Chapter Five

Defense Strategy Alternatives: Choosing Where to Place Emphasis and Where to Accept Risk
by Mich?le A. Flournoy and Sam J. Tangredi

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review will provide the Bush administration with its primary opportunity to articulate a defense strategy for the United States. Whether the Bush team chooses to retain, revise, or significantly depart from the themes of the current strategy, the resulting defense strategy should chart the course of defense decisionmaking for the next 4 years. The strategy developed in the QDR will provide the basis for the new Defense Planning Guidance, which sets the planning and programming priorities for the Department of Defense. It will also constitute the principal DOD input to national security strategy (NSS), which will be developed concurrently by the National Security Council for the President. Most importantly, it will serve as the Bush administration's chief vehicle for communicating its vision and priorities for the U.S. military to Congress, the American people, and both allies and potential adversaries around the world.

During the 1997 QDR, there was a great deal of debate about whether defense reviews should be strategy-driven or resource-constrained.1 Fundamentally, however, this debate was premised on a false choice. In truth, any responsible defense review must be both strategy-driven and resource-constrained. It must be strategy-driven to ensure that the Nation spends the limited resources that it devotes to defense (means) in the most effective ways possible to achieve its national objectives (ends). But ultimately it must also be resource-constrained to be relevant; a strategy that assumes unconstrained resources may enlighten as to what we might devote to defense in an ideal world, but it is not particularly useful to the real-world decisionmaker wrestling with hard choices about how to spend the next dollar.

This tension between the ideal and the practical is illustrated in the juxtaposition of two definitions of strategy. The first is from the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "Strategy [is] the art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during war and peace, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat." 2 Ideally, a choice of strategy would indeed "afford the maximum support to policies." But in the real world, "Strategy is a fancy word for a road map for getting from here to there, from the situation at hand to the situation one wishes to attain." 3 Strategy involves the same resource constraints and issues of any journey--not just where to go, but questions about when to go, how fast to travel, and how much it will cost. The image of a road map--taken from a volume appropriately subtitled ends and means--reminds us that the decision to adopt a particular strategy is but the first choice of any integrated path of decisions linking objectives to the actual employment of resources. The real challenge is to determine the best strategy possible given the available resources, while explicitly accounting for risk when actual resources fall short of the ideal.4

Strategy as the Driver

For strategy to drive the rest of the QDR, at least three conditions must be met. First, the strategy must be developed and endorsed at the highest levels of DOD early in the QDR process. Given the compressed timelines of the review, crafting the defense strategy must be an immediate top priority, perhaps the most crucial one, for the new Secretary, Chairman, and rest of the senior DOD leadership.5 In practice, failing to make strategy an early priority would mean conducting the rest of the review without the benefit of a clear vision and priorities: in essence, attempting to do strategic planning without a clear sense of the desired outcomes. The result would be a disconnected journey full of stops and starts, which is subject to the pull of inertia that is often described as muddling through.

Second, as soon as DOD leadership is comfortable with the new strategy, it needs to issue the resulting strategic vision in the form of binding guidance to the rest of the review's participants. Otherwise, the strategy risks being ignored by those who would prefer to see the review primarily as a "budget drill," and thus risks being ultimately disconnected from how DOD actually allocates its resources. Without a binding strategy, QDR participants could be tempted to stick to the most familiar, and possibly most parochial, paths--another recipe for collective muddling through.

Third, the strategy must have teeth. It must articulate clear choices about where to place emphasis and where and how to accept or to manage a degree of risk. It must be consistently enforced in the decisionmaking fora of the review. Only thus can the QDR achieve a concert of the whole from the sum of very capable but potentially competing parts.

This chapter seeks to jump-start the strategy development process by identifying the reasonable range of defense strategy alternatives for the Bush administration. It begins by laying out a menu of six broad defense strategy options, describing where each strategy would place emphasis and where it would accept some degree of risk. It assesses the principal strengths, weaknesses, and risks of each. It concludes by arguing for a strong linkage between strategy and resource decisions.

Each of these strategy alternatives is essentially a different approach to dealing with the future security environment discussed in chapters 2 and 3 and to answering the 12 strategy questions articulated in the introduction (chapter 1). These strategy alternatives also provide the foundation for many of the chapters that follow. The discussions of force sizing, force structure, overseas presence, peacetime operations, transformation, and strategic forces and national missile defense, and strategy-driven integrated paths are all grounded in the strategies presented in this chapter. In essence, this is the heart of the book, a central and unifying point of reference for the chapters that follow.

Alternatives for the Bush Administration

The current defense and foreign policy debate in the United States suggests six broad defense strategy alternatives for consideration by the Bush administration. They are summarized in table 5-1. This range of alternative strategies represents the range of plausible, if not necessarily probable, U.S. defense strategies. In determining plausibility, the dominant question asked about each alternative was whether it represents the thinking of a significant group with direct influence on American politics. Foremost but not exclusive sources were the stated positions of U.S. presidential candidates in the 2000 election campaign. Another significant source was the views expressed by participants in ongoing or previous defense reviews, such as the 1997 National Defense Panel. Other commentary in influential public media by noted defense experts was a third source; however, much of that defense debate was already reflected in the alternative campaign positions.

In the pages that follow, each of these alternatives is described in terms of its worldview, that is, what it identifies as most important about the future security environment; its assessment of the U.S. role in the world; key elements of the strategy; and the priorities that it would establish for the U.S. military and for DOD more broadly. More specifically, we compare and contrast how each strategy treats the following types of issues:

• Overseas presence and peacetime military engagement: how much is appropriate? for what objectives? 6
• Smaller-scale contingencies: which SSCs merit U.S. involvement? what should the U.S. role be, once the United States is involved? 7
• Major theater wars: how likely are such conflicts? what kind of wars should DOD prepare for? should DOD prepare for one or more MTWs? 8
• Homeland security: what is the nature and immediacy of the threat? what is the appropriate role for DOD? 9
• Nuclear deterrence and NMD: what are the appropriate roles for nuclear weapons? what offense-defense vision should guide U.S. strategic policy, posture, and arms control efforts?
• Transformation: what are the objectives of transformation? what capabilities should it yield? at what pace should it be pursued? 10
• Role of allies and partners: how much should the United States rely on its allies and international partners, and what assumptions should be made about their capabilities and participation in combined operations?

While a host of other issues affect American defense choices, such as the ability to recruit and to train quality personnel, these seven issues appear to have the most direct effects on the choice of strategy. They are the key characteristics that distinguish one defense strategy from another in the contemporary world.

Strategy A: Shape, Respond, Prepare--The Current Defense Strategy

Although the descriptive phrase "shape, respond, prepare" was first articulated during the 1997 QDR, it describes the premises of U.S. defense strategy throughout the Clinton administration. The strategy has had both vocal supporters and critics outside the administration, but there has been general agreement that it represents a serious effort to come to grips with defense requirements in the post-Cold War world.

In the worldview underlying Strategy A, the international system is viewed as stable overall, but the security environment is seen as dynamic and uncertain, with a number of ongoing and potentially festering regional threats to peace. There appears to be no global threat from a military near-peer competitor (like the Soviet Union was during the Cold War), and the rise of such a global competitor is considered very unlikely until at least 2025. The primary military challenge comes in the form of aggression by rogue states; of particular concern is the potential of large-scale, cross-border aggression against a U.S. friend or ally. In addition, given its unique position of power in the world and its conventional military dominance, the United States faces the rise of asymmetric threats, such as weapons of mass destruction, information warfare, and terrorism that could threaten its interests, allies, forces, and even the U.S. homeland.

Strategy A's worldview is unabashedly internationalist, seeing American support of democracy and market capitalism as suitable foundations for a just world system. Rather than subordinating American interests to some sort of collective worldview (largely unformed), proponents of this strategy argue that these interests propel the United States into seeking a position of leadership that is vital to the continued maintenance of international community. The United States is seen as a global power with global interests. These interests are perceived as transcending mere parochial national objectives, due to the unique U.S. role as sole superpower. To the strategy's proponents, the United States has both a requirement and a mandate to provide the necessary leadership to ensure peace and stability in those regions that it views as vital to its national interests--and, by definition, to the interests of the world community. Without U.S. leadership, long-term peace and stability are uncertain in many world regions. The mandate to lead is bolstered by the apparent international consensus that the United States is the preferred security partner for most nations and that the United States plays a relatively fair role as a "balancer" between potentially competing regional powers and as the provider of regional stability.

To ensure that the United States maintains the political influence to play these roles, a policy of engagement is seen as a crucial element of its foreign affairs.11 Engagement is critical in maintaining U.S. influence in regions where the United States has vital and important interests, ensuring that the security environment evolves in ways that are favorable to U.S. (and also world) interests, and deterring actions antithetical to national interests.

A particularly important aspect of U.S. leadership is the strengthening and adapting of U.S. regional alliances and coalitions. Many of these alliances were created as elements of the strategy to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union. However, the linkages forged in that era appear to transcend the bounds of the Cold War and remain relevant in dealing with the regional threats of the post-Cold War world.12 At the same time, the necessity for U.S. leadership in building coalitions of the willing has been among the most widely accepted of the lessons of Operation Desert Storm. Proponents of Strategy A accept the military role in alliance-building and coalition-building as essential for the achievement of U.S. economic, political, and security goals.

The key elements of Strategy A can be characterized in terms of shaping the international environment, responding to the full spectrum of crises, and preparing now for an uncertain future. Conceptually, the strategy strives to strike a balance between these three elements. Although funding decisions create a de facto set of mission priorities, the strategy as described in the official documentation does not prioritize the elements. Critics have identified this lack of prioritization as a primary flaw of the current strategy.

Shaping refers to efforts to promote regional stability, prevent conflicts and reduce threats, and deter aggression and coercion in peacetime. As such, it encompasses many of the peacetime functions of U.S. military forces. Peacetime engagement activities are focused primarily on promoting regional stability through building alliances and coalitions with like-minded nations, consistent with the U.S. role envisioned in Strategy A's worldview. The overseas presence of combat-credible U.S. military forces--a major feature of the peacetime military posture called for by the strategy--provides a cadre of forces to conduct a robust program of engagement. At the same time, their presence helps to deter regional threats while reassuring allies and coalition partners of American support for their security. This counterbalances the coercive abilities of potential regional aggressors. If regional deterrence fails and actual hostilities occur, then presence forces are available to provide the initial military response for containing the conflict and reversing the aggressor's gains.

The responding role calls on the U.S. military to be able to deal with the full spectrum of potential crises, from deterrence in crisis, to conducting SSC operations, to being able to fight and to win MTWs, including those in which asymmetric threats such as chemical and biological weapons are used. In emphasizing full-spectrum capabilities, Strategy A sets the expectation that joint forces can transition with relative ease from peacetime operations to increasingly higher levels of conflict.13 Perhaps the most challenging and important capability requirement set by the strategy is for the U.S. military to be able to deter and, if necessary, to fight and to win two MTWs in overlapping timeframes. For force structure planning purposes, the two MTWs are currently assumed to be on the Korean Peninsula and in Southwest Asia (with Iraq as the aggressor). In addition, forces are expected to be able to conduct multiple concurrent SSCs and to transition to fight MTWs in accordance with required timelines. At the same time, the strategy calls for a secure, survivable, and robust strategic nuclear force to deter the use of nuclear weapons--and potentially other forms of WMD--within the limits established by arms control treaties.

Although the strategy does not explicitly prioritize these elements of response, in practice the two-MTW requirement has been treated as "the first among equals." It has come to drive much of DOD resource allocation in the areas of force structure and modernization. In some quarters, this has led some to refer to Strategy A (erroneously) as the two-MTW strategy.

In addition to shaping and responding, U.S. military forces are expected to prepare now for an uncertain future. This is the least developed portion of the overall strategy, particularly because of the relatively indistinct nature of future threats envisioned by the worldview. Strategy A calls for a focused modernization effort intended to?maintain the U.S. qualitative military superiority and technological edge over potential foes. Strategy A also embraces the concept that a revolution in military affairs is occurring--driven most notably by the revolution in information technologies--and argues that it should drive the transformation of U.S. military systems, operational concepts, and organizational structures. But Strategy A lacks the sense of urgency of some of the other strategy alternatives with regard to transformation, pursuing a gradual, evolutionary approach rather than a rapid, more radical approach.14 Consistent with this approach, Strategy A maintains funding for basic science and technology (S&T) and R&D programs, as well as concept development and experimentation, albeit at levels lower than the strategy alternatives that would seek to accelerate transformation. This modernization effort is assisted by several management initiatives within DOD, particularly a series of improved business and acquisition measures known collectively as the revolution in business affairs (RBA), which seeks to enhance DOD efficiency and to free up additional resources for investment in high priority areas.15

Homeland defense is a newer element of Strategy A, receiving initial attention during QDR 1997 and in the subsequent National Defense Panel report. Recent presidential initiatives have placed efforts at consequence management and infrastructure protection within the responsibilities of DOD (in support of other agencies and civil authorities). NMD remains a technology development program, rather than a requirement, in formal expositions of Strategy A.

In short, Strategy A calls for a full-spectrum force that attempts to pursue all priority missions with near-equal emphasis. The result has been a balanced mix of overseas and forward presence with global power-projection capabilities. Overseas presence is retained in Europe and Asia (albeit below Cold War levels), while a rotational presence is maintained in Southwest Asia. Critical to the success of the strategy is a series of elements identified as force enablers, including high-quality and well-trained personnel, a globally vigilant high-technology intelligence network, global communications, access to space (and potential space superiority if challenged), and retention of the sea and airspace superiority largely developed during the Cold War.

In terms of force structure, Strategy A (as currently implemented) sizes conventional forces primarily to meet the demands of the two overlapping MTWs, with the exception that naval forces are sized for presence. It assumes that such a force is sufficiently large to handle the requirements of SSCs, peacetime engagement, a modest transformation effort, and homeland defense. Separate strategic nuclear forces are retained, although some platforms originally designed for that mission (such as the B-2 bomber) have been assigned to conventional forces. Because of the emphasis on two overlapping MTWs, a high level of readiness is required throughout the force in order to meet the demands of the MTW operational timelines. The use of an MTW-structured force for multiple, concurrent SSCs has resulted in a significantly high tempo in the deployment of personnel (PERSTEMPO) and strains on some scarce specialized capabilities (LD/HD assets). Such assets include platforms that also would be in high demand in the MTW scenarios, as well as some assets that would hold a lower priority in MTW timelines but are essential for operations at the lower end of the spectrum of SSCs. High PERSTEMPO in peacetime is perceived to exacerbate the problems inherent in recruiting and retaining an all-volunteer force, especially in a period of economic growth, and has a potentially corrosive effect on long-term readiness.

Strategy A has been praised by its supporters for trying to balance risk across the near, mid-, and longer term and for broadening DOD focus beyond crisis response and warfighting to include the more proactive elements of shaping the international security environment and preparing now for an uncertain future. But it has also received criticism. Some have argued that sizing U.S. forces primarily for MTWs and naval forward presence sends a mixed signal regarding transformation. Effective transformation, they argue, requires increasing the level of resources invested in S&T, R&D, concept development and experimentation, and leap-ahead technologies while reducing the readiness of the units being transformed. This puts the goal of transformation in tension with the objective of maintaining high warfighting readiness across the force. High readiness also demands considerable resources, squeezing available funding for modernization in a fiscally constrained defense budget. Strategy A, as currently articulated, calls for a procurement target of approximately $60 billion per year, focused primarily on the modernization or replacement of current platforms. Critics see this modernization focus as an incremental effort that ultimately discourages transformation. In this light, Strategy A can be seen as taking a modest, cautious approach in preparing for the future security environment.

