My Class in US Army War College - 2002

    LESSON 33:TRANSFORMATION
    Fri 12 October 2001 (0830-1130)
    Col John Troxell 245-3293

    Nothing is more difficult than to introduce a new order. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new.

    Nicolai Machiavelli, 1513 A.D.

    1. Introduction.
         a. It should be clear to anyone who has been following the defense review process for the past year that one of the most pressing issues concerning the future of U.S. defense policy is the nature and pace of the efforts to transform our military forces. All of the defense reviews of the previous decade have been criticized, at least in part, for their lack of vision and accomplishment in transforming the force. This lesson will examine that issue in detail.
         b. The need for transformation is being driven by efforts to exploit opportunities or respond to vulnerabilities generated by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Is it possible to create a revolution in military affairs? Could significant changes in warfare based on the latest technologies emerge in the next few decades? These questions are of critical importance to military strategists as they decide how to invest scarce resources. The U.S. military services are making a considerable effort to define concepts that would allow them to exploit the next revolution in military affairs. Some insist that it is technology that transforms the very nature of warfare. Others counter that such transformations are the result of fundamental changes in warfighting concepts and organizational structure. In this lesson we will examine process, concepts associated with the on-going revolution in military affairs and barriers to transformation.

    2. Learning Objectives.
         a. Become familiar with the concept of Revolution in Military Affairs and understand the various schools of thought.
         b. Understand and be able to assess the current DoD force transformation activities.
         c. Understand the various theories of military innovation and comprehend the current barriers to military transformation.

    3. Student Requirements.
         a. Tasks. Examine contending perspectives on emerging revolutions in military affairs.

         b. Required Readings.
              (1) U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy. Readings on War, National Security Policy, and Strategy. Carlisle Barracks: 2001. Vol. IV: (Student Issue)
              (a) Michael O'Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare (Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2000), Chapter 2, "So-Called Revolution in Military Affairs," pp. 7-31.
              (b) Steven Metz, American Strategy: Issues and Alternatives for the Quadrennial Defense Review (Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, September 2000), pp. 32-37.
              (c) David A. Deptula, "Firing for Effects," Air Force Magazine, Vol. 84, No. 4, (April 2001): 46-53.
              (d) Arthur K. Cebrowski, "Network-centric Warfare: An Emerging Military Response to the Information Age," a presentation at the 1999 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, June 29, 1999.
              (e) Richard J. Dunn, III, "Transformation: Let's Get it Right this Time," Parameters, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, (Spring 2001): 22-28.
              (f) Andrew Krepinevich, "Why No Transformation," Joint Force Quarterly, No. 23 (Autumn/Winter 1999-2000): 97-101.
              (g) Harvey Sapolsky, "On the Theory of Military Innovation," Breakthroughs, (Spring 2000): 35-39.

         (2) "Army Transformation," Transformation Briefing with talking points short version, October 17, 2000. [Refer to Army Transformation Homepage, http://www.army.mil/usa/Cover%20sheet.htm

         c. Review Readings. (from Course 1): Joint Vision 2020 [Document and briefing available on the internet at: http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020

         d. Suggested Readings.
              (1) Gompert, David C. and Irving Lachow, "Transforming U.S. Forces: Lessons From the Wider Revolution," Rand Issue Paper, 2000. (Reserve Reading Shelf)
              (2) Cebrowski, Arthur K., and John J. Garstka. "Network Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1998, pp. 28-35. (Reserve Reading Shelf)
              (3) Hundley, Richard O. Past Revolutions, Future Transformations (Rand, Santa Monica, CA, 1999), Chapter 7, "DOD's Current Transformation Activities," pp. 75-88. (Reserve Reading Shelf)
              (4) Kosiak, Steven, Andrew Krepinevich, and Michael Vickers. A Strategy for a Long Peace (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, D.C., January 2001). (Reserve Reading Shelf)
              (5) O'Hanlon, Michael E. "Modernizing and Transforming U.S. Forces: Alternative Paths to the Force of Tomorrow," in QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security (National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 2001), pp. 293-318. (Student Issue)

    4. Points to Consider.
         a. What are the various RMA schools of thought, and why does O'Hanlon argue that we should be wary of the RMA hypothesis? Do you agree of disagree?
         b. How does a country go about exploiting a revolution in military affairs?
         c. Would a radical transformation of the U.S. military make American forces too complex to interoperate with those of allied countries in future multinational military operations?
         d. Assess the various service programs for transformation. Does there need to be greater coordination of investment of resources toward the different service concepts, or is the nation better served by having each service compete to produce the best ideas and systems?
         e. What are the barriers to transformation and why will it be so difficult to surmount them?
         f. What is the strategic motivation for change and innovation within the U.S. military? What are the most appropriate organizational strategies to pursue military innovation? 1