LESSON 32:WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) AND DETERRENCE
Thur 11 October 2001 (0830-1130)
Directed Study (1300-1600)
Col Glenn Trimmer 245-3261
Hermocrates of Syracuse to the Sicilian
envoys at Gela, 424 B.C.
ADM Richard Mies, Army War College Symposium
8 December l999
1. Introduction.
a. A key objective of Block IV is for the student to analyze current U.S. national security strategy. Since the Bush Administration took office last January, few elements of national strategy have received more discussion or analysis than U.S. deterrence policy and the related issue of U.S. capability to defend against WMD. Today's deterrence debates are broader in scope, focusing both on chemical and biological as well as nuclear weapons and on an expanding number of actors that might use such weapons. Regardless of where one stands on the current debates over deterrence and WMD, understanding the evolution of the debate is critical to a better comprehension of the strategic environment we face as we begin the 21st Century.
b. During the Cold War, U.S. deterrent strategy and the resulting nuclear forces were focused on preventing an outright assault on the U.S. with nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union, and on building a credible second strike capability should deterrence fail. Throughout the Cold War our focus remained on ensuring that U.S. deterrent forces posed a credible threat, guaranteeing retaliation even after a worst-case first strike by the Soviet Union. As U.S. deterrent policies evolved from massive retaliation to mutual assured destruction and beyond, the United States and its Cold War antagonist agreed to limit defenses against ICBMs in order to 1) maintain the vulnerability which we deemed would deter attack by any side, and 2) lay the groundwork for a number of efforts to reduce and/or limit overall nuclear forces. A number of arms control treaties and agreements were negotiated and signed with the former Soviet Union. Simultaneously other treaties or agreements were negotiated to try and slow the spread of technologies for the design and/or delivery of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
c. The end of the Cold War and increasing evidence of the spread of technologies to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction to other nations has led to a hotly contested, and a very different debate about future deterrence. Today, chemical and biological weapons have gained in prominence as concern over a massive nuclear exchange has diminished. And, while the threat of a massive nuclear strike is perceived to have diminished, there is rising concern over so-called "rogue states" or "states of concern" that either currently, or soon, may threaten the United States homeland with WMD. The resulting deterrence debate will undoubtedly drive hard decisions on both offensive and defensive force structures. That will, of course, have an impact on the defense budget and Service programs. Moreover, reactions of allies and others to date indicate that this issue may also prove key in determining how the United States is viewed by others around the world.
d. We will begin this lesson with a lecture in Bliss Hall that examines the evolution of deterrence theory and practice from 1945 to the present. We will look in particular at how U.S. deterrent policy development was impacted by certain actors as well as how policy and resulting forces were impacted by the political and economic environments of the day. Approaches to deterrence from the fairly simple expansion of conventional weapons deployment of post WWII to the "cooperative engagement" approaches of the Clinton Administration will be included. Required readings for this lesson were selected to build upon the lecture by bringing us up to date on the deterrent strategy and WMD debate. These readings will be used to facilitate seminar discussions that follow the lecture.
2. Learning Objectives.
a. Understand how U.S. strategic deterrence policy and concerns over weapons of mass destruction have evolved since WW II.
b. Understand the impact of actors, technology, and the political-military-scientific-economic environment on the definition of past U.S. deterrent policy.
c. Understand and be able to discuss differences between the issues which drive today's debates on deterrence policy and WMD versus debates during the Cold War.
d. Become familiar with the current Administration's approach to deterrence policy, strategic force programs, and national missile defense. Understand the logic behind the Administration's call for greater offensive force cuts and a new focus on defensive forces.
e. Understand how U.S. polices on deterrence and defense against WMD are viewed by U.S. allies and others around the world.
3. Student Requirements.
a. Tasks. None.
b. Required Readings. U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy. Readings in War, National Security Policy, and Strategy. Carlisle Barracks: 2001. Vol. IV: (Student Issue)
(a) Lawrence Freeman, "Does Deterrence Have a Future," Arms Control Today, Vol. 30, No. 8 (October 2000): 3-8.
(b) Keith Payne, "The Dilemma of Popular Usage and a New Direction," in The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction. The University Press of Kentucky, 2001. Ch. 5, pp. 97-114.
(c) Francois Heisbourg, "Brussels's Burden," The Washington Quarterly Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer 2000): 127-133.
(d) "Remarks By The President To Students and Faculty At National Defense University," by George W. Bush" (Also available on the internet at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010501-10.html
(e) Laurie Garrett, "The Nightmare of Bioterrorism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 1 (May 2001): 76-89. Lionel will brief
(2) LTC Antulio J. Echevarria II, "The Army and Homeland Security: A Strategic Perspective," March 2001. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. (Faculty Instructor Handout)
c. Suggested Readings.
(1) Brodie, Bernard, ed., The Absolute Weapon, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1946. (Classic reader for early thought on deterrence/impact of nuclear weapons on strategy) (Reserve Reading Shelf)
(2) Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control, Volume I Executive Report. January, 2001, National Institute for Public Policy. (This recent study group included many members of the nuclear policy community that are closely linked to, or have become part of the George Bush Sr. Administration policy team). Available on the internet at http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/volume%201%20complete.pdf
(3) National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile Development and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Though 2015," Stubborn Things, Senator Thad Cochran (United States Senate, September 2000): 117-132. (Reserve Reading Shelf)
4. Points to Consider.
a. How have key personalities (actors) and the political and economic environment impacted past U.S. deterrence policies and approaches to deterrent force deployments?
b. What is the appropriate role of nuclear weapons in future U.S. deterrent strategy?
c. President Bush this summer recommended significant nuclear force structure cuts and a new focus on defensive forces. In your view, what levels of offensive and defensive forces should be pursued in order to provide satisfactory deterrence for the future?
d. Should defensive forces be folded into the "deterrent equation?" Do defensive forces contribute to, or undermine deterrence in today's strategic environment?
e. In light of the on-going proliferation of technologies for producing and delivering WMD despite treaty prohibitions against these activities, do arms control agreements still provide important contributions to keeping the U.S. secure from WMD attack?
f. Is traditional deterrence theory as developed during the cold war relevant in today's strategic environment?
g. Is the U.S. taking the appropriate steps to prepare for attack by WMD. Are homeland security measures just about chemical and biological threats?
h. Given resource constraints, and in light of the WMD threat, do you believe the fielding of a national missile defense worth the resources that will be required to support that defense?