However, the loudest criticism of Strategy A is that it is too ambitious and has failed to articulate clear priorities, especially when resources have fallen short of requirements. The strategy, it is argued, has overcommitted the force; it has called on the U.S. military to do too much with too little. In practice, the strategy has called on the U.S. military to undertake a variety of missions beyond those for which the force was sized and resourced (MTWs and naval forward presence). This has contributed to a resource shortfall that is allowed to revolve among the elements of the strategy: if readiness is fully funded, then modernization is squeezed; if modernization is emphasized, risk is taken in MTW preparation; if involvement in SSCs exceeds a certain level, both readiness for MTWs and investment in future capabilities may suffer.

Seeking to balance the requirements of shaping and responding in the near term with the need to prepare now to meet future requirements may be a conceptual strength for Strategy A, but the strategy's failure to articulate more explicit priorities that suggest where to place emphasis and where to accept a degree of risk when available funding is insufficient to meet all of the strategy's requirements has contributed to the projected strategy-resources mismatch.

Strategy B: Engage More Selectively and Accelerate Transformation

In contrast to the current strategy, Strategy B establishes a different set of priorities and reduces the emphasis on the requirements of two overlapping MTWs. The primary emphasis of Strategy B is on accelerating the transformation of the U.S. military to meet emerging and longer-range future threats. The primary source for details of such a transformational approach is the National Defense Panel report of 1997, and Strategy B remains the most widely discussed alternative to the current strategy. Additional support for a Strategy B-like approach appeared in the presidential campaign speeches of Governor George Bush; however, support for alternative B crosses partisan lines.16

The underlying worldview is similar to that of Strategy A in that it sees a dynamic, uncertain security environment in which the United States, as sole superpower, must provide global leadership. The rise of a military near-peer competitor in 2001-2025 is seen as less likely. However, the proponents of Strategy B see the rise of a near-peer competitor some time in the future as a natural aspect of the competitive nature of the international system. Thus, they view efforts to maintain American military superiority over any rising near-peer as the primary long-term objective of the strategy. In the interim, the strategy focuses on the rise of potential regional military competitors, such as the possible emergence of a hostile China in the Pacific region.

The emphasis on the emergence of near-peer or regional competitors gives this strategy's proponents a greater sense of urgency with regard to asymmetric threats and antiaccess or area-denial strategies.17 Thus, homeland defense is elevated to one of the top DOD priorities.

An accelerated, more revolutionary transformation of U.S. power-projection forces is seen as necessary in order to keep pace with regional antiaccess strategies and area-denial capabilities. More regional powers are seen as having both the capability and the intent to challenge the interests of both the United States and a stable world. The proliferation of WMD, information systems, improved ballistic and cruise missiles, and other advanced technologies--many available in the commercial sector--are seen as placing potent offensive weaponry within the grasp of rogue states and terrorist organizations. Resentment of American power and influence is perceived to be rising among the disaffected populations of have-not states, fueled by the xenophobic nature of many autocratic regimes. At home and abroad, Americans appear to be the most lucrative targets for those seeking media attention or notoriety.

This raises more than a threat to homeland security: U.S. foreign policy measures face greater opposition abroad at the same time that domestic support for American overseas military presence may be wavering. Coercion by rogues or regional competitors may be more successful in dissuading allies or coalition members from providing access or host-nation support for U.S. forces. The worldview of Strategy B involves greater concern about delayed or denied access and the survivability of American power-projection forces in a contested regional theater. The survivability of legacy systems in the face of unexpected and aggressive use of advanced military technology by opponents is questioned. A transformation to a more capable, more high-technology force is required. This is a perception shared by many who view an ongoing RMA as the defining element of the future security environment.

This emphasis on the need for transformation effectively displaces the need to prepare for multiple overlapping MTWs as the primary concern of defense strategy. Strategy B proponents view as unlikely a situation in which the United States is forced to fight two major wars in two separate theaters at the same time, but in the event that such a situation actually occurred, they are confident that new technologies and operational concepts could reduce the capabilities necessary to fight and to win both wars. To some extent, this correlates with the view that the quality and technological advantages of the U.S. military, particularly in air and space forces, could bring cross-border aggression to a rapid halt, thereby eliminating the requirement for two simultaneous major campaigns and thus allowing for the staggering of counteroffensives.

The requirement for U.S. military involvement in multiple concurrent SSCs is also challenged by this strategy. Strategy B suggests that the United States--even in its superpower leadership role--can and should be more selective in choosing to engage militarily in SSCs. The U.S. military should not, as a rule, be used in situations in which vital or truly important American interests are not at stake. In situations involving less-than-vital interests, the United States should refrain from taking a leadership role and should instead allow regional allies or partners to provide the required leadership and capabilities. U.S. involvement in such situations should be governed by the notion of comparative advantage; that is, the United States should bring to the table only what others cannot. For example, the success of a coalition of the willing in dealing with a particular SSC might hinge on maritime, air, or strategic lift capabilities that only the United States could provide, while the United States would probably offer no particular comparative advantage in putting peacekeeping forces on the ground. A current model for encouraging an ally to lead while providing limited but important forms of support would be U.S. support for Australia's leadership of the multinational response to the East Timor crisis.

Proponents of more selective engagement also argue that extensive U.S. involvement in SSCs generates high operational and personnel deployment tempos that degrade warfighting readiness and negatively affect recruitment and retention in the U.S. military. This aspect of Strategy B would also suggest that peacetime military engagement should be more selective overall and that U.S. forces should be withdrawn from some of the long-term deployments in which they are currently involved. The resources and efforts thus made available could then be channeled into the transformation effort or the increased emphasis on homeland defense. Many Strategy B advocates express support for significant efforts toward an NMD, which would require considerable resources. But even without NMD, the perception is that a strong commitment to an increasing DOD role in developing capabilities for detection and response to future asymmetric threats could require a shifting of resources away from engagement. A reduction in operational tempo could also allow greater scope for the organizational transformation efforts needed to match the high-level interest in new approaches to warfighting that might prove more effective and do more with less.

In setting out the desired missions and activities of the U.S. military, Strategy B provides a distinct set of priorities. The highest DOD priorities would include the acceleration of more revolutionary military transformation directed at preparing for future regional competitors or near-peers possessing considerable antiaccess and asymmetric warfare capabilities. This would be complemented by an increased DOD support for homeland defense. The more traditional military ability to "fight and win the nation's wars" would also be a priority; however, proponents of Strategy B might well reassess the scenarios and requirements for MTWs, paying more attention to asymmetric threats and antiaccess challenges as well as to the potential of new technologies and operational concepts. SSCs that directly affect vital national interests would also be a high priority, but those involving non-vital interests (such as American values or humanitarian concerns) would not. This strategy would also give greater priority to modernizing the nation's nuclear deterrent.

Strategy B would most likely opt for a balanced mix of overseas presence and power-projection capabilities, both geared toward survival in the expected antiaccess environment. This would include full-spectrum force protection against asymmetric threats, including chemical and biological warfare and terrorism. The primary homeland defense efforts would be NMD, WMD consequence management, computer network defense, and domestic and international counterterrorism.

One of the implications of implementing Strategy B in a resource-constrained environment would be potential reductions in modernization programs, force structure, and readiness (particularly readiness for a second MTW) in order to finance transformation and homeland defense. Supporters of the strategy advocate more investment in concept development and experimentation, on both the service and joint forces level. To achieve the material goals of transformation, selective investment would be made in modernization, with less emphasis on the recapitalization of legacy systems and more funding for basic science and technology, military R&D, and potential leap-ahead technologies. Many of these technologies would be directed toward defeating regional antiaccess systems, as well as toward strengthening homeland defense.

Emphasis on transformation and homeland defense programs would be balanced by the policy of selective engagement and the resulting reduction of PERSTEMPO and current strains on LD/HD units. This could help to resolve some of the challenges associated with recruiting and retaining the highly capable personnel needed in a transformed military.

Strategy B is praised for both its emphasis on reducing the employment of today's military and for its focus on transforming DOD to deal with emerging and future challenges that could, if not adequately addressed, compromise U.S. military superiority and ultimately threaten vital national interests. Critics of this strategy, however, raise two primary concerns. The first is a great skepticism that any future President will be able to be significantly more selective in the commitment of the Armed Forces to operations such as Kosovo, Bosnia, or Somalia. The past, they argue, is prologue; decisions regarding U.S. military intervention are ultimately political decisions, and politics will frequently override the calculus of national interest and stated policies about the use of force.

The second set of concerns relates to transformation. What exactly is transformation? What are its objectives? What capabilities will it yield? And what will it require in terms of force structure reductions, reallocation of resources among the services, or cancellation of major procurement programs? These issues need to be addressed by the strategy's proponents. The primary criticism of Strategy B, however, is that it underestimates the near-term risks associated with accelerating transformation. These critics argue that near-term threats, such as large-scale aggression in Southwest Asia, on the Korean Peninsula, or elsewhere, remain real and that ensuring that the U.S. military can respond effectively to them is the primary responsibility of any Secretary of Defense. Therefore, near-term readiness and force structure should not be sacrificed to facilitate transformation. Whether they agree, any administration that adopts Strategy B will need to be more explicit in accounting for any additional near- or mid-term risk that it would accept as it shifts additional DOD resources into transformation.

Strategy C: Engage More Selectively and Strengthen Warfighting Capability

Strategy C represents a blend of the selective engagement principles of Strategy B and the more traditional emphasis on high-end warfighting that is the de facto priority of Strategy A. The underlying worldview is similar to that of Strategy A: the future security environment is seen as dynamic and uncertain, requiring the leadership of the United States to support a stable international structure. No military near-peer opponent is seen on the immediate horizon (at least until 2025); but unlike the Strategy B worldview, the long-term rise of a near-peer (beyond 2025) is not necessarily seen as inevitable, nor is it considered to be a dominant planning factor for defense policy. Strategy C's worldview focuses on near-term threats of large-scale aggression. Like Strategy A, Strategy C accepts the possibility of multiple overlapping MTWs; indeed, it makes these scenarios the focus of defense planning. In this context, it is more concerned about asymmetric threats to overseas presence and power-projection forces than about emerging threats to the U.S. homeland.

The ultimate goal of Strategy C is to achieve the warfighting objectives of Strategy A, but at a lower level of risk and without a potential strategy-resources mismatch. Strategy C's priorities stem from a view of a peacetime U.S. role in the international system that is more similar to the B position: U.S. leadership is seen as not essential for collective responses to SSCs where less-than-vital national interests are involved. Strategy C is more selective toward SSCs and engagement. Any decision to use force would be tied directly to U.S. vital interests. But Strategy C is also likely to focus its peacetime engagement efforts toward measures that would enhance the warfighting capabilities of key allies and coalition partners.

This is a back-to-basics strategy in which the primary mission of the Armed Forces would be to "fight and win the Nation's wars," including two overlapping MTWs. Preparing for SSCs involving vital interests and maintaining a robust and credible nuclear deterrent would also be considered high priorities. To reduce tempo strains on LD/HD assets and personnel and to increase the level of MTW warfighting readiness, military forces currently deployed to long-term less-than-vital SSCs would be withdrawn. Resources would be redirected toward correcting warfighting capability shortfalls, improving readiness, and modernizing combat platforms. As a general policy, Strategy C would likely gain considerable support from many active-duty and retired military officers, particularly those tasked with Title 1X service responsibilities for recruiting, training, and equipping the force.

Implementation of Strategy C at a full level of resources would undoubtedly result in a very high quality warfighting force, with a balanced mix of overseas presence and power-projection capabilities. Emphasis would logically be given to forward presence and prepositioned forces in regions where the warfighting risk is judged to be most likely (currently East Asia and Southwest Asia). Readiness would be kept at very high levels, and the overall defense program would be focused on identifying and correcting current warfighting capability shortfalls in areas such as strategic lift, ISR, precision munitions, combat service and service support, and chemical and biological defense.

The primary bill-payer would be the strategy's more selective engagement policy with regard to SSCs, but resources saved here would not likely be adequate to cover proposed additional investments in warfighting readiness and capabilities. Selectivity toward SSCs could also result in reductions in PERSTEMPO and in the use of LD/HD assets, ameliorating two current resource issues. Increases in high-end warfighting effectiveness would require increased investment in the recapitalization of current platforms and systems, as well as a robust modernization program. However, there appears to be no conceptual imperative for a particularly aggressive transformation program, given the focus on near- and mid-term regional threats rather than the potential rise of a near-peer competitor. While RMA-style technological developments would be welcome, they are not seen as urgently needed to maintain U.S. superiority in the prosecution of future wars. Improving homeland defense would be considered part of any Strategy C defense program, but it, too, would be pursued at only a moderate pace. Homeland defense efforts would likely revolve around military support to civilian agencies. In sum, Strategy C reflects the highest-priority mission of Strategy A, along with a selective engagement philosophy similar to that of Strategy B.

Strategy C is praised by some as refocusing DOD on its most central and enduring mission of fighting and winning the nation's wars. Supporters argue that this strategy would reduce the wear and tear on U.S. forces, enhance their core warfighting competencies, and ensure U.S. military superiority well into the future. Critics of the strategy are united in the argument that the opportunity costs of focusing primarily on warfighting are too great, but they are divided on what those opportunity costs are. Proponents of Strategy A and Strategy D (discussed below) emphasize the loss of opportunities to shape the international security environment and to use the U.S. military more proactively to prevent small crises from becoming larger and more costly conflicts. By contrast, proponents of Strategy B are more concerned about Strategy C's lack of urgency with regard to both homeland security and transformation. They believe that the focus on near- to mid-term regional threats is misguided and that a modest homeland defense and transformation efforts will not be sufficient to meet emerging and future challenges at home and abroad.

Strategy D: Engage Today to Prevent Conflict Tomorrow

Although the specifics of the worldview underlying Strategy D may appear similar to the other alternatives, there is a profound difference in philosophy toward the nature of deterrence and the role of the United States in the international system. Strategy D calls for maximum peacetime engagement by U.S. military forces, in the belief that such a level of engagement can deter or prevent conflict, including the outbreak of MTW.

The Strategy D worldview sees few threats to vital U.S. national interests, but identifies many smaller near- and mid-term threats to regional peace and security as meriting U.S.-led collective intervention. Crises such as ethnic conflicts and failing states are judged de facto threats to America's long-term interests, even if they do not have a direct effect on America's national survival. From this perspective, the U.S. military is an effective tool for an interventionist as well as internationalist foreign policy. U.S. leadership is seen as the essential mobilizer of collective action, and the cost of such leadership is perceived to be the willingness to put "boots on the ground" and U.S. troops into the more dangerous situations of peace enforcement.

Overseas presence becomes a dominant military activity in the world of Strategy D. However, the predominant logic of presence is not the traditional justification of having forces available for initial response to crises that could become MTWs. Rather, there is a certain degree of skepticism among Strategy D proponents about whether MTWs are likely in a world marked by globalization and economic interconnectivity. Presence is seen, instead, primarily as a deterrent and a moderator of the outbreak of lesser regional conflicts, a politico-military symbol of U.S. involvement, a method of engaging and training foreign militaries and promoting democracy, and a means of providing the initial forces for SSCs. Large-scale cross-border aggression is largely seen as a threat of the past. The implication is that presence forces are needed in great numbers, but not all such forces necessarily need to be as credibly combat-capable for high-end warfighting as they have been configured in the past.

Likewise, there is considerable skepticism about the eventual rise of a military near-peer competitor because of both the expected ameliorating effect of globalization and the belief that an interventionist but even-handed American foreign policy--with considerable efforts at multilateral diplomacy and international consensus-building--would preclude the jealousies and competitions that might provoke the rise of a military competitor. Conflict among the advanced nations would be prevented by shared trade and converging values; conflict with lesser-developed states by ensuring that they receive a share of the globalized economy; and conflict within failing states, with rogue states, and with terrorist groups by a policy of multinational response, always supported and sometimes led by the United States.

