mobile warfare. Defensive tactics in the early years of W.W.I were inefficient. Both sides emphasized forward defense, with costly counterattacks attempting to quickly recapture every inch of lost territory. (Guderian provides more detail on these types of battles). Eventually, German General Staff officers developed a better alternative. The front line was to be very thinly held, a defense in depth created, and allied initial breakthroughs of the forward line allowed to take place. The attackers were then channeled into killing zones of machine gun and artillery fire, and finally dealt with by squads of counterattacking infantry, hitting the enemy before they could regain their former lines or dig in defensively. These German defensive tactics caused the allies considerable casualties.

As the war progressed, these defensive tactics evolved into offensive ones, called infiltration, stormtroop or "Hutier tactics". These were combined with the new Bruchm�ller artillery tactics, in which a hurricane barrage-a carefully orchestrated, short but intense bombardment designed to isolate, demoralize, and disorganize enemy defenses-took place. The stormtrooper battalions would then infiltrate enemy lines, bypassing major pockets of resistance, making full use of Auftragstaktik (decentralized execution) on the part of squad leaders. In fact, these tactics depended on the initiative of the individual storm troop detachment leaders-without Auftragstaktik, the Germans would've been unable to exploit any successes developed by their new offensive tactics. Penetrations were aided by flights of close-support aircraft, which bombed and strafed the enemy trenches. This return of mobility to the battlefield during the March 1918 Ludendorff offensives, as House observes, "had much to do with the later development of German blitzkrieg."

Bottom Line-W.W.I operational experience provided a framework that interwar German armor theorists would build upon.

10. During World War I, what did German tank commanders believe was the greatest value of the tank?

According to House, Germans commanders were more concerned about the psychological impact than the actual capabilities of the tanks. This led postwar German theorists to emphasize, "psychological effect rather than infantry support." (House, 10) The Germans had only a handful of poor-quality tanks in World War I (in fact, captured tanks in German service outnumbered German-built ones.)

11. What inspiration did Guderian gain from allied developments in World War I?

Guderian focused first on the British use of tanks at Cambrai in November 1917, and pointed out that the British broke through the German defenses but were unable to exploit their success. According to Guderian, after the German spring offensive of 1918 had reached its culminating point, the allied mass employment of armor in the summer of 1918 was decisive for the allies.

12. What similarities and differences do you note between Guderian's ideas and those of the British theorists?

Many of the operational details between the theorists were remarkably similar-after all, they were all trying to overcome the same problem-the W.W.I trench warfare stalemate. Guderian even noted that British manuals were used as the basis for the development of the early Panzer force.

We've looked at the theory and how it was developed. Now, let's take a look at the issue of translating theory into practice, with an examination of how the ideas developed by Guderian and his colleagues actually played out on the field of battle.

13. What was Guderian's theory of mobile warfare?

According to Muller, "Guderian was actually more important as a refiner and perfector of German armored doctrine, rather than its creator." What's important here isn't to determine who actually developed blitzkrieg, but to study both the process of turning theory into practice and the circumstances (contextual and operational art elements) that allowed this to happen.

Note: The following information is not contained in the supporting essays. It is taken from, Achtung-Panzer! written in 1937 by Major General Heinz Guderian.

Because of his personal experience with positional warfare along the Western Front during W.W.I, General Heinz Guderian sought to develop new methods of waging offensive warfare. Guderian believed that modern weaponry and positional warfare made unsup-ported infantry incapable of successfully functioning offensively in modern war. (p 35)

His historical analysis of World War I, especially the use of allied tanks, helped Guderian develop his mechanized warfare theory. He argued that World War I demonstrated the primacy of the defensive, but that two new weapons-the aircraft and the tank, were primarily offensive, and together could represent revolutionary change. (p 200) Note: Clausewitz spoke of the relationship between the attack and the defense, but stated that their relative strengths were situation-specific. Guderian was prescient enough to realize that a shift in the relative strengths of the two was underway.

