The following is Anwar Ibrahim's statement to the Federal Court, requesting that Chief Justice Eusoff
Chin step down from hearing his appeal. The statement, except for minor editorial corrections, is as
circulated via email and in the newsgroup soc.culture.malaysia by M.G.G Pillai.

MGG attached the following introductory statement to it:

The newspapers and the official media today reported brieþy but obscurely, of the Chief Justice, Tun
Eusoff Chin, refusing to recuse himself from hearing the Federal Court appeal by Dato' Seri Anwar
Ibrahim. He argued the appeal himself, having discharged his counsel to do so. Indeed, if his counsel
had made the submission he made, they could have landed themselves in court for contempt. The
hearing was to appeal against a Court of Appeal decision that the Prime Minister need not appear as a
defence witness in Dato' Seri Anwar's defence. What follows is the transcript of his statement to the
court:

DATO' SERI ANWAR IBRAHIM: I respectfully am applying to this court for your Lordship, Tun
Eusoff Chin, the Chief Justice, to disqualify himself from hearing this appeal.

The essence of a fair trial is that the proceedings including appeals thereforeafter are conducted by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. This tribunal is enshrined in
international law and practice; and the Malaysian Constitution. (Ref: UN Declaration of Human Rights
(Article 10); further elaborated in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 14 (1)).

In Valente v The Queen (1988) 2 SSR 673, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the distinction
between impartiality and independence. It described impartiality as a "state of mind or attitude of
the tribunal of the issues and the parties in a particular case" whereas independence focussed
on the status of the court or tribunal in its relationship with others particularly the executive branch of
the Government. The Court asserted that the traditional objective guarantees for judicial independence
must be supplemented with the requirement that the Court or tribunal be reasonably perceived as
independent. This additional requirement was deemed necessary to ensure not only "that justice is done
in individual cases, but also of ensuring public confidence in the justice system".

The Court added:

"Without that confidence the system cannot command the respect and acceptance that are
essential to its effective operation. It is, therefore, important that a tribunal should be
perceived as independent, as well as impartial, and that the test for independence should
include that perception. The perception must, however, as I have suggested, be a perception of
whether the tribunal enjoys the essential objective conditions on guarantees of judicial independence,
and not a perception of how it will in fact act, regardless of whether it enjoys such conditions or
guarantees." (p689)

The applicable test for recusal as laid down by the Appellate Courts of Australia, Canada, United
Kingdom and recently reiterated by the Constitutional Court of South Africa is as follows:

"The question is whether a reasonable objective and informed person would on the correct
facts reasonably apprehend that the Judge has not or will not bring an impartial mind to hear
on the adjudication of the case, that is a mind open to persuasion by the evidence and the
submissions of counsel. The reasonableness of the apprehension must be assessed in the light of the
oaths of office taken by the Judges to administer justice without fear or favour, and their ability
to carry out that oath by reason of their training and experience. It must be assumed that they
can disabuse their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs and predispositions. They must take into
account the fact that they have a duty to sit in any case in which they are not obliged to recuse
themselves. At the same time, it must never be forgotten that an impartial Judge is a
fundamental prerequisite for a fair trial and a judicial officer should not hesitate to recuse
herself or himself if there are reasonable grounds in the past of the litigant to apprehend that
the judicial officer, for whatever reasons, was not or will not be impartial." (President of the
Republic of South Africa and Others vs South Africa Rugby Football Union and Others 1999 (4) SA
147)

It is not for the Judge called upon to recuse to say that he will be independent or impartial. It is how a
reasonable objective and informed person will perceive.

I am conscious of the presumption that judicial officers are impartial in adjudicating disputes. I am
equally conscious of the principle that the onus is upon me to rebut that presumption by adducing
cogent and convincing facts.

My application for recusal are based on the following grounds:

   1.I have ample evidence to show that the Chief Justice craved for an additional six months
     extension, to ensure that no action would be preferred against him; and to ensure that I fail in my
     appeal. I am also privy, then as Deputy Prime Minister, to the fact that the Anti Corruption
     Agency had prepared a preliminary report against the Chief Justice in 1998 over corruption.