With the overwhelming military superiority developed during the Cold War and demonstrated in the Gulf War, the United States is uniquely positioned to take more of the initiative in shaping the international environment, blending military power, diplomacy, foreign assistance, and commercial ties to reduce threats, resolve crises, and prevent conflicts. This unique leadership role is, according to Strategy D, best played by advancing the shared interests and values of the international community through more effective multilateral alliances, coalitions, and institutions, and especially through the United Nations. This would require that the use of U.S. military forces be governed not only by U.S. national interests, but also by U.S. values concerning freedom, peace, and justice for all humanity. The Strategy D motto might be "We should do what we can, and all we can," to promote peace, stability and international norms.

The key elements of Strategy D would focus on a more active use of the military to shape the international environment, preferably within multinational organizations and institutions as well as U.S.-led coalitions. Peacetime engagement would be the primary employment of U.S. forces, most of it directed toward enhancing key multilateral capabilities through the involvement of unique U.S. assets. Strategy D would greatly increase U.S. involvement in SSCs in order to prevent them from precipitating greater conflicts and to mitigate their international effects. As an adjunct, the United States would increase efforts to enlist regional allies and partners to join in such efforts. Although it is difficult to identify current real-world proponents of this strategy, it reflects the arguments made by several prominent officials at one time or another, including former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and some regional CINCs.

To reorient assets toward increased peacetime engagement and SSCs, alternative D would reduce (or even eliminate) the current emphasis on multiple MTWs. Transformation efforts would be pursued at a modest pace or perhaps downgraded in order to finance maintenance of and upgrades to a larger force structure with an expanded inventory of legacy systems. Modest support to civilian agencies for homeland defense would be continued. Nuclear deterrence forces, which appear to have no role in engagement or SSCs, would face reduced emphasis and would be shaped by greater emphasis on arms reductions.

Based on its worldview and emphasis, Strategy D would set distinctly different priorities for the missions and activities of the U.S. military. The highest DOD priorities would incorporate the lowest priorities of alternatives B and C and include proactive peacetime engagement, particularly directed toward building alliances and coalitions; support for multilateral international institutions; intervention in multiple, continuing SSCs so as to prevent or to mitigate the development of crises or conflicts of greater scale (such as MTWs); support for arms control and international accords; and the ability to fight and to win one MTW, although not necessarily at low risk, if deterrence failed.

Homeland defense, transformation, nuclear deterrence, and preparations to fight multiple MTWs would be much lower priorities. Theoretically, these elements would be of lesser concern due to the strategy's robust overseas presence adapted to post-Cold War world realities--including globalization--and greater involvement with multilateral alliances, coalitions, and institutions.

Current power-projection capabilities would be reoriented to support multiple concurrent SSCs and to provide for a transition to fighting a single MTW if that were necessary. Potential strains on LD/HD assets would be mitigated by building more of these units, shifting additional units from the Reserve to the active force, or selectively substituting alternative units as circumstances allowed. This strategy might also employ greater tiering of readiness, particularly for forces that would deploy late to an MTW. Overstretch would be a distinct possibility if this strategy were not fully funded, and affordability could be problematic under projected fiscal constraints.

Another major implication for the joint force might be broader application of the current rotational approach to peacetime force management to include more than naval forces and the new Air Expeditionary Forces. The entire force, including the Army Reserve, might even be reorganized for rotational deployments. Modernization of existing platforms and systems would be more selective, with a distinct emphasis on recapitalization rather than transformation. Under a philosophy of "numbers count most for presence," the acquisition policy might be one of accepting less-capable platforms in order to afford greater quantities, resulting in a force structure with much more of a high-low mix than today's force. This might also slow the growing capability gap between high-tech U.S. forces and those of the allies and coalition partners with whom the United States seeks to operate.

A modest, reoriented concept-development and experimentation effort would optimize tactics and techniques for the increased number and types of SSCs. Funding for strategic nuclear forces would undoubtedly be reduced.

Strategy D is praised for its willingness to use American preeminence in the service of international peace and stability and for its emphasis on conflict prevention. Its supporters argue that this strategy refocuses the U.S. military on deterrence as its most important mission. They view greater involvement in peacetime engagement, presence, and SSCs as fully legitimate military missions toward that end. Critics, on the other hand, argue that Strategy D risks a promiscuous level of U.S. military intervention that could create serious tempo strains (even for a larger force), undermine warfighting capability and credibility of the U.S. military over time, and potentially backfire by generating anti-American sentiment in reaction to U.S. interventionism.

Strategy E: Strategic Independence

Strategy E can be seen as almost the mirror-image of the priorities of Strategy D. There are, nonetheless, some remarkable similarities in their worldviews, if not in their interpretation of future events. Strategy E, like Strategy D, posits a low probability for multiple overlapping MTWs, as well as the lack of a military near-peer for the foreseeable future, to at least 2025. It also predicts the frequent occurrence of ethnic and regional conflicts, failed states, and internal wars. Unlike Strategy D, however, it sees no reason for the United States to involve its military forces in any of these less-than-vital SSCs.

Its strategy of strategic independence is predicated on the belief that there are very few threats to truly vital U.S. interests. American allies, most of which are the among the richest nations on earth, are assumed to be economically and politically capable of taking more (or total) responsibility for their own defense and in coalition operations, and for any SSCs in which they choose to involve themselves. In this worldview, the alliances and coalitions of the past are seen as increasingly burdensome entanglements and are a prime cause of threats to U.S. forces by drawing the United States into conflicts and dilemmas that have no real impact on U.S. national interests. It sees part of the resentment toward the United States--which appears to be expanding in some regions of the world--as caused by American involvement in entangling alliances and unnecessary operations.

Additionally, many allies are viewed as having been allowed to be free riders on the U.S. defense effort. Their political support may have been important during the Cold War, but it is no longer in U.S. interests to keep funding their defense. With the collapse of the Soviet empire, a "strategic pause" in the security environment should enable the United States to focus on more pressing domestic concerns.

The proponents of Strategy E--which appear to include representatives of both the far left and the far right, the latter represented by the publications of libertarian think-tanks such as the Cato Institute--may accept that America is a global power with global interests.18 But they have no interest in accepting the role of world policeman and see only danger in being the unequivocal provider of a nuclear umbrella for the free world. U.S. global interests are best protected and advanced primarily through economic means, although many Strategy E supporters may retain a profound skepticism toward economic globalization. To them, international leadership means moral leadership and empowering allies and others to help themselves. Direct involvement of the United States military in situations that affect less-than-vital national interests is seen as squandering U.S. credibility and power, both of which should be focused on supporting the sources of national strength: the American people, their freedom, their prosperity, and their way of life. Allies are best encouraged to pursue more independent defense efforts and to contribute more to any necessary coalition operations.

In implementation, Strategy E would not necessarily reduce overall U.S. military strength. It would see great value in maintaining, as an insurance policy, a strong military with unmatched warfighting capabilities. But it would employ the Armed Forces rarely and very selectively. Strategy E would probably call for a military prepared to fight and to win multiple MTWs in the unlikely event that they occurred. Such strength would be seen as deterring any serious challenge to vital U.S. interests. However, peacetime engagement activities would be reduced to a minimum and involvement in less-than-vital SSCs would be avoided. Where such involvement could not be avoided, the responsibility for SSCs would be handed off to coalition partners as soon as possible. Allies and coalition partners would also be expected to accept more responsibilities in preparing for possible MTWs.

One area of increased emphasis would be homeland defense, especially defense against asymmetric threats, since they could have a direct effect on the American people and could limit U.S. freedom and prosperity. Attacks on the U.S. homeland could provoke an overwhelming response by U.S. power-projection forces.19 However, there appears to be no overriding impetus for more than a modestly funded transformation effort.

Like other defense strategies, the primary military mission of Strategy E remains being prepared to "fight and win the nation's wars." Similar to Strategies A and C, alternative E might consider maintaining a two-MTW capability as appropriate insurance for the nation's security. Interpretations would differ, however, as to what constitutes an MTW and when to involve U.S. forces in combat. Only SSCs deemed critical to the protection of America's vital interests would be seen as legitimate missions for the U.S. military.

Homeland defense would also be a high priority in Strategy E, since it would contribute most directly to the protection of American freedom, lives, and property. A robust NMD would be a significant element of homeland defense, along with WMD consequence management, computer network defense, and counterterrorism.

Nuclear deterrence against threats to the United States and its vital interests would also be a priority and is conceptually linked to homeland defense. It is doubtful, given the underlying worldview, that there would be much faith in arms control as a permanent element of U.S. security policy.

With alliances and engagement viewed as entanglements, the following activities would receive much lower priority: alliance and coalition commitments, extended nuclear deterrence, and peacetime engagement not directly tied to vital national interests. The lack of a military near-peer competitor on the immediate horizon would also tend to make transformation a lesser priority, at least initially. However, maintaining overall U.S. technological superiority over potential threats would be considered important.

Strategy E would call for a much different military posture than today, with significantly reduced overseas presence. Instead, power-projection capabilities based in the United States would be robust and well equipped. The need for increased standoff capabilities might eventually lead to a greater emphasis on transformation, if legacy systems appeared to lack the ability to defeat evolving antiaccess challenges. These power-projection capabilities would be balanced by equally robust homeland defense capabilities.

Alternative E carries with it a series of substantially different implications for the overall force. Given the assumption that we are now in a "strategic pause," it is likely that the DOD budget would be reduced in order to provide funding for domestic priorities. A significant portion of these cuts would come from reducing the overseas basing structure and forces stationed or deployed overseas, and curtailing most engagement activities, although any element of the force that is not structured for MTW (or vital-interest SSCs) would be a candidate for reduction or elimination.

MTW forces would be kept at high levels of readiness, and this would be assisted by great reductions in PERSTEMPO and substantial reductions in the peacetime use of LD/HD units.

Investment in selective recapitalization and modernization, rather than an overall transformation of the force, would be the preferred method of maintaining the current military technology edge. However, there would be modest funding of transformation activities to keep pace with evolving threat capabilities.

Nuclear programs tied primarily to extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella over allies might be reduced, while investment in overall strategic modernization would be increased. Funding for nuclear testing or upgrades to stockpile stewardship capabilities might also be increased.

While Strategy E is praised by some for its greater focus on homeland security, it is widely criticized for its isolationism. Critics argue that pulling back from our international commitments and bringing the bulk of U.S. forces home would severely damage important alliances, our ability to respond rapidly and effectively to crises, and ultimately our vital national interests.

Strategy F: Preventive Defense

Although Strategy F is included in the range of defense strategy alternatives suitable for examination during QDR 2001, it could be placed in a different category. For starters, it comes from a very specific source, rather than a compilation of sources and statements. Its most detailed expression appears in Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America by Ashton Carter and William Perry, although it has also appeared in articles and seminar reports. It is included in our range of potential defense strategies because of the influence of its concepts and the stature of its proponents in the defense policy debate.20

It is also different from the other strategy alternatives in its scope and means of execution. Even its proponents admit that the particulars of preventive defense make it more of an overall national security strategy than a defense strategy to be executed by DOD. "It is a broad politico-military strategy, and therefore draws on all the instruments of foreign policy: political, economic, and military." 21 As such, many of its elements may lie outside the scope of the actual QDR process. But "the role of the U.S. Department of Defense is central." Perry states that during his tenure as Secretary of Defense, "we established a number of programs and initiatives that made a strong start at incorporating the strategy of Preventive Defense into the activities of the Defense Department." 22

It is a strategy with a very explicit focus on four specific threats that it considers potential mid- or long-term challenges to the survival of the United States: the return of an aggressive Russia; "loose nukes" or the uncertain security of fissionable material from the former Soviet Union; the rise of a hostile China; and the continuing proliferation of WMD, and especially the potential for WMD terrorism on U.S. soil.

But as explicit as these specific threats are in determining the character of alternative F, the underlying worldview is similar to Strategies A and C. While the security environment may always be dynamic and uncertain, there are no imminent threats (in the short term) to U.S. survival, although there are currently a host of lesser regional threats. No actual military near-peer competitor is seen as possible until beyond 2025, although a central purpose of the strategy is to prevent the two likely candidates, Russia and China, from becoming such competitors. However, the rise of asymmetric threats is recognized, especially the potential for WMD terrorism against the U.S. homeland. The high level of concern about asymmetric threats is similar to that evidenced in alternative B. The proper role of the United States in the international environment is the same as that of current Strategy A.

Key elements of Strategy F revolve around preventing future threats to survival of the United States. The strategy calls for an emphasis on shaping the international environment through peacetime engagement at a level greater than Strategy A in regard to the four long-term threats identified above. But it would not spread the engagement effort across the board as implied in Strategy D. Such a broad brush, it would be feared, could all too easily neglect the four major threats.

Alternative F would place greater emphasis than today on transformation activities, but it would do so as a hedge against the failure of preventive defense efforts rather than as a centerpiece of the strategy. There would likely be a much greater emphasis on being able to fight and to win in the face of asymmetric threats and antiaccess strategies, particularly in a WMD environment. This concern with WMD extends to homeland defense, with consequence management and counterterrorism being the foremost emphasis, although computer network defense and some limited form of NMD (oriented toward rogue states, but potentially capable of dissuading others from greater WMD and missile investments) might also be pursued.

As part of the overall philosophy of international engagement, Strategy F would posit some involvement in SSCs, but it would be more selective than the current strategy in order to maintain resources and focus on the big four threats. As part of the preventive defense approach, which is intended to ensure that Russia and China become satisfied members of the community of nations, Strategy F would pursue further reductions in strategic offensive arms and use both bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements to further international security.

The highest priorities of alternative F would be efforts to diminish the four long-term threats to U.S. survival. For DOD, this would require peacetime military engagement to influence Russia to develop and maintain close ties to the West and to help establish a stable European security order; efforts to reduce and secure the WMD legacy of the Soviet Union in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of rogue states or terrorist groups; and steps to engage and to build a strategic partnership with an economically rising China.

U.S. power-projection forces would also be required to maintain (and to improve) the ability to fight and to win an MTW, even in the face of extensive regional WMD use and sophisticated antiaccess strategies. Homeland defense, and especially counters to WMD terrorism, would be a DOD priority. Transforming the force to deal with increasingly high-technology threats might also be a priority, but primarily as a hedge against failure of the overall strategy to prevent the rise of a military near-peer competitor.

Lower priorities for alternative F would logically include preparation for multiple MTWs; peacetime engagement that is not focused on the four primary potential threats; SSCs involving other-than-vital interests; and nuclear forces and programs beyond what is needed for basic deterrence.

Alternative F would opt for a balance between overseas presence and power-projection forces similar to the mix inherent in Strategy A. To some extent the similarities between these two alternatives are to be expected. As Secretary of Defense from 1994 to 1997, Perry set in place many of the policies later codified in QDR 1997, and he then articulated them in Preventive Defense not long after leaving office. The overseas presence posture of alternative F would not necessarily be radically different from today's posture; what might be different is the level and direction of engagement activities. Rather than focus on allies and coalition partners, engagement activities might be primarily directed at neutralizing the four primary threats. For example, the United States might seek to conduct a series of combined exercises with the forces of Russia and China. There might be increased levels of cooperation with non-military as well as military counterterrorist forces of other nations.

However, the basing of U.S. forces overseas might be adjusted in ways designed to encourage more positive relations with Russia and China or to dissuade them from taking undesired actions. This could include reductions in overseas presence at certain locations, such as in Europe or the Western Pacific, or--conversely--an increase in presence in those areas in order to deter them from threatening actions toward neighboring states. In any event, the focus of presence and engagement would be adjusted toward preventive defense.

With an eye toward the proliferation of antiaccess or area-denial systems, Strategy F would tend to advocate a full-spectrum power-projection force that could overcome advanced regional defenses. Increased emphasis would be placed on counterproliferation and counterterrorism, to foreclose any WMD option as part of an antiaccess or asymmetric warfare campaign, and to neutralize any deterrence of the U.S. ability to project power by a threat to use WMD on U.S. soil.

