TH 511 DISCUSSION
Throughout this course we have learned how war theory defines the field of military thought and doctrine, and provides an orderly methodology for thinking about war (including the use of air and space power). This lesson wraps up the War Theory course with a discussion of emerging air and space power theory.
Airpower theory since the time of Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) focused upon strategic bombardment doctrine which advocated economic warfare based upon industrial targeting. Desert Storm marked a shift from this economic-based form of warfare to what has been called "control" warfare. You will study two control warfare theorists who are part of the leading edge in this transition. As your reading by David S. Fadok notes, Col. (Ret.) John Warden advocates parallel, inside-out attack against five target categories he refers to as the "five rings," while John Boyd's concept is one of operating inside an enemy's decision cycle. In both cases, these theorists contend that the airpower objectives and associated strategies should focus on enemy command and its paralysis. This lesson will afford the opportunity to compare and contrast Warden's and Boyd's ideas, and analyze the possible future direction of airpower theory's development.
Another important area of emerging theory is that dealing with space. Lt. Col. Michael
R. Mantz is a leading advocate for the development of a separate theory for space. His
theory divides military space operations into three broad categories: space denial, space
strike, and space protection. Mantz then proposes a set of space combat power axioms that
defines these categories and synergize their combat effects.
LOQ. How does Fadok describe the evolution of airpower theory?
DISCUSSION. Before airpower, most theorists sought to achieve war aims through
either annihilation or attrition of the enemy's armed forces. Early airpower theorists
argued that war aims could be achieved more effectively and efficiently by rising above
and reaching beyond surface forces. What emerged during the interwar years was a strategic
bombardment doctrine advocating economic warfare based upon industrial targeting. As
the previous lesson shows, this doctrine continued to be employed with mixed results
through Viet Nam. In Desert Storm one could argue that the shift towards the control
warfare discussed by Warden and Boyd began. Control warfare is based upon command-based
targeting rather than industrial targeting.
FUQ. How would you define the strategic paralysis Fadok recognizes as a by-product of our emerging airpower theory?
DISCUSSION. Fadok argues that the roots of the concept of strategic paralysis go
all the way back to Sun Tzu, who said "those who win every battle are not
skillful--those who render others' armies helpless without fighting are the best of
all." Clausewitz, though often seen as bent on destruction of the enemy, was even
closer to the concept of strategic paralysis when he defined destruction of the enemy as
follows: ".... they must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on
the fight." Fuller's Plan 1919 (TH 507) may have been the first operational plan
aimed at enemy paralysis He described man as consisting of three components: body, mind,
and soul. These formed the basis for his analogous three spheres of war: that aimed
towards the physical (destruction of the enemy's physical strength), the mental
(disorganization of his mental processes), and the moral (disintegration of his moral will
to resist). Again, great similarities with Sun Tzu's are evident. Fadok adds to Fuller's
original concept the idea of nonlethal intent. This idea does not necessarily imply the
elimination of destructive actions or fatalities during combat, but their minimization
through application of non-lethal means.
In summary, Fadok describes strategic paralysis as a military operations with physical,
mental, and moral dimensions which ideally focus on disabling rather than destroying the
enemy. This will permit military objectives to be attained with minimal impact upon the
post-hostility environment.
FUQ. How are Col Boyd's and Col Warden's theories of strategic paralysis similar and how are they different?
DISCUSSION. Fadok compares Cols. Boyd and Warden to Jomini and Clausewitz,
respectively. This comparison is not without merit. Boyd's theory is process-oriented and
aims at psychological incapacitation. He talks about conducting military operations inside
the enemy's decision-making cycle (OODA loop) to induce an enemy force to collapse of its
own weight. Boyd's theory is quite esoteric. He speaks of getting inside his "mind,
time, and space," yet offers few, if any, operational details as to how to go about
accomplishing these abstract aims.
Warden's strategic paralysis theory is form-oriented and aims inflicting physical
incapacitation through parallel, inside-out strikes against an enemy's five strategic
rings, always focusing on the effects strikes have on the inner, "leadership"
ring, whether that ring is specifically targeted or not. Adoption of Warden's strategy
requires one to view the enemy through a systems analysis approach. Adoption of a systems
approach permits a complex enemy system to be reduced to its basic parts or functions, the
thorough analysis of which yields appropriate target sets. This approach permits enemy
combat effectiveness to be mathematically represented as follows:
combat effectiveness = physical strength x moral strength
Warden contends that by inducing physical paralysis and reducing the physical component
to zero, the moral component will no longer be relevant.
