TH 511 -EMERGING AIR AND SPACE THEORY

DATE: 13 Oct 97

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

511.1 Comprehend the impact of contextual elements upon the development of space control theory.

511.11 Explain the major factors impacting space operations.

Another important area of emerging theory is that dealing with space. Lt. Col. Michael R. Mantz is a leading advocate for the development of a separate theory for space. His theory divides military space operations into three broad categories: space denial, space strike, and space protection. Mantz then proposes a set of space combat power axioms that defines these categories and synergize their combat effects.

In his study, Mantz defines:

Space Denial - The hostile application of destructive or disruptive force against enemy space systems to deny the enemy's use of the space medium.
Space Strike - The hostile application of destructive force "from space against natural-body-based (earth, moon, and asteroid) targets."
Space protection - Defined as "defensive application of...force to defend friendly space systems."

Current USAF doctrine considers air and space as an indivisible whole and emphasizes the following traditional space capabilities: communications, reconnaissance, navigation and warning, and surveillance. The advent of "cyberwar" suggests that space will become increasingly important in future warfare. One must therefore ask the following questions: Does our current airpower theory adequately addresses space concerns? If it does not, is a distinct space theory required? What concepts should our space theory include, and how will these concepts be integrated into other theories?

Mantz changes AFM 1-1's roles from space support, force enhancement, space control, and force application to threespace support, force enhancement, and space combat (roughly incorporating AFM 1-1's concept of space control and force application). Space combat is the focal point of much of Mantz's space theory. He suggests that a theory of space combat is necessary to the understanding and proper employment of our space capabilities, particularly given the rapid proliferation of space based capabilities throughout the world.

Mantz notes several current arguments against space combat, the first of which is the physical challenge of getting into space. He suggests that the US space launch capability is not responsive enough. He is also concerned about the cost of spacelift, and political resistance to the militarization of space which many view as a violation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Finally, Mantz recognizes possible technology shortfalls which may preclude effective space combat even if other constraints were removed.

511.12 Explain the nature of the emerging space threat.

Many nations learned a great deal from the Gulf War. They noted not only the significance of precision-guided munitions, but also the importance of space-based force enhancement. Access to space systems may make the difference between victory and defeat in future wars.

These nations are attempting to acquire space-derived data through their own military systems or through international commercial systems. In addition to access to space-derived data, they learned the importance of denying your enemies access to space-derived data. Space combat support systems have become high-value targets.

The threat of observation can be most disarming for commanders, especially if their strategy is maneuver-oriented. An Air Force Space Command-National Security Industries Association study stated that imaging "systems have direct military utility in areas such as:

- Technology verification of an enemy's capabilities
- Analysis of terrain features for combat planning
- Surveillance of forces and their movements
- Targeting of hostile forces
- Assessment of battle damage

Commanders can take some actions to minimize observations, but it will be impossible to totally avoid detection. Multiple sources of space data exist. Data can come from military, civil, or commercial satellites owned by the using country or owned by another country. Some nations have "intelligence-sharing agreements" or commercial arrangements with space-faring nations. Other aspiring nations are pursuing indigenous capabilities. (Mantz)

Brazil, the United Kingdom, India, Israel, and Japan have all studied or acquired some commercial or military observation satellites-either imaging, radar, electronic intelligence, weather, or environmental monitoring. So-called third tier states, such as Iraq, Libya, and Pakistan, either possess or desire to acquire observation capabilities. As mentioned earlier, Iraq tried to procure a reconnaissance satellite from Brazil, China, and France. Iraq used commercial imagery during its war with Iran and prior to its invasion of Kuwait.

Space launch by itself is not a threat per se, but it is required for an indigenous space combat capability. A space launch capability enables the other space combat and force enhancement missions. Space launch technologies also enable ballistic missile development. Third tier states attempting to procure ballistic missile or space launch capabilities are Libya, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Taiwan, South Africa, and South Korea.

511.2 Comprehend the nature of current air and space control theories.

AFM 1-1 notes that there are physical differences between the atmosphere and space, but defines no absolute boundary between them. Thus, the term "aerospace" comprises the entire expanse above the earth's surface outwards towards infinity. The entire earth's surface is therefore accessible to aerospace forces.