Guderian envisioned that the armored forces would be composed of three branches: armored and motorized reconnaissance, antitank, and tank units. Tanks would compose the bulk of the offensive striking power of the new army. Guderian envisioned three types of tanks: infantry support vehicles, tanks able to force a breakthrough of the enemy's defenses (the most important category), and very heavy "fortress-storming" tanks. (pp. 169-170)

Guderian felt the tank force must be a separate branch of the army for the revolutionary potential of the new weapon be fully exploited. Tanks "must be employed en masse in both breadth and depth. They strive to exploit tactical success into the operational dimension." (p 170)

Guderian believed that successful tank actions depend upon suitable terrain, surprise, and mass attack in depth. (181) He stated that tanks would have to deal with many threats and obstacles when assaulting a prepared enemy defensive line-mines, antitank guns, and enemy tanks. The entire depth of the enemy defense must come under simultaneous attack by air and ground forces. (p 180) Each of the attacking elements would have a clearly defined "combat mission", (p 183) allowing the individual commanders to exercise Auftragstaktik.

Guderian stated that aircraft could function as very useful direct and indirect support for mechanized forces. They could provide close fire support or attack targets well behind the front lines. (pp. 195-196) He saw tanks and aircraft as mutually supportive-the tanks could drive for the enemy's frontier airfields, and bomber and troop transport aircraft could seek out targets beyond the striking range of tanks. (p 207)

14. How did Guderian apply C2 to blitzkrieg?

Guderian's W.W.I background was in radio communications. To him, the informational and communication aspects of mobile warfare were all important. He believed that reliable communications between armored vehicles, their commanders, and higher headquarters were vital for the success of blitzkrieg.

Guderian's forces included reconnaissance units to gather intelligence and maintain contact with the enemy. They were composed of fast armored cars equipped with radios. Aerial reconnaissance, SIGINT, and other sources added to Guderian's overall intelligence picture. Guderian's command tanks were equipped with transmitters and receivers. The other tanks had receivers only.

15. How did the experiences of the "years of the blitzkrieg victories" (1939-1941) validate the hopes and predictions of Guderian?

COMMENTS: Both the Muller and Landry essays show that in many aspects, Guderian's predictions were borne out-German armored forces used combined arms, surprise, mobility, concentration (mass), speed etc., to achieve swift victories. The Panzer force did indeed function as "Thor's Hammer, to strike the enemies of the Reich," as German propaganda claimed. B. H. Liddell Hart, in his book Strategy, gives a good description of the German blitzkrieg victories between 1939 and 1941 (Strategy, 222-248).

According to Muller, "The application of German armored doctrine during the German "years of victory" of 1939-1941 validated the hopes of its backers. It also converted many skeptics. Germany launched World War II on 1 September 1939. The Panzer spearheads, with massed air support, punched through the Polish linear defenses in two days and were operating in the clear by the third day-effectively, the campaign was over at this point. As a result, many German officers-including an infantryman named Erwin Rommel, later known as the Desert Fox-became converts to the idea of armored warfare. Even Hitler was amazed at the results. On touring the shattered Polish defenses, Hitler asked Guderian, "Our dive bombers did that?" Guderian replied proudly, "No, our Panzers!""

Guderian put his ideas into practice in May 1940, when he elected to cross the Meuse and drive on into the French defensive zone without waiting for the infantry to catch up. Such infantry that did accompany XIX Panzerkorps were motorized-again, a validation of Guderian's concepts. In the invasion of the USSR, 1941, Guderian's concepts were put into action on a grand scale. Large, independent Panzer groups exploited their mobility and ability to strike concentrated to carry out mass encirclements of Soviet armies during the summer of 1941.

16. What contextual and operational art factors influenced and constrained the development of British armor theory?

According to House (this material was not included in your readings), the following six factors affected all the world's nations in the interwar period: "...general revulsion against warfare and all things military", extremely tight defense budgets for the 15 years following W.W.I, rapidly changing technology, which made governments unwilling to invest in weapons that would become obsolete soon after development due to further technological developments, confusion regarding terminology used for this new technology, extremism and lack of consistency among advocates of new technology, and opposition to new technology and tactics from the traditional arms of the military. (For more detail see Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. Ft Leavenworth, Kansas: USA CGSC, 1984, pp. 43-46)

House goes on to give specific British obstacles to the development of armor theory. These included traditionalism within the British Army, which discouraged radical changes to doctrine, lack of interest by the newly independent Royal Air Force in anything but strategic bombing and interdiction, resulting in a lack of ground support doctrine development, and traditional defense needs of the British empire, which required large numbers of infantry soldiers for low intensity, police type actions instead of conventional warfare. (For more detail see Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. Ft Leavenworth, Kansas: USA CGSC, 1984, pp. 46-52)

In discussing the Labour government that came to power in the early 1930's in Britain, Baucom states, "The "pacifist idealism" of this government, combined with the economic slump that began in 1929, ensured there would be no large-scale mechanization of the British army." (Baucom's comment was not included in your readings.)

