TH 508 EARLY AIRPOWER THEORY

TH 508 EARLY AIRPOWER THEORY: THE AIRPOWER PIONEERS

AND THE AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL (ACTS)

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

508.1 Comprehend the factors influencing joint doctrine. [I.2 (b)]

508.11 Describe the contextual and operational art elements which influenced Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell, and the ACTS.

1. World war I was very costly.
2. European powers had to rebuild their economy after the war.
3. The US was entering a period of isolationalism.
4. The Versailles Treaty (1919) significantly impacted Germany's ability to have a powerful army and to manufacture arms, the German Army was reduced to a 100,000 man cadre.
5. Technological advancements in aviation were outpacing the ability of the countries to produce up to date products. As soon as a product would come to market, it would be obsolete.
6. The Great Depression (1929).
7. Massive military downsizing after the war
8. A reluctance of senior leaders to see beyond the limited use of air power during World War I.
9. World War I aircraft for the most part were used for aerial recognizance and were under the command of the specific country's Army.
10. Although technology was moving quickly, people were still envisioning equipment that had not been designed yet.
11. The concept of "morale bombing" and what was the perception of bombing military or civilian targets.

ACTS:

The US Army Reorganization Act of 1920 created the US Air Service as a combatant arm of the US Army. The United States Air Service, in keeping with the long precedent of professional education for the separate combat arms and services, formulated plans for its own educational system. On 25 February 1920, the War Department authorized the establishment of eleven special service schools for the US Air Service, including the US Air Service School at Langley Field, Virginia. The course consisted of 9 months and 1345 hours of instruction divided among a variety of air power subjects. In 1931 the school was moved to Maxwell AFB in Montgomery, Alabama.

ACTS was perhaps most affected by the socio-cultural, economic, and political contextual elements, and operational art element technology. The US resumed an isolationist posture following W.W.I. and as the Howard article (TH 502) recognized, it is difficult to affect significant change the military during such ages of peace." This difficulty was exacerbated by the Great Depression which further decreased the governments ability and willingness to devote funds towards defense. At the same time, while rapid changes in aircraft technology seemed to support the development of strategic bombing theory, it made procurement risky. Similar to our situation with respect to automation today, during the interwar years what was cutting edge aircraft technology one day was dangerously obsolete the next.

508.2 Comprehend key airpower concepts of Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell, and the ACTS.

508.21 Compare and contrast Douhets, Trenchards, and Mitchells views on airpower.

Douhet:

Douhet believed that command of the air transcended our current concepts of air superiority and air supremacy. Command of the air existed when we find ourselves able to fly in the face of an enemy who is unable to do likewise. Douhet believed that air supremacy reflected only a capability until it was executed to actually command the air.

Douhet posited that command of the air was achieved in much the same way as Mahan sought to achieve command of the sea. The enemy's air force was to be destroyed to the extent that it no longer constituted a threat. Douhet believed that this was ideally accomplished by preemptive strikes against enemy aircraft, airfields, and related industries. This would destroy enemy aircraft on the ground, eliminating the possibility of their striking similar friendly targets. When such a strike was either unfeasible or not totally successful, air combat would ensue as each side vied to achieve command of the air. Douhet believed that war could be won with air power alone, while the Army and Navy played strictly defensive roles. <[>Douhet.doc / Act1.doc]

Trenchard:

Hugh Trenchard, the father of the RAF, presented a theory of strategic airpower that identified enemy morale or "will" as the key target, and then institutionalized those ideas through a series of doctrinal manuals. These precepts were then taught and refined at another of Trenchards creations, the RAF Staff College. He viewed air power as a weapon that could attack centers of transportation, communication, and production, rather than carry out direct attack on armies and navies. In other words, he agreed with Douhet that an enemy could be defeated without first destroying its armies. Trenchard also believed that the bomber would always reach its target, and that the best defense against an enemy bomber was an equally capable or better bomber used to destroy the enemy bomber force on the ground He believed that However, his theories proved ill-suited to the conditions that arose in World War II. When thrust into the furnace of total war those theories were adapted and reforged. The goal became unconditional surrender (i.e. bombing populations of people in addition to military targets), and the nuances inherent in the doctrine of "morale bombing" were lost on the process.