Aerospace control assures the friendly use of the environment while denying its use to an enemy. Aerospace control includes all missions whose objectives are designed to gain and maintain control of the aerospace environment. Counterair missions are those whose objective is control of the air. The objective of counterspace missions is control of space. These missions can be further divided into offensive and defensive aerospace control. Offensive aerospace control operations seek out and neutralize or destroy enemy aerospace forces and ground-based. defenses at a time and place of our choosing. Defensive aerospace control operations detect, identify, intercept, and destroy enemy aerospace forces at-tempting to attack friendly forces or to penetrate the aerospace environment above friendly surface forces.

Much of the theoretical underpinning for space control should be familiar from to you from your earlier study of Mahan and Corbett. The vast, open, and unobstructed nature of both the air and space and sea mediums suggest that their respective theories should share some common themes. It is useful to reconsider Corbett's and Mahan's ideas on sea control in assessing Mantz's theory of space. Lt Col Mantz's views concerning space combat are derived from his views on space control just as Mahan's and Corbett's thoughts on naval warfare flowed from their views on command of the sea.

Mahan, Corbett and Mantz all recognize that success in their respective mediums depends upon the ability to operate in an unconstrained fashion. Therefore, to exercise command of the air Douhet recognized that the skies had to be cleared of opposing air forces. In the same way, Mahan argued that sea control depended upon clearing the seas of enemy fleets. Both concepts are similar to Mantz's concept of space denial operations.

511.21 Discuss Mantz's theory of space control.

Mantz defines Space Control (like command of the air and command of the sea) involving operations to ensure unencumbered use of space while denying use to the enemy.

Total space control (the combination of space denial, space protection, and passive space defense measures) is neither achievable nor necessary.

Space control consists of both denying enemy access and assuring friendly access. These two missions can support each other or can be mutually exclusive. For example, total space denial might be achieved, but at the same time an inadequate space protection capability may not assure access. This is a stand-off situation; neither side has the use of space. The possibility of achieving total space denial is unlikely given the extensiveness of space, the number of space objects on orbit, and the number of space denial resources required.

But total space control may not be required to defeat an opponent. First, not all orbits need to be denied since only certain orbit types are militarily significant. Second, certain space denial methods would not only deny enemy access to those orbits, but also friendly access. Finally, a 1993 Air Command and Staff College study concludes:

Therefore, space control ultimately will prove to be conditional in almost all cases. Practical military application of space control will vary according to the degree of control desired; the speed with which it is needed; the frequency of occurrence; the specific terrestrial or space regions in which control is desired; how long control must be sustained; whether attacks on opposing systems are to be physical or otherwise, reversible or not, etc.

Space control may be limited to temporary, local control.

511.22 Discuss Warden's theory of strategic bombing via the "systems" approach.

Col John Warden has emerged as a leading advocate of force application in the third dimension. Credited as the originator of the four-phase campaign which guided allied air efforts during Desert Storm, Warden's vision of twenty-first century warfare unabashedly asserts the dominance of aerospace power over surface force. Furthermore, in concert with the "Long Blue Line" of American air theorists, he contends that the most effective and efficient application of air power is in the strategic realm. However, unlike his predecessors, particularly those at the Air Corps Tactical School, Warden's strategic air warfare is more political than economic in nature. Targeting enemy leadership to produce desired policy changes is the overarching aim that should guide the employment of friendly air forces. In this respect, Warden acknowledges an intellectual debt to the British military theorist, J. F. C. Fuller. One of Fuller's classic works, The Generalship of Alexander the Great, convinced the young Air Force Academy cadet of the efficacy of attacking the command element as a means of defeating armed forces-a strategy of incapacitation through decapitation."

Analyzing the enemy as a system, Warden contends that all strategic entities can be broken down into five component parts. The most crucial element of the system, the innermost ring, is

Figure 1. Warden's Five Strategic Rings

leadership. Extending outward from the leadership center, in descending importance to the overall functioning of the system, are the rings of organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and fielded forces (fig. 1).

Within each ring exists a COG or collection of COGs that represents "the hub of all power and movement" for that particular ring. If destroyed or neutralized, the effective functioning of the ring ceases, and this will impact the entire system in more or less significant ways (depending upon whether it is an inner or outer ring). To accurately identify these key hubs within each sub-rings (of leadership, organic essentials, etc.), and these into five more, if necessary, until the true COG surfaces.

The central theme of the Five Rings model is that the most effective strategic plan always focuses on leadership first and foremost. Even if leadership is unavailable as a target set, the air strategist must still focus on the mind of the commander when selecting centers of gravity among the other rings. For within these rings lie centers of gravity which, when hit, impose some level of physical paralysis, thereby raising the costs of further resistance in the mind of the enemy command. The implicit message is that destruction or neutralization of the leadership COG(s) will produce total physical paralysis of the system, whereas successful attack upon COGs within the other rings will produce partial physical paralysis, but unbearable psychological pressure upon the leadership.

Warden proposes three main ways to make the enemy do what we want him to do-the military strategies of imposed cost (coercion), paralysis (incapacitation), and destruction (annihilation). Collectively, these strategies represent a continuum of force application. The point chosen along that strategy continuum should coincide with the level of objective intent.

An imposed cost strategy seeks to make continued resistance too expensive for the enemy command. It attempts to do so by estimating the opponent's pain threshold, based on his value system, and then exceeding this threshold as violently and instantaneously as possible through simultaneous, or parallel," attacks upon the designated target set. Theoretically, such attacks coerce the enemy leadership to accept our terms and change its policy through the actual imposition of partial system paralysis, as well as the potential, or threatened, imposition of total system paralysis.

A paralysis strategy seeks to make continued resistance impossible for the enemy command. It does so by thoroughly and simultaneously incapacitating the entire enemy system from the inside out. This total system paralysis, in turn, provides us the freedom of movement to change policy for the enemy leadership without interference.

Finally, a destruction strategy seeks to annihilate the entire system, making policy change by the enemy leadership irrelevant. However, as Warden cautions, "the last of these options is rare in history, difficult to execute, fraught with moral concerns, and normally not very useful because of all the unintended consequences it engenders.'' In light of these observations, he dismisses this military strategy as politically unviable for twenty-first century warfare.

Finally, regarding means, Warden advocates the continual breakdown (or, in mathematical terms, the differentiation) of each strategic and operational ring until one surfaces the key to partial or total paralysis. Such successive differentiation exposes the interdependent nature, or "connectedness," of the enemy as a system. Consequently, a thorough systems analysis may reveal COGs that are linkages between rings as well as components within them.

To summarize the salient points of Warden's theory of strategic paralysis: First, the air strategist must fully appreciate the general nature and specific content of the objectives set by his political masters since these (1) prescribe the behavioral change(s) expected of the enemy leadership and (2) suggest the level of paralysis needed to effect the change(s); second, the air strategist must focus all energies in war on changing the mind of the enemy leadership, directly or indirectly, through the imposition of the necessary level of paralysis upon him and/or his system; third, the air strategist must analyze the enemy as an interdependent system of Five Rings to determine those centers of gravity within and between rings whose destruction or neutralization will impose the necessary level of paralysis; fourth, the air strategist must plan to attack all defined targets in parallel to produce the most rapid and favorable decision......

511.23 Discuss Boyd's theory of "strategic paralysis."

Machines don't fight wars. Terrain doesn't fight wars. Humans fight wars. You must get into the mind of humans. That's where the battles are won.
-Col John Boyd

Boyd became the first individual ever to link Godel's incompleteness theorem, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and the Second Law on entropy. In doing so, he synthesized the following: One cannot determine the nature and character of a system within itself and, furthermore, any attempts to do so will lead to greater disorder and confusion. Upon this single proposition, Boyd would build a comprehensive theory of conflict which linked victory to successfully forcing an inward-orientation upon the adversary by folding him back inside himself.

Boyd's theory of conflict advocates a form of maneuver warfare that is more psychological and temporal in its orientation than physical and spatial. Its military object is "to break the spirit and will of the enemy command by creating surprising and dangerous operational or strategic situations." To achieve this end, one must operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than one's adversaries. Put differently, the air of Boyd's maneuver warfare is to render the enemy powerless by denying him the time to mentally cope with the rapidly unfolding, and naturally uncertain, circumstances of war. One's military operations aim to: (1) create and perpetuate a highly fluid and menacing state of affairs for the enemy, and (2) disrupt or incapacitate his ability to adapt to such an environment.

