The Tripolitan War, 1801-1805, confronted the young American nation with a limited war in the littorals. The Navy did indeed provide victory, but the duration and results show the limits of projecting power ashore from the sea.

By 1801, attacks on American ships led President Thomas Jefferson to order a squadron to the Mediterranean. When Richard Dale arrived with his four ships in July 1801, he discovered that the Bashaw of Tripoli had declared war. Philadelphia remained outside Gibraltar trapping Tripoli's two largest warships; President and Enterprize sailed for Tripoli; and Essex escorted American merchant ships. Enterprize delivered the first military success by crippling the Tripoli on August 1, 1801. These measures checked Tripolitan piracy but did not compel Tripoli to end the war. Although the squadron stymied Tripoli, the failure to win highlights the inadequacy of forward-deployed peacetime naval forces to decisively defeat an enemy.

America dispatched another squadron in early 1802. After lengthy procrastination, the new heavier squadron under Richard Morris struck. The Americans captured Meshuda as it tried to enter Tripoli harbor under the Moroccan flag, sent a raiding party ashore west of Tripoli, and defeated a force of Tripolitan gunboats. After defeating another Tripolitan vessel, however, Morris lifted the blockade of Tripoli fearing intervention by Morocco. Morris’ squadron, though more powerful than Dale’s, was still unbalanced and helpless because Tripoli’s navy would not sortie to fight. The Navy's heavy ships sailed supreme at sea but were unable to project power ashore or even close to shore.

A more balanced third squadron under Edward Preble containing heavy frigates and lighter vessels re-established the blockade of Tripoli with Philadelphia accompanied by Vixen to work close to shore. Two ships convoyed American merchant ships.

Unfortunately, Philadelphia ran aground off Tripoli while Vixen investigated reports of Tripolitan ships loose in the area. The Americans, alone and surrounded by Tripolitan gunboats, surrendered. To recoup the loss, a volunteer crew sailed a captured vessel, renamed Intrepid, into Tripoli harbor in February 1804 disguised as a Maltese vessel. The ship maneuvered alongside Philadelphia where the Americans boarded the frigate, overwhelmed the Tripolitan crew, and burned the ship. The incident demonstrated the need for numbers rather than relying solely on a few high value ships. When Philadelphia, clearly a superior ship to anything Tripoli had, ran aground, even a small friendly warship would have prevented defeat.

Beginning August 3, 1804, Preble initiated a series of attacks on Tripoli that used gunboats and mortar vessels borrowed from Naples. Although energetically executed, Preble's attacks highlighted the difficulty of winning with bombardment. First, he had no intelligence on how the defenders were holding up under the attacks. More fundamentally, lacking any ground force to put ashore and compel capitulation, Preble had to hope that the enemy would decide to give in rather than endure.

Littoral Warfare

Preble's war ended on September 9, 1804, when Samuel Barron arrived. The new squadron was the largest and most balanced yet and included two American-built bomb vessels and nine American-built gunboats. Barron still lacked a ground threat to complement his powerful fleet.

To create a ground threat, the Americans raised a mercenary army around Mohamet Caramanli, brother of the Bashaw and claimant to the throne. The agreement reached between the Americans and Caramanli called for Tripoli to use tribute to pay America for the costs of the war! With some difficulty, the force advanced from Egypt and seized Derna after a march of 600 miles with the support of American warships offshore.

On August 26, 1805, the American Consul General arrived in Tripoli to commence negotiations. Terms were agreed upon on June 3, 1805. America agreed to pay $60,000 for peace and ransom for the POWs, but not the customary annual tribute.

With the Navy supreme at sea and an "American" ground force in place, the Bashaw had been compelled to seek peace. The "army" was no substitute for a trained and well equipped ground force, however, and could only achieve a partial victory. While American casualties were low, the war had dragged on for years because America did not send a force capable of landing and smashing the foe. The partial victory was also a reminder that mission creep can be avoided. Barron kept his objectives in mind and did not try to achieve a greater victory when he lacked the tools to do so. Finally, the maintenance of warships in the Mediterranean after the treaty was signed shows that victory must be maintained, especially in a limited war that leaves your enemy intact.

Despite the changes over the last 200 years, the Tripolitan War shows us the difficulty of relying on a Navy/Marine Corps team to fight war in the littorals. However good that team is, it can never replace a large well trained United States Army capable of capitalizing on the initial gains of the Navy and Marines to cement a decisive victory.

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