In a fiscally constrained environment, Strategy F might shift resources from some current programs to programs specifically designed to address WMD and terrorist threats. Such a focus might require more extensive experimentation to deal with new threats and selective modernization that would hold recapitalization in abeyance until the development of even more advanced technologies. Although the concept of preventive defense does not necessarily call for a reduction in the current level of PERSTEMPO and the operational strains in LD/HD units, its proponents have indicated such reductions are necessary to prevent an eventual decline in the quality of American military personnel.23

This strategy is praised for placing greater emphasis on some of the more serious potential future threats to U.S. security and for attempting to make their prevention the primary focus of U.S. national security planning. The primary criticism of this strategy is like that of Strategy B: that it fails to give adequate weight to near- and mid-term threats to U.S. security, such as regional aggression, and that, in a resource-constrained environment, this might result in inadequate resources for and higher risk in mission areas, such as warfighting and SSCs.

Hybrids and Fading Distinctions

None of these six strategy alternatives constitutes rigid dogma; elements can be blended to create hybrid alternatives within the range identified. There are, in fact, potential constraints that could encourage such a blending. One area of concern that has been frequently voiced is the question of just how free the President might be in selecting among SSCs in which to involve the U.S. military. Considerable skepticism has been expressed concerning the ability of decisionmakers to resist intense media attention on what would be considered a non-vital interest under an adopted strategy alternative. Could an administration patiently explain the logic of American non-involvement in a crisis involving potential genocide, starvation, or gross injustice and repression when the eyes of the American people have focused on the crisis, or would it be forced to act regardless of its formal, declared strategy? If the latter, would one of the sharp distinctions between, for example, strategy alternatives A and B become muted?

Another constraint is available resources. Is the level of presence, engagement, and involvement in SSCs that is postulated by Strategy D affordable? Would the American people be willing to bear a greater economic burden in order to be able to "engage everywhere all the time"? Or would fiscal constraints force a scaling-down of the ambitious engagement program in alternative Strategy D, making it look more like a version of Strategy A?

Our point is that political and economic constraints could easily force a blending of the principles and priorities of the strategy alternatives as described. This in no way mitigates the need for a comprehensive assessment of the priorities and risks inherent in each of the strategy alternatives. Such assessments provide an analytical basis for actual choices. But sharp distinctions blur when plans are translated into real-world policies. As Helmuth von Moltke reportedly said about military operations: "No plan survives contact with the enemy." Some of the starker distinctions between strategy alternatives might not survive contact with practical policy constraints.

Thus the real, not merely rhetorical, differences between the strategy alternatives become most evident when the strategies are translated into program and resource allocation decisions. For example, the distinctions between alternatives A and B become very clear when the question "What levels of funding would be applied to which priority mission?" is asked. Again, this points to the need to examine the linkage between strategy alternatives and their associated integrated paths of programmatic implications.24

Conclusion

The challenge and opportunity of QDR 2001 require closely linking the strategy selected and the force structure and management choices that define the defense program, as well as identifying the areas and degrees of risk that will be accepted in making those choices. Whatever strategy is adopted, the administration must strive to do three things well: to articulate the strategy in a way that makes it understandable and acceptable to the American people; to derive force sizing criteria and to make acquisition and force management choices that implement the inherent priorities of the strategy; and to be explicit as to the risks--military, political, or economic--that it is willing to accept in implementing the strategy. Execution of these three imperatives may be the most critical factor in the success of the next QDR.

Being explicit as to priorities and risks could make the administration vulnerable to public criticism (both just and unjust) and posturing by political opponents. It also disallows the fuzzy rhetoric that blurs the clear identification of winners and losers in the competition between ideas and programs. Egos and budget shares could get bruised. A considerable degree of political courage is required, but the potential dividend of such explicitness--a coherent, sustainable, supported, and successful defense policy that will guard American interests, deter war, and preserve a just peace--is worth the risks.

Notes

Chapter Six

Sizing Conventional Forces: Criteria and Methodology
by Mich?le A. Flournoy and Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

For better or for worse, those who will do the hard work in the 2001 QDR of translating strategic priorities into force structure options will have a huge audience as they do their work. To ensure that key judgments and decisions are made explicitly and in a manner that reflects the strategy's guidance on where to place emphasis and where to accept or to manage a degree of risk, they will need to create a process for force sizing that is both rigorous and transparent. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to outline a methodology for sizing conventional forces to meet the requirements of a given strategy. This methodology enables force planners to translate the priorities of a chosen strategy--whatever those priorities may be--into discrete force structure options that can then be further assessed through modeling and analysis.1

This chapter reviews four alternative approaches to force sizing. Because each has its strengths and weaknesses, all four approaches informed the development of the NDU QDR Working Group's proposed methodology, which is next described. The chapter details each step in the force sizing process and highlights the key decisions and judgments that must be made along the way.

Four Perspectives

One can view the challenge of sizing U.S. conventional forces from at least four different perspectives. Each has an internally consistent approach to generating force structure, based on varying worldviews and assumptions about missions, scenarios, and capabilities. Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches raises a number of key choices that were central to the development of the force-sizing methodology that we propose later in this chapter.

Threat-Scenario Approach

The threat-scenario approach sizes U.S. forces based on specific threats. It uses validated threat estimates provided by the national intelligence community to identify specific threat scenarios to which the U.S. military might have to respond in the near to mid term. This methodology then prioritizes scenarios in accordance with the strategy, placing greater emphasis on those scenarios that fall into priority-mission categories. Once priority-threat scenarios are identified, critical assumptions about warning, concurrency, and separation time are established and specific requirements for the U.S. military are determined. The final step is identifying one or more force structure options that can meet these requirements.

The advantages of this approach to force sizing center around the high credibility of scenarios derived from validated intelligence assessments. This approach tends to generate a force that emphasizes contingency response capabilities and warfighting competencies. Its disadvantages stem from the fact that focusing on specific scenarios may yield forces (and rationales for those forces) that are not readily adaptable to change, such as unforeseen changes in the security environment. Indeed, the near-term focus of this approach tends to neglect preparation for long-term threats and hedging against uncertainties. Perhaps most important, it also neglects the utility of military activities to shape the international security environment: it sizes forces to respond to foreseen threats, not to prevent or deter them.

Regional-Missions Approach

The regional-missions approach sizes U.S. conventional forces based on prioritized regional requirements. Based on current geographical divisions outlined in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), this approach sizes the force according to identified military requirements in five key regions: Western and Eastern Europe (U.S. European Command), Asia and the Pacific Basin (U.S. Pacific Command), the Middle East and Central Asia (U.S. Central Command), Central and South America and the Caribbean (U.S. Southern Command), and the continental United States. For each region, two principles are applied. The first is sizing for peacetime engagement and presence: the day-to-day demands placed on the military. The second is sizing for contingency operations in the same regions, including CONUS-based forces and strategic reserves.

These principles are applied in the following manner. First, baseline and minimum engagement and presence forces are calculated for each theater. Baseline forces are those that the regional commander in chief requires to undertake day-to-day presence and engagement activities in the region. Minimum forces are those stay-behind forces that the CINC would need to ensure stability in the region, even in the midst of one or more major wars elsewhere. Second, forces for anticipated smaller-scale contingencies are derived for each theater. Finally, potential major theater war requirements are determined for each theater. These requirements are then viewed in combination, on a global basis, to determine both relative priorities and how forces would be allocated across regions. As part of this process, theater-level shortfalls and contingency and support forces are identified, from other theaters or from the United States.

This approach captures both the shaping and contingency-response requirements of any given strategy. In addressing a broad range of potential scenarios and options, it emphasizes regional CINC needs. On the other hand, the decentralization inherent in this approach emphasizes local requirements and, in a resource-constrained environment, begs for additional prioritization to adjudicate competing requirements across regions. This bottom-up compilation of many diverse requirements may also be difficult to summarize in a succinct and compelling rationale for the size and shape of U.S. forces. Lastly, the near-term focus of this approach tends to reinforce current concepts of operations (what we need today) more than innovative approaches to anticipated future challenges (what we may need for tomorrow).

Generic-Missions Approach

The generic-missions approach sizes forces based on generic missions derived from the priorities of a particular strategy. Based on strategy-driven guidance, this approach sizes the force for the missions or activities explicitly identified in the strategy, such as MTWs, homeland security, overseas presence, peacetime engagement, SSCs, and transformation. After these missions or activities are identified, they are prioritized according to the dictates of the strategy. Forces are allocated to each category in priority order. Areas of potential overlap--generally forces that are appropriately given more than one mission--are identified, for example, naval forces that would provide overseas presence in peacetime and also be part of the initial response to deter or fight a war.

The principal advantage of this approach is that it is highly sensitive to strategy guidance and can effectively capture all of the priority missions identified. But it also has the defects of its virtues. For example, the sensitivity of this approach to a particular strategy's priorities can be a weakness if it yields forces that do not have the flexibility or balance to deal with the unexpected--that is, to respond effectively to developments not anticipated by the strategy.

Future-Capabilities Approach

The future-capabilities approach sizes forces based on capabilities required to deal effectively with future threats and opportunities. Under this approach, the characteristics of the future security environment (for example, in 2025) are outlined, and anticipated priority military missions and operating assumptions are identified. Force structure options are then developed based on the capabilities required to carry out these missions. This process is generally oriented toward the future security environment considered most likely, but it also permits sizing forces to hedge against wildcard developments, that is, less likely but dangerous futures.

Because this approach focuses on longer-term threats to U.S. security, it can be more difficult to implement. No crystal ball provides a clear and certain picture of the military challenges that we will confront in the future, and the more distant the future, the murkier the picture. There are also political sensitivities associated with planning against potential future adversaries who are not yet adversaries. This uncertainty places a premium on hedging against a range of future possibilities rather than optimizing the force for one anticipated or hoped-for future. In addition, if applied independently, this approach might not yield a force well suited to near-term contingencies, but any force-sizing approach that we apply must be able to negotiate the near term. No sitting Secretary of Defense can take on an unacceptable level of risk today in order to better prepare the U.S. military for tomorrow: he or she must strike a balance. Therefore, this approach is probably most useful not as a stand-alone approach, but as one that complements others that capture near-term requirements as well.

Integrating the Approaches

Each of these four approaches looks at the problem of force sizing from a different perspective, and each has unique strengths and weaknesses. However, no single approach seems strong enough to stand on its own merits. For this reason, the working group ?eveloped a composite force-sizing methodology that integrates elements of all four approaches. It seeks to draw on the strengths of each approach while avoiding its most serious weaknesses. DOD does not yet have a common or approved methodology for force sizing, so we offer this approach as a useful starting point for force planners and decisionmakers in the QDR.

Proposed Methodology

Each of the four defense strategy alternatives described in chapter 5 offers a different set of priorities for the U.S. military and DOD. Once the Bush administration determines the defense strategy that it wishes to pursue, its challenge is to translate its priorities into criteria for sizing the force and allocating resources within the DOD. Moreover, it will face critical decisions about where to place emphasis and where to accept or to manage risk.

This section describes a step-by-step methodology for sizing U.S. conventional forces (see figure 6-1). This approach to force sizing can be used to support any strategy alternative chosen by the Bush administration. As this seven-step process sizes conventional forces to the requirements of a given strategy, it makes the most critical policy decisions and military judgments transparent and unavoidable.

Step 1 defines the terms that form the language of force sizing. These sizing elements should reflect the key missions and activities identified in the strategy, such as MTWs, homeland security, overseas presence, peacetime engagement, SSCs, and transformation.

Step 2 prioritizes these elements to reflect the strategy's guidance on where to place emphasis and where to accept or manage a degree of risk. As part of this process, a target level of acceptable risk is established for each element. For example, in a resource-constrained environment, one might aim for low or low-to-moderate risk in a strategy's highest priority areas while accepting moderate-to-high or high risk in some lower priority activities.2

Step 3 develops individual force structure building blocks for each of the sizing elements, consistent with the target level of risk.

Step 4 melds the discrete building blocks of forces based on key considerations, such as assumptions about which forces would disengage from SSCs to redeploy to MTWs, which forces would swing between MTWs (that is, take part in one campaign and then quickly redeploy to another), or which forces would be dual-tasked (such as forward presence forces also available for MTWs). Here again, the target level of risk must be considered as the building blocks are adjusted, because a low-risk force for a given set of missions may be markedly different from a high-risk force.

Step 5 develops the rotational base requirements for forces involved in overseas-presence and long-term SSC operations. For example, how many carrier battle groups are required in the force to keep three of these groups forward-deployed at any given time? How many Army brigades are needed to support one forward-deployed in Bosnia on an ongoing basis?

Step 6 assesses the forces necessary to generate the combat and support forces required by the strategy. Any unique capabilities and requirements that were not fully integrated as building blocks should also be included here, such as training units (supporting force accession or training missions), higher-echelon maintenance and support units, and strategic mobility forces.

Step 7 evaluates the ability of the resultant force structure to support the associated strategy. An iterative process of wargaming, modeling, and analysis determines whether strategic priorities and areas of emphasis are accurately reflected in the force structure. The force structure can be further adjusted if target risk levels are not met initially or if they are subsequently modified for specific sizing elements.

Step 1: Definition of Sizing Elements

The key elements used in force sizing should be the priority missions and activities assigned to the U.S. military by a given strategy. Obviously, these elements--how they are defined and what priority they are given--will vary by strategy. In developing its approach to force sizing, the NDU QDR Working Group adopted or developed several definitions based on the range of missions and activities that the U.S. military currently prepares for or undertakes. These definitions are provided below to illustrate the first step in the methodology, recognizing that some of these terms may change or be defined differently in a future strategy.

Any U.S. defense strategy will include deterring and, if necessary, fighting and winning major wars as a key element. In the absence of an official DOD definition, the NDU Working Group defined an MTW as U.S. military operations to deter and to defeat large-scale aggression by a state or coalition that threatens an ally or the stability of a region; it involves joint and combined military operations that project, apply, and sustain substantial U.S. combat and combat support forces for high-intensity conflict. This definition was crafted to support a broader MTW scenario set than the two canonical MTWs that are currently the primary basis for U.S. defense planning (Iraq and Korea).

Another key element of any defense strategy is overseas presence, which we define as the military forces permanently stationed or rotationally or intermittently deployed overseas for the purposes of influence, engagement, reassurance, deterrence, and initial crisis response. Because many overseas-presence forces require a substantial rotation base, this element has potentially profound implications for the size of the associated force.

In the past, U.S. forces have been sized predominantly for two elements alone: warfighting and presence. Other missions and activities have been treated, explicitly or implicitly, as lesser included cases in sizing the force: it was assumed that forces sized for warfighting and presence would be sufficient to meet any other demands. However, the increasing peacetime demands placed on the U.S. military in the last decade have called this assumption into question, with increases in so-called low density/high demand (LD/HD) assets, and chronic operations and personnel tempo strains in parts of the force. Even under a strategy of more selective engagement, we propose including peacetime demands explicitly in the force-sizing process so that decisions about whether to treat them as lesser included cases are conscious and explicit.

Peacetime demands can be thought of in at least two categories. The first of these is the full range of military operations beyond peacetime military engagement but short of MTW. This category of operations has been known by many different names over the last decade, from low-intensity conflict, to military operations other than war, peace operations, and smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs). The current Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) identifies more than a dozen kinds of SSCs, as indicated in table 6-1.

The second category is peacetime military engagement: U.S. military activities designed to enhance constructive security relations and to promote broad U.S. security interests, including activities such as combined training, military-to-military interactions, and various other programs.

At least one of the defense strategy alternatives outlined in chapter 5 would place greater emphasis on homeland security. Thus, homeland security should also be treated as a potential element in force sizing. While its effect on the size of U.S. conventional forces overall might be only marginal, its effect on the size and shape of certain elements of the force may be substantial. We defined the military elements of homeland security as those military operations and activities involved in deterring, preventing, defending against, and responding to attacks on the U.S. homeland, including national missile defense, territorial defense (air, land, sea, and space), critical infrastructure protection, selected counterterrorism activities, consequence management, and other activities in support of domestic civil authorities.