17. What international factors constrained and influenced the development of armor theory in Germany after 1918?

The primary constraint was the Versailles Treaty, 1919. The Military Clauses of the treaty forbade Germany to possess an armored force, or to manufacture armored vehicles. In addition, the entire German army was reduced to a 100,000-man cadre. Guderian obviously felt very bitter about these constraints. Like most Germans of his age, he refers to Versailles not as a treaty, but as a Diktat, or dictated arrangement, since Germany really had no choice but to accept the terms. Also, Germany was concerned about potentially hostile powers on both eastern and western borders (Poland and France). Germany had a border conflict with Poland immediately following the war, and the French in 1923 occupied the Ruhr industrial region after the Germans fell behind on their reparations payments. So Germany faced the old pre-W.W.I nightmare of being encircled by enemies.

18. What specific effects, positive and negative, did the Versailles Treaty have on military development in Germany?

COMMENTS: Negative: Technological development was stifled, realistic exercises were impossible, and crude mockups had to substitute for real tanks. Also, the Inter-Allied Control Commission kept a watchful eye on German military developments.

Positive: Germany was not saddled by stockpiles of obsolete equipment and could start with a clean slate. Furthermore, the General Staff was forced to spend its time thinking and developing concepts rather than drilling with the old methods (which, with a tiny army, were no longer valid anyway). The restricted size of its army required German thinkers to develop mobile concepts to enable it to operate more effectively to make up for its numerical inferiority. At the same time, the victorious powers greatly reduced their armaments, in part because Germany was no longer a threat. Therefore, Germany did not fall as embarrassingly far behind as she might have otherwise. Also, the humiliation of Versailles and the effects of the allied blockade (which continued well past the Armistice of Nov. 1918 made many German officers determined to right the wrong and work towards the day when they could rearrange the balance of power in their favor.

19. How did the German military carry on the development of armored doctrine in spite of the obstacles?

COMMENTS: The General Staff officers attempted to run realistic exercises, in spite of its lack of equipment. The military was able to experiment, on a limited basis, with armor in Russia, due to a secret treaty (Treaty of Rapallo, 1922). It also keenly observed foreign developments. Guderian freely admitted that, before 1933, British tank regulations were the pattern for German practice. (Achtung, 167) Could this be what Tom Peters referred to as "creative swiping" in Thriving on Chaos? (279) The General Staff also established headquarters to oversee the development of mobile warfare, and continued development of tactics through maneuvers (Guderian here gives much credit to Gen Oswald Lutz, in some ways more deserving of the title "Creator of the Panzer Force" than Guderian himself). The General Staff ethic enabled the military to continue development of armored doctrine. Guderian's success proved that the German General Staff was far more tolerant of mavericks and boat-rockers than most of the other world's militaries.

20. How did political developments in Germany during the interwar period assist the development of German armored warfare?

COMMENTS: The Baucom and Muller essays both mention some of these developments. Adolf Hitler rose to power on 30 January 1933. Guderian notes that this event changed things overnight. (Achtung, 162) Hitler announced the abrogation of the Versailles Treaty and the initiation of open rearmament-for professional German officers, the "candy store" was open for business. The Weimar government had emphasized conciliation and building harmony with the Allies, but Hitler had an ambitious program of foreign expansion and (ultimately) armed conquest. Development of the armored forces proceeded apace after this political change. The Command of the Tank Forces was established in 1934 and the first three Panzer divisions were created in 1935. Guderian happened to get one of those divisions.

According to the Baucom article, Hitler readily accepted the blitzkrieg concept for three reasons. First of all, he liked the idea of Germany seizing the initiative in battle. Also, blitzkrieg campaigns would have a low impact on the German economy because of the speed and relative ease of victories. Finally, once demonstrated, he could use the threat of blitzkrieg attack as a bargaining chip to win victories diplomatically without resorting to war.

Note: Guderian believed there were other factors that conditioned the development of military thought and doctrine. (From Achtung-Panzer!, 168)

Geography-Germany was (and is) a continental power, surrounded by potentially hostile states. It could not, unlike Britain or the USA, pursue policies of isolationism or limited liability.

Borders-He also believed the strength or weaknesses of a nation's borders affected the development. Germany had few natural or man-made defenses on its borders. It was no Switzerland. Its enemies would have few natural barriers (other than rivers) standing in their way.

Raw Materials-Another factor he addressed was the availability of raw materials. This was always a big problem for resource-poor Germany. Moreover, lack of foreign exchange meant that they could not be easily purchased abroad, nor brought in by sea in time of war if Germany had to deal with a blockade.

Industry-German heavy industry was well developed, but owing to the lost years of Versailles, its weapons industries were just gearing up in the 1930s.

Armaments-As compared to its neighbors, Germany was not so far behind as she could have been, since many of the allies cut back on their own armaments programs. Still, in some weapons categories (including tanks and heavy aircraft engines) Germany lagged behind.

One must also assess the intent of one's neighbors. Guderian devoted a portion of his book to what were essentially propaganda "scare" tactics-pointing out that the hostile French to the west and the Red Menace to the east posed a threat to Germany's existence.

21. How did various contextual and operational art factors facing Germany in W.W.II prevent Guderian's ideas from being translated into practice?

COMMENTS: Economics-The House article reveals that the German economy, constrained by its raw materials base, was never able to provide the numbers of tanks and vehicles that Guderian's totally mechanized army would require. He himself notes how few motor vehicles Germany produced compared to the US. As a result, the German army of World War II was essentially a World War I infantry army, with horse drawn transportation and logistics. It had only a few armored and mechanized formations (only about 13 percent of the army was motorized in 1939, and only 6 percent was armored). (The Change in the European Balance of Power)

Technology-Guderian gave specific characteristics for the various types of tanks Germany would require. In practice, German tank development lagged behind his requirements. Most of the tanks in the inventory in 1939 were Panzer I and IIs. The Pz I was never really intended to be a combat vehicle; it weighed only 6 tons and was designed for training and had only machine guns for armament. Guderian wanted capable medium tanks, with greater speed, armor protection, and firepower. Tanks fitting this description, the Panzer III and IV, did not appear until 1938-1939, and in small numbers at first. Many German divisions in Poland, France and the USSR were accordingly equipped with captured Czech Model 38 tanks. The awesome Panther and Tiger tanks did not appear until 1943, and then in quite small numbers (only 484 examples of the 68-ton King Tiger tank, one of the most formidable armored vehicles of the war, were built).

Hitler was personally concerned with the question of armor technology. One of the major reasons for the failure of the Kursk offensive in July 1943 was Hitler's insistence upon waiting for further deliveries of the latest Panther and Tiger I tanks. This delayed the operation by at least two months, squandered the element of surprise, and allowed the Soviets to complete elaborate defensive preparations which thwarted the German breakthrough attempt. Moreover, the temperamental new tank designs broke down in large numbers, leaving the elderly Panzer IV to bear the brunt of the armored battle.

Interservice Rivalry-This was also brought out in the House article. With resources scarce, a fierce battle took place between the various services for allocations. The "ideologically reliable" Luftwaffe frequently won out, leaving scant resources for the panzer force.

Overall German Objectives-Hitler's national security agenda eventually overtaxed the resources of all branches of the German military. Even the successful panzer drives into the Soviet Union did not amount to more than operational victories on a grand scale-they were swallowed up in the huge Russian spaces, in effect dispersing their combat power over too wide an area.

SUMMARY:

The Blitzkrieg story is an excellent example of the process by which war theory is developed, implemented, and finally translated into useful practice. Blitzkrieg made the German army a formidable adversary throughout W.W.II and served as the foundation for subsequent ground combat theory and doctrine, including US Army AirLand Battle doctrine.