     Undoubtedly, there were precedents to the extension. What is exceptional in this case is that it
     was given amidst public knowledge of the CJ's misconduct. And with the issue of the tribunal
     being pursued and the issue of corruption left hanging, would the CJ dare cause the displeasure
     of the PM? Particularly so, when I have been appealing to the courts not to allow itself to be
     used to legitimise political persecution!

     In early August 1998, the CJ called on me at the Treasury; initially to express his sympathies
     and concern over the scurrilous and malicious allegations against me. He then accused a Cabinet
     minister and a lawyer of demeaning his reputation. He further mentioned to me that the
     Attorney-General was disturbed that the same lawyer had claimed that the would be
     recommended by me to replace the Attorney-General, Tan Sri Mohtar Abdullah. I denied. The
     following (day?) when I met the Chief Justice at Parliament House, I noticed a distinct change in
     his demeanour and was rather cold and aloof. I gathered later that something was amiss after he
     was summoned a few times by the PM. It was later confirmed that the PM had decided to
     dismiss and prosecute me and that the CJ was incorporated into the scheme. This is a major
     cause of apprehension for me.

   2.It is now public knowledge that certain improprieties has been levelled against the CJ. The
     allegations, together with photographs and other documentary evidence are widely disseminated
     through the Internet and the alternative media. A serving Minister, when questioned bout the
     CJ's conduct described it as "improper". The revelations about the CJ's family holiday travel to
     New Zealand with lawyer Dato' V.K. Lingam's family in late 1994; compounded by his attempt
     to dismiss the episode as "coincidental" in contrast to the facts revealed in the Bowman Report
     exposed the discrepancies and contradictions and have brought into question the CJ's conduct
     and credibility. Rule 3 (1) (d) of the Judge's Code of Ethics reads:

"conduct himself dishonestly or in such manner as to bring the judiciary into disrepute or to
bring discredit thereto"

The Constitution provided under Article 125 (3) that a judge could be removed on ground of breach
of the Code. The Prime Minister makes a representation to the Yang Dipertuan Agung to appoint a
tribunal. The judge concerned could be suspended from his office pending the tribunal hearing.

Dato' V.K. Lingam's name surfaced earlier when I presented the preliminary report on Perwaja to
Parliament in 1996. In the Price Waterhouse's report, the fees paid for legal services was considered
exhorbitant and "questionable" coming to millions. The CJ was known to have made critical comment
on my announcement. I chose to ignore the comments, not being aware then of his close association
with Dato' V.K. Lingam.

A Cabinet minister and another lawyer met the PM and me separately to allege the CJ of the
improprieties. Accordingly, I advised them to report to the Anti-Corruption Agency. I did not initiate
the investigations as alleged by the CJ.

Incidentally, attempts by the Malaysian Bar Council to deliberate on the conduct of the CJ and
recommend the setting up of a tribunal was evidently frustrated and derailed through a select judicial
process providing a restrictive interpretation of Article 125 and 127 of the Constitution.

We had one of the best judiciaries in the Commonwealth, or in this part of the world. However, under
the CJ's leadership, it has deteriorated to such a level and further erode public confidence. Even when
I was Minister of Finance, the Bar, Bank Negara and the Treasury informed me of several feedbacks
from foreign investors and local business men as to their loss of confidence in the Malaysian judiciary.
Many of the international contracts now contain clauses that in the event of any dispute or litigation
arising from these contracts, the parties involved will not resort to Malaysian courts, but instead subject
themselves to arbitration, usually in a foreign forum. The appraisals and concerns expressed on these
issues by me in appropriate forums with the Bar, Bank Negara and the Cabinet was viewed with
contempt by the CJ.

The appeal of M.G.G. Pillai and others in the Tan Sri Vincent Tan case reveals serious improprieties in
the part of the CJ. Arguments in that appeal were heard by the Federal Court presided by the CJ on
January 12, 1998. Judgement was not delivered until July 12, 2000 - more than two and a half years
laters. Rule 3 (1) (f) of the Judge's Code of Ethics provides as follows:

"inordinately and without reasonable explanation delay in the disposal of cases, the delivery
of decisions and the meeting of grounds of judgement."