The Bush administration may also want to consider, as part of its force-sizing calculus, the requirements of transformation, that is, the set of activities by which DOD seeks to harness the revolution in military affairs to make fundamental changes in technology, operational concepts and doctrine, and organizational structure. Specifically, should the administration set aside forces for concept development, experimentation, and reconfiguration, or should it treat such activities as additional rotational demands on the operational force? If transformation is a high priority in administration strategy, it will need to be factored into calculations of overall force structure.

Step 2: Prioritization

The second step in sizing the force is to prioritize the various sizing elements in accordance with the strategy and to determine the level of acceptable risk for each element.3 This step yields the criteria that will be used to develop one or more force structure options. Force-sizing criteria are often expressed as equations designed to indicate the number and types of operations that the U.S. military should be able to conduct concurrently, such as 2 MTWs, or 1 MTW + 1 halt + 3 SSCs (where halt refers to an operation in its halt phase, to halt an adversary's advance). Missions or activities not included in the equation are generally treated as lesser included cases: things that the military may be required to do, but for which additional forces are not provided.

If, however, force-sizing criteria are to influence the resource allocation process more accurately, it may be more useful to think of them as a list of explicit resource priorities rather than as an equation. The strength of this more vertical approach is that it explicitly identifies a lowest-priority category as the principal area in which a greater degree of risk would be accepted or managed, if resources are constrained. For example, each of the following force-sizing criteria would be consistent with the current “shape, respond, prepare now” defense strategy that we have called Strategy A:

In practice, however, these two sets of priorities could have very different implications for resource allocation and U.S. conventional forces. In the first case, DOD would seek to provide all necessary resources for the first MTW, then for the second MTW, and only then for the level of peacetime operations presently engaged in, such as presence, engagement, and SSCs. In a resource-constrained environment, this approach could result in serious tempo strains in parts of the force, particularly for those assets in highest demand in peacetime, and could mean an inability to maintain desired levels of overseas presence and military engagement around the globe. In the second case, DOD would seek to provide full resources for the first MTW, then for peacetime operations, and only then for the second MTW. Here, a higher priority is given to what the U.S. military now does day-to-day in support of shaping and responding. In practice, this might translate into greater resources for the rotation base and high-demand assets required to sustain the prescribed level of presence, engagement, and SSCs. If resources were constrained, it might also mean accepting a greater degree of risk in the second MTW in some form, perhaps by dual-apportioning forces (assigning some forces roles in both MTWs), relying more on the Reserve components, reducing the number of forces allocated to the second war, or some other approach.4 Strategy A presents a fundamental choice between sizing the force primarily for warfighting or sizing the force for a combination of warfighting and priority peacetime demands.

Another critical factor in sizing the force for Strategy A, as well as the other strategies, is the MTW scenario set. If it were broadened beyond the two canonical cases to include a wider range of threats, end-state objectives, operating conditions, and concepts of operation, the same force-sizing criteria might yield a force very different from today's force. In practice, this would mean looking across a number of scenarios to identify the most demanding combinations of challenges for each element of the force, and then sizing each element accordingly. For example, the Navy might be most stressed by a combination of two MTWs involving the closure of sea lines of communication and cross-straits aggression (as in a hypothetical case of aggression across the Strait of Hormuz or the Taiwan Strait). The Army might be most stressed by cases involving defeating large land invasions, supporting a regime change, and restoring stability on the ground post-conflict (as in the canonical cases of Korea or Iraq). Sizing different elements to meet the most stressing combination of plausible MTW challenges would make force sizing a more iterative process in which the capabilities of U.S. forces would be optimized across a larger range of scenarios and challenges.

Strategy B suggests a different set of force-sizing criteria alternatives. Each of the following sets of criteria would be consistent with a strategy of engaging more selectively and accelerating transformation:

Here, again, the two different sets of priorities would have very different implications for the size and shape of the U.S. military and for resource allocation more broadly. In the first case, DOD would seek to provide all necessary resources for the first MTW, then DOD support to homeland security, then transformation (for example, standing experimentation forces, or forces undergoing reorganization and retraining), then a more selective level of presence, engagement, and SSCs, and finally a second MTW. In a resource-constrained environment, this would effectively shift resources from the second MTW to higher-priority areas, such as homeland security and transformation. Strategy B might manage risk in the second MTW by adopting a limited end-state objective (such as restoring the pre-war border) and an alternative concept of operations that would reduce the U.S. forces required to fight and to win the war.

The second set of priorities would take a fundamentally different approach to force sizing, consistent with the Strategy B emphasis on preparing for more serious future threats, such as conflict with a more capable regional foe or near-peer competitor. This future capabilities approach would identify the capabilities that the U.S. military would need to fight and to win a major war against a much more capable regional foe in the 2015-2020 timeframe, and then reorient and reshape the current force incrementally toward that end. This approach would increase investment in priority future capabilities, in preference to those capabilities with declining relevance. It would also put a premium on forces for homeland security and transformation. Both of these force-sizing criteria for Strategy B would size U.S. forces for a mix of warfighting and other priority demands. The fundamental choice here is one of timeframe: Should U.S. forces be sized primarily to meet near and mid-term demands, or rather according to anticipated future capability requirements?

Strategy C--"Engage More Selectively and Strengthen Warfighting Capability"--is less ambiguous about the criteria it would use to size U.S. conventional forces:

First, this approach would seek to provide all necessary resources for the capability to fight two major theater wars; second for overseas presence geared toward deterrence and crisis response, and third for a more selective level of peacetime military engagement and SSCs in support of U.S. vital interests. Here, the critical issues lie in how requirements are defined in each of these categories. The choice of MTW scenarios would be critical, as would the definition of presence requirements. In a resource-constrained environment, this approach would seek to manage risk primarily in the category of peacetime engagement and SSCs. In practice, this might mean accepting higher tempo and readiness strains in high-demand units and personnel, reducing training for and potentially the quality of performance in SSCs, and cutting back on military-to-military interactions with allies and partners.

Strategy D--"Engage Today to Prevent Conflict Tomorrow"--suggests a radically different choice of force-sizing criteria alternatives that would give much greater emphasis to sizing U.S. forces to meet the requirements of an expanded level of involvement in presence, engagement, and SSCs:

The first case would give highest resource priority to the peacetime operations and activities of the U.S. military, while also maintaining a core warfighting capability as a hedge against the possibility that even a more active deterrence strategy could fail. In the second case, DOD would first seek to provide all necessary resources for a single MTW--preserving a core warfighting capability--and then the expanded levels of presence, engagement, and SSCs called for by the strategy. Here, the fundamental choice is whether to preserve a core warfighting capability as a top priority, a choice that would likely hinge on judgments about how much warfighting capability would already reside in forces designed primarily for presence, engagement, and SSCs.

This process of prioritization raises several crucial force-sizing decisions, including whether:

• to size the force primarily for warfighting;
• to size the force for both warfighting and priority peacetime demands, such as presence, engagement, SSCs, and homeland security as identified and prioritized by a given strategy;
• to size and to shape the force based on required capabilities for the future;
• to size the force primarily for what the military does daily while maintaining a core warfighting capability.

Part of the prioritization process is setting a target level of acceptable risk for each element of the force-sizing criteria. These will vary by strategy, but only a low-to-moderate level of risk might be accepted in a strategy's highest priority areas, whereas higher levels of risk might be accepted or managed, if necessary due to resource constraints, in one or more lower priority areas. Such judgments about acceptable levels of risk must be made as explicit as possible to enable sound force structure decisions that reflect the priorities of a given strategy and the desires of the DOD senior leadership.

Step 3: Developing Force Building Blocks

Once the Bush administration has a prioritized set of force-sizing criteria and an understanding of where it is willing to accept or to manage, at least in principle, a degree of risk, the next step is to develop force building blocks for each element of the criteria. What follows seeks to highlight some of the issues that will need to be considered and judgments that will need to be made along the way with regard to MTWs, overseas presence, SSCs, homeland security, and, in some cases, transformation.

Major Theater Wars

Several key factors must be considered in developing a force building block for major theater wars: the number of MTWs for which to be prepared, assumptions about concurrency if planning for the possibility of more than one MTW at a time, the level of acceptable risk for each MTW, the overall scenario set, and the particulars of individual scenarios.

The number of MTWs to be sized for and the general degree of concurrency should be spelled out in the strategy, whereas the target level of risk for each MTW should be developed in prioritizing the sizing criteria during Step 2. For example, one standard would require the ability to conduct two overlapping MTWs, both at low-to-moderate risk; another would require the ability to conduct two overlapping MTWs, the first at low-to-moderate risk and the second at moderate-to-high risk. In all cases, the target level of risk may have significant implications for the size and nature of the MTW force building block. Accepting low-to moderate-risk in an MTW may yield one type of force building block, whereas accepting high risk may yield quite another. How general terms like nearly simultaneous or overlapping are translated into specific assumptions about how many days, weeks, or months might separate two or more major wars will also have a major impact on force requirements.

Developing force building blocks for MTWs will be more challenging if, as we recommend, the Bush administration seeks to optimize the force across a range of MTW scenarios broader than the canonical Iraq and Korea cases. This would require a substantial shift in approach, that is, from designing forces to meet the requirements of two specific cases, to developing a portfolio of forces and capabilities that can meet the most stressing requirements of a wider variety of potential warfighting scenarios. Based on our assessment of the future security environment,5 we recommend that the MTW scenario set include not only cases of large-scale, cross-border land invasions by enemy armored forces, but also cross-straits aggression involving enemy missile, air, naval, and, possibly, amphibious forces. Our assessment of future threats also suggests that the U.S. military should plan to be able to operate in the face of delayed or denied access to key bases and facilities in the theater, as well as adversary attempts to thwart U.S. power projection through attacks on U.S. deployment sites and en-route infrastructure.

In practice, developing forces to meet the demands of such a broadened scenario set involves identifying the most stressing MTW cases for each type of force--heavy ground forces, light ground forces, amphibious forces, naval forces, air forces--and then sizing and shaping a force building block for that type of force accordingly. For example, whereas heavy ground forces might be most stressed by scenarios involving an armored land invasion, naval forces might be more stressed by cases of cross-straits aggression, naval blockade, or closure of sea lines of communication. In each case the Bush administration would need to consider individual force requirements in the context of the joint campaign. Such an approach has the potential to yield a more robust set of forces and capabilities that can meet the most stressing aspects of a broader range of potential future challenges.

The particulars of each warfighting scenario will require that at least six key factors be assessed: adversary objectives, forces, capabilities, and concepts of operations (including the use of weapons of mass destruction or other antiaccess measures); U.S. and allied end-state objectives and concepts of operations; anticipated strategic warning time; level and timing of U.S. mobilization; campaign phasing and synchronization; and allied and coalition contributions. Each of these variables can significantly affect the size and shape of the forces required.

Finally, in developing the MTW and other force building blocks, it will be important to size not only major combat elements, such as divisions, wings, and carrier battle groups, but also other combat and critical support forces and capabilities (such as special operations forces, logistics forces, tankers, airlift and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities).

Overseas Presence

Developing a force building block for overseas presence involves several steps. The first is to understand whether the Bush administration's strategy calls for any changes in the requirements for U.S. forces deployed permanently or rotationally overseas. Does the strategy require changes in U.S. overseas posture based on existing or anticipated changes in the security environment, new regions of emphasis in U.S. security policy, or a reassessment of priority missions and activities of the U.S. military? Secondly, is the administration willing to consider new ways of meeting overseas-presence requirements, such as substituting one kind of force for another, forward-stationing additional elements of the force, or keeping platforms forward for longer peri?ds while rotating their crews? Our examination of defense strategy alternatives in chapter 5 suggests that while the overall need for the U.S. military to be forward-deployed will not be called into question in the 2001 QDR, the particulars of overseasmpresence--both the specific requirements and how those requirements are met--may be fertile ground for change.6

Smaller-Scale Contingencies

The primary consideration in developing a force building block for smaller-scale contingencies is the notional level of U.S. commitment to SSCs that is expected to result from the chosen strategy. Based on the four principal strategy alternatives examined in chapter 5, three notional levels of U.S. military involvement in SSCs were developed. The three levels of commitment were designated as limited--somewhat less than today, based on the more selective engagement called for in Strategies B and C; full--approximately equivalent to today, as reflected in Strategy A; and expanded--greater than today, reflecting the more extensive U.S. military engagement called for by Strategy D. Table 6-2 outlines the three levels.

While it would be impossible to predict a president's actual decisions on use of force, it is important that the Bush administration seek to identify the level of U.S. military involvement in SSCs that it expects--with assumptions about the numbers, types, and concurrency of operations--as part of the force-sizing process in order to capture the particular demands of such operations on the force over time. Our analysis suggests that this will be true even with a more selective engagement policy. Even with the most limited level of commitment to SSCs, a number of high-demand assets experienced substantial tempo strains.

Once a notional level of commitment is defined, force planners should estimate the steady state forces required to sustain the major part of the operation. In some cases, these forces may be somewhat smaller than the forces initially required and significantly larger than the forces required in the final phases of the operation. This calculation will not be easy; no two SSCs will be alike, and timelines and force requirements will vary widely, even for SSCs with similar characteristics.7

Force structure requirements derived from this approach are measured in the same terms described for the MTW building block, but with additional considerations. First, the SSC building block should not take into account possible force substitutions (this issue is addressed in subsequent modeling and analysis). Second, there may be potentially larger force requirements (surging) at the start of some SSCs, such as opposed interventions and peace accord implementations. These force levels are not reflected in steady state forces; rather, the building block should be based on anticipated force size and types called for over the predominant portion of the SSC. Third, some SSCs, such as shows of force, may be precursors to MTWs, undertaken to deter aggression and to signal U.S. resolve. In such cases, no additional force structure should be considered beyond that already included in the MTW building block. Fourth, long-term rotational requirements and use of presence forces are not directly reflected in this stage of the methodology. (These requirements are addressed in Step 5.) The result of this step in the process should be a notional building block of forces designed to meet the anticipated SSC requirements of a given strategy.

Homeland Security

If a strategy gives high priority to DOD support for civilian agencies in a variety of homeland security missions, then force planners should examine the implications of this set of missions for the size and shape of U.S. conventional forces. Referring to Step 1 and Step 2 definitions and priorities of the military missions included under the homeland security umbrella, one would begin by identifying which priority missions would have a potentially significant impact on conventional forces. This led the working group to focus on critical infrastructure protection (for example, computer network defense, information operations, and deployment infrastructure) and on consequence management in response to WMD terrorism on U.S. soil.

For each mission area, a set of planning factors should be developed that articulates assumptions about the number, type, and concurrency of such operations that the U.S. military should be prepared to undertake. For example, one might plan to be able to respond to one large or one small kinetic WMD event concurrent with one large and one small chemical, biological, and radiological WMD event, while also being able to provide simultaneous physical protection of up to 10 strategic deployment sites. Here, it will be important to view homeland security requirements not in isolation but in the context of other priority demands that may be placed on the U.S. military at the same time. Given that the most likely time for a WMD terrorism attack on U.S. soil may be during or just before a major war abroad, the Bush administration will need to consider a new standard: meeting homeland security requirements while fighting one or more major wars. This is true not only for domestic consequence management, but also for the full range of potential DOD homeland security missions. Otherwise, the President might be forced to choose between securing vital American interests at home and securing them abroad.

Based on these planning factors, the homeland security building block should include those forces required to meet homeland security missions over and above those required to meet the strategy's warfighting requirements. Such forces will be primarily small, specialized, and currently scarce units that would provide unique command, control, logistic, and organizational capabilities in support of local, state, and Federal agencies.

Transformation

Finally, if transformation is treated as a force-sizing element, then planners must determine whether to develop a building block of stand-alone forces that would be set aside for activities such as concept development, experimentation, and reconfiguration, and essentially unavailable for other missions, or instead to treat transformation requirements as simply another set of peacetime demands on the force that should be met on a rotational basis.

