19 January 1862, Kentucky, War Between the States

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Narrative from Company A, 20th Tennessee Infantry

BATTLE OF FISHING CREEK

Memphis "Daily Avalanche," 31 January 1862, page 2

"John Hapley," the correspondent of the Nashville Banner, gives the following outline of the Fishing Creek fight:

     For days previous Major-General Crittenden had information to satisfy him that the enemy was concentrating large forces around his position at Mill Springs, with the evident determination to cut off his supplies and starve out our little army; and a force supposed to be 3,000 strong, had made its appearance suddenly on this side of Fishing Creek. General C. concluded it would be politic to fight the enemy by detachments, to advance upon the force at Fishing Creek, and, if possible, drive them back, and then to engage afterwards with any other forces that might obstruct the navigation of the Cumberland by Southern steamers. He held a consultation with the different commanders of the post, and all agreed, with one assent, that to attack the enemy at Fishing Creek was the most feasible plan of operations.

     We were all ordered to cook two days rations on last Saturday morning, the 19th [sic – read 18th] of January, preparatory to a march that night, and towards evening we received orders to march at 12 o’clock M., in the direction of Fishing Creek.

     It had been raining all day, and the roads were in wretched condition for the task we had before us, the dust being reduced to the consistency of mush, sometimes knee-deep, and in many places almost impassable. The following was the order of march: First General Zollicoffer’s Brigade -- the 15th Mississippi, Colonel Walthall, in advance; battery of four guns, Captain Rutledge; 19th Tennessee, Colonel Cummings; 20th Tennessee, Colonel Stanton. Next, General Carroll’s Brigade -- the 17th Tennessee, Colonel Miller; 28th Tennessee, Colonel Powell; and two guns of Captain McClung’s Battery, in the rear of the infantry. Next to Carroll’s Brigade, the 16th Alabama Regiment, Colonel Wood, in reserve. Cavalry Battalions in the rear -- Colonel Branner, on the right, and Colonel McClellan on the left. Independent companies in front of the advance regiment; ambulances and ammunition in the rear of the whole, and in the order of their regiments.

     At midnight we started on the march, the most cheerless and disagreeable night I have ever experienced, to attack an enemy eight or nine miles distant. Long before we reached the vicinity of the enemy, our troops were completely fagged out, from the great difficulty of dragging themselves through the thick, heavy slush, in almost Egyptian darkness. Before daylight a cold rain commenced falling, which saturated our clothing and rendered progress still more difficult and disagreeable. Early in the morning our vanguard commenced firing on the pickets, and now and then the echo of a distant shot would fall upon the ear, volleys of musketry and rifle shot, which told that the bloody work had commenced ahead. We then pushed on, in order to surround the enemy’s camp and take him by surprise before the day was too far advanced. This intended surprise proved a failure.

     The Mississippians went down the road, towards the upper ford of Fishing creek, at a double quick, followed by Cummings’ regiment.

     Just then a couple of riderless horses came galloping towards us from the woods ahead, which proved that the advance cavalry had encountered the enemy without any doubt. The two preceding regiments were just disappearing in a skirt of woods on ahead of us when our regiment (Col. Battle’s) was ordered to double quick, and we went forward rapidly, passing a rude hut on the left of the road, which had already been converted into a temporary hospital, and where our own regimental Surgeons were at that moment dressing the wounds of a cavalryman, who had been shot by the pickets. We filed to the left across an open field, and then formed in line of battle, and so advanced up the field in the direction of the enemy’s camp, which we had not yet seen. As we passed, I saw Gen. Zollicoffer sitting quietly in his saddle and surrounded by his staff. A placid smile stole over his features, as we went forward with so much eagerness and hurry and that was the last I saw of him; for he fell on the battlefield in an hour afterwards. As we advanced into a copse of woods at the upper end of the field, the Mississippians opened fire on our left. We quickened our pace, and coming out of the woods on the rise of another open field, found ourselves in the very face of the enemy, who opened on us a terrible volley.

     Our boys immediately commenced firing without waiting for orders, and then the battle commenced in dead earnest. For three quarters of an hour it as one incessant, deafening rattle of small arms, intermingled with the heavy booms of the enemy’s cannon and the crash of grape and canister among the trees and bushes. Just then it commenced raining, and the priming in the pans of our muskets became wet and the pieces refused fire. In this the enemy had a fearful advantage in their percussion lock rifles. We retired below the crown of the hill to get the firelocks in order, and then advanced, firing again.

     At this juncture we were in a fearful strait, with guns rendered utterly useless by the rain, and no supporting regiment coming to our assistance, while we knew from the report of their guns that the enemy were advancing in front. Then, as a last resort, we were ordered to charge right in among the Yankees, and the gallant twentieth went forward with a yell that made the woods resound. As we rose the first hill, the hissing of the bullets past our ears, and the dead cluck of the minnie balls in the solid timber, seemed to exceed in shrillness the crash of the rifles that were discharged in our faces. On we went, down the slope, across the ravine and up the next hill, the leaden messengers dealing death and destruction in our ranks.