The reason given by the CJ was flimsy, i.e. that the delay was because the judges could not agree on
the quantum! (The Star, June 7, 2000). However, when judgement was in fact delivered, one of the
three, Justice Chong Siew Fai, had already retired on July 3. The single judgement written by the CJ
was delivered in open court by the Senior Assistant Registrar.

It is also relevant to note that the earlier High Court judgement was delivered by Judge Dato' Moktar
Sidin. Revelations on how the judgement was written in party by Dato' V.K. Lingam shows the extent
of the decadence among senior members of the judiciary.

The CJ was apparently impervious, sitting in the same M.G.G. Pillai's appeal when the counsel who
argued for the Respondent, Tan Sri Vincent Tan was Dato' V.K. Lingam; perceived as his close
friend. The CJ ought to have voluntarily recused himself from hearing the appeal. Subsequently, in
another case where Dato' Lingam appeared for one of the parties, the CJ recused at the request of the
Bar Council, when the holiday photographs were produced.

The CJ reached his age of retirement on June 19, 2000; and Dato' Seri Dr Mahathir had dismissed any
possibility of making representations for a tribunal (The Star, June 14, 2000). But most amazing amidst
public consternation about the CJ's conduct, he extended the CJ's term of office for another six
months, suggesting that "we have the need to see that everything is in place before he leaves"
(NST, June 17, 2000)

Is my appeal in the agenda, "to see everything is in place"? This perception that the CJ has become
more beholden to the Prime Minister is pertinent. There is reasonable apprehension to the effect. All
along my defence has consistently been that the malicious and fabricated charges, inter alia, has been
that there was a political conspiracy at the highest level to dismiss, persecute and villify me with Dato'
Seri Dr Mahathir as the maestro.

In any event, the CJ should not be sitting in any new appeals during the extended six months. Though
Article 125 (1) does not expressly say so, yet the purpose of the short extension is to enable the judge
concerned to complete any unfinished business, like outstanding judgements; and not to be assigned
any new cases including appeals.

The CJ on a number of occasions found my remark on the judiciary objectionable and abhorrent and
strongly protested to the Prime Minister. My decision to keep the rapport with the Bar Council,
personalities such as Param Cumaraswamy; some of my speeches including with reference to the Lim
Guan Eng case, and the access given to some senior Judges, including Judge Syed Ahmad Idid and
Judge Dr Visu Sinnadurai were regarded with contempt. My statements were seen as a personal
attack on him and it angered him enormously.

In his first meeting with me as the DPM, I strongly urged him to accept the overtures from the Bar
Council. Unfortunately, the CJ chose to adopt the confrontational politics inherited from Tun Hamid
Omar (his predecessor). Be that as it may, that should not preclude my having meetings with
representatives of the Bar to listen to their proposals and grievances.

I submitted to the PM and the Cabinet that Param Cumaraswamy, UN Special Representative, is
entitled to immunity from legal process during the course of his mission under the UN Conventiion on
Privileges and Immunities. The CJ disputed this in a memo to the PM which was subsequently sent to
me. Obviously, the CJ had prejudiced Param's case and deplored my so-called intervention.
Admittedly I intervened at the personal request of the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. And this
was conveyed to the Cabinet on 3rd December 1997. I alerted my Cabinet colleagues that Param's
interview in "Malaysian Justice on trial" merit scrutiny. And by prolonging the issue, and by
subjecting to the ICJ, would seem untenable and an embarrassment to the Malaysian judiciary.
Understandably, I was overruled by Dato' Seri Dr Mahathir. But, it was most unbecoming of the CJ to
cast aspersions and anger against me for expressing my views to the PM and the Cabinet.

In late July 1998, Dato' Seri Dr Mahathir informed me that the CJ and the Attorney-General met him
and denounced my speech in London as an attack on the AG's Chambers and the judiciary. I was
mindful and circumspect of the sensitivities but I did relate to the students my predicament of having to
explain the decision on the Lim Guan Eng case; the solution being legal and judicial reform. The PM
further intimated to me the CJ's extreme displeasure for what he perceived as personal attacks against
him and undermining his authority.