Step 4: Addressing Overlap

With initial force-structure building blocks established, the next two steps tailor the aggregate force based on several practical considerations usually defined in policy or by planning assumptions. These include assumptions about extracting forces from one operation to participate in another, requiring some forces to stay behind in unengaged (that is, non-MTW) theaters even in the midst of one or more MTWs and other policy and planning assumptions that could affect force availability, such as swinging or dual-apportioning forces between major military operations, the timing and sequencing of force movements, and use of the Reserve components.

Accounting for Planned Force Extractions

Current policy assumes a 100 percent disengagement of U.S. forces from SSCs in the event of two MTWs. But this policy may be neither attainable nor strategically sound in practice. There may be real constraints on the ability of the Armed Forces to withdraw from SSCs in a timely manner and to redeploy to an MTW. Equally vital U.S. interests may be at stake in the SSC; a U.S. withdrawal might cause the collapse of an entire coalition operation; allies or Reserve forces might not be willing or able to fill in for departing U.S. forces; or the additional strategic lift required might not be available in a timely manner. Therefore, the working group applied a more conservative assumption that 50 percent of the forces involved in SSCs would disengage and redeploy to a major war.8 This means that only half of the force requirements for a given strategy's level of commitment to SSCs is considered in force sizing. The other half is assumed available for other higher priority activities. The value of this approach is that it clearly articulates SSC force requirements as a discrete category, separate from MTWs, and acknowledges that, in practice, some forces may not be easily extracted, reconstituted, and redeployed in accordance with CINC timelines. How this overlap is defined--by a percentage of the force or by types of units or personnel--can be modified, but the conceptual underpinning remains constant.

Counting Presence Forces

The role of overseas-presence forces in MTWs and SSCs is also considered at this stage of the process, and the overall force structure adjusted accordingly. For example, forward-deployed naval, air, and ground forces may be part of the initial response to a crisis; indeed, this is an express part of their purpose. Therefore, care must be taken not to double-count such forces in both the presence and MTW or SSC building blocks. On the other hand, some forward-deployed forces may be so vital to deterrence and stability in a given region that they would not be withdrawn from an unengaged theater even in the event of MTW execution. For the purposes of the working group's analysis, assumptions about which forces should be treated as stay-behind forces were derived from judgments about what would be required to meet U.S. treaty commitments, maintain deterrence and regional stability in a given theater, and provide the regional CINC with minimum essential levels of force protection, support to noncombatant evacuation operations, and strike capability.

Swinging, Dual Apportionment, and Use of the Reserve component

Additional adjustments to the aggregate force structure must be considered in light of various policy assumptions. The first such assumption deals with forces that would swing between operations, that is, be used in one campaign and then quickly redeployed to another. Forces that are considered as candidates to swing between operations are generally self-deploying or require relatively little strategic lift, such as long-range bombers and certain naval assets. The second assumption deals with forces that are dual-apportioned, that is, forces that could be allocated to one or another theater in wartime. These are usually scarce or unique assets that more than one CINC would desire in wartime, such as the 82d Airborne Division or unique chemical-biological defense assets, whose deployment would hinge on a decision of the National Command Authorities as a crisis unfolded. Finally, there are assumptions to be made about the Reserve forces that would be called up in the event of one or more MTWs and about mobilization timelines. The greater and more timely the mobilization of the Reserve components assumed, the less the demand for active-duty forces, and vice versa.

All of these considerations should be taken into account to determine where force building blocks should be counted in a purely additive manner and where overlap should be discounted to avoid double-counting forces that are appropriately assigned more than one mission or function.

Step 5: Assessing Rotational Base Requirements

Step 5 in our force-sizing methodology accounts for the rotational base requirements associated with overseas commitments of long duration, that is, both overseas presence and participation in long-term SSCs. In this step, force planners examine those operations or activities that would necessitate rotations of forces in order to keep time away from home for given units or individuals within acceptable levels, as defined by their service.9 This involves, first, identifying the presence, engagement, and SSC commitments that would require rotations to sustain. These might include, for example, maintaining a nearly continuous naval presence in a given region, keeping a brigade-equivalent of ground forces deployed to an SSC over several years, or sustaining a no-fly zone or sanctions-enforcement regime on an indefinite basis. The forces required to meet these long-term commitments are then multiplied by a service's rotational factor, generally between 4 and 5, but sometimes higher. The resultant force structure is then compared to the aggregate force structure derived from the various building blocks (adjusted for overlap), and the greater of the two becomes the force structure option for a given strategy.10

Step 6: Making Final Adjustments

Up to this point, the force-sizing effort has focused primarily on major conventional force elements such as Army divisions and Navy carrier battle groups. Step 6 is designed to ensure that adequate attention is paid to those forces necessary to generate and to sustain this capability, as well as meeting other unique requirements. In this step, any such forces that have not been included thus far must be identified and integrated into the overall force structure. Such generating forces might include training units (supporting force accession or training missions), higher-echelon maintenance and support units, and strategic mobility forces. Key sustainment forces might include strategic lift, tankers, logistics forces, and ISR capabilities.

Step 7: Modeling and Analysis

In Step 7, the overall force structure that results from the previous steps is tested through iterative wargaming, modeling, and analysis to determine whether it meets the requirements of the strategy at the levels of risk deemed acceptable. This is no small challenge for several reasons. First, a force must be assessed not only in terms of its performance of warfighting missions, but also in terms of its performance of the full range of priority missions identified in the strategy, its ability to sustain the prescribed level of peacetime operations (such as presence, engagement, and SSCs), its flexibility to deal with both anticipated and unanticipated future threats, and its affordability.11 However, few if any currently available force performance models accurately reflect how the U.S. military actually operates, nor are there adequate models that capture the full range of peacetime demands and facilitate evaluation of force sustainability over time. Most existing models have critical deficiencies, and the lack of better models makes it difficult to assess and to compare alternatives. This state of affairs will present a difficult challenge for decisionmakers in the 2001 QDR, requiring them to make critical judgments and decisions with inadequate analytic support.

Conclusion

The Bush administration will face several key decisions in sizing U.S. conventional forces to meet the requirements of its chosen strategy at acceptable levels of risk. The purpose of this chapter has been to outline a methodology that addresses each of these decisions and offers QDR planners a transparent and replicable way to translate strategy into force structure options. DOD currently lacks such a methodology. There is great promise in the proposed approach, and it is offered to the 2001 QDR as a way to proceed. Whatever the specific strategy developed in the QDR, the NDU Working Group believes that the administration should size the force in a manner that takes into account not only the strategy's warfighting requirements, but also its high-priority peacetime demands, whatever those demands may be. We also recommend taking a second look at the size and shape of the force through the lens of future capability requirements. Equally important, whatever the methodology used to arrive at the force structure that will support the selected strategy, it must explicitly account for risk and be able to withstand open, independent scrutiny.

This will be no small challenge given the current state of the available models and analytic tools. While some might be tempted to use the need for better analysis or more rigorous risk assessment to postpone some of the most difficult decisions, they cannot afford to do so in the 2001 QDR. Failure to confront the hard choices that must be made to close the strategy-resources gap would be a decision in and of itself, one with serious consequences for the U.S. military. Given the lack of adequate models, the QDR should focus primarily on developing a defense strategy, setting clear priorities for DOD, and making the most important program decisions. A follow-on effort should conduct more in-depth analysis to flesh out and refine all of the programmatic implications. Risk assessment during the QDR itself should aim for rough order-of-magnitude judgments of risk to inform the most significant decisions; more detailed risk assessment could be part of the follow-on analytic effort.

Consistent with this approach would be a more varied and iterative set of tests (reflecting a given strategy's priorities) to assess and to refine force structure options. Such an approach might begin with a series of seminar wargames that would play a given set of force-structure options across a broad range of high-end operations--including a wider range of potential threat scenarios, end-state objectives, operational constraints, and concepts of operations--consistent with the chosen strategy. The same options might be played in a concurrent series of war- games aimed at assessing force sustainability over time. Those options that look most promising in wargames might then be subjected to more in-depth modeling and analysis to further assess force performance. In the 2001 QDR, this will require cobbling together a suite of existing joint and service models to examine various aspects of force performance in major contingencies.12 Promising options could also be assessed in terms of force preparation risk and affordability risk. Based on initial results and on the tradespace candidates consistent with the given strategy, the force structure options could be refined and reassessed. The result of such a process would be a more rigorously tested force structure optimized across a more representative range of strategy-driven challenges.

This will inevitably be a highly imperfect process in the next QDR, given the state of the tools available. Nevertheless, a more comprehensive and iterative approach to force structure assessment is far better than one that relies primarily on a limited set of modeling runs that do not fully capture how the U.S. military operates.

In the longer term, DOD needs to give much higher priority to investment in new modeling, analysis, and decision-support tools as well as to the creation of a common conceptual framework for the assessment of risk. In the near term, however, DOD should strive to create a rigorous and transparent process for force sizing that ensures that key judgments and decisions are made explicitly and in a manner that reflects the strategy's guidance on where to place emphasis and where to accept or manage a degree of risk.

Notes

Chapter Seven

Assessing Risk: Enabling Sound Defense Decisions

Risk assessment will be a fundamental part of the 2001 QDR. According to the National Defense Authorization Act, "The assessment . . . shall be undertaken by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That assessment shall define the nature and magnitude of the political, strategic, and military risks associated with executing the missions called for under the national defense strategy. The results of the review [shall be submitted to Congress] including a comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of the U.S. and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy at a low to moderate level of risk." 1The objective of this chapter is to establish a methodology for talking about, measuring, comparing, and deciding on defense issues from a perspective of risk assessment.

This chapter proposes a general theory of risk assessment with two goals: establishing the conceptual basis for a detailed risk assessment analysis and suggesting principles to inform work on risk assessment in the 2001 QDR. To accomplish these goals, a set of definitions is outlined, beginning with national security risk and then addressing strategic military risk and operational risk. A methodology is outlined for evaluating force structure alternatives by assessing different levels of risk that combine force performance (how a force structure fights and deters) and force sustainability (how a force structure maintains readiness over time).

Other measures for risk assessment are defined that include affordability (Can we afford to buy the force?) and preparation for the future, which has two components: transformation, which involves preparing for the most likely future, and hedging, which means preparing for less likely futures. The methodology combines quantitative measures with qualitative judgments. A toolkit for force planners (see page 211) integrates all of the elements into a consistent, replicable process for risk assessment. The toolkit is designed to have broad applicability for use with a host of current and potential modeling and analysis approaches.

Concepts of Risk

For a subject so important to defense planning as risk, it is surprising that there is no current DOD-wide definition as it relates to force planning. In the definitional manual of the Joint Staff, the only mention of risk is as a technical definition associated with the employment of nuclear weapons. Neither current national security nor national military strategy discusses risk. Also, the 1997 QDR report and the associated National Defense Panel report are both silent on this issue. Most recently, the annual DOD report to Congress for 2000 did not address risk. Senior military leaders have not been silent on this issue, however. In recent congressional testimony, the Chairman voiced concern about the ability of the Armed Forces to execute assigned missions under conditions of acceptable risk.2 Some of the best recent treatments of risk assessment have come from the private sector, but this literature tends to focus on business and portfolio management risk, as well as complex system risk.3 The idea of risk in relation to strategy and force structure is an idea more talked about than formally embedded as an element of U.S. defense planning.4 The measurement of risk is becoming increasingly important in force planning and strategy development, but it has proven resistant to quantification.

National Security Risk Assessment

National military strategy (NMS) is a distillation of broader national security strategy (NSS). The latter operates the classic levers of military, economic, and diplomatic power to support and to advance U.S. global interests. It embodies the highest statement of national security objectives. National security risk therefore is the overall probability that the application of the national elements of power will be unable to achieve national security objectives. The 1999 NSS established three primary objectives: enhancing American security; bolstering economic prosperity; and promoting democracy and human rights abroad. This is the grand arena of foreign policy, where the largest and most enduring national objectives of the United States are pursued.

NMS focuses more narrowly on the military lever of national power.5 The most recent NMS, which was published in 1997, uses the "shape, respond, prepare" construct to describe how military forces are to be used for national military objectives in support of NSS. The broadest national objectives of the United States provide the framework within which NMS operates. This is an important consideration because any military strategy draws its planning horizons from the role given to the military element of national power under the national security strategy. While reference has been made to the existing NSS and NMS, the concepts that are proposed in this chapter are designed to be useful for evaluating any strategy.

Defining Strategic Military and Operational Risk

The working group proposed a working definition of strategic military risk as the overall probability that a military force will be unable to achieve all of the objectives of a defense strategy. Strategic military risk involves prioritizing between, while simultaneously accomplishing, the objectives of a defense strategy. Strategic military risk involves the aggregate effects of operational activities and how they influence overarching security objectives, such as maintaining strong alliances, influencing (or coercing) potential adversaries, and supporting peace and stability. These objectives are operationalized as deterring and fighting major theater wars, conducting a broad range of smaller-scale contingencies, participating in a wide variety of presence and engagement activities abroad, and preparing the U.S. military forces for the future by transforming the force for expected future demands and by hedging against uncertainty.

Operational risk is the probability that a military force will be unable to achieve operational objectives within a defense strategy. Operational risk involves a given force structure's performance in two areas: first, meeting operational objectives in MTW scenarios, SSCs, and other operations short of theater-level war (and the deterrence that obtains from the demonstrated ability to execute these operations); and second, sustaining acceptable long-term readiness across an extended timeframe and a range of operations, including SSCs and presence and engagement operations.

The first question to ask about strategic and operational risk is whether failure is likely. The second question is equally important: What are the consequences of failure? While the failure of a military strategy might directly threaten the survival of the United States, operational failure might have lesser, if still significant, effects. Measuring risk is a function of assessing the two variables: the likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude of the undesired consequences. As the consequences of failure increase, the degree of risk that can be tolerated decreases.

The ability of a given force structure to support the mission areas of a given military strategy determines operational risk. Strategic military risk depends not only on operational risk, but also on the relative priority of the different elements that comprise the strategy, as well as whether the elements are affordable. The working group's approach emphasizes the relationship between strategic military and operational risk, focusing its attempts to quantify strategic risk on assessments of force performance, sustainability, preparation for the future, and affordability. (Other factors--such as diplomatic and economic--also influence the calculation of national security risk, but they are beyond the scope of this work.)

This chapter addresses a force planner's and a strategist's definition of risk assessment; however, it does not directly address tactical risk in the sense of ongoing military operations (that is, whether we will be out-gunned, out-flown, out-ranged, out-leveraged, etc.). Initiatives at the service level address issues of tactical risk associated with training and combat operations. The working group's definition also diverges slightly from the Congressional mandate to consider "political, strategic, and military" elements of risk. This study's definition subsumes some of the political considerations, while others are beyond the scope of this analysis, and even beyond the scope of the QDR, because they depend on factors outside of DOD, such as interagency issues.

Defining Levels of Risk

Four levels of risk are specified in this study. In general, low risk is a judgment that failure is unlikely, and objectives will be realized within acceptable levels of expenditure of resources and time.6 Moderate risk is a judgment that failure is still unlikely, but success may require the expenditure of somewhat higher than desirable levels of resources. The timeframe to achieve success may also be extended. High risk is a judgment that failure is possible (although still unlikely), and the expenditure of high levels of resources across an extended timeframe is likely. Unacceptable risk is a judgment that failure is likely, and the expenditure of very high levels of resources across an extended timeframe is probable, with no assurance of a favorable outcome.

The definitional structure deliberately omits a category for very low, zero, or negligible risk. While pursuing a strategy and an associated force structure that operate without risk may be desirable, the cost of moving from low risk to no risk may require an exponential increase in resources. There is a trend in defense thinking to enshrine very low- or no-risk options as among the most desirable characteristics in any concept, program, or plan, but this is unrealistic. Time and energies are better spent managing risk.