Based upon an analysis of ancient and modern military history, Boyd identifies four key qualities of successful operations-initiative, harmony, variety, and rapidity. Collectively, these characteristics allow one to adapt to and to shape the uncertain, friction-filled environment of war. Boyd credits Clausewitz for recognizing the need to improve one's adaptability in war by minimizing one's own friction. In addition, borrowing from Sun Tzu, Boyd insists that friction can be used to shape the conflict in one's favor by creating and exploiting the frictions faced by one's opponent. He then relates this idea of minimizing friendly friction and maximizing enemy friction to his key qualities of initiative, harmony, variety, and rapidity.

To minimize friendly friction, one must act and react more quickly than one's opponent. This is best accomplished by the exercise of initiative at the lower levels within a chain-of-command. However, this decentralized control of how things are done must be guided by a centralized command of what and why things are done. This shared vision of a single commander's intent ensures strategic and operational harmony among the various tactical actions and reactions. Without a common aim and similar outlook on how best to satisfy the commander's intent, subordinate freedom-of-action risks disunity of effort and an attendant increase in friction.

To maximize enemy friction, one should plan to attack with a variety of actions which can be executed with the greatest possible rapidity. Similar to the contemporary notion of parallel warfare, this lethal combination of varied, rapid actions serves to overload the adversary's capacity to properly identify and address those events which are most threatening. By steadily reducing an opponent's physical and mental capability to resist, one ultimately crushes his moral will to resist as well.

While Boyd's theory of conflict addresses all levels of war (to include the grand strategic), this discussion focuses on the operational and strategic levels. At the operational level, Boyd speaks of severely disrupting the adversary's combat operation process used to develop and execute his initial and subsequent campaign plans. This disruption occurs by rapidly and repeatedly presenting the enemy with a combination of ambiguous, but threatening events and deceptive, but nonthreatening ones. These multiple events, compressed in time, will quickly generate mismatches, or anomalies, between those actions the opponent believes to threaten his survival and those which actually do. The enemy must eliminate these mismatches between perception and reality if his reactions are to remain relevant-that is, if he is to survive.

The operational aim should be to ensure the opponent cannot rid himself of these menacing anomalies by hampering his ability to process information, make decisions, and take appropriate action. In consequence, he can no longer determine what is being done to him and how he should respond. Ultimately, the adversary's initial confusion will degenerate into paralyzing panic, and his ability and/or willingness to resist will cease.

Similarly, at the strategic level, Boyd speaks of penetrating an adversary's "moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and overload his system." This three-dimensional being consists of "moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon.'' To paralyze this strategic being, Boyd advocates standing Clausewitz on his head. Instead of destroying "hubs of all power and movement," one should create non-cooperative centers of gravity by attacking the moral-mental-physical linkages which bind the hubs together. At the operational level, the end result is the destruction of the enemy's internal harmony and external connection to the real world. Theoretically, this severing of internal and external bonds produces paralysis and collapses resistance.

In what is perhaps the most well-known feature of Boyd's theory, he contends that all rational human behavior, individual or organizational, can be depicted as a continual cycling through four distinct tasks-observation, orientation, decision, and action. Boyd refers to this decision-making cycle as the "OODA loop." (fig. 2) Using this construct, the crux of winning

Figure 2. Boyd's OODA Loop

vice losing becomes the relational movement of opponents through their respective OODA loops. The winner will be he who repeatedly observes, orients, decides, and acts more rapidly (and accurately) than his enemy. By doing so, he "folds his opponent back inside himself" and eventually makes enemy reaction totally inappropriate to the situation at hand. The key to attaining a favorable edge in OODA loop speed and accuracy (and, hence, to winning instead of losing) is efficient and effective orientation.

To survive and grow within a complex, ever-changing world of conflict, we must effectively and efficiently orient ourselves; that is, we must quickly and accurately develop mental images, or schema, to help comprehend and cope with the vast array of threatening and non-threatening events we face. This image construction, or orientation, is nothing more than the process of destruction (analysis) and creation (synthesis) described earlier. It is,in Boyd's words, the process of "examining the world from a number of perspectives so that we can generate mental images or impressions that correspond to that world.'' Done well, it is the key to winning instead of losing. Done exceedingly well, it is the mark of genius.

The mental images we construct are shaped by our personal experience, genetic heritage, and cultural traditions. They ultimately influence our decisions, actions, and observations. Observations that match up with certain mental schema call for certain decisions and actions. The timeliness and accuracy of those decisions and actions are directly related to our ability to correctly orient and reorient to the rapidly unfolding, perpetually uncertain events of war. Mismatches between the real world and our mental images of that world will generate inaccurate responses. These, in turn, produce confusion and disorientation which then diminish both the accuracy and the speed of subsequent decision making. Left uncorrected, disorientation will steadily expand one's OODA loop until it eventually becomes a death trap.

Tying the preceding comments together, Boyd proposes that success in conflict stems from getting inside an adversary's OODA loop and staying there. The military commander can do so in two supplementary ways. First, he must minimize his own friction through initiative and harmony of response. This decrease in friendly friction acts to "tighten" his own loop (i.e., to speed up his own decision-action cycle time). Second, he must maximize his opponent's friction through variety and rapidity of response. This increase in enemy friction acts to "loosen" the adversary's loop (i.e., to slow down his decision-action cycle time). Together, these "friction manipulations" assure one's continual operation within the enemy's OODA loop in menacing and unpredictable ways. Initially, this produces confusion and disorder within the enemy camp. Ultimately, it produces panic and fear which manifest themselves in a simultaneous paralysis of ability to cope and willingness to resist.....

As Boyd himself would admit, his theory of conflict is quite esoteric. He speaks of dismembering the "moral-mental-physical being" of the enemy, of getting inside his "mind-time-space," yet offers few, if any, operational details as to how to go about accomplishing these abstract aims. The absence of detail is particularly frustrating for the practically minded war fighter whose profession centers on translating relatively obscure political ends into concrete military ways and means. But while Boyd's purpose is not to frustrate, neither is it to dictate.

As he tells it, John Boyd is a believer in theories not theory, in doctrines not doctrine. He refuses to advocate any one approach, any one formula; following a single path to victory makes one predictable and vulnerable. Moreover, through the study of all theories and doctrines, the warrior is able to accumulate a full bag of strategic tricks. Then, as a particular conflict unfolds, he can pick and choose from this bag as the situation demands. So, although Boyd's work is void of practical recipes for success, it is so by design. A more appropriate critique of his discourse on winning and losing lies elsewhere.

Ironically, one of the greatest strengths of Boyd's theory is, at the same time, a potential weakness-the emphasis on the temporal dimension of conflict. Reflecting an American bias for fast-paced operations and the related preference for short wars, Boyd presumes that operating at a faster tempo than one's opponent matters; or, more to the point, that it matters to the enemy. He may not care that we are "OODA looping" more quickly. Indeed, it may be in his interest to refuse to play by our rules.

511.24 Explain how each of these theories was influenced by previous theories examined during the course.

Fadok argues that the roots of the concept of strategic paralysis go all the way back to Sun Tzu, who said "those who win every battle are not skillful--those who render others' armies helpless without fighting are the best of all." Clausewitz, though often seen as bent on destruction of the enemy, was even closer to the concept of strategic paralysis when he defined destruction of the enemy as follows: ".... they must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight." Fuller's Plan 1919 (TH 507) may have been the first operational plan aimed at enemy paralysis He described man as consisting of three components: body, mind, and soul. These formed the basis for his analogous three spheres of war: that aimed towards the physical (destruction of the enemy's physical strength), the mental (disorganization of his mental processes), and the moral (disintegration of his moral will to resist). Again, great similarities with Sun Tzu's are evident. Fadok adds to Fuller's original concept the idea of non-lethal intent. This idea does not necessarily imply the elimination of destructive actions or fatalities during combat, but their minimization through application of non-lethal means.

Fadok describes strategic paralysis as a military operations with physical, mental, and moral dimensions which ideally focus on disabling rather than destroying the enemy. This will permit military objectives to be attained with minimal impact upon the post-hostility environment.