The CJ should not have objected to my meeting Judge Syed Ahmad Idid. He sought an appointment
prior to his retirement; i.e. after investigations over his controversial open letter was completed. But
these were serious allegations of corruption, abuse of power, and misconduct of the CJ and some
members of the judiciary. In retrospect, looking at these complaints, many of the allegations contained
therein appear to have been substantiated.

In another case, one of the most qualified judges in the country opted to resign rather than be
subjected to the CJ's victimisation. I have personal knowledge of the alleged victimisation through
uncouth disciplinary methods and occasional transfers to Muar and finally to Tawau. Again, I
intervened and intimated the Prime Minister. Unfortunately, the CJ was adamant and the judiciary lost
Judge Dr Visu Sinnadurai who had such impeccable credentials. Judge Dr Visu had earlier written a
memorandum on the judiciary including Proposals for Reform on the Judiciary. The memo was a
confidential document to the PM and myself as the DPM. The memo to the PM was submitted through
me and I indicated my support to most of the proposals. Unfortunately, being anathema with the
executive, the memo was detested by both the PM and the CJ.

The Memo/Report emphatically states that the "Malaysian Judiciary appears currently to be in a
state of turmoil..." The Report enumerated Tun Eusoff Chin's demeanour; alienating the Bar; verbal
exchanges of challenges in the Press; citing for example the Ayer Molek case being "something amiss in
the Judiciary." [see extract of the Report On The Judiciary, on Eusoff Chin pp 11-13]

The Report attributes the blame to the CJ for aggravating the loss of public confidence in the Judiciary.
"It even appears that the appointment of Judges to the High Court in the past few years were
made not in accordance with the Federal Constitution insofar as there had been no prior
consultation with the Chief Judge, at least of Malaya." As such only people known to be close to
him, as cronies were appointed or promoted. A Judge with questionable integrity, and in the wake of
negative representation from the Bar, was promoted to the Court of Appeal.

Incidentally, this was the same Judge that I sought to disqualify from hearing my case the Court of
Appeal. Judge Dato' Moktar Sidin refused to recuse himself even after my insistence of his clear
partiality and bias due to the deferment of his appointment to the Court of Appeal as a result of my
meeting with the Rulers. In the pre-council to the Rulers' Conference, the issue of alleged corrupt
practice of Judge Mokhtar Sidin was brought up. Subsequently the PM dismissed the allegations
without investigations being carried out and facilitated his appointed[ment?]. The CJ took it as a
personal challenge that his recommended candidate was objected to.

The Report states, inter alia, "Senior judges are not promoted either because, it is said, the
Prime Minister does not approve of them, or because of quota, or even on the ground that
such persons are unsuitable as being anti-establishment." Often related issues were also
highlighted. for example that "the Courts have arrogated to themselves the law making
function", usurping the power of the Chief Judge on transfers, distribution of cases, etc; and the fact
that the "Judiciary is now rife with clashes of personalities, with less time for the development
of the law." And yet most damaging for the image of the judiciary is the perception of biasness,
friendly lawyers continue appearing before the CJ and the same judges and "by coincidence or
otherwise, these lawyers appear before the same judges and win cases."

I have often alluded to the infamous Ayer Molek Case which have generated much public debate
particularly in the legal fraternity. It has adversely affected the credibility of Judge Dato Azmel Maomer
for the questionable judgement that bear an appearance of being influenced by unseen hands. The facts
surrounding the case have been well documented in the Law Reports. But the observations of the
Court of Appeal (comprising Dato' N.H. Chan, Dato' Siti Normah Yaacob, and Dato' K.C. Vohrah),
when allowing the Defendant's Appeal (on 31 July 1995), on the facts of the case and the procedural
manipulations involved bear repeating. Dato' N.H. Chan, delivering the judgement of the Court of
Appeal, had this to say:

   a."This is a case about injustice which has been perpetrated by a court of law. This is also
     a case of abuse of power of the High Court and, therefore, it concerns the inherent
     power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its procedure and in
     which the court has a duty to exercise this salutary powers.
   b.......
   c."Here, the Plaintiffs through their legal advisers have abused the process of the High
     Court by instigating the injustice through misuse of the courts procedure by
     manipulating it in such a way that it becomes manifestly unfair to the Defendants. By
     doing what they did, these unethical lawyers have brought the administration of justice
     into disrepute among right-thinking people."
   d."These observations are made so that people will not say, "Something is rotten in the
     State of Denmark." - Shakespeare, Hamlet, 1."

