The previous lesson makes it clear that the air pioneers and the Air Corps Tactical
School (ACTS) viewed strategic bombing as airpower's primary role. It was this capability
on which they based most of their argument in favor of an air force totally independent
from the other services, and it is this capability which has driven the air strategies
employed in W.W.II and thereafter. Trenchard (albeit reluctantly) and Mitchell also
recognized the need for airpower to perform other, sometimes defensive roles. First among
these secondary roles for Trenchard was the role of defensive counter air (DCA). As
mentioned in the previous lesson, he was forced to allocate fully one-third of the Royal
Air Force (RAF) force structure to pursuit aircraft to perform this role. While our study
of airpower from World War II through DESERT STORM in the next lesson (TH 510) will focus
on strategic bombing campaigns, this lesson will focus on the successful employment of
airpower in its less popular, yet no less important defensive role during the historic
Battle of Britain. The results of this campaign suggests that the funds Trenchard invested
in pursuit aircraft during the interwar years was money well spent. They also provided
some initial data points with which to begin our assessment of early (pre-W.W.II) airpower
theories.
LOQ. The Luftwaffe's air campaign against Britain in 1940 was arguably the first
large-scale strategic bombing campaign. To what extent was it conducted in accordance with
the concepts of Douhet and Trenchard? Did it validate their views on strategic bombing?
DISCUSSION. The Luftwaffe's conduct of the Battle of Britain was not entirely consistent with either Douhet's and Trenchard's concepts on strategic bombing. The results of the campaign do, however, suggest strengths and weaknesses in Douhet's and Trenchard's views.
The Channel and airfield phases of the campaign were not so much a part of the strategic bombing campaign as they were a prelude to it - what Douhet referred to as "air combat" to achieve command of the air. Consistent with Douhet's view on the employment of airpower, the Luftwaffe's objective in both of these phases was to knock the RAF - particularly Fighter Command - out of the war through a combination of air-to-air combat (the focus of the Channel phase) and the destruction of airfields and aircraft on the ground (the focus of the airfield phase).
The Luftwaffe's first appeared to diverge from Douhet's theory of strategic bombing when it transitioned to the bombing of London prior to achieving command of the air. Two primary reasons are usually cited for this premature transition: First, the Luftwaffe incorrectly believed that it had nearly achieved its objective of eliminating Fighter Command as a significant threat to its command of the air. Second, the Luftwaffe was unable to resist the urge to respond in kind to British bombing raids on Berlin. Douhet was adamant in his view that command of the air was a prerequisite to the successful conduct of strategic bombing. The losses the Luftwaffe's incurred while conducting its failed bombing campaign against London appears to validate his view, but before asserting this, one must remember that these attacks forced Fighter Command into the air where its greatly attritted forces could be engaged by Luftwaffe fighters accompanying the bomber formations. In this sense, the London bombing phase can be viewed not as a failed strategic bombing campaign, but as a continuation of the Luftwaffe's battle for command of the air through indirect means.
Battle results suggest that Douhet and Trenchard were less prescient in their views on defense against air attack. Both theorists believed that bomber formations would be able to defend themselves from air attack and avoid anti-aircraft artillery so as to reach their intended targets in sufficient strength to accomplish their missions. Throughout the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe assigned fighters to escort its bombers (at roughly a 1:3 ratio) and still incurred prohibitive losses. This was due to Britain's effective use of new radar technology (an excellent example of the MTR/RMA concept) which made surprise impossible, its well-organized ground control system, and its will to win. Weaknesses within the Luftwaffe also contributed to its ineffective strategic bombing.. The Luftwaffe was designed primarily to support the army on the ground. This being the case, its bombers did not possess the armor and weapons systems Douhet suggested be incorporated in his "battleplane". The German bombers were also incapable of carrying sufficient payloads and had sufficiently heavy bombs were available. Weaknesses in bomber self-protection were not completely compensated for by the use of fighter escorts because the limited fighter range would often not permit them to remain with the bomber fleets throughout the mission.
The Luftwaffe's strategic bombing campaign against London ultimately neither validated nor invalidated Douhet's and Trenchard's shared view that the strategic use of airpower could alone could be decisive in war. First, neither air pioneer suggested that targeting civilians alone ("moral bombing") would be decisive. Both recognized that strategic bombing campaigns had to combine morale bombing with the bombing of industrial targets (Trenchard's "vital centres"). Such industrial targeting did not take place during the campaign.
One might argue also argue that the Battle of Britain can not be used to validate the
concept of strategic bombing because it's objective was not strategic, but operational.