To sum up, Boyd's and Warden's airpower theories both focus on inducing strategic
paralysis in an enemy. They differ in that Boyd would induce this paralysis through
psychological incapacitation which renders military forces powerless whereas Warden
advocates inducing physical paralysis on the enemy's fielded forces, thereby rending moral
strength irrelevant.
FOQ: What does Boyd mean when he talks about "psychological dislocation"?
DISCUSSION. This entails rendering the enemy powerless by denying him the time
to mentally cope with the rapidly unfolding, and naturally uncertain circumstances of war.
This is best accomplished by conducting military operations which force the enemy to
respond to fluid, uncertain situations at a faster rate than his decision-making apparatus
can easily handle.
FUQ: What does Col. Warden mean by the concept of "cascading effect"?
DISCUSSION. A "cascading effect" is achieved by thoroughly and
simultaneously incapacitating the entire enemy system from the inside (leadership ring)
out (ending at his fielded forces). Employing airpower in parallel, near-simultaneous
attacks against multiple, diverse target sets throughout the 5-ring system overload his
decision-making apparatus to the extent that it can no longer react to defend itself.
During this course we have discussed the evolution of the way we think about war from
the classical theorists' basic concepts through the modern medium-based theories which
tailor those concepts to best reflect their unique concerns. This evolution will continue
as we enter the 21st century.
LOQ. From the Fadok reading, what will future warfare entail?
DISCUSSION. Fadok envisions a transition from economic warfare based upon
physical destruction to control warfare based upon informational targeting. He differs
from both Boyd and Warden in the target sets he attempts to affect. Instead of targeting
the leadership (either psychologically or physically), Fadok believes his information
processing systems must be attacked. Fadok believes such "information dominance"
will grow to be even more important than it was in the Gulf War. Some have called this new
form of warfare "cyberwar" - the planning and execution of military operations
in accordance with information-related principles. Fadok postulates that as technological
advances permit decision-making and command structures to shift from top-down
organizations to more horizontal structures, the leadership element may diminish in
importance. This would arguably reduce the importance Warden and Boyd attach to the
leadership ring of the enemy system, while increasing the importance of information
networks.
Another factor to take into account when considering our transition to
"cyberwar" is the uneven rate at which nations (or any politically significant
organizations) reach maturity in the ongoing information or cyber MTR/RMA. The US military
in the 21st century (and by extension, US air and space power) will have to be capable of
successfully responding to what the Tofflers refer to "first wave" (agrarian)
threats and "second wave" (industrial) threats, as well as "third
wave" (information pr "cyber") threats simultaneously.
FUQ. What does Col Warden view as primary characteristics of 21st century airpower?
DISCUSSION. Warden believes that airpower in the 21st century will continue to
emphasize precision, nonlethal technology, and information. These may be incorporated into
a "reconnaissance-strike complex" which fuses sensors and shooters either
physically or electronically. While this makes the shooter more dependent upon the sensor,
such vulnerability is nothing new and is, in some respects, a strength.
Current USAF doctrine considers air and space as an indivisible whole and emphasizes
the following traditional space capabilities: communications, reconnaissance, navigation
and warning, and surveillance. The advent of "cyberwar" suggests that space will
become increasingly important in future warfare. One must therefore ask the following
questions: Does our current airpower theory adequately addresses space concerns? If it
does not, is a distinct space theory required? What concepts should our space theory
include, and how will these concepts be integrated into other theories?
Much of the theoretical underpinning for space control should be familiar from to you
from your earlier study of Mahan and Corbett. The vast, open, and unobstructed nature of
both the air and space and sea mediums suggest that their respective theories should share
some common themes. It is useful to reconsider Corbett's and Mahan's ideas on sea control
in assessing Mantz's theory of space. Lt Col Mantz's views concerning space combat are
derived from his views on space control just as Mahan's and Corbett's thoughts on naval
warfare flowed from their views on command of the sea.
LOQ. How does AFM 1-1 define the aerospace environment?