     They reserved their fire until we had approached quite close upon their fortifications, and then they opened upon us a murderous fire, so constant, so regular and so deadly, that no troops in the world could withstand it, and we were forced to retire with heavy losses. It was as gallant and daring charge as was ever made, yet I think it extremely unfortunate that it was made before the nature of the ground and the number of troops were better understood. The enemy were covered by the woods all the time; they were densely packed behind log breastworks, with artillery in their rear, and, still in the rear of that, a battalion of cavalry, in line and under cover. Even if we had succeeded in driving them from behind their logs, their field pieces would have swept us like chaff before the wind, at that close range. Besides, we were subjected to a cross fire from another regiment, which had begun to flank us on the right, and was firing up the ravine, and had nearly surrounded us before we could fall back. Our charge was all that saved the Mississippians, who were fighting desperately on our left -- indeed, that regiment and our own were the chief participants and the only sufferers in the action. I have since heard officers who were in the Mexican campaign assert, that at the charge at Monterey, the enemy’s bullets never came so fast as they did on this occasion. It really seemed as if one could just hold out his open hand and gather bullets by the handful! The firing was so incessant, that it must have been from two or three regiments at least.

     In this charge every field officer in our regiment was wounded, and had his horse killed under him. Such another instance is not recorded in the annals of ancient or modern warfare.

     In this charge our company, the Hickory Guards, lost eight men killed and wounded, and among them our gallant and noble First Lieutenant, Balie Peyton, jr. He was in command of the company at the time, in the absence of our Captain, (who had just started home, on a sick furlough, before the expedition was ordered.) Peyton led the company in the charge, and was shot in the forehead, close to the enemy’s works, and his comrades were unable to bring him from the field. THE REGIMENTS IN THE REAR OF US WERE PANIC-STRUCK AT THE OVERWHELMING FORCE OF THE ENEMY, AND LEFT THE FIELD IN SUCH HASTE, THAT THE ENEMY, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF IT ADVANCED TOO RAPIDLY, FOR ANY OF HIS MEN TO BEAR HIM OFF WITH SAFETY. He was on the right of the company, and amid the general confusion and uproar, I did not observe that he was missing when he [sic, read "we"] fell back, and never learned that he was shot until the enemy had driven us back nearly a mile. At that time we were scattered about in squads and endeavoring to overtake the remaining regiments who had fallen back, and were falling back on our encampments and fortified position at Mills Springs.

Lt. Bailie Peyton, Jr.
(from Ridley, "Battles and Sketches")

     Everybody seemed to be retreating, though nobody was running to an alarming extent. I avoided the main road myself, and kept to the woods, with a small party of our men, and after awhile we all got lost in the woods. We could still hear the enemy shooting at stragglers in the rear, and occasionally, the boom! boom! of the cannon, advancing toward Mill Springs. I believe I have never in my life suffered so much from fatigue as I did on that march back to the camp through the woods. Already much fatigued from marching all the night previous, I was little prepared for a precipitate race through the hills for my life, and determined to "go slow and trust to luck," even at the risk of being taken prisoner.

     We got in about five o’clock, almost exhausted, and had barely set foot inside of our own breastworks before the cannon of the enemy commenced bombarding us from the outside. Our cannon returned the fire and drove the assailants back. At nightfall the firing ceased, but our men, tired and worn out as they were, stood behind the breastworks until midnight, when orders came for us to retreat quietly across the river.

     The steamer "Noble Ellis," with three barges attached commence the work of transportation, and though we abandoned baggage, and wagons, and horses and cannon, and everything save what we had on our backs, the whole night was consumed in getting the army over the river, which was very high at the time. I should not forget to mention that the cannon were spiked before they were left. We retreated towards Monticello, Gen. Crittenden having determined to strike for the Cumberland, at the highest point where boats could be landed with safety, in order to be in open communication with Nashville. The last party that left Mill Springs, set fire to the boat and scuttled the barges and started off for Monticello, just as the enemy marched into our old encampment, and commenced throwing shell on this side of the river.

     We reached Monticello that night, and then we were threatened with starvation -- an enemy far more formidable than the one we had beyond the river. Since Saturday night we had not an hour of sleep, and scarcely a meal of food.

     We reached this point to-night, about five miles distant from Livingston, and are now en route for Gainsboro. The loss of our regiment in the battle is estimated at 35 killed, 50 wounded, and 16 missing. Of this number five were commissioned officers, four being killed and one wounded. The loss of the Mississippi regiment is between 150 and 200 killed and wounded. The force of the enemy was supposed to be about 22,000, and many seem to think they were commanded by Rosencranz [Gen. William Rosecrans].

This account was obviously written by a soldier in Company A, the "Hickory Guards," 20th Tennessee Infantry, but by one who had a great deal of knowledge beyond simple observations from the ranks; it was most likely written by Lt. Albert Roberts, who used the non-de-plume of "John Happy" (Lindsley, Vol. 1, p.382; McMurray, pp. 76, 408-409). During the battle of Fishing Creek, after the death of Lt. BailiePeyton, Lt. Roberts took command of Co. A.  His narrative is full of detailed and interesting information on the part his regiment played in the battle, including their charge toward the main Federal line, which resulted in the death of Lt. Peyton. It is also interesting to note that this writer interpreted the rail fence, behind which the main Federal line was formed, as intentional "fortifications" and "log breastworks." (From microfilm of the Memphis "Daily Avalanche" in the Woodruff Library, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia)

Lt. Albert Roberts, Co. A, 20th Tennessee Infantry
"John Happy"
(from McMurray, "History of the Twentieth Tennessee Regiment)

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