Mitchell:

Closer to home, the primary American theorist advocating air power was General William Billy Mitchell. Mitchell advanced his beliefs on air power at the same time Douhet wrote his. The difference between them was primarily one of perspective. Mitchell wrote from the American perspective and viewed aviation more globally than Douhet, who adopted a more limited, continental approach. Mitchell's views concerning the attack on an enemy's industrial structure are nonetheless strikingly similar to Douhet's:

To gain a lasting victory in war, the hostile nations power to make war must be destroyed
-- this means the manufactories, the means of communication, the food products, even the farms, the fuel and oil and places where people live and carry on their daily lives. Not only must these things be rendered incapable of supplying armed forces but peoples desire to renew the combat at a later date must be discouraged. Aircraft operating in the heart of an enemys country will accomplish this object in an incredibly short space of time, once the control of the air has been obtained and the months and even years of contest of ground armies with a loss of millions of lives will be eliminated in the future.

The bombardment aircraft should be able to sink a battleship. Finally, the attack aircraft should be designed to attack troop concentrations, airfields, or manufacturing districts. Mitchell contended that attack aviation rendered the greatest service because of its demoralizing effect on the enemy, but it needed the support of pursuit for protection.

Similarities:

1. All three were senior influential officers in their respected country.
2. All believed that there was no way to have defensive air power.
3. All three believed in attacking the enemy to destroy his "will" to fight.
4. All believed that the air should be its own service. All aircraft should fall under one. command. The United States still doesn't have all air power under one to this day.

Differences:

Targeting civilians:

Douhets view was unique in that he considered the defeat of fielded forces unnecessary for victory. To influence the moral and industrial capacity of a nation, he advocated targeting non-combatants, exemplifying the total war concept. Trenchard and Mitchell were both against targeting civilians, but in the end, the Americans and the British would both inflict major damage on the German population to destroy their "will" to fight.

Aircraft type:
Mitchell and Douhet differed in their opinions about aircraft types required for the air force mission. Douhet believed almost exclusively in the battleplane, but Mitchell saw three categories of combat airplanes: pursuit, bombardment, and attack. Trenchard believed in 1/3 of the force as pursuit and the other 2/3 strategic bombers.

Summary:
RAF doctrine, which expanded and codified Trenchard's beliefs, was thus a unique strain of airpower theory that combined the Douhetian objective of undermining morale, and the American Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) strategy of targeting industrial sites. In the event, none of these three airpower theories proved completely accurate in World War II. But it must be remembered that the airplane was in its infancy and there was very little experience upon which to base airpower doctrine. Airmen thus did the best they could, examining the history of warfare and of airpower in the Great War, calling upon their own aviation experience, and, most of all, relying on their own logic and imagination unconstrained by temporary technological limitations.

508.3 Comprehend the influence of Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell, and the ACTS on interwar airpower thought.

508.31 Assess the relative influence of Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell, and the ACTS on the interwar defense organizations and force structures.

In the last year of World War I, air power demonstrated the best of it's abilities for all nations involved. The air services played a valuable and necessary role in every action. Their presence significantly affected the successes of the ground troops both materially and morale-wise. Offensives were planned with information obtained by the airplane, attacks were supported and sustained with a significant measure of air supremacy, and defensive action was not secured without aerial support. Air forces gained respect and autonomy as military leaders and civilian authorities realized the importance of air power. Great Britain was the first nation to officially form an independent military arm, the Royal Air Force. All the nations air services matured and developed distinct qualities and characteristics during the Great War.

Status of A/C on November 11, 1918 at the end of WWI

French: 3556 a/c left 158 aces/ highest 75
German: 2500 a/c left 363 aces/ highest 80
American: 1340 a/c left 118 aces/ highest 26
British: 1576 a/c left 784 aces/ highest 73

Which of the theorists had the most influence on ACTS?

Were the ideas of Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell the seeds of the ACTS strategic bombardment theory? Douhet had an immediate impact on ACTS. Four copies of his book, The Command of the Air, were available as early as 1923 at the Air Service Field Officers School. His book The War of l9XX was published in 1930 and appeared in the ACTS library one year later. The ACTS library also had a copy of Colonel C. deF. Chandlers US Air Services article Air Warfare Doctrine of General Douhet which gave a summation of Douhets theories. But was Douhet a part of the curriculum of ACTS? General Ira Eaker, a student of the ACTS in 1935 indicated in a postwar interview said that he was.

Interviewer: Sir, the question has often been raised about the extent of Giulio Douhet s influence on American air doctrine. As a matter of fact, you just recently mentioned that a recent study asserts that his book, The Command of the Air, was available in the ACTS library during the 1920s. Do you recall if his name or his writings were discussed among your peers, and were you personally aware of his specific ideas either before or after you attended the ACTS?

Eaker: I think he exercised considerable influence, but Trenchard even more. There was General Fuller, a British General who was writing on Air Power. All of these writers-these military men who were writers on aviation created a great deal of interest, and they developed partisans in this country. And Douhets teachings and writings; we read all his books.

Targeting:
Hansell credits Douhet with an even greater influence, particularly in the area of targeting. Using Douhets writings, ACTS examined the problem of target selection, and the "industrial web theory" was born.

However, most students and faculty deny such influence, believing that Mitchell had more impact.

Yet, when one examines the ACTS lesson materials, Douhet emerges as the primary influence. One study concluded: While the School throughout the period 1920-1935 was of course subject to various influences of an intellectual order, there was none so pervasive or significant as that of Douhet. The very fact that his was a carefully integrated theory, with all constituent elements derived from and dependent upon his philosophy of strategic air warfare, helps account for his penetrating influence there. For the school embraced during the decade 1925-1935 his unique counter-air force strategy, battle plane concept, minimization of pursuit, conversion of observation and attack roles to support bombardment, rationale for concentrating all possible resources on the striking force, self-sufficiency of the air organization-including dispersal for security, and passive air defense, as well as his war-winning formula for using massed air power to destroy the most vulnerable elements of the enemy nation.

Air Arm Secondary?
However, the school didn't always subscribe to the air arm being secondary. In 1928, the Office of Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC) disputed the schools conservative view of air power. Prior to this time, ACTS considered the air arm secondary to the ground forces - a conflict was terminated only when the Army occupied enemy territory. The OCAC stated that an all-air operation could win a war when the enemy s will to resist was defeated; from that point on, the school embraced both Douhet and Mitchell.

READINGS:

1. Douhet: Excerpts from The Command of the Air (Douhet) - in coursebook
The Command of the Air summarizes the first (and arguably the best, most comprehensive) theory of airpower ever written.

2. Trenchard: Trenchard and Morale Bombing: The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine Before World War II (Meilinger) [23Meil.doc]
The Meilinger article traces the evolution of airpower and strategic doctrine in W.W.I and the RAF between the wars, paying special attention to the concept of morale bombing - how it originated with Trenchard in the First World War, and how it evolved during the interwar period.

3. Mitchell: Excerpts from Winged Defense (Mitchell) [Mitch. doc ]
The excerpts from Winged Defense allow the student to gain an appreciation for and understanding of key aspects of Mitchells airpower theory from his seminal work.

4. ACTS: Excerpts from The Air Corps Tactical School: The Untold Story (Griffin) - in coursebook
Excerpts from Griffins booklet provide an excellent summary of the process which created the US daylight precision strategic bombardment theory - the foundation for all succeeding airpower theory and practice.

5. Excerpted from The First Air Campaign: August 1914 - November 1918 (Lawson) [20Lawson.doc]

LESSON OUTLINE:

Thesis: This lesson introduces students to the ideas of the three early airpower theorists whose concepts most heavily influence the way we in the US think about airpower, as well as to the ACTS theory of strategic bombing which has been the foundation of US airpower thought and practice since World War II.

Main Point 1: The theories of the three airpower pioneers were influenced by both their World War I experiences (which drove them to seek ways of ensuring that protracted land warfare would never recur) and the varied affects of contextual and operational art elements on their nations following the war. All three influenced the development of a uniquely American theory of airpower at the ACTS.

Main Point 2: Students at the ACTS recognized that the pure application of any existing airpower theory would not adequately address the rapidly changing environment.

Main Point 3: The three airpower pioneers and the ACTS theorists were in general agreement key airpower tenets. Their disagreements usually resulted from unique national concerns.

Main Point 4: The airpower pioneers and the ACTS significantly influenced the organization and force structure of their respective air forces prior through WW II.