DISCUSSION. AFM 1-1 notes that there are physical differences between the
atmosphere and space, but defines no absolute boundary between them. Thus, the term
"aerospace" comprises the entire expanse above the earth's surface outwards
towards infinity. The entire earth's surface is therefore accessible to aerospace forces.
FUQ. What are the roles and typical missions for aerospace power outlined in AFM 1-1?
DISCUSSION. Aerospace power can be employed across the traditional Air Force
operational spectrum. AFM 1-1 begins its discussion of aerospace control by addressing the
typical missions of counterair and counterspace. It then discusses possible force
applications including strategic attack, interdiction, and close support missions. AFM 1-1
also recognizes aerospace contributions to force enhancement such as airlift, air
refueling, spacelift, electronic combat, surveillance and reconnaissance, and special
operations. Force support roles including base operability and defense, logistics, combat
support, and on-orbit support are also addressed.
FUQ: How do Mantz define "space control"?
DISCUSSION. Space control (like command of the air and command of the sea)
involves operations to ensure the unencumbered use of space while denying such use to the
enemy.
FUQ: "How is space control similar to command of the air or sea?
DISCUSSION. All three recognize that success in their respective mediums depends
upon the ability to operate in an unconstrained fashion. Therefore, to exercise command of
the air Douhet recognized that the skies had to be cleared of opposing air forces. In the
same way, Mahan argued that sea control depended upon clearing the seas of enemy fleets.
Both concepts are similar to Mantz's concept of space denial operations.
FUQ: How do Mantz's proposed space roles and missions differ from AFM 1-1?
DISCUSSION. Mantz changes AFM 1-1's roles from space support, force enhancement,
space control, and force application to threespace support, force enhancement, and space
combat (roughly incorporating AFM 1-1's concept of space control and force application).
Space combat is the focal point of much of Mantz's space theory. He suggests that a theory
of space combat is necessary to the understanding and proper employment of our space
capabilities, particularly given the rapid proliferation of space based capabilities
throughout the world.
FUQ. What elements does Mantz's include as components of space combat?
His concept of space combat includes space denial, space strike, and space protection.
In his study, Mantz defines space denial as "hostile application of destructive or
disruptive force against enemy space systems to deny the enemy's use of the space
medium." He defines space strike as the hostile application of destructive force
"from space against natural-body-based (earth, moon, and asteroid) targets."
Space protection, meanwhile, is defined as "defensive application of...force to
defend friendly space systems."
FUQ. What arguments does Mantz cite which oppose the concept of space combat?
DISCUSSION. Mantz notes several current arguments against space combat, the
first of which is the physical challenge of getting into space. He suggests that the US
space launch capability is not responsive enough. He is also concerned about the cost of
spacelift, and political resistance to the militarization of space which many view as a
violation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Finally, Mantz recognizes
possible technology shortfalls which may preclude effective space combat even if other
constraints were removed.
FOQ. Mantz proposes a preliminary set of space combat power axioms which highlight the difficulty in establishing a distinct space theory. How do his space combat power axioms compare with airpower tenets?
DISCUSSION. The initial impression one gets in reviewing Mantz's theory via his
space power axioms is that there is nothing that really distinguishes space concerns from
those of airpower generally. His axioms seem to be founded upon the same airpower tenets
which have been evolving since W.W.I. This contradicts his major contention that the term
"aerospace" theory is invalid because it does not recognize the inherent
differences in the air and space mediums. It would seem that if space theory is to be
considered apart from airpower theory, its body of thought should diverge from or
transcend in some way that of airpower.
Throughout this course we have observed how war theory - how we think about war - has evolved over time as a result of fundamental changes in contextual or operational art elements which sometimes manifest themselves as MTRs or RMAs. The validity of theory is assessed as it is put into practice in a variety of settings. Theory and the doctrines which flow from it are then modified as required by the lessons learned. If we fail to capture the lessons learned in combat into our theory of war, our doctrine becomes dogma and will ultimately result in our defeat on the battlefield. Our current doctrine seems to have served us well during Desert Storm. How long it will remain adequate is a matter of debate. It will be up to you, the airpower planners and leaders of the next century to ensure that our ideas concerning the proper employment of air and space power continue to evolve when necessary based on our past experiences, our present requirements, and our most informed guess as to what the future holds.