Fadok also compares Cols. Boyd and Warden to Jomini and Clausewitz, respectively. This comparison is not without merit. Boyd's theory is process-oriented and aims at psychological incapacitation. He talks about conducting military operations inside the enemy's decision-making cycle (OODA loop) to induce an enemy force to collapse of its own weight. Boyd's theory is quite esoteric. He speaks of getting inside his "mind, time, and space," yet offers few, if any, operational details as to how to go about accomplishing these abstract aims.

Warden's strategic paralysis theory is form-oriented and aims inflicting physical incapacitation through parallel, inside-out strikes against an enemy's five strategic rings, always focusing on the effects strikes have on the inner, "leadership" ring, whether that ring is specifically targeted or not. Adoption of Warden's strategy requires one to view the enemy through a systems analysis approach. Adoption of a systems approach permits a complex enemy system to be reduced to its basic parts or functions, the thorough analysis of which yields appropriate target sets. This approach permits enemy combat effectiveness to be mathematically represented as follows:

combat effectiveness = physical strength x moral strength

Warden contends that by inducing physical paralysis and reducing the physical component to zero, the moral component will no longer be relevant.

To sum up, Boyd's and Warden's airpower theories both focus on inducing strategic paralysis in an enemy. They differ in that Boyd would induce this paralysis through psychological incapacitation which renders military forces powerless whereas Warden advocates inducing physical paralysis on the enemy's fielded forces, thereby rending moral strength irrelevant.

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From the Fadok reading, what will future warfare entail?

Fadok envisions a transition from economic warfare based upon physical destruction to control warfare based upon informational targeting. He differs from both Boyd and Warden in the target sets he attempts to affect. Instead of targeting the leadership (either psychologically or physically), Fadok believes his information processing systems must be attacked. Fadok believes such "information dominance" will grow to be even more important than it was in the Gulf War. Some have called this new form of warfare "cyberwar" - the planning and execution of military operations in accordance with information-related principles. Fadok postulates that as technological advances permit decision-making and command structures to shift from top-down organizations to more horizontal structures, the leadership element may diminish in importance. This would arguably reduce the importance Warden and Boyd attach to the leadership ring of the enemy system, while increasing the importance of information networks.

Another factor to take into account when considering our transition to "cyberwar" is the uneven rate at which nations (or any politically significant organizations) reach maturity in the ongoing information or cyber MTR/RMA. The US military in the 21st century (and by extension, US air and space power) will have to be capable of successfully responding to what the Tofflers refer to "first wave" (agrarian) threats and "second wave" (industrial) threats, as well as "third wave" (information pr "cyber") threats simultaneously.

Warden believes that airpower in the 21st century will continue to emphasize precision, nonlethal technology, and information. These may be incorporated into a "reconnaissance-strike complex" which fuses sensors and shooters either physically or electronically. While this makes the shooter more dependent upon the sensor, such vulnerability is nothing new and is, in some respects, a strength.

LESSON OUTLINE:

Thesis: Current USAF doctrine considers air and space as an indivisible whole and emphasizes the traditional space capabilities -- communications, reconnaissance, navigation and warning, and surveillance along with the more familiar core competencies. This lesson explores the nature of space operations and examines the basis of a theory of space control. In examining the emerging airpower theories of Warden and Boyd, students will be introduced to the concepts of "strategic paralysis" thru "cascading effects" and "psychological dislocation." They will also ponder the question: What does it take for revolutionary new ideas to be incorporated into formal doctrine?

Main Point 1: Development of a comprehensive theory of space control is impacted upon by a unique combination of contextual and operational art elements which must be thoroughly understood if they are to be dealt with properly..

Main Point 2: Mantz's proposed space control theory is very to existing airpower theory. It's axioms address space strike, space denial, and space protection.

Main Point 3: Both Warden and Boyd take a systems approach to airpower employment which will result in inducing strategic paralysis on the enemy. Boyd's theory is geared at inducing this paralysis through psychological dislocation whereas Warden proposes to induce it through the physical destruction of critical nodes which will result in a cascading effect that totally incapacitates the enemy system.

Main Point 4: Existing airpower theory as outlined in AFM 1-1 as well as the emerging theories of Warden, Mantz, and Boyd are heavily influenced by theorists who preceded them.