Those sharing this view believe that the primary objective of the Battle of Britain was to
win command of the air over Britain not as a prelude to the conduct of a strategic air
campaign (e.g. the bombing of London), but as a prelude to the amphibious invasion of
Britain - Operation SEA LION. Using this argument, one can conclude that the strategic
aspect of the campaign - the bombing of London - was nothing more than an unfortunate
diversion of assets away from the primary Luftwaffe objective of commanding the air.
FOQ. Our discussion above suggests that the Luftwaffe's conduct of the Battle of
Britain was not always consistent with Douhet's and Trenchard's views on the proper
conduct of strategic bombing. Did the British respond to the attack in a manner consistent
with their ideas?
DISCUSSION. Douhet believed that because defense against air attack was impossible, the only response to such an attack was to mount a similar, more successful air offensive against the enemy. The side which would be victorious in this "air combat" would be that which could inflict the greatest damage on his opponent's aircraft and related industries while absorbing strikes against his own. The British did, in fact, respond to the Luftwaffe's air offensive with a limited counteroffensive, but targeted Berlin and other population centers. While creating a short-lived psychological impact on the German public, this approach minimized the damage to the Luftwaffe. It did, however, result in the Luftwaffe diverging from the air pioneers' emphasis on concentration of force as it diverted some of its assets to the defense of the homeland.
The British decision to respond primarily defensively to the German air attack was
distinctly not Douhetian, but had its advantages. By engaging the Luftwaffe over England
and the Channel instead of over Europe, Fighter Command was able to maximize its time in
the air, and engage either unescorted German bombers or fighters which were very low on
fuel. This gave the Brits a decided tactical advantage. Additionally, at this stage in the
war, trained pilots and crews were a scarce commodity. Those forced to bail out over
England and the Channel had a fair chance of being recovered to fly again. It would have
been virtually impossible to rescue crews bailing out over Europe.
FOQ. In addition to the obvious advantages the Brits gained through the early
employment of radar technology, RAF ground control measures and the favorable disposition
of its aircraft contributed to Fighter Command's success during the battle. There was some
controversy, however, over this disposition. What was the "Big Wing"
controversy, and what were the merits of the opposing points of view?
DISCUSSION. The Big Wing controversy resulted from two very different views of how Fighter Command should be employed in response to the Luftwaffe's attacks. Park advanced the view that Fighter Command assets should be located in the south of England and sent up to meet incoming Luftwaffe attacks as soon as radar could identify German location and direction with reasonable accuracy. The primary advantage to Park's approach was that Luftwaffe attack formations could be broken up prior to reaching their intended targets. There were several disadvantages, however. First, such an approach would require the Brits to meet large, inbound Luftwaffe formations at a great numerical disadvantage. Second, the earlier the Brits engaged the Luftwaffe, the more likely they were to have to engage in air-to-air combat against German fighters, and these fighters would have more fuel to expend. Lastly, despite radar technology, it was possible that by scrambling its fighters at the earliest opportunity, the Brits would decrease their chances of successfully intercepting their enemy.
An opposing defensive strategy was advocated by Leigh-Mallory. Known as th "Big Wing" concept, Leigh-Mallory suggested that Fighter Command position the bulk of its assets further to the north. This would provide much better security than bases to the south. While such positioning would make it less likely that Fighter Command could intercept and disrupt Luftwaffe bomber formations prior to the Germans' reaching their targets, the additional response time would permit Fighter Command to scramble larger numbers of aircraft against each attack, and more accurately intercept the bomber formations. Any German fighters remaining with the formation would also be low on fuel.
Fighter Command deployed in such a way as to allow both Park's and Leigh-Mallory's
defensive philosophies to be exercised. This permitted it to be more successful than would
have been the case had either philosophy been fully embraced.
The RAF's success in the Battle of Britain was important in that it demonstrated the feasibility of mounting a aerial defense against air attack. Prior to the invention of radar, an effective defense would not have been possible. The Battle of Britain also highlighted some key weaknesses in existing strategic bombing theory. The most important of these was the vulnerability of bomber formations to air attack. Just as the radar justified Trenchard's purchase of pursuit aircraft for defensive counter-air, the pursuit plane and radar dictated that fighters be developed which had sufficient range and speed to escort bomber formations all the way to the target. Had the ACTS fully appreciated this lesson, the human and material costs of the strategic bombing campaigns on which they would soon after embark would have been much less costly in terms of aircraft and crew. These campaigns will be addressed in the next lesson.