The Consequences of Failure

Understanding what consequences are associated with the failure of a strategy and a force structure is important. National security strategy failure could threaten both the immediate and the long-term survival of the nation. An example of this type of failure would be the collapse of a critical collective security alliance, such as NATO.

Strategic military failure directly affects the vital national security interests of the United States and could threaten the physical, political, or economic survival of the nation.7 Strategic military failure could lead to national security strategy failure. It could result in loss of political or military leadership; weakened alliances and coalition-building capability; loss of deterrent capability and military credibility; loss of domestic political support; or renewed opportunity for others to challenge U.S. interests.

Failure at the operational level involves the loss of national resources, such as ships, planes, vehicles, or, most importantly, personnel. Failure at this level might also include the loss of terrain, noncombatant casualties, and other adverse operational outcomes that have an ultimately negative effect on the national military strategy.

Assessing Strategic Military Risk

Strategic military risk involves issues of national survival, stability of regions and key allies, and critical global interests, commitments, and influence. The relative priority among the four primary elements characterizes a given strategy: MTWs (and how many are planned for); SSCs; presence and engagement activities; and preparing for the future (including both transformational activities taken to prepare a force for the most likely future, and hedging activities undertaken to prepare for a less likely future).8 These four elements are the actual activities that all military strategies must undertake--below the level of "shape, respond, prepare." The relative emphasis that alternative military strategies place upon each of these activities becomes the measure of their differences.9

Differences become apparent as strategies establish priorities among the different elements that define them. A judgment of risk is derived from the relative ordering of the elements (for example, a strategy that assigns a lower priority to MTWs is tacit?y accepting some measure of risk in that element) as well as how well the associated force structure supports the different elements. The aggregation of these elements yields a judgment of strategic risk. For the purposes of this study, factors that op"rate at the national security strategy level (for example, diplomatic and economic elements of power) are recognized, but not explicitly analyzed.

Strategic military risk is a complex cumulative judgment based on the priorities assigned to elements within a given strategy as well as the operational risk that is determined by the military strategy's associated force structure. Aggregated operational risk (explained below) affects strategic military risk, as do the long-term issues; for example, how well does it prepare for the unexpected? For this reason, a qualitative analysis of how any military strategy prepares for the future--that is, how it transforms and hedges--must also be part of any strategic military risk assessment.

Last, is a given military strategy affordable? Can the nation afford to expend the treasure a military strategy requires and to sustain the strategy over time? While this is inherently quantitative, it also requires assessments of political will (How much should be spent on defense?) that make it ultimately a qualitative analysis as well.

Assessing Operational Risk

The credibility of a force structure rests upon its perceived ability to execute the tasks called for by its associated military strategy. These are both immediate (the ability to perform satisfactorily in contingency taskings, also known as force performance) and long-term (the ability to retain effectiveness over many operations and a long period of time, also known as force sustainability). To be credible, a force structure must be effective in both areas. Force credibility is the core military contribution to both deterring and executing the full spectrum of military operations.

The methodology suggested in this section uses both a quantitative and a qualitative approach, but the numbers assigned here are less important than the overall process. The numbers are open to discussion, and there may well be better values to plug in than those that have been selected here. The method is meant to suggest ways to assess operational risk more rigorously.

Measuring Force Performance Risk

Force performance risk is the probability of a given force structure's failure to meet established objectives when executed against a given scenario. The potential scenarios range from the most stressing that military forces will face, from major theater warfighting to SSCs and lesser contingencies. The analysis considers risk for execution of both a first and a second MTW (or however many the strategy dictates), and other lesser requirements. The analysis is built around the most difficult tasks military forces could be called upon to execute: MTWs.10 There are, however, a myriad of other demanding contingency operations that might prove at least as challenging for all or part of a force structure.

Four operational objectives were adopted as the primary means of measuring force performance in the most demanding scenarios.11 Taken together, they attempt to capture what happened within the battlespace: what key terrain was lost, gained, or changed hands; what damage was inflicted upon the enemy; how long key activities took to accomplish; and what friendly losses were incurred.

These metrics are no more than tools for analysis; they can assist but not supplant sound military analysis in making the final judgment of the level of risk for a given MTW. However, some quantification is desirable, so long as the results of modeling and assessment are subjected to the common sense test.

Battlespace

Physical occupation of ground will remain the ultimate determinant of an aggressor's success in any scenario involving invasion or occupation. Concurrently, airbases, ports, and maritime chokepoints govern the use of air and sea forces. The ability to exploit space influences all other capabilities. Key terrain is uniquely tied to geographic localities and specific scenarios, but some generalization is possible. Aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), surface ports of debarkation (SPODs), and sea lines of communication (SLOCs) necessary for force deployment are key terrain. Some--not all--airbases are also key terrain (such as those airbases critical to force flow and friendly air operations). Political centers--almost always cities--are key terrain, with the national capital usually being primary. Physical features, such as mountain passes, rivers, and other lines of communication, may be crucial. Key terrain may refer to terrain that is initially either friendly or enemy. Three potential snapshot days were used to measure retention or control of terrain within the battlespace: the halt day, the counteroffensive day (COFFD), and the campaign completion day (CCD).

Designating key terrain is not a rigid, mechanical process. In evaluating force performance, the noncontiguous nature of the modern battlefield must be considered. In U.S. doctrine, for example, the retention of terrain is meaningless unless it serves some operational purpose. Thus the process must be qualitative as well as quantitative and must encompass some measure of the operational art.

At low risk, at the end of the operations, the enemy does not control any key terrain. For moderate risk, the enemy may control some key terrain, but no airfields, APODs, SPODs, or political centers. At high risk, the enemy may control some key terrain, including tertiary political centers, and at least one APOD, SPOD, or airbase, and may threaten a SLOC to the degree that significant maritime assets must be dedicated to maintaining its security, and seaborne force flow is reduced by 25 percent or less. Unacceptable risk is where the enemy controls key terrain including multiple political centers, and more than one APOD, SPOD, or airbase, and closes SLOCs through mining or other sea-denial operations to the extent that seaborne force flow is reduced by 26 percent or greater.

Effect on an Enemy

A measure of the warfighting capabilities of the enemy is critical to assess force performance. Enemy strength and effectiveness will directly influence the types and quantities of friendly forces required. Degradation of enemy capability is a fundamental criterion for transition between phases of campaign plans. Five metrics have been selected for this evaluation.

Ground forces: the mobile offensive ground forces of an opponent.

Air forces: the fighters and attack and bomber aircraft that are capable of undertaking their primary missions.

Air defense: both integrated area air defense systems and nonintegrated point air defense.

Enemy naval forces: surface, subsurface, and purely naval aviation assets.

WMD: encompassing offensive systems that could be employed either against forces in the field or against countervalue targets.

Low risk means that enemy ground forces have been reduced by approximately 50 percent and have lost the ability to maneuver above battalion level; air forces are not capable of coordinated operations; air defense is negligible, except for sporadic point defense; enemy naval forces are unable to conduct operations, and possess a limited and uncoordinated capability to conduct sporadic antiaccess operations; the enemy possesses a very limited WMD capability, able to deliver only infrequent, inaccurate, and uncoordinated attacks.

Moderate risk means that enemy ground forces have been reduced by approximately 30 percent and have lost the ability to maneuver above brigade level. As above, air forces are not capable of coordinated operations, and air defense is negligible, except for sporadic point defense. Enemy naval forces are unable to conduct coordinated offensive operations but, unlike the low risk assessment, can conduct some limited antiaccess operations. The enemy possesses a limited WMD capability, with the capability to deliver only inaccurate but more frequent attacks.

High risk means that enemy ground forces have been reduced by less than 30 percent and retain the ability to maneuver offensively at division level. Air forces are capable of limited operations. Air defense is limited to point defense. Enemy naval forces retain the capability to challenge with limited sea denial operations and can conduct coordinated antiaccess operations that materially reduce seaborne movement of forces into the theater. The enemy possesses a limited WMD capability, with the capability to deliver sustained, if still inaccurate, attacks.

Unacceptable risk means that enemy ground forces have been reduced by less than 20 percent and retain the ability to maneuver offensively above division level. Air forces are capable of limited operations and may be capable of locally challenging friendly air superiority. Air defense is limited to point defense. Enemy naval forces possess the capability to challenge U.S. and allied sea superiority at a time and place of their choosing and can conduct coordinated antiaccess operations that threaten to halt the flow of seaborne reinforcements (this is linked to SLOC control in the key terrain metric). The enemy possesses a WMD capability, able to deliver sustained attacks that are coordinated with ground or air operations.

In evaluating the metrics of enemy degradation, if a single condition obtains from a higher level of risk, then the higher level of risk is the condition that is reported. For example, if all conditions are met for an evaluation of moderate risk but the enemy retains the capability to conduct sustained WMD attacks, then the overall enemy risk degradation would be assessed as high instead of moderate.

Time

The length of the campaign, or the portion of the campaign within which force performance is measured, is established based on the achievement of theater operational objectives. Three measures can be used, depending on the insights that are being sought. The first is halt day, which is the time when an enemy advance is stopped. The second is COFFD, which is the day that the CINC plans to begin his or her counteroffensive, based on closure of the joint force and establishment of operational preconditions. The third is CCD, which is the planning date for the completion of operations.12 These days are generally expressed in the language of force performance risk already outlined: possession of key geographic objectives, enemy degradation, and friendly status.13 Also, these dates have dual significance. First, they are temporal anchors, the specific points in time at which the other measures of force performance are assessed. Second, the dates reflect the cost in time for the execution of a scenario. The period between the planning dates for either COFFD or CCD and the actual dates is the measure of risk. The ability to halt the initial enemy offensive enables all other subsequent operations. The actual dates of these three measures are triggered by the accomplishment of required objectives.

Low risk means that halt day, COFFD, or CCD has been met either by the designated day or by a delay of not more than 20 percent of total time elapsed; moderate risk means a delay of 21-50 percent; and high risk means a delay of 51-100 percent. Unacceptable risk means delay of more than 100 percent, or that the halt day, COFFD, or CCD cannot be triggered because of an inability to meet the required operational objectives.14

U.S. Air, Ground, and Sea Losses

This metric captures the loss rates of U.S. forces over the timeframe of a given scenario.15 Air losses are measured as a percentage of all aircraft operating in theater. Ground losses are measured as a percentage of all armored fighting vehicles and artillery in theater. Sea losses are measured as a percentage of all warships and support craft operating in theater.16

For air, sea, and ground forces, a total loss of 2 percent or less in each category is considered to be low risk; 3-6 percent, moderate risk; and losses of 7-10 percent, high risk. Losses greater than 10 percent are considered unacceptable.17 For the purposes of this study, damaged vessels that must be withdrawn from operations are considered losses.

Linking risk assessment to friendly losses is a potentially emotional issue. In this study, these numbers are used as a force planner's assessment tool, not an operational planner's decision support criteria. This is a critical distinction because the dynamic chaos of an actual warfighting environment could reasonably justify an operational planner's acceptance of losses in excess of those stated above. On the other hand, to a force structure planner, a potential force that performs relatively poorly in this area may require greater scrutiny and analysis.

In addition to the primary force performance metrics, four supporting measures were examined: a measurement of the day that aerospace superiority was attained in the theater, the day that maritime superiority was attained, the day that enemy air defenses were effectively suppressed, and the total allied air, ground, and sea losses. Other measures may be worth further study, such as the measurement of personnel losses, either in addition to or instead of equipment losses; the measurement of collateral civilian losses; effects of attack on enemy strategic infrastructure; a rolling comparison of relative combat power; and a qualitatively-based measurement of the attainment of political objectives in SSC operations.

The four primary metrics are applied with equal weight in this analysis. Changing the relative weighting might result in significantly different insights and assessments. There are also potential linkages between different metrics worthy of further exploration. The most obvious example of linkage is that between losses and time. A shorter campaign might not be as sensitive to U.S. losses as one that is longer. Applying different weights to metrics is an area ripe for further exploration.

Some cautions must be kept in mind when applying this methodology. First, this approach measures battlefield outcomes; it cannot measure, except indirectly, the effects of these outcomes on the political will of the enemy. Since influencing the will of the enemy is a primary objective of any military engagement, this is a notable deficiency. This can be compensated to some extent by parametric adjustments, such as assuming that an opponent will halt or withdraw after sustaining a given set of operational reverses.18 Unfortunately, this is a relatively clumsy input, rather than an output.19

It is easy--and wrong--to overstate the relationship between force performance risk and national will. The risk assessment that is derived from how a given force structure performs against a given scenario will not change, even if the level of U.S. national interest does. Losses that are acceptable in some circumstances may prove unacceptable in others, but this is not a reflection on the performance of the force. Instead, it mirrors different levels of national interest. Risks and losses that were acceptable in Normandy in 1944 were not acceptable in Mogadishu in 1993. This methodology uses a reasonable person scale that attempts to capture what is acceptable and unacceptable. This scale may change as a function of national will, but it is a matter that is external to the questions of force performance that are evaluated here.

Examining Different Conditions for Force Performance Risk

The methodology for determining force performance risk is based on describing the overall attributes of a given force structure in the execution of a given scenario. To be useful, however, the methodology must go beyond a single assessment of a base case force structure and a base case scenario. To capture fully the robustness of the force, a variety of variables are considered. The same force structure is examined against scenario excursions that introduce different assumptions about such factors as warning time, postures of engagement, separation time, enemy WMD employment, and enemy force performance. For ease of measurement, these excursions from the base scenario are executed in increasing order of difficulty against each force structure. Other potential variables could also be employed to enrich and to fine-tune the assessment of force performance risk.

In aggregating the results of force performance evaluations, the highest single level of risk within a given outcome dictates the overall risk score assigned to a given force structure.20 This is a conservative methodology, based on the belief that the force planner must always be prudent in examining force structure alternatives because the future can be seen only dimly. Things are different for the operational planner, who can, and often must, accept less conservative approaches to risk assessment.

This methodology for assessing force performance risk, anchored in high-end warfighting, can yield useful insights into operations of lesser intensity, such as coercive campaigns and other high-end operations. However, domestic disaster relief and other less stressing humanitarian operations, as well as many special operations, are less susceptible to this form of analysis.

In MTWs, there is a silent assumption that we are fighting for vital national security interests. In an SSC or other type of operation, this probably is not the case; thus the tolerance for U.S. losses may well be much lower. There may also be a time constraint. Changing the values associated with different levels of risk is a starting point.

Force Sustainability Risk

Force sustainability risk is the probability that a given force structure will be unable to meet established readiness objectives and availability requirements when executed against a given future scenario.21 The force structures evaluated are the same structures that are being examined for force performance risk. The notional future security environments include a range of SSC, presence, and engagement requirements of varying degrees across a specified period of time. In this study, the period is 6 years. Different futures are executed, based on a range of scenarios with variable intensity, frequency, and concurrency, and linked to the assumptions of different NMS. Readiness objectives are measured in three areas: operations tempo (OPTEMPO) for service force elements, demand for and employment of jointly-managed LD/HD elements of the force, and PERSTEMPO, measured within each service.

The objective of a force sustainability analysis is to identify force elements that will have significant tempo problems, as well as those that are underutilized. Taken together with force performance, this approach yields an overall picture of how effectively a given force structure adapts across a broad spectrum of challenges. A fundamental assumption of this approach is that excessive OPTEMPO causes units and personnel to function at lower levels of readiness, manifested in terms of additional wear and tear on equipment, cost, and violation of service force management policies.22 This can lead to morale and retention problems and an inability to perform higher-priority missions. Unavailability of certain units, because of excessive demand or simple shortages, is also critical information.

We assign a score of low risk in force sustainability for major force elements when requirements are met with less than 3 percent of the force experiencing broken OPTEMPO (meaning in excess of service rules), there are no nonavailability issues, and no substitution is required (replacement of a required force element with another of functionally similar capabilities but dissimilar basic type, either interservice or intraservice). Low risk in force sustainability for LD/HD assets occurs when requirements are met with less than 10 percent experiencing broken OPTEMPO, there are no nonavailability issues, and no substitution is required. Low risk in force sustainability for individual servicemembers occurs when requirements are met with less than 3 percent of the force experiencing PERSTEMPO in excess of service rules.

We assign a score of moderate risk in force sustainability for major force elements when requirements are met with 4-6 percent of the force experiencing broken OPTEMPO; nonavailability is less than 5 percent and is met through substitution; LD/HD asset requirements are met with 11-15 percent of the force experiencing broken OPTEMPO; and nonavailability is 6-10 percent and is met through substitution. Moderate risk in force sustainability for individual servicemembers occurs when requirements are met with 4-6 percent of the force experiencing PERSTEMPO in excess of service rules.

High risk in force sustainability for major force elements occurs when requirements are met with 7-12 percent of the force experiencing broken OPTEMPO; nonavailability is 6-10 percent and is met through substitution; LD/HD asset requirements are met with 16-25 percent of the force experiencing broken OPTEMPO, nonavailability is 10-15 percent, and requirements cannot always be met through substitution (that is, shortages occur). High risk in force sustainability for individual servicemembers occurs when requirements are met with 7-12 percent of the force experiencing PERSTEMPO in excess of service rules.

Unacceptable risk in force sustainability for major force elements occurs when requirements are met with 13 percent or more of the force experiencing broken OPTEMPO, nonavailability is 11 percent or greater and is not always met through substitution. Unacceptable risk in force sustainability for LD/HD assets occurs when requirements are met with 26 percent or more of the force experiencing broken OPTEMPO; nonavailability is 16 percent or greater; and requirements cannot always be met through substitution. High risk in force sustainability for individual servicemembers occurs when requirements are met with more than 13 percent of the force experiencing PERSTEMPO in excess of service rules.

Force sustainability risk assessment looks at the robustness of force structures over an extended period of time. As with the force performance evaluation, if an element performs at a higher level of risk, then the entire structure is assessed at that higher level. However, not all shortfalls or OPTEMPO failures are equal. In assessing results, sound military judgment must remain the final test.

Operational Risk: Aggregating Force Performance and Force Sustainability Risk

The operational risk associated with a given force structure is a combination of its ability to perform in contingency operations (MTWs and higher-end SSCs) and in the extended day-to-day deployments that characterize the vast majority of current military requirements, namely, the lower-end SSCs and presence and engagement elements of a strategy. There is a tension between the definition of the principal utility of military force structure on one hand, "Henceforth the adequacy of any military establishment will be tested by its ability to preserve the peace," as articulated by Henry Kissinger, and the assertion on the other that "the purpose of the military is to fight and win the Nation's wars," as claimed by Colin Powell. Since force performance risk assessment is not subsumed under force sustainability, it is necessary to assess each separately.

After a given force structure is evaluated by the force performance and force sustainability methodologies, two measurements of risk are the result. These evaluations receive equal weighting under the rubric of operational risk.23 The higher of the two risk evaluations becomes the overall operational risk assessment. For example, a force that performs at a moderate level of risk in force sustainability analysis might have an unacceptable level of risk in force performance analysis; the force would receive an overall assessment of unacceptable.

This is a simple and straightforward merger that yields a clear audit trail. The utility of a methodology that is transparent, linear, and replicable is obvious. Values can be changed to fit differing assumptions and biases; the approach is broad enough to accommodate alternative approaches.

At this level of aggregation the methodology used for determining force performance is immaterial; either a quantitative or a qualitative approach will yield the necessary input. Some combination of the two is probably the best approach. The working group used contractor modeling as an input and its own judgment as the basis for evaluating force performance. Force sustainability was modeled by a simple spreadsheet approach, which informed the final analysis. Regardless of the approach selected, modeling and analysis must inform and not dictate final judgments of risk. Key assumptions must be explicitly stated and all findings qualified by reference to them. The final result of this process is an assessment of operational risk.

The Future and Money

The focus in time to this point has been through 2010. To develop a fuller picture of the risks associated with a given military strategy, it is necessary to look also at the longer-term future (transformation and hedging), and the fiscal reality (affordability, both internal and external to the defense program).

Transformation and Hedging

Near-term strategies and force structures have a cumulative effect on the long-term future. Incremental planning, by its nature, tends to accept that the future will be a continuation of the past and that trends are basically linear. Thus an overarching long-term plan is needed for longer-term objectives, and near-term plans need to be developed with the long-range objectives in mind. Both the long-term and near-term plans should routinely be evaluated in light of actual and potential changes in the future security environment. In essence, a peacetime military portfolio plays a role in deterrence, shaping, and influence; however, the overriding factor is to provide insurance against catastrophic and potentially unanticipated loss by being able to fight and win the Nation's wars. Insurance is intended to prepare against events that are possible--perhaps even likely--and this requires transformation of the force over time. At the same time, prudence dictates that we also prepare for less likely but perhaps more dangerous futures--and this is hedging.

There will always be a level of risk about the longer-term future, which in this case is the probability that a strategy and an associated force structure will be unable to achieve future strategic objectives. An example would be the inability of the United States to defend an ally in the face of enemy use of antiaccess strategies. A balanced and flexible strategy and associated force structure is one that can deal with both anticipated and unexpected developments.

To prepare against all possible future threats is prohibitive in terms of resources and decisionmaking ability. The objective, therefore, is not so much to maintain an ability to do everything all of the time as it is to be able to adjust, modify, or augment current forces so as to do what is needed when necessary. Whatever strategy and force we create will be wrong to some degree; the goal is not to be so wrong that we are unable to recover and to adapt to unexpected future contingencies. There are a number of methods to evaluate what we might need to deal with future trends and discontinuities.

One practical method is to establish a checklist against which military strategy and force requirements can be evaluated. For example, transformation and hedging provide a framework for assessing strategies against a set of future risk criteria. Other checklist items could be added to expand the scope of the analysis.

The first area is that of transformation: whether a given military strategy and defense program will adequately prepare the U.S. military for the most likely long-term security environment. Low risk in this area would be a strategy and program that reflect a coherent long-term vision of the future, coupled with an action plan for the creation of force structure capabilities that will yield low-to-moderate risk outcomes in assessments of force performance in the 2025 timeframe. Moderate risk in this area would be a strategy and program that reflect a coherent long-term vision of the future, coupled with an actionable plan for the creation of force structure capabilities that yield moderate-to-high risk outcomes in assessments of force performance in the 2025 timeframe. High risk in this area would be a strategy and program that still reflect a coherent long-term vision of the future, coupled with an actionable plan for the creation of new and emerging force structure capabilities that, nevertheless, yield high to potentially unacceptable outcomes in assessments of force performance in the 2025 timeframe. Unacceptable risk in this area would be a strategy and program that do not represent a coherent long-term vision of the future. Elements of the future vision might be present, but there is no linkage between the vision and the potential strategies and force structures.

The second area is that of hedging: whether a given military strategy and associated defense program have the flexibility to respond quickly enough to unexpected military or technological developments. This area has both a long-term and a short-term component. Unexpected political developments can occur in the immediate future, while threatening technological developments are normally associated with more distant timeframes. The critical element is the ability to respond effectively in the time period between strategic warning and the actual emergence of the threat. However long this period is, can we create an effective counter? Low risk means that there is both sufficient flexibility in U.S. force structure and a negligible external threat. There are no warning indicators. In this case, the event horizon is well beyond the response time. Moderate risk assumes that there are indicators of potentially threatening political or military developments in the long term, but initiatives are under way within the existing force structure to address the potential threat. This is the current state of affairs. High risk assumes that there are compelling indicators of potentially threatening political military developments in the near term, but it is not certain that initiatives under way to address the potential threat will be completely effective or ready before the threat matures. Unacceptable risk assumes that a potential threat looms, but there is no effective counter available within the timeframe of warning and threat maturation. These are qualitative judgments and, therefore, have a higher degree of subjectivity than many of the operational risk issues that have been previously discussed. Because of this, the most effective way to apply this evaluation may be to work with a range of outcomes (displaying the results of short- and mid-range analysis against a spread of potential futures), based on different views of the future security environment. The working group did not conduct this modeling and assessment, but this field is ripe for additional analysis.

Affordability

The final test of any military strategy and its force structure is that of affordability. Affordability risk is the probability that a given defense strategy and program will not be fully provided with necessary resources; the resulting mismatch could be more dangerous than a more modest strategy that is fully funded. Affordability is measured in two areas: internal and external. Internal affordability refers to the departmental program. Are the basic elements of force structure, modernization, sustainability, and readiness provided with all required resources? The degree to which there is a resource shortfall for these elements--the departmental programs--reflects the degree of risk assumed. We assign a score of low risk to a program funded at or near the total cost of the force structure; moderate risk to one funded close to the total cost, but with certain shortfalls; and high risk to a program that underfunds significant program elements. We assign a score of unacceptable risk to a program that underfunds significant program elements and where the gap increases over time, resulting in pronounced and cumulative effects in combat readiness and preparedness for the future that cannot be readily remedied. In effect, judgments in this area evaluate the internal consistency of the DOD program. Does the budget match the plan? This is easier to measure historically rather than to predict because few programs at inception assume less than full funding. Because of this, this measure of risk may be of less utility in assessing future risk.

External affordability refers to the DOD program. Does the total program meet guidance on resource expenditure? This assessment requires the application of explicit assumptions. The risk here is the likelihood that the program, whether it is internally consistent, will survive external political scrutiny, based on the bottom line of total expenditure. In essence, how much is the Nation willing to spend on defense? In assessing this metric, it is important to understand what is being measured. It is not the soundness of the program, but its political viability. In other words, will the program survive?

Low risk is a defense program that falls within the anticipated topline. Moderate risk is a program that is slightly above the anticipated topline. High risk is a program that is significantly larger than the anticipated topline. A program that is more than 10 percent above the anticipated topline is unacceptable. These calculations and assessments reflect working group assumptions about the likelihood of future spending patterns. They could be adjusted or changed in other analyses to reflect different views of these issues. As in prior cases, the higher of the two risk assessments is the operative assessment.24

A Toolkit for Risk Assessment

Ultimately, the judgment about the level of risk for a given military strategy and associated force structure is a combination of both quantitative and qualitative factors. The process that is suggested here is cumulative, but it must not become rigidly mechanical. The greatest analytical danger is that a risk assessment process that relies on the aggregation of risk may become, in Winston Churchill's famous aphorism, no more than "the sum of their fears," a result that may be neither useful nor insightful.

The approach to risk assessment that has been developed throughout this chapter is depicted in figure 7-1. Step 1 defines a military strategy by prioritizing the elements of the strategy. For the working group modeling effort, the primary elements are MTWs and deterrence, SSCs, presence and engagement, and preparing for the future. This process must be closely linked to the overarching national security strategy and its associated national military strategy. If the latter de-emphasizes engagement, for example, it would place a lower premium on the utility of the presence and engagement element. Prioritizing elements of the strategy begins the process of defining the bounds of acceptable risk. Since there will be both strategic emphasis and fiscal constraints, not all elements of the strategy will receive the same support.

Step 2 determines a range of force structure options to execute the strategy. A number of different approaches can be used to accomplish this. The easiest way may be to begin with the existing force and make successive adjustments that incrementally change the composition of the force structure. The resultant force structures should reflect a broad range of options.

Step 3 determines explicit risk metrics and levels of emphasis for all elements of the strategy, based upon the work done in Step 1, focused on the force structure.

Step 4 evaluates the force structure options developed in Step 2 to determine whether they meet the four major requirements of the strategy: force performance, force sustainability, preparing for the future, and affordability. Force performance and sustainability assessments are combined to yield the overall assessment for operational risk, which reflects the highest level of risk of the two.25 This is the measure of force credibility, which is one of the most significant contributions of a given force structure to a military strategy. Operational risk directly influences the levels of risk not only for MTWs and higher-end SSCs (specifically as a function of force performance), but also for lower-end SSCs and presence and engagement (as a function of force sustainability). The next areas of assessment are those of preparing for the future (transformation and hedging) and affordability.26

Taken together, these measures yield a level of strategic military risk for a given strategy and a given force structure. The overall risk score is based on the highest level of risk of any category for any given force structure. In this methodology, all factors receive equal weight, but subsequent analysis may indicate that this is too blunt an instrument. Areas could be assigned different weights; the policy of assigning overall risk as a function of the highest level of risk in any category may also merit rethinking.

This is an iterative process, as scenarios and force structure excursions are examined and adjusted to meet different risk criteria. This may prove the most difficult part of the entire process. It will be relatively easy to design forces that meet risk criteria of a given strategy; it will prove far more difficult to design forces that meet acceptable strategy-driven risk criteria and affordability requirements.

Step 5 examines the results of Step 4. Force structures that meet all risk assessment criteria can be taken forward for further detailed analysis. Force structures that do not meet risk criteria are returned to Step 3 for adjustment and, where indicated, re-appraised. While modeling is an important part of this process, ultimate decisions about relative levels of risk must lean heavily on qualitative analysis. The objective of the methodology is to arrive at Step 5 with a force structure that meets the requirements of the strategy, is affordable, and leaves a clear audit trail of analysis and decisions.27

How can unacceptable levels of risk be mitigated? There are two broad approaches to this issue. The first is the most common, and the most dangerous: redefine the problem or assume it away. When there is an apparently intractable mismatch of resources and ends, simply redefining success or the nature of the threat is a common approach. The danger is that the redefined threat may not accurately reflect the real world. Redefining strategic problems is a dangerous business and must be anchored in thorough analysis and realistic assessments.

The second approach is to increase resources. It is easier to develop conceptual solutions to strategic problems when increased resources can be presumed. The problem here, of course, is that key elements of this solution lie outside DOD. Current attempts by service chiefs to identify the need for an increase in the topline, and the resistance their efforts are meeting, are testimony to this. Ultimately, some balance of the two approaches is the most likely outcome.

Conclusion

This chapter has articulated a general theory of risk assessment for the 2001 QDR, designed to have utility for a broad variety of potential models and analytic approaches. It makes no attempt to prejudge or to compare the effectiveness of differing approaches. The general theory that has been advanced in these pages should be evaluated independently of the particular models that the working group used. The shortcomings of the models used have been identified; their deficiencies, however, should not reflect on this general theory of risk assessment. It has been said, "All models are wrong. Some are useful." 28 Modeling has been useful in illuminating some specific cases of this general theory, but the level of modeling available precluded comprehensive analysis.

Two recommendations flow from this chapter. First, the DOD needs a systematic approach to assessing risk. This begins with the creation of a common definitional and conceptual structure for the discussion of risk. This approach must be able to evaluate risk--strategic military and operational--in an internally consistent manner, without reference to the sliding scale of national will. All too often the discussion of risk in an operational context defaults to relative judgments based on perceptions of national security policy. While this linkage is important, it is more important for the force planner to be able to make consistent risk judgments based on known, replicable information. Quantitative analysis has a role to play in this process, but it must never be subordinated to sound, seasoned military judgment.

Second, the DOD must pursue better models to support analysis of alternative force structures. All existing models have critical deficiencies, which limit any study that uses them; this study is no exception. The absence of good modeling means that new ideas and concepts cannot be validated or rigorously assessed. A second-order effect is to reinforce the tendency to evaluate operational outcomes at the national security strategy level (in terms of national will). This robs analysis of rigor.

The thread that will guide force planners through the next QDR is a common understanding of risk, based on robust analysis and transparent methodology. Understanding how to assess levels of risk is the tool that differentiates between strategies. It is easy to create strategies and force structures with unconstrained resources. It becomes far more difficult when inadequate means are the only tools at hand. Building strategies and force structures that are obviously unaffordable and then making incremental or salami-slice cuts is a fundamental abrogation of responsibility. A constant referral to ends, means, and potential tradeoffs is the best approach.