This timely rebuke by the Court of Appeal was welcome by the public because the excesses and
corruption were getting pervasive. An expedited hearing by the Federal Court was heard within a few
days of the Plaintiff's application (again involving Dato' V.K. Lingam) at an Ipoh sitting. The CJ
constituted an unconstitutional Federal Court as it breached the provisions of Article 122 (2) of the
Federal Constitution in that a member of the sitting was a close friend of the CJ. The Court of Appeal's
decision was overturned and the relevant portions of the grounds of judgement of the Court of Appeal
was expunged!

Allegations of corruption and instances of conflict of interest continue to undermine the integrity and
rocked the foundation of the nation's judicial system. Exasperated by such developments, I chose to
circulate the Ayer Molek judgements to the Cabinet, and specifically underlining Dato' N.H. Chan's
rebuke and the Federal Court's alleged transgression of the Constitutional provisions of Article 122
(2). The Prime Minister interjected by informing the Cabinet that he would seek clarification from the
CJ. That episode was cited in a few meetings by the CJ showing a clear displeasure and prejudice
towards me.

The CJ, according to one High Court Judge, took exception to some of my speeches perceived to be
critical of misdemeanours of some members of the judiciary; particularly my speech inaugurating the
seventh Asean Law Association and the chapter "Justice And the Law", in my (book), "The Asian
Renaissance" (1996). I retorted to the said Judge that I merely reaffirmed the constitutional mandate
and democratic ideal, including the issue of separation of powers. May I further reiterate:

"Judges ought to exercise their judicial powers in accordance with the rule of law and not the
rule of men. In doing so, judges must constantly bear in mind the legitimate expectations of
the people as to their competency, dedication and impartiality. The growing concern of the
public regarding the increasing incidences of judicial indiscretions is a matter to be neither
taken lightly nor viewed negatively. Not only must judges display the requisite level of
competence and expertise, they must, like Caesar's wife, be above suspicion." (The Asian
Renaissance, 1996, pp 64-65)

I made reference to judges with impeccable credentials. There are many other judges still in our
judiciary who discharge their duties according to the oath of office; and who are also guided by their
religious duty and moral beliefs. We implore upon them to have the moral courage, respect the rule of
law and be dictated by their conscience. For, it is in them that the future and hope of our judiciary lies.

IT is most distressing that the CJ should consider my clamour for judicial and legal reforms as a
personal threat to him. He should not have summarily dismissed it as merely echoing "foreign
sentiments". Long before the report "Malaysian Judiciary in Jeopardy" was released, our Lord
Presidents, Judges, the Malaysian Bar and others, consistent with all the great traditions of mankind,
enjoin the maintenance of the rule of law and dispensation of justice. Clearly, my criticisms of
"retrogressive judgements from our own courts" and insistence for "progressive reforms" to be
instituted was resented by the CJ. Such reform and reviews are critical to ensure that our ideals of
justice are not compromised and our laws are not rendered archaic and obsolete. (The Asian
Renaissance (1996), pp 68-70),

The test applicable for recusal is whether a reasonable objective person informed of these facts would
have any confidence in the Chief Justice to dispense independent and impartial justice. The scurrilous
allegations, the malicious prosecution preferred against me is, as consistently contended in my defence,
a result of a high level conspiracy involving the supremo, Dato' Seri Dr Mahathir himself instructing the
instruments of the state to persecute and villify me. I must prove my innocence. I need to be
adjudicated by an independent judiciary. And I fear with the grounds stated, and with all that I hear of
you, subservient to the Prime Minister and now beholden to him, I am apprehensive of your impartiality
in this appeal.

Hence, I urge you, please, CJ, recuse.

Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim